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Abstract 
The discipline of language policy and planning (LPP) is often proposed as a viable 
tool for language revitalisation. However, the conventional paradigm upon which 
LPP is based is inadequate for such an inherently political, contentious and 
problematic area of social policy, and does not address the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourse that is at the very core of language revitalisation efforts. It is 
therefore argued here that LPP needs to be explicitly underpinned by critical 
discourse theory (CDT) if it is to be of genuine use to those involved in language 
revitalisation efforts, particularly to grass roots language activists. Following an 
introductory chapter which provides a background to the research and a rationale 
for it (Chapter 1), there is a critical review of selected literature on LPP and CDT, 
a review which ends by proposing a list of criteria which, it is argued, can be used 
to determine the extent to which discourse that is intended to be counter-hegemonic 
adheres to the principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse as outlined in 
the literature on CDT (Chapter 2). In the following three chapters (Chapters 3, 4 & 
5), these criteria are applied to the analysis of three recent reports that have a direct 
bearing on indigenous language revitalisation in Australia (Our Land Our 
Languages) and New Zealand (Ko Aotearoa Tēnei and Te Reo Mauriora). The first 
of these reports is found to adhere very closely to the criteria; the second less so; 
the third almost not at all. The different ways in which each of these reports has 
been received would tend to support the hypothesis that, other things being equal, 
the more closely a text of this type conforms to the criteria - that is, the more closely 
it is aligned to the fundamental principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse 
as outlined in CDT - the more likely it is to be positively received and, therefore, to 
represent an effective challenge to the existing hegemony. The overall conclusion 
is that CDT can not only assist language activists by providing a basis for 
determining how successful counter-hegemonic discourse is likely to be in 
achieving its aims but has the potential to provide LPP with a secure theoretical 
foundation (Chapter 6). 
Keywords: 
te reo Māori, language revitalisation, indigenous language revitalisation, language 
policy and planning, critical discourse theory, counter-hegemonic discourse  
-ii- 
He tuku 
E tukuna atu nei ēnei tuhinga ki a Ngāti Pūehutore, ki a Ngāti Takihiku, ki a Ngāti 
Whakatere, ki te iwi whānui hoki o Raukawa, otirā, ki te hunga katoa puta noa i 
Aotearoa nāna i whakapau kaha ki te pupuru i tēnei reo rangatira. 
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He kupu whakawhetai 
I te tīmatanga te Kupu 
i te Atua te Kupu 
ko te Atua anō te Kupu 
I te Atua anō tēnei Kupu i te tīmatanga. 
Nāna ngā mea katoa i hanga 
 
Kia tau iho ngā manaakitanga a te Runga Rawa ki runga ki a kīngi Tūheitia me tana 
whānau anō hoki.  
E te hunga mate, moe mai rā i te moengaroa tē whakaarahia, i te urunga tē taka. 
Pupū ake ana te aroha mō koutou nāna ahau i tautoko ki te whakatutuki i te kaupapa 
nei. Tuatahi, kei taku kaiarahi matua, kei a te Amorangi Winifred Crombie, tēnā 
koe mō āu kupu whakamānawa mai me tāu whakamārama i te huarahi e tika ana 
kia taea te tihi o te maunga teitei nei. E mihi ana hoki ki a Tākuta Hemi Whaanga 
mō tō mātauranga ki ngā tini āhuatanga o te tuhi me te whakaputa i ngā tuhinga 
pēnei nei me ngā wā i whakawātea i a koe anō ki te āwhina i ahau. 
 
Ka rere hoki aku mihi ki te Whare Wānanga o Waikato mō te homai i tētehi Waikato 
Doctoral Scholarship hei āwhina i ahau ki te whakaoti i tēnei mahi. Pikitū ake nei 
hoki te mihi ki ngā kaimahi o te Tari Karahipi, otirā ki a Gwenda Pennington mō te 
pai o tāna mahi whakahaere me tōna kaha ngākaunui ki ngā ākonga. I 
whakawhiwhia anō hoki ahau ki ētehi pūtea tautoko a te Pua Wānanga o te Ao. Nō 
reira, e te Pua Wānanga, me āna kaiako, me āna kaimahi, tēnā rā koutou katoa nāu 
ahau i āta poipoi mai o te tīmatanga o taku tohu paetahi i te tau 2001, ā, tae noa ki 
tēnei wā. 
 
Ki aku hoa mahi, ki a Jillian Tīpene koutou ko Murray Peters, ko Joeliee Seed-
Pihama, otirā ki a Tubby Barrett kōrua Riri Te Whara Ellis he nui ngā hua i riro i 
ahau i ā tātou wānangananga, i ngā whakawhitiwhiti kōrero anō hoki. Mā te Atua 
koutou e manaaki. 
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Ka huri ake au ki taku tau whakaruruhau e tū kaha tonu nei ahakoa ngā āhuatanga 
i pākia mai i roto i ngā tau i mahue ake nei. E Wini, i te otinga o taku tohu paerua, 
i pēnei taku kupu whakamihi ki a koe: nōku te waimārie ko koe tōku hoa. Nāu te 
pīkaunga taumaha i kawe kia wātea ai au ki te whakaoti i tēnei tuhinga. Kei te tika 
tonu ēnei kupu mōu. Nō reira, kei te nui tonu te aroha. He taonga koe nā Ihowa. 
 
Ki aku tamariki e arohatia nuitia nei, ki a Koha a te Atua, koutou ko Te 
Tuhikiterangi, ko Pirikiteariki, nei aku wawata mō koutou: kia piri koutou ki te 
Ariki, ki āna tikanga, me tōna aroha hoki. 
 
Ngā whakamoemiti, ngā whakawhetai e Ihowa 
Mō āu manaakitanga ki te iwi e tau nei 
Ko koe te piringa, ka puta ki te oranga 
E te Ariki  
Paimārire 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the research 
1.1 General Introduction 
The Māori language is a critical aspect of the identity of New Zealand. 1  In 
particular, it is a critical aspect of the identity of Māori in this country. Benton 
(1998, June/July, p.31) has referred to it as “our only unbroken link with the 
country’s human history”, adding that “[w]ithout it, we’re just bleached driftwood 
abandoned on the shore”. However, it is now, after approximately 200 years of 
colonisation, at its lowest ebb. In spite of a number of world renowned revitalisation 
initiatives, achieving the critical mass of speakers needed for widespread 
intergenerational transmission is a distant hope. The language has almost no public 
presence outside of the education and broadcasting sectors, the proportion of both 
adult and child speakers continues to decline and English is so pervasive that it is 
likely that all of the remaining Māori speakers are also proficient in English (Bell, 
2010, p.5; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, pp.168-169; 2011d, pp.1-2). Indeed, Matamua 
(New Zealand Press Association, 2010, September 10) rejects as a misconception 
the belief that “te reo Maori is experiencing a resurgence”, predicting instead that 
it “could die out by 2050”. 2  Clearly, notwithstanding efforts to revitalise the 
language, we are still at a crisis point. 
                                                 
1 The first time that a Māori term is used it will be italicised and an explanatory note provided. The 
Māori term for New Zealand is Aotearoa and can be used alongside or instead of the English term. 
Although the author has used New Zealand this thesis, Aotearoa is often used in excerpts from the 
documents that are analysed as well as in a number of cited sources. Similarly, although the author 
uses the term Māori language, the Māori terms, such as te reo Māori, te reo Maori, or ‘te reo’ are 
often used in the documents and cited sources (see footnote 2 for example). 
2 This is supported by the Waitangi Tribunal (2011a, p.169) which stated that “the notion that te reo 
is making forward progress is manifestly false.” Matamua (Massey University, 2007, August 24) 
was also reported as stating that “if we don’t use the language as a natural part of everyday life we 
are going to go past the tipping point in the next 10 or 20 years. That is, we will reach a point where 
there is not a critical mass [of Māori language speakers] and it is just going to die away.” 
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1.2 The Māori language in New Zealand since colonisation: A brief 
historical overview 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide a brief overview of the fate of the Māori 
language from the beginning of European colonisation until the time when 
revitalisation efforts began. Readers who seek further information are advised to 
consult the following works (among others): Bell, 1991, 2010; Benton, 1981, 1987; 
1991; de Bres, 2008a; Chrisp, 2005; Christiansen, 2001; Grin and Vaillancourt, 
1998; Hohepa, 1999; Ka'ai, 2004; Ka’ai-Mahuta, 2011; Matamua, 2006; Nock, 
2010; Ormsby-Teki, Timutimu, Palmer, Ellis, & Johnston, 2011; Parliamentary 
Library, 2009; Powick, 2002; Reedy, 2000; Smith, 1989; Spolsky, 2003, 2005; 
Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, 2010, 2011a, 2011c; and Winitana, 2011.3 
1.2.2 First contact 
Europeans arriving in New Zealand between 1790 and 1840 were faced with an 
autonomous race numbering between 100,000 and 150,000 people, affiliated to one 
or more of over forty tribes situated throughout the land (Belich, 1986, p.300; 
Crosby, 1999, p.17). These people had a complex culture with well-established 
social institutions, such as the whare wānanga through which philosophy, beliefs, 
traditions, and knowledge were transmitted (Nock, 2010, p.185). Their skill and 
thirst for warfare caused a more circumspect approach to colonisation than was 
evident in Australia.4 
 
Prior to 1850, virtually all social and economic communication between Māori and 
Pākehā was through the Māori language (Spolsky, 2003, pp.555-556). 5 
Representatives of the Crown were Māori speaking (Waitangi Tribunal 2011c, 
                                                 
3 Government agencies including The Ministry of Māori Development (Te Puni Kōkiri), The Māori 
Language Commission (Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori), Ministry of Culture and Heritage, and The 
Ministry of Education have also produced a number of reports and information concerning Māori 
language decline and revitalisation. 
4 Belich (1986, p.305) states that, “with all due respect to British humanitarianism, one reason the 
New Zealand settlers did not treat the Maoris as their Australian counterparts did the Aborigines 
was that, when they tried, they got killed.” 
5 Pākehā is the Māori name for New Zealanders of British/European ancestry, specifically a person 
of fair skin. Although the term is not generally applied to darker-skinned New Zealanders, such as, 
for example, people who have immigrated from Asia or Polynesia, it is sometimes applied more 
widely to non-Māori society or government in order to identity the non-Māori Other. 
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p.451). The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Treaty’) was 
translated into, and discussed in Māori.6 Furthermore, driven by Māori-medium 
mission schools and by grammars, biblical translations and dictionaries published 
by missionaries, Māori were, by 1850, proportionately more literate than settlers 
(Benton, 1987, p.64; Ka’ai-Mahuta, 2011, p.200; Nock, 2010, p.186). Such was the 
dominance of the Māori language that the possibility of the language becoming 
extinct would have been inconceivable. As Christiansen (2001, p.13) observes: 
 
Initially there was no reason to think that a new language spoken by a 
relatively small number of explorers, traders, and settlers from Europe could 
pose any threat to the continued viability of the dialects of the Māori 
language that were the medium of communication, ceremony, trade and 
commerce, matters spiritual and political used in the valleys and districts of 
Māori settlement throughout Aotearoa. Indeed, the early European settlers 
and missionaries were quick to learn the language and to use it in their 
encounters with Māori. 
 
Nevertheless, the unthinkable did occur. A mere 130 years after the signing of the 
Treaty the Māori language was in dire straits. The percentage of Māori children 
who spoke the language had plummeted from 90% in 1913, to 26% in 1953. By the 
1970s, it was a mere 5% (including no more than 100 pre-school children) (Benton, 
1981, 1991; Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, para.3.3.2; 2010, p.7). Most of the remaining 
approximately 64,000 fluent speakers were elderly. Māori had been displaced by 
English in most aspects of everyday family life and its role in the upbringing of 
children had become almost non-existent. It was clear that “if nature were left to 
take its course, Māori would be a language without native speakers with the passing 
of the present generation[s] of Māori speaking parents” (Benton, 1991, p.12). As 
Matamua (2006, p.71) has maintained, “[t]he complete eradication of the Māori 
                                                 
6 The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and over 500 
Māori chiefs from throughout New Zealand. It established a British Governor of New Zealand, 
recognised Māori ownership of their lands and other properties, and gave the Māori the rights of 
British subjects. The Māori version of the Treaty, which retains Māori autonomy over their own 
affairs, was by far the most signed, however the English version, which gives Britain sovereignty of 
New Zealand was preferred by the Crown. Despite the lack of consensus over its meaning it is 
generally accepted that the Treaty is the founding document of New Zealand as a nation. 
-4- 
language had nearly come to pass”. It was at this point that a concerted effort 
towards revitalisation began. 
1.2.3 Colonisation and control 
The rapid decline of the Māori language can only be fully understood in the context 
of the colonisers’ aim to achieve hegemony and assimilation. Three primary 
elements were critical to the paradigm of settlement colonisation: economic 
necessity, familiarity, and a sense of superiority. 7 First, as with colonisation in 
general, settlement colonisation was primarily driven by an economic imperative: 
the desire not only to achieve a basic standard of living in the new country but, 
ultimately, a better standard than many settlers had in their European homelands. 
Second, colonisers aimed to re-create (to the extent possible) the way of life with 
which they were familiar. The third element was an internalised assumption, 
influenced partly by social Darwinism and the colonisers’ more advanced 
technology, of innate superiority and the concomitant inferiority of Māori language 
and culture (see for example, Belich, 1986, pp.299-300; Salmon, 1991, pp.95-97, 
113,116, 308, 352 & 427-9). This ideology of racial hierarchy produced widespread 
negative attitudes toward Māori and the Māori language. Many believed that the 
demise (or assimilation) of the Māori population and the decline of the language 
would be the inevitable result of natural selection (Belich, 1986, pp.299-301 & 323; 
Durie, 1998, p.31; Ka’ai-Mahuta, 2011, pp.204-205). 8  This combination of 
elements is significant: not only did it underpin the gradual dispossession of Māori 
land and the increasing control over their lives and minds, it also justified it. 
 
                                                 
7 Mufwene (2002) has observed that language loss has been the most catastrophic in settlement 
colonies, such as New Zealand and Australia, rather than trade or exploitation colonies. This is 
because coloniser intentions in the latter two kinds of colonisation do not extend to cultural and 
linguistic domination, that is, they do not extend to what McGrath (1995, p.xxix) describes as “the 
establishment and maintenance of hegemony . . . over land, bodies and minds”. 
8 This perspective is most commonly linked to comments by Dr Isaac Featherston, Superintendent 
of Wellington Province in 1846, that, “A barbarous and coloured race must inevitably die out by 
mere contact with the civilized white; our business, therefore, and all we can do is to smooth the 
pillow of the dying Maori race” (Owens, 1972, p.419). A similar sentiment, again from the late 19th 
century, is cited by Durie (1998, pp.31-32), as "Just as the Norwegian rat has displaced the Māori 
rat, as introduced plants have displaced native plants, so the white man will replace the Māori”. The 
notion of the inevitable extinction of Pacific islanders as a result of contact with Europeans was 
widely held over a long period of time with Howe (1977, p.140) suggesting that it “long predated 
evolutionary theories of Darwin and others in the second half of the nineteenth century.” 
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The critical precursor to language decline is the establishment of economic and 
political control. Thus, as Spolsky (2003, p.554) observes, “[t]he question of 
success or failure of Māori language policy in New Zealand . . . cannot be restricted 
to linguistic issues alone”. Because colonising interests created an environment in 
which the Government and other institutions could directly affect the vitality of the 
Māori language, “non-linguistic factors were critical” (Spolsky, 2003, p.559). 
These factors include: 
 
 the assumption by Pākehā of control over government (following the Treaty 
of Waitangi); 
 an exponential increase in settler numbers and a serious reduction of the 
Māori population (as a result, largely, of warfare and European diseases); 
 large-scale alienation from, and confiscation of, land (which undermined 
the ability of Māori to compete economically);  
 use of British military forces to overcome Māori resistance (and increase 
Pākehā control); 
 privileged access for Pākehā to public discourse (including English 
language popular media such as newspapers, and more recently, television, 
radio and the Internet). 
The Treaty of Waitangi was interpreted by Pākehā as giving them the right to 
govern the country as a whole, an interpretation that was eventually extended 
to include the formation of policies and the introduction of laws that privileged 
‘white’ institutions and pushed Māori and the Māori language into the 
background (Smith, 1989, pp.3-5; Weatherley, 2009, pp.1-2).9 As Matamua 
(2006, pp.67-68) observes, “the true enemy of the [Māori] language was the 
new institutionalism”, that is, the English language institutional infrastructure 
(including parliaments, schools, courts, laws, statutes, bills and religious 
institutions) which was imposed on the Māori world. English became the 
normal language in the public arena. Institutions and activities that supported 
                                                 
9 Cheyne, O’Brian and Belgrave (2008, p.21) state that “Once Pākehā society became dominant, for 
all legal purposes the Crown controlled the meaning of the Treaty. The Crown was even able to 
determine when the Treaty would be acknowledged and when it could be safely be ignored”. Given 
that power-relations in New Zealand remain essentially unchanged in 150 years, the political 
struggle for cultural and social equity is highly salient to Māori language revitalisation. 
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the Māori language were increasingly forced “behind closed doors” (Smith, 
1989, p.4). As Smith (p.4) notes: 
 
Highly visible Māori political or economic structures were either 
systematically destroyed or forced outside the mainstream public arena . . . 
. The definition of public practice became synonymous with dominant 
Pākehā structures and relations; conversely, private practice became 
associated with subordinate Maori structures and relations. 
 
Accompanying the increasing control by Pākehā of institutional structures was an 
exponential increase in settler numbers and a serious reduction in the Māori 
population due, in large measure, to a combination of warfare and European 
diseases. Between 1840 and 1871, settler numbers went from 2,000 to 256,393, 
while the 45,470 Māori had become a minority in their own country (Christiansen, 
2001, pp.15-16). 10  Furthermore, as Māori did not see themselves as a single, 
monolithic nation but as independent tribal groups, their capacity to operate as a 
bloc was reduced.11 This change in the population structure also impacted on the 
Māori language. As Christiansen (2001, p.16) observes: “There was now little 
motivation for European immigrants to learn Māori, as their survival no longer 
depended on their ability to communicate with Māori people”. Furthermore, the 
lack of density of Māori populations outside of Auckland, Waikato and the Bay of 
Plenty meant that language maintenance was very difficult (Spolsky, 2003, p.559). 
 
Added to the change in the respective populations and the increasing Pākehā control 
of institutional structures was extensive alienation from, and confiscation of Māori 
land, something that was reinforced by the use of British military to overcome 
Māori resistance. During the 1860s, approximately 18,000 British troops were 
engaged in military operations against opposition forces that numbered no more 
                                                 
10 Mason Durie (1998, p.31) also notes that Fenton’s 1857-58 “headcount” estimated the Māori 
population at 56, 049 while the 1896 count recorded an all time low of 42, 113. 
11 The Māori king movement is the best known attempt to create a unified bloc that transcends tribal 
loyalties. However it was never universally accepted amongst Māori, with some tribes even fighting 
on behalf of the Government. 
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than 4,000 at any one time (Belich, 1986, p.132; Spolsky, 2003, p.55).12 Taken 
together, these things seriously undermined the ability of Māori to compete in the 
economy. The socio-economic disadvantage that ensued inevitably lowered the 
perceived status of the Māori-speaking community which, in turn, impacted in a 
negative way on the perceived value of the Māori language (Benton 1991, p.15).13 
 
Also impacting on the perceived value of the Māori language was Pākehā control 
over privileged access to public discourse (including English language popular 
media), such as newspapers and, more recently, television, radio and the Internet, 
something that was challenged only by a vibrant Māori newspaper sector that 
existed until the 1930s and, occasionally, by activists such as those involved in the 
newspaper campaign against the Taranaki war which arguably led to the recall of 
governor Gore Browne (Lethbridge, 1993, pp.188-200; Storey, n.d., p.11).14 
 
Māori were not merely passive victims in the face of increasing Pākehā control. 
They were eager to acquire Pākehā knowledge and Western technology 
(Christiansen, 2001, p.18; Ka’ai-Mahuta, 2011, p.204). Even after the wars between 
Māori and Pākehā (1860 – 1872), wherever Māori were able to resist land sales, 
they were also able to retain a measure of autonomy, particularly in isolated rural 
communities. Where resistance was untenable, they often collaborated (Belich, 
1986, pp.303-304). Spolsky (2003, p.555) conceptualises the colonisation process 
as one that involved “the continued effort of two groups of people sharing common 
space, each taking an active role in negotiating the way in which that sharing should 
be instantiated as regards language choice”. Thus, throughout the early part of the 
19th century, many Māori leaders encouraged the learning of English (Matamua, 
2006, p.70). For example, Sir Apirana Ngata is cited by Harrison (2002, p.49) as 
having argued that the priorities for Māori education should be “English, English, 
                                                 
12 Belich (1986, p.132) states that “for the first two months of the war they were only outnumbered 
four to one. After this, the disparity mounted until it reached ten to one . . . . The most fundamental 
feature of the Waikato war was the vast British superiority in numbers.” 
13 See also Chrystal (2000, p.133) who states that “an endangered language will progress if its 
speakers increase their legitimate power in the eyes of the dominant community.” Clearly, the 
inverse is also true, as seen in the case of the Māori language. 
14 Anglican humanitarians, such as Archdeacon Octavius Hadfield, Bishop George Selwyn and 
William Martin, wrote letters and published pamphlets in Great Britain against the Taranaki war in 
an apparently successful bid to convince the Colonial Office and Parliament to stop Browne and his 
strident Māori policy. 
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English”.15 This did not, however, indicate that he was advocating the rejection of 
Māori culture and language but rather encouraging the attainment of the benefits of 
the Pākehā world only accessible through English in addition to the treasures of the 
Māori world only accessible through the Māori language, as seen in the following 
words of encouragement, penned by Ngata in 1949 to a young girl: 16 
 
E tipu e rea mō ngā rā o tō ao. 
Grow tender shoot for the days of your world 
Ko tō ringaringa ki ngā rākau a te Pākehā hei oranga mo tō tinana. 
Turn your hands to the tools of the Pākehā for the well-being of your body 
Ko tō ngākau ki ngā taonga o ō tīpuna Māori hei tikitiki mō tō māhunga. 
Turn your heart to the treasures of your ancestors as a crown for your head 
Ko tō wairua ki tō Atua, nāna nei ngā mea katoa 
Give your soul to God, the author of all things. 
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the ideal of two cultures living peacefully side by 
side envisaged by some Treaty signatories or as popularised by early historical 
narratives depicting colonial New Zealand, the reality was that Māori were almost 
always required to adapt to Pākehā, any accommodation by Pākehā being 
essentially ‘tokenistic’ (Christiansen, 2001, p.20) or representing a kind of ‘false 
generosity’ (Freire, 1984, pp.532-533). 17  Although Spolsky (2003, p.571) has 
described the process of negotiation between Māori and non-Māori as ‘often 
painful’, it is clear that the pain has never been shared equally by both partners. 
1.2.4 Major causes of language loss 
The colonists’ vision of New Zealand could be realised only if they gained overall 
control of everything, language included. To do so, they needed to place the English 
language at the centre of public society. This involved: 
 
                                                 
15 Sir Apirana Tūrapa Ngata (1874-1950) was arguably the foremost Māori politician ever to have 
served in Parliament. He is also known for his promotion of Māori culture and language. 
16 Words and translation obtained from Houia-Roberts (2003, p.4). 
17 Freire (1984, p.533) stated that “in order to have the continued opportunity to express their 
‘generosity’, the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the 
permanent fount of this ‘generosity, which is nourished by death, despair and poverty. This is why 
dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its cause.” 
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 immersing Māori children in English; 
 removing Māori language from the public sphere; 
 fracturing the institutions which supported the Māori language; 
 supporting and reinforcing negative beliefs about, and attitudes towards the 
Māori language. 
1.2.4.1 Education: The immersion of Māori children in English 
The most powerful mechanism for assimilating minority children into mainstream 
cultures is schools (Houia-Roberts, 2003, p.5) and in the case of New Zealand, there 
was a “systematic attempt to engineer a linguistic and cultural shift to English” 
(Benton, 1996, p.66). In Spolsky’s (2003, p.556) words: “Gaining control of the 
new technique (literacy) came with a high price”. The initial success of Māori 
language mission schools was cut short in 1847 when subsidies were paid only to 
mission schools that taught through the medium of English. Further Government 
involvement in schooling, such as, in particular, The Native Schools Acts of 1858 
and 1867, The Native Schools Code in 1880 and its revision in 1897, first reduced 
the role of the Māori language to a mere “bridge to their later acquisition of English” 
(Ormsby-teki et al., 2011) and then required that English be the sole medium of 
education (Benton, 1996, p.64; Kā’ai-Mahuta, 2011, pp.204-205; Smith, 1989, 
pp.4-5). By the turn of the century, “Māori was banished altogether from the 
classroom” (Benton, 1991, p.23). 
 
Although some Māori leaders were concerned about the potential impact of 
English-medium instruction on the Māori language, many believed that that impact 
would be minimal in view of the fact that only a limited amount of time was spent 
at school and, at that time, the language was still strong in Māori homes and Māori 
children could switch with relative ease between Māori and English (Ormsby-Teki 
et al., 2011). Unfortunately, exposure to English, combined with the fact that 
children were punished for speaking the Māori language at school, had a powerful 
impact. Many children who grew up speaking Māori to their parents would not use 
the language when interacting with their own children for fear that they would be 
punished if they used the language at school (Benton, 1991, p.18; Edwards, 1990, 
pp.28-32). 
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1.2.4.2 Removal of Māori language from the public sphere 
By the 1890s, virtually all high value functions (including schooling, legal and 
commercial transactions and government) were conducted through the medium of 
English (Parliamentary Library, 2000, p.1; Smith, 1989, p.5). Although this was, in 
part, a natural consequence of Pākehā control of these domains, policy and 
legislation also played a part. 
 
With the exception of the vibrant Māori language newspaper sector, which 
communicated with Māori communities between the 1840s and 1930s, there were 
practically no public domains in which Māori was used for daily communication in 
those geographical areas dominated by Pākehā. Nevertheless, Māori language was 
still strong in those rural settlements where the majority of Māori lived (Nock, 2010, 
p.187). In these isolated settlements, the Māori language was more than just the 
language of home life and cultural and religious activities around marae. It was also 
used by whānau groups when engaging in agriculture-related employment activities 
(Benton, 1996, p.66; Te Puni Kōkiri, 2004, p.13).18 Thus, in spite of the increasing 
encroachment of English, there was a brief period between 1890 and 1940 during 
which English and Māori had complementary, albeit unequal functions (Benton, 
1991, pp.14-15). The vast majority of Māori were native speakers, and used the 
Māori language extensively in community settings, leading Te Puni Kōkiri (2004, 
p.14) to suggest that during this period the Māori language was “relatively secure”. 
This would not last. The high incidence of bilingualism among the younger 
generations, combined with the loss of young Māori leaders in World War II and 
the massive social and economic changes following the war, contributed to a steep 
decline in the use of the Māori language. 
1.2.4.3 Fracturing the social institutions which supported the Māori language 
In 1945, 80% of Māori lived within their rural tribal boundaries. However, on-going 
loss of land, the difficulty of finding work in rural areas (and, sometimes, the dream 
of a better life in the towns) meant that, by 1966, 62% of Māori lived in urban areas 
(Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999, p.6). By 1996, only 14% of Māori remained in their 
traditional rural areas. 
                                                 
18 Whānau is a close knit extended family structure. 
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This rural exodus fractured the cohesive whānau units which had been a bastion of 
the self-generation of the language (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999, p.6; 2004, pp.14-15). 
This social dislocation was compounded by integrative policies, such as pepper 
potting 19 (which reduced opportunities for everyday conversations in Māori) and 
English-medium education which, taken together, meant that, outside of contexts 
such as the marae 20or, sometimes, the church, there were no social institutions that 
supported the transmission of the Māori language to children (Benton, 1991, p.9; 
Christiansen, 2001, p.18; Smith, 1989, p.5). As has been noted by Te Puni Kōkiri 
(2004, p.14): 
 
The linguistic result of the urban migration, and policies of state agencies, 
was that the Māori language was not used in the majority of urban domains 
despite the fact that, in the first decade of urban migration, virtually all 
Māori adults and many Māori children could speak Māori. 
 
In contrast, the dominance of English in urban domains, especially in workplaces, 
and the influence of negative attitudes towards the Māori language, resulted in 
many Māori families making a conscious decision that it would be better to use 
English rather than Māori as the primary means of communication with their 
children (Benton, 1987, p.66; Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori, 
2003, p.11). Even so, as Benton (1998, June/July, p.31) observes, there was no 
evidence of any great leap forward in the school work of children as a result. 
 
Other significant factors in the increasing use of English in households include the 
rise in the number of mixed marriages as well as the introduction of English 
                                                 
19 ‘Pepper-potting’ is the intentional intermingling, within a single area, of different classes of 
houses or social groups. The New Zealand pepper-potting policy dispersed Māori families among 
European dominated areas to prevent residential concentrations of Māori. This was in line with 
Hunn’s (1961, p.14) recommendation that Māori urbanisation be actively nurtured as “the quickest 
and surest way of ‘integrating’ the two species of New Zealander. Hunn (1961, p.14) hoped to 
prevent a “colour problem from arising . . . as the Māori population expands” noting that “people 
understand and appreciate one another better and mutually adjust themselves easier if living as 
neighbours than if living apart in separate communities.” 
20 Although the term marae technically refers to the open space in front of a meeting house, it can 
also refer to the whole complex, including the buildings and grounds. It is generally expected that 
oratory in formal ceremonies at the marae will be conducted in the Māori language. As such it is 
often considered as the last bastion of the Māori language. 
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television into family homes in the 1960s. For the first time ever, the 
intergenerational transmission of the language had been deeply ruptured and almost 
all Māori children were being raised primarily as speakers of English (Te Puni 
Kōkiri, 2004, p.15). The result was disastrous for the Māori language. An entire 
generation of children had no or little knowledge of their own language, a 
generation which would become, in the ensuing decades, a monolingual English 
“fifth column” to their Māori speaking relatives, thus completing “the anglization 
of the New Zealand countryside” (Benton, 1991, p.22). 21 As Hunn (1961, p.15) 
correctly noted in his much criticised report, “every Maori who can no longer speak 
the language, perform the haka or poi,22 or take his place on the marae, makes it 
just so much harder for these remnants of Maori culture to be perpetuated”. 
1.2.4.4 Negative attitudes and ideologies 
There was a widespread belief that the English language and the culture associated 
with it were superior to Māori language and culture. This belief was accompanied 
by the conviction that English was the key to future employment and success and 
that bilingualism impeded children’s development. These beliefs had a marked 
effect on Māori perceptions of their own language, something that was reinforced 
by English language popular media (Christiansen, 2001, p.18). Benton (1987, p.66) 
asserts that television had a powerful influence on children, explaining that it 
reinforced “the implicit message of the school that English was the only language 
of any importance in the wider world.” 23 
 
Unfortunately, the promised “better future” that would result from ‘Pākehā 
knowledge’ was not equitably enjoyed by Māori people (Christiansen, 2001, p.18). 
                                                 
21 In his landmark representation of the Māori language crisis, Benton (1991, p.16) noted three 
transition points of decline that were experienced (at different times) by every part of the country, 
(1) Māori ceasing to be the first language understood by children; (2) Children unlikely to acquire 
fluency in Māori; (3) Children more likely to be monolingual English speakers. 
22 Haka and poi are types of cultural dances that are closely associated with the Māori language. 
23 The emergence of bilingualism among minority language speakers is not only considered a step 
toward language death in a practical sense but it also is reflective of a transition in the attitudes 
toward both languages (Lewis, 2007, pp.8-9). For example, Te Puni Kōkiri (2004, pp.13-15) links 
the “pronounced ambivalence towards the Māori language” among Māori society around the 1900s-
1940s (the period of the emergence of the first bilingual generations) to the speed with which Māori 
urban migrants in the 1950s discarded Māori names for their children in favour of English ones. In 
the face of “massive uncontrolled exposure to English in environments where the Māori community 
was no longer able to determine the linguistic norms” the earlier ambivalence led to a giving way of 
the desire to retain their language (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2004, p.15). 
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What emerged in the 1950s, and was apparent by the 1970s, was a ‘Māori under-
class’, which, together with its concomitant social problems, further reinforced the 
low estimates and negative stereotypes of Māori and their language held by the 
wider population (Nock, 2010, p.187). 24  In addition, many Māori, especially 
younger Māori, were embarrassed about using their Māori language skills in public. 
Taken together, these attitudes and behaviours led ultimately to a situation in the 
1970s which Christiansen (2001, pp.18-19) has described as follows: 
 
Māori remained physically identifiable as Māori but a large majority had 
lost understandings of cultural beliefs and practices, had become removed 
from living arrangements which allowed extended families to operate as 
economic and social units, and had lost the language which enabled 
communication with the world as Māori.25 
 
The colonist agenda of control involved placing the English language at the centre 
of society and, at the same time, removing the Māori language to its margins and 
rupturing the intergenerational transmission. As a result, in less than 175 years, the 
Māori language declined from being the only language in these islands to being a 
critically endangered minority language. 
1.3 Rationale for this research 
1.3.1 A personal perspective 
On a personal level, there have been a number of particularly influential events and 
experiences that have guided my decision to carry out the research reported here. 
One of these was my decision, at the age of twenty five, to learn the Māori language 
and the events and circumstances that surrounded that decision. Another reason was 
my marriage to a Māori woman and our decision that our children should be brought 
up to speak the Māori language and to be familiar with te ao Māori (Māori cultural 
life). Also of significance were experiences leading up to, and during the time when 
                                                 
24 Nock (2010, p.187) writes that “[s]ub-standard housing, high unemployment and poor health, 
together with the loss of family support networks, created a breeding ground for the emergence of 
social problems”. 
25 Christiansen (2001, p.19) goes on to state that this type of cultural dispossession would, in later 
years, be identified as a major cause of mental ill health for Māori. 
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I was involved with others in developing a Māori language plan for Whakamārama 
marae (Lewis, 2007), my wife’s home marae. 
 
I was born into a New Zealand Pākehā family, my ancestors being of Welsh, 
English, Scottish, and Norwegian extraction. I was brought up and educated in a 
context in which I had limited exposure to Māori people, culture or language until, 
in 1990, at the age of 20, I began work at the Taumarunui branch of the Public Trust 
Office and experienced life in a small King Country town where many of the 
inhabitants were Māori. There I learned for the first time not only that Pākehā and 
Māori often thought about and did things in very different ways, but also that the 
ways in which Pākehā thought about and did things were by no means always 
appreciated by Māori. I also began to realise that, contrary to what I had been taught 
at school, Māori language and culture were neither dead nor irrelevant. 
 
When, in 1992, my workplace was restructured and I lost my position, I decided, 
with the encouragement and support of a number of friends and acquaintances, to 
enrol for a Māori language course. Initially, I was seriously concerned about 
whether it was appropriate for me to enrol in such a course in view of the fact that 
so many Māori at that time had had no opportunity to learn the language. However, 
towards the end of my first year of study, I began to be convinced, partly as a result 
of advice I was given by a kaumātua26 that it was acceptable for me to have a place 
on a Māori language course so long as I was fully responsive to the responsibilities 
associated with my learning of the language. 
 
My awareness of these responsibilities was heightened as a result of my experiences 
at Whakamārama marae where, due to a serious lack of kaumātua to attend to the 
paepae,27 I was sometimes called on to speak, most notably, and poignantly, on 
occasions when family members of a deceased relative were unable to deliver a 
eulogy in Māori. These experiences, combined with the fact that, at the time, Te 
Awamutu (where Whakamārama marae is located) had only one kōhanga reo28 and 
                                                 
26 Kaumātua are respected tribal elders. 
27 The paepae is the bench or front row of seats generally situated in front of the meeting house, 
where the main orators of a marae sit before they deliver their speeches. 
28 Kōhanga Reo (Literally - language nest) refers to the total immersion Māori language family 
programme for young children from birth to six years of age. 
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no kura kaupapa Māori,29 convinced me of the need to work with others to develop 
a Māori language strategy for Whakamārama marae and look towards shaping the 
implementation activities.  
 
It proved very difficult, however, during the development of that strategy, to locate 
people who had expertise in the area of language policy and planning. Indeed, 
although the funder of that project, Mā Te Reo,30  stipulated that our planning 
meetings should be facilitated by an expert in that area, it was unable to identify 
anyone in the country with the appropriate expertise who could perform that role. 
By the time the strategy referred to above had been completed, there was a new 
focus within our iwi (tribe), Raukawa, on lifting the profile of the Māori language, 
particularly through language planning. I was fortunate to be invited to take up an 
iwi-level position as a member of a highly committed team whose task it was to 
undertake a range of further language-related activities. However, in spite of our 
best efforts, it proved impossible to attract sufficient government funding to retain 
key staff. It therefore seemed to me that there were important lessons that we still 
needed to learn, lessons that were likely to be of relevance to all of those who were 
committed to furthering the cause of Māori language revitalisation. It was at that 
point that I decided to conduct research in the area of language policy and planning, 
my overall aim being to determine whether some of the problems we faced could 
be resolved by exploring the approaches others involved in indigenous language 
revitalisation had adopted. 
1.3.2 A political perspective  
Language policy and planning activity relating to the revitalisation of the Māori 
language in New Zealand has, so far, been only moderately effective. In its recent 
review of over 30 years of revitalisation efforts, the Waitangi Tribunal (2010, p.x; 
2011d, pp.1-2) observed that the Māori language is at a ‘crisis point’.31 Rather than 
moving towards a critical mass of speakers and widespread intergenerational 
                                                 
29 Kura kaupapa Māori are Māori-language immersion schools (kura) which reflect Māori cultural 
values with the aim of revitalising Māori language, knowledge and culture. 
30  Mā te Reo is a Government funded programme established in 2001 to support projects, 
programmes and activities that contribute to local level Māori language regeneration. Mā te Reo is 
administered by Te Taura Whiri I te Reo Māori. 
31 The Waitangi Tribunal (Māori: Te Rōpū Whakamana i te Tiriti) will be discussed in Section 
1.3.2.1 
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transmission, things had gone backwards. The proportion of Māori who spoke the 
Māori language had continued to decline, with a significant decline in children aged 
under ten who were speakers of the language (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011d, p.2). 
There had been a large decrease in the number of children attending Māori language 
medium education, with kōhanga reo attendance having decreased from 14,514 in 
1993 to 9,288 in 2009 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011, July 2, p.2). The Waitangi 
Tribunal (2010, pp.x, 28-29) also noted that the language that is being taught is of 
a lower quality than previously, with teachers at all levels being more likely to be 
second-language learners rather than native speakers. Furthermore, the Māori 
language had - and has - almost no public presence outside of the education and 
broadcasting sectors, something reflected in Houia-Roberts’ (2003, p.18) assertion 
that even though “children may learn Māori . . . there are very few domains in which 
they can actually use it”. Indeed, the Waitangi Tribunal (2011d, p.2) accepts that 
the focus on education programmes is a strategy that is “no longer working”. 
 
Many believe that the answer may lie in co-ordinated, comprehensive, coherent and 
consistently implemented language policy and planning (see for example, Benton, 
1996; Human Rights Commission, 2008; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2003; Peddie, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2003, 2005; The Royal Society of New Zealand, 2013, March). It is 
noted in the Māori Language Strategy (Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo 
Māori, 2003, p.3) that one of the key principles required for its successful 
implementation is “greater planning and co-ordination” in order to ensure “that we 
can do the right activities in the right ways and at the right times”. Effective 
language planning is influenced by numerous factors and therefore encompasses far 
more than one or two key sectors (Cooper, 1989, p.182; Eggington, 2005, p.223; 
Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.8; Lewis, 2007, pp.11-12). To be successful, it needs to 
penetrate and “pervade the entire society” (including all national and local 
government departments, the civil service, business, industry, and educational 
institutions) (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.187). It needs to be reflected in all areas 
of public activity (from road signs to currency) (Shohamy, 2006, p.53). It needs to 
involve all languages and it needs to be accompanied by adequate resources. The 
following discussion relates to four major projects aimed at achieving this type of 
language policy and planning. They are: 
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 The Waitangi Tribunal and the legal system; 
 Grassroots revitalisation initiatives; 
 The New Zealand national language policy experience; 
 The Māori Language Strategy 2003. 
1.3.2.1 The Waitangi Tribunal and the legal system 
Following the realisation in the 1970s of the tremendous level of language decline, 
a Māori voice began to emerge as part of the wider movement calling on the 
Government to honour its Treaty promises. Indeed, the concomitant increase of 
public awareness of the Treaty, together with the establishment of the Waitangi 
Tribunal in 1975 and the subsequent integration of Treaty rights into the New 
Zealand legal system, has meant that the Treaty has arguably provided the greatest 
amount of political leverage for Māori. In this regard, it is not surprising that the 
greatest advances in government protection of the Māori language have arguably 
been due to the legal system upholding Treaty of Waitangi rights (Romaine, 2002, 
pp.205-206).  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal, which has been central to this struggle, is a permanent, 
commission of inquiry (including Māori and non-Māori members) charged with 
investigating and making recommendations on claims brought by Māori relating to 
breaches by the Crown of the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi.32 The 
Tribunal’s recommendations are generally non-binding on the Government, and 
therefore the Tribunal aims to move parties closer to a settlement by “conducting a 
robust inquiry, identifying all parties and their representatives in a public and 
transparent process that clarifies key issues, resolves points of contention where 
possible” (Waitangi Tribunal, n.d.). A critical issue is that the framework for 
settling Treaty grievances is set in a context of Pākehā dominance, which 
effectively means the Crown determines the meaning of the Treaty, when it can be 
acknowledged and when it can safely be ignored (Cheyne, O’Brian & Belgrave, 
2008, p.21).33 
                                                 
32 See Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 for a brief context to the signing in 1840 as well as the role of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. 
33 Member of Parliament Tariana Turia (2013, May 15) believes that the [Treaty] settlement process 
is both unfair and unjust, asking “where in the world does the perpetrator of the crime - in this case 
the Crown - also get to be judge and jury? When is the perpetrator ever allowed to determine whether 
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Early claims heard by the Waitangi Tribunal related to tangible taonga (treasure) 
such as ‘lands and estates, forests, fisheries’ (as stated in Article two of the English 
version of the Treaty). However in 1984, Huirangi Waikerepuru and Ngā 
Kaiwhakapūmau i te Reo Māori Incorporated Society filed a claim with the 
Tribunal arguing that the Māori language is also a taonga, that the Crown’s Treaty 
promise to protect it had not been kept and that the Māori language should, 
therefore, be given official recognition and nurtured in government at all levels, 
especially in broadcasting, education and health (Matamua, 2006, p.52). In its WAI 
11 Te Reo Māori report (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986) on this claim, the Tribunal 
accepted the claimants’ fundamental arguments and directed the Government to 
take steps to protect the language, with specific mention of broadcasting policy and 
Māori medium education. Nevertheless, the Tribunal, clearly aware of negative 
attitudes in relation to the claim, followed a pragmatic approach, rejecting the 
notion of compulsory Māori language in schools and mandatory bilingual 
documents for the Public Service and stating that “we think it more profitable to 
promote the language than to impose it” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, p.6). 
 
A direct outcome of the WAI 11 inquiry was the Maori Language Act 1987 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Māori Language Act’).34  This Act of parliament 
provided an official status for the language and established the Māori Language 
Commission (later called Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori) as a central planning 
agency. Nevertheless, other than granting the right to speak Māori in certain legal 
settings (using registered translators), the Māori Language Act left this official 
status undefined, omitting key WAI 11 Te Reo Māori recommendations, such as 
the right to use the language in dealings with public bodies, Māori/ English bilingual 
positions in the State Services and Māori language protection in broadcasting 
policy. Consequently, not only was the Māori language not given the same status 
as English but, in stating in its provisions that the use of the Māori language could 
                                                 
a crime was committed or not-how bad the crime was-and what compensation will be paid - if any? 
Who has access to millions of dollars of funding to back their side of the story-to hire the best 
lawyers to put their case? Who has limited access to legal aid and research to tell their side of the 
story? How does that equate to a fair and just process for dealing with Treaty claims?” 
34 In an act that appears to be intended to stifle public debate on the contents of the WAI 11 report, 
the Māori Language Act 1987 was presented to parliament on the same day as the report was 
released. 
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not “affect the right of any other linguistic community in New Zealand to use the 
language of that community”, the Maori Language Act 1987 clearly signalled that 
the expectation was that Māori language would be effectively limited to very few 
domains.35 In the event, Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (hereafter referred to as Te 
Taura Whiri) was not provided with adequate resources to begin to alter this 
situation.  
 
Other Māori language-related claims heard by the Waitangi tribunal include WAI 
026/150, concerning the allocation of radio frequencies, and WAI 176 concerning 
Broadcasting. These claims began as result of the lack of provision for Māori radio 
and television in the Māori Language Act 1987 however, gained momentum with 
Government’s proposal in 1989 to privatise frequency management licences and to 
transfer the assets of the public broadcasters to quasi-private sector entities (Bell, 
2010, p.7; Matamua, 2006, p.47). The claimants argued that this move would 
undermine the Crown’s ability to protect the Māori language. This matter was 
played out in a series of court cases, eventually arriving at the Privy Council which, 
although it upheld the previous decisions in favour of the Government, did find that: 
 
 the Māori language is in a serious state of decline; 
 It is an official language of New Zealand, a highly prized treasure 
(taonga) for Māori and also part of the national cultural heritage; 
 The Māori language is protected by the Treaty – the Crown has an 
obligation to protect and preserve the Māori language as part of 
taonga in return for being recognised as the legitimate Government 
of the whole nation by Māori; 
 In practice, it is inevitable that the Crown would have to bear a 
substantial proportion of the costs of any Māori language broadcast 
                                                 
35 It is arguable that, in the main, the Māori Language Act 1987 benefitted the governing élite, in the 
same way that Cooper (1989, p.81) believes the anti-sexist language campaign “drained popular 
discontent . . . into harmless channels, without changing the fundamental social, economic, and 
political arrangements that promote . . . inequality.” Purcell (2009, p.152) asserts that élite group 
concern for weaker group wellbeing does not compromise their own welfare or hold on power. 
Consequently, the ultimate aim of language activists should be to change the fundamental social 
structures from which the inequality derives. 
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(Matamua, 2006, p.55; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011c, pp.401, 442 & 
452-453).36 
 
The Government accepted this perspective and subsequently created Te Māngai 
Pāhō (also called The Māori Broadcasting Funding Agency) in 1993 to fund the 
Government’s Māori broadcasting initiatives.37 This was a significant milestone, 
with Matamua (2006, p.59) observing that “most Māori believed it was a step 
toward reclaiming some type of Māori self-determination”. It was these claims, 
together with a number of unfunded Māori initiatives, that created a momentum that 
produced a nationwide network of Māori radio stations and, permanently on air 
from 2004, a national Māori Television Service (Matamua, 2006, pp.47-50). This 
represents a crucial step forward for the prestige of the language in what Bell (2010, 
p.12) asserts is “arguably the most important public, institutional domain in 
society”. He (Bell, 2010, p.22) nevertheless warns that if a minimum level of 
mainstream and primetime television programming is not achieved, the Māori 
language “is in danger of being ghettoized on a minority channel and will not 
receive the profile which it needs in society at large to increase its prestige in the 
eyes of its speakers (Bell, 2010, p.14). 
 
One of the most significant Waitangi Tribunal claims in recent times is the WAI 
262 (Indigenous flora and fauna, cultural intellectual property) claim. This claim 
arose from concerns that mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge and ways of 
knowing) in relation to Māori taonga - including Māori language dialects - was 
being lost, as were the taonga themselves, and that the control guaranteed to Māori 
in the Treaty was being denied to them as a result of legal or policy decisions. The 
Te reo Māori chapter of the inquiry report, Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, identified the health 
of the Māori language as “approaching a crisis point” (WT, 2011, July 2, p.1) and 
was unequivocal in identifying government policies and practices as the primary 
cause. Reference was made to a lack of imagination, ambition and commitment in 
relation to the Māori language on the part of government. The report noted that 
there was little evidence of true partnership, repeated policy failures, a lack of 
                                                 
36 See New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513. 
37  The Waitangi Tribunal noted that in 2006 Te Māngai Pāhō (Originally called as Te Reo 
Whakapūaki Irirangi) spent $49.8 million on Māori broadcasting  
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commitment to the implementation of the 2003 Māori Language Strategy and 
inadequate resourcing. It also questioned why key WAI 11 recommendations had 
still not been implemented twenty five years after the 1986 report. The main 
recommendations of the inquiry report, entitled Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, include a 
strengthening of Te Taura Whiri. This report will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 
4. 
1.3.2.2 Grassroots revitalisation initiatives 
The development of Māori education initiatives such as Te Ataarangi (in 1979), 
Wānanga Māori38(1981), Te Kōhanga Reo (1982), and Kura Kaupapa Māori (1985) 
have made a significant contribution to language revitalisation (Waitangi Tribunal, 
2011a, p.155). All of these projects began as a result of grassroots energy, were 
supported (after much lobbying) by the Government and then grew dramatically in 
the 1990s (Ormsby-teki et al., 2011, p.31). By 1993, for example, there were 809 
kōhanga with 50% of all Māori in pre-school (14,000) attending. Despite the 
difficulty of gaining government approval, by 1999 there were 59 kura kaupapa and 
over 30,000 students being educated through the language (Waitangi Tribunal, 
2011a, p.155). Similarly, following a Treaty settlement relating to tertiary wānanga, 
the number of students learning the Māori language at tertiary level peaked in 2003 
at 36,000 (Ormsby-teki et al., 2011, p.32).39 Unfortunately, inadequate education 
infrastructure resulted not only in the high demand not being capitalised on, but also 
in a consistent decline in numbers. By 2009, there were 350 fewer kōhanga attended 
by 5,200 fewer children (only 25% of Māori pre-school children). In a sombre 
concluding remark, the Waitangi Tribunal (2011a, p.165) notes that “[t]here is no 
suggestion yet that the bottom of this renewed decline in the fortunes of te reo has 
been reached.” 
  
Within Māoridom, iwi (tribes) are robust and cohesive people groups made up of a 
number of hapū (sub-tribes) and marae and are, therefore, a critical locus of 
                                                 
38 Wānanga: A place of (higher) learning. In recent times the term has been applied to universities 
and other tertiary level institutions. Hence, the ‘University of Waikato’ is also known as ‘Te Whare 
Wānanga o Waikato’. 
39 Other notable milestones include the establishment of tribal wānanga, the statutory recognition of 
the Kura Kaupapa Māori guiding philosophy in 1999, as well as the launch of the Māori-medium 
Curriculum and the Māori Education Strategy in 2008 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, p.155). 
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revitalisation planning. The first such initiative, Whakatupuranga Rua Mano,40 was 
a 25 year plan which began in 1975 and involved a confederation of three tribes (Te 
Āti Awa, Ngāti Raukawa and Ngāti Toa). It emerged from research which showed 
that practically no young speakers within those tribes possessed any significant 
knowledge of the Māori language. It included marae-based wānanga that eventually 
gave rise to the tertiary institution, Te Wānanga-o-Raukawa, described by 
(Ormsby-teki et al. (2011, p.32) as one of the most significant developments in 
Māori language revitalisation. A second well known iwi language revitalisation 
initiative is Kotahi Mano Kāika 41 run by the Kai Tahu tribe, a tribe which arguably 
has the lowest number of speakers. The aim of Kotahi Mano Kāika is to have 1000 
or more Kai Tahu families speaking the Māori language in their homes as the 
normal language of communication by 2025. The project involves weekly language 
lessons and immersion camps, kapa haka, and uses IT and professionally made 
resources in their dialect. At this stage there has been little robust evaluation of the 
impact that this project has made on Kai Tahu members. However, a review by 
Mere Skerrett notes the “general agreement that still there was only a small amount 
of whānau dedicated to the kaupapa”42 (2010, p.6) and concludes that despite a 
“groundswell of excitement and activity . . . the wider commitment was just not 
evident,” with tribal leadership “paying lip service to the idea . . . or letting the 
politics of distraction get in the way” (2010, p.11). Notwithstanding the fact that 
wealth creation is a revitalisation strategy, a key criticism within a number of tribes, 
particularly those who have already received Treaty claims settlements, is that key 
decision makers are prioritising wealth creation strategies at the expense of the 
development of comprehensive language revitalisation strategies (Te Paepae 
Motuhake, 2011, p.39). Furthermore, although a number of iwi have developed iwi-
revitalisation strategies, at this stage most lack the resources to make any substantial 
impact, with Raukawa being an example here (see Section 1.3.1). 
                                                 
40 Translation: ‘Generation Two Thousand’. 
41 The full name is Kotahi Mano Kāika, Kotahi Mano Wawata (‘One thousand homes, one thousand 
hopes’). 
42 Kaupapa: initiative or project  
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1.3.2.3 Aoteareo: The national language policy experience 
Joseph Lo Bianco (1987, p.3), in the Australian National Policy on Languages, 
noted that the absence of an explicit and comprehensive policy does not mean 
significant decisions affecting language are not occurring, stating that “the primary 
purpose of Australia’s language policy was to make the choices about language 
issues in as rational, comprehensive, just and balanced a way as possible." In New 
Zealand, however, the necessary coordination is absent. National language planning 
has been side-stepped and such language planning as there is continues to take place 
in a largely ad hoc way, with legislative measures that impact on language rights 
being largely divorced from any centralised language planning activity.43 
 
Following the launch of Australia’s National Policy on Languages in 1987, the New 
Zealand (Labour) government explored the possibility of developing its own 
national language policy. In August 1990, the then Minister of Education, Phil Goff 
(cited in Peddie, 2003, p.17) announced that an amount of $100, 000 was budgeted 
for the purpose of formulating a policy, observing that: 
 
Until now, issues associated with languages in New Zealand have been dealt 
with in an ad hoc way. . . . Without common goals and a co-ordinated 
framework around which policies can be developed and programmes 
implemented, it has been difficult for the government to respond 
comprehensively to language issues. 
 
This process appeared to stall briefly during election year. However, it was 
continued by the incoming National Government. In 1992, the Minister of 
Education, Lockwood Smith, commissioned Dr. Jeffery Waite to prepare the 
groundwork for the design of a national language policy document. Waite consulted 
widely, finally recommending that bilingualism for all should be the general aim, 
with the strengthening of the Māori language at the top of a list of critical language 
                                                 
43 As indicated by the large number of Acts that affect the Māori language in some way including, 
for example, the Race Relations Act 1971, the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, the Māori 
Language Act 1987, the Broadcasting Act 1989, the Māori Television Service Act (Te Aratuku 
Whakaata Irirangi Māori) 2003, and the New Zealand Sign Language Act 2006. 
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issues in need of urgent attention (Waite, 1992, p.18). 44  However, despite 
widespread acceptance of the general direction in which Waite’s thinking was 
heading, the national languages policy project was abandoned. Peddie (2003, p.19) 
has noted that a combination of factors was responsible for the abandonment of the 
policy, including, in particular, the neo-liberal support for “weaker centralised 
direction” and hesitation related to the place of the Māori language in a national 
policy.45 The underlying problem, however, was that the political will required to 
overcome the perception of high political risk was lacking. As East, Shackleford 
and Spence (2007, p.24) have concluded, “the positive opinions expressed by 
government at that time were an effective rhetorical device for hiding the fact that 
the government was doing virtually nothing”. 
1.3.2.4 The Māori Language Strategy 2003 
Julia de Bres (2008c, p.11) links the beginnings of the Māori language strategy to 
a Māori language march to Parliament in 1994, where, “on the spot”, the then 
Minister of Māori Affairs agreed to the development of a strategy for sustainable 
revitalisation. This agreement was made good in 2003 when Te Puni Kōkiri, in 
conjunction with Te Taura Whiri and other government organisations with areas of 
responsibility for the Māori language, published the Māori Language Strategy.46 
This strategy aimed to coordinate the sector in relation to the following objectives: 
 
 To increase the number of those who know the Māori language; 
 To improve proficiency levels in Māori; 
 To increase the number of situations in which Māori can be used; 
                                                 
44  Waite (1992, p.19) also believed that the “allocation of resources should favour Maori 
revitalisation programmes that are under Maori control, set in a context of Maori values, and based 
on the direct transmission of the language from native speakers to native speaker”. 
45 Other factors listed by Peddie (2003) include the rapidly-changing demography of New Zealand, 
which made firm decisions over languages difficult; the relative lack of understanding by business 
of the advantage of international languages in trade; and economic uncertainties. Peddie (1997) also 
lists racist attitudes, the lack of a cohesive, concerted approach by language groups, as well as the 
difficulty in negotiating decentralised government policies, business and economic priorities. He 
also noted that although 20 Government departments were represented in the interdepartmental 
advisory group, there were very few of a senior level with the authority to make decisions. In any 
case, the project was most likely doomed to failure because so little consideration was given to the 
importance of gradual change accompanied by centralised educational campaigns. 
46 The development of the current Māori Language Strategy took nine years of policy work and 
research and involved the production of two documents: Toitū Te Reo (Te Taura Whiri, 1996) - a 
consultation document, and; Te Tūāoma (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999) - an initial strategy (see de Bres 
(2008c) for an in-depth discussion on the development of the Māori Language Strategy. 
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 To ensure the Māori language can be used for the full range of modern 
activities; and 
 To foster positive attitudes towards the language so that Māori-English 
bilingualism becomes a valued part of NZ society (Te Taura Whiri i Te 
Reo Māori & Te Puni Kōkiri, 2003).  
The vision was as follows: 
 
By 2028, the Māori Language will be widely spoken by Māori. In particular, 
the Māori Language will be in common use within Māori whānau homes 
and communities. All New Zealanders will appreciate the value of the Māori 
language to New Zealand society (Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori & Te 
Puni Kōkiri, 2003, p.5). 
 
Although the Māori Language Strategy (2003), has not been quite so 
comprehensively buried as, for example, Waite’s draft national language plan, the 
Waitangi Tribunal (2010, p.66) has described it in the following way,  
 
[It is] a well-meaning but essentially standard and pre-consulted Crown 
policy that does nothing to motivate Māori at the grassroots […] [It] is 
another failure of policy. It is too abstract and was constructed within the 
parameters of a bureaucratic comfort zone. It is less a Māori language 
strategy than a Crown Māori language strategy  
 
What the Tribunal (2011c, p.462) found particularly disappointing, however, was 
that the wording of the published goals was “watered down” from the more 
“specific and adventurous” aims of earlier discussion documents. Furthermore, as 
de Bres (2008c, p.19) observes, the focus of the 2003 strategy is “more firmly on 
language use in whānau and community settings”, a contrast to an earlier focus on 
“what the government could do to support Māori language within its existing 
functions”. 
 
With reference to its implementation, the Tribunal (2011c, p.463) noted that what 
we have is “a picture of lost opportunities due to poor communication and 
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coordination, unrealistic expectations, and de-prioritising within agencies”. As with 
Waite’s document, it appears that the critical underlying issue is not so much the 
lack of actual co-ordinated and cohesive planning as the lack of that genuine 
commitment to co-ordinated and cohesive planning (Hollings, 1991, pp.60-61; 
Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), 2007, pp.6, 8 & 18-19) which Dua (1991, 
pp.106 & 132) considers to be of fundamental importance. 47 As Nicholson (1987, 
p.5) has observed, commitment is essential if the nation is “truly serious about 
Māori language revival”. Without this commitment, New Zealand language policy 
and planning efforts have created “an impressive façade of progress masking a 
retrogressive reality” (Benton, 1991, p.30). 
1.3.2.5 Conclusion: The central problematic in Māori language revitalisation 
The central problematic in Māori language revitalisation (or the revitalisation of 
any language for that matter) is neither technical nor bureaucratic but rather political 
and ideological. 48  It is intrinsically related to the negative, sometimes openly 
hostile, attitudes of some (mainly English-speaking) New Zealanders towards the 
threat to English hegemony posed by any encroachment by Māori language on 
domains that are primary English-speaking (de Bres, 2008a, pp.21-22; 46-55; 2009, 
p.18; Harlow, 2005; Hollings, 1991, p.58; Lane, 2003).49 At the core of this conflict 
is competition for political and economic control as well as control over the 
instrumental and identity-making functions of language; a continuation, therefore, 
of colonialist struggles (Bunwaree, Carroll and Carroll, 2005, pp.157-158; Cooper, 
1989, p.80; Lo Bianco, 1990, p.74; Schmidt, 2006, p.98; Williams, 2000, p.2; 
                                                 
47 Commitment from both élites and non-élites is fundamental to effective LPP - see Chrystal, 2002, 
p.154 and UNESCO, 2003, pp.13-14 (commitment to language revitalisation); Dua, 1991, pp.106, 
121-122 (commitment to systematic / comprehensive evaluation, proper implementation) and 
Tollefson, 1991, p.211 (commitment to democracy). 
48 A belief that is common among monolinguals, English monolinguals in particular, is that ‘other’ 
(minority) languages either threaten the dominant language or undermine national unity. Thus, 
irrespective of whether the ‘stated’ rationale is based on equal opportunity, pedagogy, practicality 
or economics, the critical aspect is that bi/ multilingualism is constructed as a problem. See for 
example, Eggington (1997, p.44); McGroarty (1997, pp.76, 80); Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gournari 
(2003); Myers-Scotton (2006, pp.404-405); Schmidt (2006, pp.99-100) and; Shohamy (2006, pp.79-
80). 
49 For example, 71% of non-Māori did not want their children to speak Māori (de Bres, 2008a, p.47). 
This includes the approximately 12% of ‘English only’ New Zealanders who tend to forcefully 
express their belief that English should be the only language used in New Zealand public life (de 
Bres, 2008a, pp.51-53). In connection with this, it is important to note that although there may be 
tacit agreement by many non-Māori to the principle of revitalising the Māori language, there is 
considerable resistance to specific initiatives (Nicholson & Garland, 1991, p.405). 
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Wright, 2004, pp.225-227). It is thus not surprising to find that policy and planning 
discourse is often largely controlled by those in whose interests it is to preserve the 
status quo. Indeed, central to the basic neo-Marxist and post-structuralist criticisms 
identified by Fishman (1994, p.91) is the fact that classical language planning is: 
 
 is conducted by élites that are governed by self-interest; 
 reproduces rather than overcomes socio-cultural and econotechnical 
inequalities; 
 inhibits or counteracts multiculturalism; 
 supports the globalisation of western ideals, which in turn would lead to 
new forms of colonialism.50 
 
The lack of macro-level support for dominated languages is not so much a reflection 
of resistance to bilingualism per se, rather, as Cooper (1989, pp.79-87, 109 & 183-
185) and Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gournari (2003, p.9) maintain, it is a reflection 
of self interest, of the desire of the majority to retain control over the minority.51 As 
Houia-Roberts (2003, p.18) observes with reference to the Māori language, while 
the government has assumed that the future of the language should rest with the 
majority, “the majority has done little to assure its future”. At the core of this 
dilemma is the fundamental political conflict that is always present whenever 
hegemony is threatened by attempts to create, reproduce and transform social 
relations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.122-127 & 134-145; Purcell, 2009, p.151). 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, Māori cannot wait any longer for the 
Government to intervene in an effective way: they must themselves lead and direct 
Māori language revitalise efforts. This certainly does not mean, however, that 
Māori should accept sole responsibility for the revitalisation of the language and, 
in particular, it does not mean that Māori families should accept sole responsibility 
the revitalisation of the language. This would be extremely dangerous, particularly 
in the context of what Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) has referred to as a type 
of ‘market fundamentalism’ that “places pluralism under very great pressure” by 
                                                 
50 The fifth ‘criticism’ identified ethnographic research as the most appropriate methodology for 
avoiding the four issues named here. 
51 Shohamy (2006, p.167) expresses it like this, "Controlling language is a way of controlling us." 
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ensuring that “cost is what ultimately determines the distribution of resources” and 
where “the whole idea of difference has been privatised . . . pushed back into the 
family and the home”. In this context, what taking the lead means is using whatever 
strategies are necessary in order to ensure that the Government adheres to its 
democratic responsibilities and creates an environment in which the Māori 
language becomes, in actuality, a truly national language for New Zealand. 
 
In this context, it is relevant to note that Lewis (1962, February 13 - See 
http://quixoticquisling.com/testun/saunders-lewis-fate-of-the-language.html for G. 
Aled Williams’ English translation), in a BBC 52  radio lecture that arguably 
triggered the Welsh language revival, highlighted the importance of insisting that 
government institutions at all levels act responsibly in relation to issues associated 
with language diversity and language rights. The following is an extract from the 
translation of that lecture: 
 
The political tradition of the centuries and all present-day economic 
tendencies militate against the continued existence of Welsh. Nothing can 
change that except determination, will power, struggle, sacrifice and 
endeavour. May I call your attention to the story of Mr. and Mrs. Trefor 
Beasley? Mr. Beasley is a coal miner. In April l952 he and his wife bought 
a cottage in Llangennech near Llanelli, a district where nine out of every ten 
of the population are Welsh-speaking. All the councillors on the rural 
council which controls Llangennech are Welsh-speaking: so too are the 
council officials. Therefore when a note demanding the local rates arrived 
from ‘The Rural District Council of Llanelly’ Mrs. Beasley wrote to ask for 
it in Welsh. It was refused. She refused to pay the rates until she got it. She 
and Mr. Beasley were summoned more than a dozen times to appear before 
the magistrates’ court. Mr. and Mrs. Beasley insisted that the court 
proceedings should be in Welsh. Three times did the bailiffs carry off 
furniture from their home, the furniture being worth much more than the 
rates which were demanded. This went on for eight years. In 1960 Mr. and 
Mrs. Beasley received a bilingual note demanding the local rates from 
                                                 
52 British Broadcasting Corporation 
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Cyngor Dosbarth Gwledig Llanelli, the Welsh on the bill being just as good 
as its English. 
 
Lewis believed that “the example of Mr. and Mrs. Beasley shows how we should 
set about it [i.e. insisting on language rights]”. He concluded his speech by asserting 
that “nothing less than a revolution to restore the Welsh language in Wales” was 
needed, adding that success would only be possible “through revolutionary 
methods”. 
 
To date, the concept of comprehensive, cohesive and co-ordinated national 
language planning has had no real impact on successive governments in New 
Zealand even though it has had a greater impact in a number of other countries 
including Wales and Australia, both of which are faced with issues relating to 
indigenous languages. Nor have either the Maori Language Act 1987 or the Māori 
Language Strategy (2003) led to any genuine strengthening of the positioning of 
the Māori language in this country. Furthermore, in spite of the many and varied 
strategies aiming to revitalise the language that have been put in place by Māori 
themselves, the future of the Māori language remains very far from certain. In this 
context, a research project that aims to explore the issue of Māori language 
revitalisation in the context of language policy and planning seems to be overdue. 
My concern here is not only with language policy and planning. It is also with 
critical discourse theory. It was noted above that language revitalisation efforts 
inevitably involve that fundamental political conflict that results whenever 
hegemony is threatened by attempts to create, reproduce and transform social 
relations. This being the case, I believe that critical discourse theory (CDT), which 
explores issues relating to hegemony and counter-hegemony, has much to offer to 
minority language activists. Indeed, I believe that CDT should play a central role in 
language policy and planning (LPP) as an academic discipline, providing it with a 
theoretical base that it currently appears to lack. 
1.4 Introduction to the research question, research methods and thesis 
structure 
The overarching research question underpinning the research project reported here 
is: 
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With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the 
revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory 
contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the 
production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony 
and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations? 
 
The question above is addressed initially through a critical review of selected 
literature in the areas of critical discourse theory (CDT) and language policy and 
planning (LPP). That review aims, in part, to identify effectiveness criteria derived 
from critical discourse theory that can be applied in the context of language 
revitalisation activities (Chapter 2). 
 
The second stage in addressing the overarching research question outlined above is 
to apply the criteria derived from CDT to the contextualised analysis of official 
reports relating to indigenous language revitalisation. Accompanying the analysis 
of each report is an analysis of responses to it. The aim here is to determine whether 
there are any marked differences between responses to the proposals and 
recommendations made in those reports that meet the criteria (i.e. conform to the 
proposed guidelines) and those that do not. 
 
The first of the reports analysed is Our Land Our Languages: Language Learning 
in Indigenous Communities, a report produced by the Australian House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs in September 2012 (see Chapter 3). This report, which includes thirty major 
recommendations and is already being described by many commentators as being 
of major significance in relation to indigenous language revitalisation in Australia. 
 
Each of the next two reports analysed is concerned, in whole or in part, with the 
revitalisation of the Māori language in New Zealand. The first of these reports, Ko 
Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Māori Culture and Identity, was released by the Waitangi Tribunal in July 
2011 (see Chapter 4). It recommends wide-ranging reform of laws and policies 
affecting Māori culture and identity and calls for the Crown-Māori relationship to 
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move beyond grievance to a new era based on partnership. Chapter 5 of that report, 
on which the analysis centres, relates to the Māori language. The final report 
analysed is Te Reo Mauriora, a review of the Māori language sector and the Māori 
Language Strategy that was written by a panel of Māori language experts and 
released in April 2011 (see Chapter 5). These two reports, each of which is 
concerned, in part, with the Māori Language Strategy (2003), are very different in 
terms of the organisational and rhetorical approaches adopted. They have also 
elicited very different types of response, largely positive in one case, and largely 
negative in the other.   
 
The final chapter (Chapter 6) provides an overview of the research together with a 
discussion of its limitations and its potential contribution to language policy and 
planning as an academic discipline and, more specifically, to language revitalisation 
activities.  
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Chapter 2  
A critical review of selected literature on language policy and 
planning and critical discourse theory  
2.1 General Introduction 
In this chapter, a critical review of selected literature in the areas of language policy 
and planning (LPP) (2.2) and critical discourse theory (CDT) (2.3) is undertaken in 
order, in particular, to assess the importance accorded to hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourse in LPP and to determine whether CDT has anything to offer 
in this area that may have implications for language revitalisation activities. The 
chapter ends by proposing a number of criteria which, it is argued, could be used to 
determine the extent to which discourse that is intended to be counter-hegemonic 
adheres to the principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse as outlined in 
the literature on CDT (2.3.5). 
2.2 Language policy and planning (LPP) 
2.2.1 The emergence of LPP as an applied discipline 
The deliberate shaping of the nature and function of languages has been practised 
since antiquity. Currently, 78 of the 125 polities with constitutional statements 
about the status or use of their language(s), name a single official or national 
language, with 32 of these 78 cases including statements relating to the protection 
of languages, particularly where minority and indigenous languages are concerned 
(Spolsky, 2004, pp.11-13). The deliberate shaping of languages has been referred 
to in a variety of different ways, such as, for example, language engineering (Miller, 
1950), language planning (Haugen, 1961 [1972]), language management 
(Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003) and language policy (Sibayan, 1974). The most 
commonly used terms throughout recent literature are ‘language policy’ and 
‘language planning’.53  Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, 
                                                 
53 Wright (2004) refers to the discipline as “Language policy and Language planning” however 
others (such as Grin, 2003a, pp.27-28) do not always explicitly distinguish them. Although the 
predominant term used by Cooper (1989) was language planning which he called the “most popular” 
(p.29), he appears to treat “language policy-making” (p.31) as synonymous to language planning. 
See also Ricento (2000, p.23) who deliberately uses ‘language policy’ as a superordinate term which 
subsumes ‘language planning’ while Hornberger (2006, p.25) notes that some have subsumed policy 
into language planning. Shohamy (2006, pp.49-50) sees that language policy is less interventionist 
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they can be seen as a collocation that combines two distinct but complementary 
elements of a whole, the former (language policy) relating to formal or implicit 
statements, laws, initiatives, beliefs or decisions, including the authorisation of 
subsequent planning activity, the latter (language planning) to activity that shapes, 
promotes, implements and evaluates language policy in the attempt to modify or 
reinforce language behaviour.54 
 
Language policy and planning (LPP) is now recognised as a branch of applied 
linguistics. Ricento (2000, pp.10-20) has traced its development through three 
overlapping major epochs. 55  In the first phase (1960s-1970s), LPP reflected 
Eurocentric conceptions and positivist social science paradigms, focusing largely 
on the importation of ‘developed’ Western languages to former colonial states in 
Africa and South-East Asia in order to secure unity and socio-economic 
development, but with little problematisation of its methodology, assumptions or 
interests (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.757; Ricento, 2000, pp.10-13).56 By the beginning of 
the second phase (early 1970s – late 1980s), a number of scholars had identified 
some of the limitations of LPP and had begun to acknowledge the socio-political 
effects of early LPP, such as marginalising local languages and effectively 
extending colonial power relations (Bamgbose, 1978, pp.62-63; 1987, pp.7-10; 
Cobarrubias, 1983, pp.40, 53 & 70-77; Tollefson, 1991).57  During the second 
phase, increased globalisation led to increased language contact, and thus, in some 
cases, to language demise (Austin & Sallabank, 2011, pp.1-6 & 21; Grenoble, 2011, 
pp.27-35; Ricento, 2000, p.17). This phase also saw a greater tolerance of 
multilingualism, with some governments, such as those of Canada and Australia, 
beginning to see multilingualism as a potential resource rather than a threat (Wright, 
                                                 
than language planning, which, by specifying both the goal and the implementation of policies and 
laws “does not leave anything for the individual to decide” (p.49). However, Neustupný& Nekvapil 
(2003, p.187) and Spolsky (2004, pp.5-15; 2009, pp.4-5; 2012, pp.5) assert that language 
management is the most comprehensive term. 
54 See Baldauf, 2005, p.958; de Cillia & Busch, 2006, p.576; Hornberger, 2006, p.25; Kaplan & 
Baldauf, 1997, p.xi; Spolsky & Lambert, 2006, p.561. Note that Shohamy (2006, p.xvi) does not 
limit Language Policy “to formal limited or official policies but rather . . . powerful mechanisms 
that . . . impose, perpetuate and create ‘de-facto’ language policies and practices.” 
55 Jernudd and Nekvapil (2012) also provide a good survey of some landmark movements, models 
and frameworks in LPP. 
56 Haugen (1966, p.262) for example, still believed that the “inevitable conflicts and problems” 
could be solved by “intelligent, reasoned, understanding policies of language teaching”. 
57 LPP was acknowledged as not philosophically neutral, Eurocentric, and that greater attention 
needed to be paid to the ethical dimensions of language planning (Baldauf, 2005, p.958; 
Cobarrubias, 1983, pp.41, 58 & 70-77). 
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2004, p.10). In the third phase (1990s onward), post-modern and critical 
approaches became more prominent. These approaches eschewed the simplistic 
understanding of the interlinking of LPP, government and society, focusing on how 
to develop more democratic policies, reduce inequalities and protect minority 
languages (Pennycook, 1994, 2006, Said, 1993; Tollefson, 1991, 1995, 2002, 
2006). Within the context of LPP, terms such as linguistic ecology (Haugen, 1971 
[1972], 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1996), linguistic imperialism 
(Phillipson, 1992; 2006), linguistic human rights (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2006); 
minority language rights (May, 2000b, 2001, 2005, 2006), language shift or 
endangerment and language revitalisation (Fishman, 1964, 1991, 1994; 2001a, 
2001b, 2001c; Grenoble & Whaley, 1998, 2006; Hinton & Hale, 2001) began to 
emerge. 
 
As understanding of language and languages in society has broadened, the nature 
and scope of LPP has expanded. As recognition of the deeply political nature of 
language as a social organism has increased (Shohamy, 2006, pp.55-56; Tollefson, 
1991, pp.201-204) and as the concept of language ecology (and ecolinguistic 
language planning in particular) has developed (Calvet, 2006; Grenoble, 2011, 
pp.30-31; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.297; Mühlhäusler, 1996), LPP has become 
more nuanced and more ethnographic in character (Canagarajah, 2006, pp.153-
155) and as a consequence, has begun to draw from a much wider range of 
perspectives and disciplines.58 
2.2.2 Definition and scope of LPP  
LPP has been defined by Cooper (1989, pp.29-45 & 98) as “deliberate efforts to 
influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure or 
functional allocation of their language codes”. In common with many other 
                                                 
58 Perspectives and disciplines that include discourse analysis (Dorner, 2011; Lo Bianco, 2004; 
2005; McEwan-Fujita, 2011; Wodak, 2006), ethnography (Hymes, 1974; Canagarajah, 2006; 
Hornberger & Johnson, 2007; Johnson, 2009; McCarty, 2011), mathematics (Wyburn & Hayward, 
2008; Fernando, Goldstein & Valijarvi, 2010); political theory (Schmidt, 2006), public policy and 
economics (Grin, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; 2006; 2007; Hu & Alsagoff, 2010; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, 
pp.153-192), psycho-sociology (Baker, 2006) as well as sociolinguistics, ethnic relations, education, 
geography and history (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.738; Ricento, 2006a, p.x; Cartright, 2006). 
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attempts to define the discipline, this definition refers to context,59 intentions60, 
means,61 participants62 and effect63. One further definition that is worth noting is 
that of Christ (cited by de Cillia & Busch, 2006, p.577; Wodak, 2006, p.170) which, 
in addition to the five elements referred to above, includes a political dimension: 
 
[T]he sum total of all those political initiatives ‘from above’ and ‘from 
below,’ by means of which a particular language or languages are supported 
in their public currency, their functioning and their dissemination. Like all 
policies, it is subject to conflict, and must be permanently reordered through 
constant discussion and constant debate  
 
Recognised types of language planning, all necessarily inter-related, 64  include 
status planning, corpus planning, acquisition planning (or language-in-education 
planning), prestige planning, usage planning and discourse planning. 
                                                 
59 Context includes the events, history, demographics, cultural values, political regimes as well as 
the economic and sociolinguistic situation of the ecology (Cooper, 1989, pp.93-95). Cooper (1989, 
p.183) states that “[LPP] cannot be understood apart from its social context or apart from the history 
that produced that context.”  
60 Lo Bianco (2001, pp.222-225; 2008, p.167) observes that LPP goals have problems as a point of 
departure, problems that may themselves be problematic. These problems are inherently ideological 
and, while they may be articulated as linguistic, mostly correlate to political, economic or social 
ends. This means that, rather than focusing solely on language itself, the fundamental intention of 
LPP is to change behaviour through altering the social and political environment. Thus Shohamy 
(2006, p.45) refers to LPP is "the primary mechanism for organising, managing and manipulating 
language behaviours", Kaplan and Baldauf (1997, p.303) see LPP as being ultimately about “human 
resource development.” 
61 Formal means of LPP intervention may include laws, regulations, guidelines, policy statements, 
strategies, reports, and planning documents, which are then complemented by the allied allocation 
of human and material resources (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.3). In addition to these Shohamy (2006, 
pp.54-56) states that the real language policy is observed through a variety of overt and sub-surface 
mechanisms, which although they can be bottom up are more likely to be top-down (see Appendix 
1: Framework 2). 
62 Participants: It has been repeatedly observed that LPP is an activity in which people at every level 
of society should be involved (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, p.11). Nonetheless, it is those with the 
greatest ability to “access sanctions, penalties, and rewards, including financial sources” who are 
most able to turn ideology into policy (Shohamy, 2006, p.54). Cooper (1989, p.183) warns that 
although “[LPP] may be initiated at any level of a social hierarchy . . . it is unlikely to succeed unless 
it is embraced and promoted by élites or counter-élites.” 
63 Effect: Behaviour change (or “organis[ing] linguistic activity” (Bastardas-Boada, 1995, p.16) is 
the fundamental goal of LPP and any LPP that does not ultimately modify behaviour in the desired 
manner is of little use (Ager, 2005, pp.1039-1040). Accordingly, Eastman (1991, p.147) asserts that 
“state policies can have absolutely no effect on linguistic repertoires unless those state policies have, 
as their primary goal, social change.” 
64 Planning management, which relates to the strategic frameworks that undergird and co-ordinate 
LPP efforts and includes areas such as agency structure, leadership and support roles, research and 
analysis, accounting, plan delivery, monitoring and evaluation is often omitted from LPP modelling 
although it is generally included in language plans (e.g. the National Policy Framework in Iaith 
pawb (National Assembly of Wales, 2003, pp.9-19) and ACALP in the National Policy on 
Languages (Lo Bianco, 1987, pp.185-188). 
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The first of these (status planning) relates to decisions about the allocation of 
functions, roles and domains within a language ecology and includes, for example, 
the officialisation of languages (Cooper, 1989, pp.99-121; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, 
pp.29-38; Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.378-392).  
 
The second (corpus planning) aims to record, modify and adapt languages in line 
with particular language-internal goals such as standardisation and modernisation 
(Cooper, 1989, pp.122-156; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.29 & 39-49; Myers-
Scotton, 2006, pp.392-395).  
 
The third (acquisition planning) concerns the teaching and learning of languages 
and aims to increase the level of communicative competence in a particular 
language or particular languages (Baldauf, 2005, p.961; Cooper, 1989, pp.157-163; 
Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.395-405). 65 
 
The fourth (prestige planning) attempts to secure compliance with LPP goals in 
other areas by promoting the instrumentality and image of particular languages as 
well as the prestige of their speaking communities (Ager, 2005, pp.1035-1054; 
Baldauf, 2005, p.962; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.50-51; Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.742-
743).66  
 
The fifth (usage planning) aims to increase or modify language use in a range of 
communicative domains and networks (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; 2005, p.260; 
National Assembly of Wales, 2002, p.30). 
 
Finally, discourse planning, of fundamental significance so far as this research 
project is concerned, relates to the discursive realm and is concerned largely with 
                                                 
65 See also Baldauf, 2005, p.961; Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; Wardhaugh, 2010, p.379 for definitions 
of status, corpus and acquisition planning. 
66 There are a number of closely related terms that can be subsumed under prestige planning, 
including: esteem planning (focusing on the subjective valuing of a language) (Lo Bianco, 2005, 
pp.260-261); image planning (creating an identity for the language and the speaking and non-
speaking communities); dignity planning (a far less ambitious goal for endangered languages) (Lo 
Bianco, 2005, p.261); language marketing (derived from commercial marketing) and tolerability 
planning (aimed at changing the attitudes and behaviours of the dominant language group toward a 
minority language) (de Bres, 2008a; 2008b; 2009).  
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the rhetoric of persuasion (Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.743 & 756-757; 2005, pp.261-263). 
With reference to discourse planning, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, p.117) claim that 
“the most effective way to change the structures that affect action in human affairs 
is to alter the discourse about those structures". Paradoxically, those areas of 
language planning, including prestige planning and discourse planning, that may 
have the greatest impact on the desire for linguistic behaviour change in any 
language ecology are arguably the least well developed (Ager, 2005, p.1035). 
 
2.2.3 LPP: Selected frameworks 
Given the developing nature of LPP theory and practice, it is not surprising to find 
that a number of different frameworks have been proposed. Despite being 
inevitably prone to over-simplification, frameworks can help explain and 
strategically prioritise the complex network of inter-related factors involved in an 
integrated system (Baldauf, 2005, p.959). In this section, two of these frameworks 
are discussed from a discoursally-oriented perspective.67 
2.2.3.1 An integrated LPP framework (Baldauf, 2005) 
Baldauf’s (2005) LPP framework describes four areas of planning (status, corpus, 
language-in-education and prestige), associated with each of which are two types 
of planning goals (policy planning goals that focus on form, and cultivation 
planning goals that focus on function) (see Appendix 1: Framework 1). Thus, if a 
cultivation planning goal was revitalisation (included under the heading of status 
planning), it might be associated with a policy planning goal such as officialisation. 
 
This model includes three general planning levels (macro, meso and micro), each 
of which may be associated with a different level of awareness (overt versus covert). 
                                                 
67 Each of the frameworks discussed here is concerned with LPP in a general sense. See Appendices 
2 and 3 for other frameworks and models that relate to specific aspects of LPP, including: Haugen’s 
(2001) language ecology framework (which includes questions designed to help determine a 
language’s current status within a particular polity); the Ethnolinguistic vitality framework proposed 
by Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977), the UNESCO sociolinguistic vitality framework (2003) and the 
Lewis and Simons (2010) Expanded GIDS framework (each of which is designed to help determine 
the extent to which a language is at risk); Fishman’s (1991) Graded intergenerational disruption 
scale (GIDS) (which is designed to address the functional disruption of threatened languages in 
social space), Strubell’s (2001) Catherine wheel (which is designed to help explore the impact of a 
number of factors on language learning motivation), and Grin’s (2003b) COD policy analysis 
framework that points out that to succeed language revitalisation efforts must invest in all three 
components: Capacity, Opportunity and Desire. In addition, see Antia, 2000, pp.1-11 for an 
overview of a number of different frameworks. 
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There is no explicit reference in this framework to usage planning or discourse 
planning (although it is relevant to note here that Baldauf described this framework 
as an “evolving” one) (p.960) (see Appendix 1: Language policy and planning: 
Overarching frameworks). 
2.3.3.2 An expanded language policy framework (Shohamy, 2006) 
Shohamy (2006) places discourse (defined in the broadest sense as systems of 
relations, both linguistic and non-linguistic) at the very core of her expanded 
language policy framework. This framework (see Appendix 1: Framework 2) draws 
upon the language management framework proposed by Spolsky (2003, p.554; 
2004, p.5; 2009, pp.4-5) in which ‘total language policy’ is seen as being constituted 
of a combination of language beliefs (ideologies and attitudes), language practices 
(observable choices and behaviour – what people actually do) and language 
management (efforts to modify behaviour and ideologies), with ‘real language 
policy’ being detectable in language practices rather than being confined to explicit 
policy documents (Shohamy, 2006, p.54). 
 
In connection with this, Shohamy (2006, pp.53 & 56-58) observes that language 
behaviours, and the individual choices that underlie them, are strongly influenced 
by a multitude of non-neutral mechanisms and devices (including language tests, 
penalties, myths and propaganda) that are embedded within political, economic, 
ideological and social agendas.68 Thus, for example, she notes that the use of a 
particular language for currency is an indicator of the fact that that language has an 
implicit de facto priority over others, irrespective of the explicitly stated priorities 
within formal policy document (pp.53 & 55). Although those with direct access to 
societal power structures, especially governments and large corporations, can 
influence language policy mechanisms more easily than others, all members of 
society can attempt to influence language policy, especially through language 
practice itself (pp.xvi-xvii & 56-57). 
                                                 
68 Shohamy (2006, p.54) states that these mechanisms “lie at the heart of the battle between ideology 
and practice”  
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2.2.4 Key issues affecting language policy and planning 
In this section six key issues affecting LPP are discussed – they are global language 
endangerment (2.2.4.1); language rights (2.2.4.2); language economics (2.2.4.3); 
behaviour change (2.2.4.4); agency and intervention (2.2.4.5); and politics, power 
and ideology (2.2.4.6). 
2.2.4.1 Global language endangerment 
Since Krauss (1992) estimated that half of the world’s 6000-7000 languages would 
be extinct by the end of the 21st century, language endangerment has become a 
global issue (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p.1). The level of language loss is 
unprecedented – one fifth of the world’s languages have disappeared between 1970 
and 2005 with the current rate of loss estimated at one language every two to three 
weeks (Crystal, 2000, p.19).  
 
With the loss of language, not only does the world lose “an immense edifice of 
human knowledge, painstakingly assembled over millennia by countless minds” 
(Harrison, 2007, p.3), it also faces a range of potentially negative community 
outcomes relating to health and to social, emotional, economic and cognitive 
wellbeing (Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 2009, 
pp.60-65; Fillmore, 2000, pp.206-207; Hinton, 2001, p.5).69 This is related to the 
fact that language endangerment occurs in contexts of economic, military, social, 
cultural or political dominance, contexts in which communities are marginalised 
and placed under immense pressure to abandon their heritage languages in favour 
of languages which have become dominant and are perceived as being of higher 
status (Grenoble, 2011, p.34; Harrison, pp.5). 70 Thus, Wyburn and Hayward (2008, 
p.268) note that the dominance of any language is not due to “any intrinsic 
                                                 
69 Hale, Krauss, Watahomigie, Yamamoto, Craig, Jeanne, and England (1992, p.8) equate the impact 
of language loss to that of the extinction of animal species, stating that “any language is a supreme 
achievement of a uniquely human collective genius, as divine and endless a mystery as a living 
organism”.  
70 Elements of globalisation that have impacted on language loss include the repressive measures 
and ideologies that have been associated with colonisation, urbanisation, early childhood education, 
the spread of American pop culture via television and the Internet, the concept of national languages, 
and the encroachment of neoliberal political structures, multinationals and Western consumerism 
(Grenoble, 2011, pp.33-35; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, pp.2-3; Hinton, 2001, pp.3-4 & Myer-
Scotton, 2006, pp.406-408). Canagarajay (2005, pp.195-196) states that before the decolonisation 
project of non-Western nations (which entailed resisting English) was complete; it was subsumed 
by globalisation (which reasserted their need for English). 
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superiority of the one language over [another]” but to the “political, economical 
and/or social advantages enjoyed by its group”. 
 
The extent of language endangerment can be appreciated when it is borne in mind 
that most of the world’s nations have a single national language and approximately 
ninety four percent of the world’s population are first language speakers of only 
5.5% of the world’s remaining languages (SIL, n.d.). In such a context, speakers of 
other languages are constructed as ‘minorities’ and considered to be part of a 
problem (a multilingualism problem), with the natural response to such problems 
being to remove them (Lo Bianco, 2006, November 11, p.5). Thus, de Swaan (2001, 
pp.4-6) has compared the world language system to an inherently unequal galaxy 
of planets, with language shift, like gravitational pull, almost always towards 
languages that provide more opportunities and more upward socio-economic 
mobility.71  
 
A language becomes moribund when it is no longer being reproduced through 
transmission to children and extinct when the last speaker has died and there are no 
archives to regenerate it (Crystal, 2000, pp.20-21; Grenoble, 2011, p.40). 72 
Language death can occur within a single generation once control of domains 
relating to socio-economic mobility are lost, bilingualism becomes widespread and 
the original language is no longer the primary one in which children are socialised 
(Fishman, 1991, pp.87-109; Harrison, 2007, p.8; Lewis, 2007, pp.7-9). Other 
factors that impact on the viability of languages include user characteristics,73 the 
                                                 
71 Peripheral (local) languages are likened to moons that are grouped around planets (national or 
regional languages) which, in turn, form around a galaxy (supercentral languages such as Arabic, 
Spanish or Chinese) with English arguably the single hyper-central language (sun) (de Swaan, 2001, 
p.6). 
72 Harrison (2007, pp.5-6) notes that recorded languages are sometimes called ‘sleeping’ and may 
be ‘awakened’ or ‘revived’ in “some hoped-for future”. 
73  User characteristics includes demographics (e.g. age, density of communicative networks, 
growth, size, religious fervour), perceived status of the language community, level of control of 
resources and the means of decision-making, solidarity, physical separation, cohesive group identity, 
family ties and marriage practices, critical awareness, level of affective attachment to the language, 
and monolingual and bilingual proficiency of the speaking population relative to the total ecology. 
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extent of infrastructural support,74the language education context,75 the frequency 
of formal and informal, official and intimate interactions in the language,76 the 
language’s historical and socio-economic prestige, and a range of issues associated 
with the language itself 77 (Crystal, 2000, pp.68-90; Federation of Aboriginal & 
Torres Strait Islander Languages (FATSIL) & Australian Institute of Aboriginal & 
Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), 2005, pp.27-31; Fishman, 1991; Giles, 
Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Grenoble, 2011, pp.33-35; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, 
pp.3-13; Haugen, 2001, p.65; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.271-274; Lewis & 
Simon, 2010; Strubell, 2001; UNESCO, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, even where languages are highly endangered, language death is not 
inevitable. When faced with language loss, many communities, often supported by 
linguists, seek to revitalise their languages (Crystal, 2000, pp.91 & 106-107; 
Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, pp.69-101; Hinton & Hale, 2001). 78  Language 
revitalisation is the strategic attempt to return an endangered language to a place 
where its role as a language of communication for its speaking community can be 
sustained indefinitely. In contexts of continuing linguistic domination, such as that 
faced by Māori, Steven Chrisp (1997) suggests that revitalisation efforts are best 
focused on achieving long-term agreed diglossia, that is, agreement as to how two 
or more languages can function a single integrated society.  
 
Achieving this kind of social bilingualism involves “counter-balancing the forces 
which have caused or are causing the language shift” (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, 
p.21). Given the generally powerful, complex and political nature of these forces, 
                                                 
74 Extent of infrastructural support includes the number, status, and instrumentality of domains and 
functions, the geographical location where the language is used, the amount of multi-level 
governmental and community institutional language support through legislation, policies, strategies, 
research and funding. 
75 Language education context includes the extent to which the language is used as the medium of 
instruction, whether second/foreign language instruction pedagogy and techniques are relevant and 
effective, and the quality and amount of materials and resources. 
76  Whether interactions contribute to intergenerational transmission is a particularly important 
factor. 
77 This includes whether there is a standard (written or oral) form of the language and the extent and 
quality of its documentation and written traditions. 
78  Revitalisation can also be referred to as language ‘revival’, ‘restoration’, ‘regeneration’, 
‘maintenance’ and ‘reversal of language shift’ (Hohepa, 1999, p.46; 2006, pp.294-295; Lewis, 2007, 
pp.6-7). Spolsky (2003, pp.554-555) prefers the term ‘regeneration’ for activities that increase the 
status and salience of a language, and reserves ‘revitalisation’ for the restoration of intergenerational 
transmission. 
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especially when compared to the resources available to the communities of 
endangered languages, a strategic approach is essential. As Fishman (1991, p.113) 
explains: 
  
Stressing the wrong priorities is a very costly example of lacking a proper 
social theory or model of what RLS [Reversing Language Shift] entails. . . . 
The sociolinguistic landscape is littered with the relatively lifeless remains 
of societally marginalized and exhausted RLS movements that have 
engaged in struggles on the wrong front (or on all . . . fronts simultaneously), 
without real awareness of what they were doing or of the problems that 
faced them. 
 
Because these factors that impact on revitalisation are all interconnected, LPP needs 
to address them in a cohesive, comprehensive and strategic way. On the one hand, 
ill-thought out or unnecessarily contentious tactics can provoke a dominant 
backlash that reduces the possibility of building public and political will for 
language revitalisation. On the other hand, over-conservative goals and strategies, 
such as those which focus solely on intergenerational transmission, diglossia or 
reversing language shift, can create a ‘master-slave’ relationship where the 
language revival programme both functions within and also supports the demands 
of the dominant language and culture (Eggington, 2001, p.242; Romaine, 2006, 
p.452).79  
 
With reference to Māori language revitalisation, Fishman (1991, p.245) observes: 
 
Māori is still dying year by year and effective first aid and major surgery 
are needed urgently, rather than stressing such elective non-essentials as 
token mass media programs, the token use of Māori in government offices, 
signs and letterheads, wildly luxuriant corpus planning for ‘Māori in the 
modern sector’, literary prizes for writers, and Māori-speaking telephone 
operators and clerks at government agencies. All of the above are merely 
                                                 
79 Furthermore, when challenged, hegemonic institutions although they may cede a limited amount 
of material gain, rights or power, still “ensure they control the process and keep some basic 
assumptions in place”, therefore not “posing any fundamental challenges to the hegemonic project 
itself” (Purcell, 2009,  p.147). 
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symbolic flourishes, given the lack of substance with respect to the societal 
co-management which they imply, or even any substantially self-regulatory 
intergenerational Māori home-family-neighborhood life on which such 
efforts must be firmly based if they are to contribute to RLS per se (rather 
than merely to jobs for a few dozen disaffected intellectuals). What would 
be fine goals once stages 6 to 4 are nailed down would merely be hollow 
victories, masked defeats and hopeless distractions otherwise. Even were 
they to be granted . . . they would not stop the arterial bleeding of Māori any 
more than they have Irish or even of Basque. 
 
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that ten years later Benton and Benton (2001, p.446) 
gave a negative rating to Māori language Reversing Language Shift (RLS), stating 
that “on almost any reading of the [GIDS] scale, Maori would still be in the zone 
of maximum disruption”. 
2.2.4.2 Language rights 
The concept of linguistic human rights (LHR) is a response to the suppression of 
minority languages (often due to the imposition of a unifying national language) 
and has established itself as a major driving force within LPP. It is a concept that 
has begun to receive widespread international acceptance, with several influential 
U.N. charters and documents having been signed off. 80  A second example of 
enacted rights is the European Charter of regional and minority languages which 
not only considers that the use of these languages in private and public life an 
unalienable right but that they also contribute to the maintenance of Europe’s 
wealth and traditions (Grin, 2003b, p.207).  
In the case of language preservation, toleration or lassez-faire protection is 
inadequate – making it a matter simply of individual responsibility has proved to 
                                                 
80 King and Haboud (2007, p.61) suggest that the United Nations has been the most powerful 
language planning agent in acknowledging linguistic diversity. Thus, for example, 1966 United 
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27); the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities (1992); the 
Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (UDLR Follow-up Committee, 1998) while yet to be 
approved from UNESCO, was adopted at the conclusion of the World Conference on Linguistic 
Rights in 1996 in Barcelona, and is supported by many influential organisations and individuals. 
Article 13 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that 
indigenous peoples ‘have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their 
. . . languages’, and that signatory states ‘shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is 
protected’. 
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be unsuccessful (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.212). What is required is proactive, 
collective responsibility, including the obligation that the state should intervene 
actively in language ecologies, promoting and planning for public and private 
spaces in which communities can exercise their linguistic rights (Skutnabb-Kangas, 
T., 2006, pp.283-284).81  
This raises the issue of how overlapping language rights within the same ecology 
are to be reconciled. As de Swaan (2001, p.52) observes, the right of one individual 
to speak in the language of his/her choice does not impinge on the freedom of 
everyone else to ignore what they say. Consequently, the concept of universal equal 
rights is a practically unworkable concept, particularly as there must be a limit as 
to the number of languages that can co-exist simultaneously in the public domain 
(Pennycook, 2006, pp.68-69; Wright, 2004, pp.241-243). For this reason, 
agreements based on territorial division or diglossic arrangements must be 
considered, something which, according to Wright (2004, p.241) “depends entirely 
on dominant majorities being ready and willing to confer on the language of the 
weaker group the necessary prestige and utility”. 
Rights-based language intervention is problematic from a number of perspectives. 
Intervention, even when based on rights, always has economic, social and political 
consequences, including the potential to create new losers as well as new winners 
(Grin, 2005, p.455; May, 2005, pp.1055-1056; Ridge, 1996, pp.20-21). Thus, for 
example, a rise in the status of a particular language may result in the rise to 
dominance of one of more dialects of that language and the withering of others, the 
same type of linguicism which prompted appeal to language rights in the first 
instance. This is due to the fact that “[l]inguistic-imperialism and language-rights 
discourses . . . construct their critical frameworks from within the same paradigm 
                                                 
81 A right to use one’s language in public or even in private is not universally recognised, but should 
be (Sallabank, 2012, p.110). Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2006, pp.283-284) identifies several pairs of 
rights “dichotomies” all of which he believes are necessary in protecting dominated languages. 
These include: negative rights (basic freedom of expression & right to an interpreter) versus positive 
rights (right to use and maintain their language); toleration-oriented rights (anti-discrimination) 
versus promotion-oriented rights; individual rights versus collective rights (for languages both are 
necessary); territorial rights (rights for a language and speaker community within its own territory) 
versus personal rights (for dispersed people outside a groups territory); rights in “hard law” (binding 
on the governing body) versus “soft law” (non-binding declarations, legal precedents). Hu and 
Alsogoff (2010, p.369) also differentiate between non-instrumental rights (the fundamental right to 
express and reproduce culture) and instrumental rights (the role of language in enjoying social and 
economic opportunities). 
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they wish to critique” (Pennycook, 2006, p.68). Accordingly, Hu and Alsagoff 
(2010, p.370) stress the need for a principled and transparent approach wherever 
these type of distributive inequalities occur, while Sayers (2009, p.213) calls for a 
holistic focus on language survival that is motivated more by “plight of people” 
than by “the decrease of the number of languages”. 
Rationales based solely on language rights are considered to be the least persuasive 
to those who do not share the same moral convictions (Grin, 2003a, p.36; 2005; Hu 
& Alsagoff, 2010, pp.369-370). Where major economic forces militate against 
language shift, language rights-based arguments are unlikely by themselves to 
counteract them. As Grin (2003a, p.52) observes “the weak may avail themselves 
of a ‘right’ only to the extent that the strong have an interest in granting and 
upholding this right”. Certainly, there is a “discontinuity” between the “unrealistic 
discussions of ‘rights’ in political discourse” and the actual nature of rights that 
have a recognised legal status (King & Haboud, 2007, p.61). 
 
Nevertheless, when used in conjunction with other rationales, such as technical or 
practical “feasibility” and “proper allocation of scarce resources”, they can be 
effective (Grin, 2005, p.451). Furthermore, legislation and rights provisions can 
support language survival by providing leverage in legal contexts (Romaine, 2002, 
p.194). In New Zealand, for example, the greatest advances in government 
protection of the Māori language have arguably been due to the court system’s 
having upheld Treaty of Waitangi rights (see Section 1.3.2.1). Furthermore, the 
concept of language rights has gained considerable traction on a world-wide basis, 
meaning that ignoring language rights issues can tarnish a nation’s reputation 
internationally. 
2.2.4.3 Language economics 
The impact of economic theory on LPP has extended beyond the widespread use of 
basic economic concepts, with the economics of language (also known as language 
economics) playing an increasingly important role within the practice of LPP, 
particularly in relation to minority languages (Grin, 2003a, p.1; 2006, pp.77-89; 
Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.154-155). The economics of language focuses on the 
complex interrelationships between economic factors and language, particularly in 
relation to the application of economic concepts, tools and paradigms to explain 
-46- 
language preference and choice and to justify and evaluate LPP (Grin, 2003a; 
2003b; 2006). 
 
Within the economics of language, language is considered to be a hyper- collective 
commodity that “displays external network effects” and can therefore be related to 
economic concepts such as networks, standards, production, consumption, cost, 
demand, supply, quantity and fluctuations in value (de Swaan, 2001, pp.27-33 & 
178-179; Grin, 2003a, pp.21-22; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.155-158).82 Thus, for 
example, LPP initiatives represent supply, which, when unrelated to linguistic 
demand, will fail (Wright, n.d., p.6).83 Heterogeneous language ecologies can be 
conceived of as competitive markets in which dominant languages can threaten the 
survival of minority languages through competition for speakers, space and 
resources (Bourdieu, 1977, pp.651-653; Grin, 2003a, p.27).84 The concept of value 
is seen in terms of the fluctuating appreciation of a language as reflected in the 
behaviour (use and take up) of social actors and is based on factors such as, for 
example, the instrumental and integrative usefulness of a language relative to other 
languages as well as the nature (mono/multilinguality, density) and perceived 
esteem (wealth, likeability etc.) of its speaking community relative to other 
communities in the market (ecology) (de Swaan, 2001, pp.21, 33-59 & 176-179; 
Grin, 2003a, pp.36-39).85 The fact that the communal nature of language means that 
some of its benefits accrue to the community rather than to the individual is, 
                                                 
82 de Swaan (2001, pp.27-29) believes that the likening of a language to a collective asset such as a 
cell phone network is apt. The network (language) requires an initial investment (language learning), 
its value fluctuates in line with the number of users, and large networks enjoy economies of scale, 
with smaller ones being at an ever increasing economic disadvantage. 
83 Wright (n.d., p.6) notes that revitalisation efforts not anchored in proven community demand 
“could be judged fruitless and a waste of money - money which might have been used for other 
language planning purposes or (budgetary niceties aside) more fundamental social needs in that 
community, say housing and water supply.” 
84 Grin (2003a, pp.26-27) concedes that the metaphor of several competing currencies (languages) 
in a market is less problematic in an economic sense than a single currency analogy, which (given 
that a “market in the economic sense emerges from the existence of supply and demand functions”) 
is considered economically “unsound” with “little heuristic pertinence”. 
85 Grin, (2003a, p.36) notes that just because languages are valuable in an intrinsic sense or perhaps 
are likened to ‘treasure’ (such as the ‘Māori language as a taonga’ discourse) does not mean they 
are necessarily valuable in an economic sense, stating that “it is important to consider different forms 
of value”. 
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consequently, a “hard-nosed economic” justification for centralised intervention 
relating to the maintenance of linguistic diversity (Grin, 2003a, p.21).86 
 
Grin (2003a, p.24) has observed that economics is conceptually and perhaps 
methodologically “better equipped than other social sciences . . . to process 
decision-making problems” because it can draw on a robust and logically consistent 
conceptual framework in order to formulate, evaluate and compare advantages and 
drawbacks and subject popular rhetoric to close scrutiny (Grin, 2003a, pp.1, 24, 41 
& 55; 2005). One of the most significant contributions that language economics has 
made to LPP is in relation to the analytically rigorous and transparent evaluation 
and comparison of policy options (Grin, 2003a, p.5; 2003b, p.143). Thus, for 
example, Grin (2003a, pp.39-40) uses benefit and cost curves to prove that neither 
zero diversity nor limitless diversity are socially optimal, a finding that challenges 
both the widely held belief that diversity is always negatively correlated with 
macro-economic welfare and also the belief that boundless diversity has no 
associated social costs. This type of provision of robust instrumental rationales is 
an important contribution to LPP given the inevitable competition for policy 
attention and resources. As Kaplan and Baldauf (1997, p.167) observe, “no 
language plan no matter how sound is likely to succeed unless the decision makers 
are convinced of its economic and political value”. As noted in the previous section 
(2.2.4.2), Grin (2003a, p.53) has observed that, “the weak may avail themselves of 
a ‘right’ only to the extent that the strong have an interest in granting and upholding 
this right”. It is important that this is borne in mind in view of the fact that the 
strongest justifications for many revitalisation programmes relate to rights and 
abuse, justifications which, while important, “[cut] no ice with those not already 
convinced of the legitimacy of those arguments” (Grin, 2005, p.457) and are 
therefore likely to “[fall] on deaf ears” (Eggington, 2001, p.243).87 An example of 
an attempt to strike a balance is the evaluation by Hu and Alsagoff (2010, pp.369-
371) of the provision of English as a medium of instruction in China in terms of 
both normative rights and instrumentally oriented considerations, such as practical 
                                                 
86 Likewise, Grin (2006, pp.83-84) considers the erosion of linguistic diversity by the “free play of 
market forces” as market failure, a situation which, when it occurs, also justifies state intervention 
in the form of language policy. 
87 Furthermore, Grin (2005, p.457) asserts that “even among those who would be sympathetic to 
such rights on moral grounds, doubts may arise from a policy analysis standpoint.” 
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feasibility (availability of resources), allocative efficiency (aggregate benefits and 
costs) and distributive fairness (respective gains and losses). 
Policy evaluation is a continuing process within the LPP cycle, allowing planners 
to regularly adjust goals, strategies and priorities with a view of using scarce 
resources more effectively (Grin, 2003a, pp.8 & 41-43; 2003b, pp.117-146; Kaplan 
& Baldauf, 1997, pp.90-99 & 167-168). In this area, language economics has much 
to contribute to considerations such as the relationship between expenditure on 
different policies and the net benefit to society. Any goal, even language 
revitalisation, can be achieved with enough resources invested in it. However, given 
the scarcity of resources, the real question from an economic standpoint, is 
“whether the outcome is worth the resources devoted to achieving it” (Grin, 2003a, 
p.52). Furthermore, within the context of language economics, the comparative cost 
of implementing and failing to implement language policies is a major 
consideration. 88 
For example, the real financial cost of moving to a bilingual education system is the 
cost it entails over and above the cost involved in maintaining a monolingual 
system. Given the premise that children need to be schooled irrespective of whether 
a bilingual option is available, the financial cost of introducing bilingual education 
is likely to be a modest one when set against the probable increase in attendance 
and results. Indeed, such a move may be well worth its cost and, in the long term, 
may even pay for itself (Grin, 2003a, pp.53-54; 2006, pp.88-89). 
 
In spite of the usefulness of language economics in terms of the recasting of 
language issues and the evaluation in relation to benefits and costs, it has limitations 
(Grin, 2003a, p.5). First, the many qualitative and sociological aspects of language 
are difficult to accommodate within the context of the fundamentally quantitative 
orientation that underpins economic cost-benefit analysis and modelling 
(Eggington and Baldauf, 1990, p.91; Grin, 2003a, p.55). Secondly, LPP decisions 
involve political processes and the economics of language is only one of a number 
approaches that input into the wider political debate (Grin, 2003a, p.5). 
                                                 
88 A cost may be non-economic, such as the potential for inter-group tension that may arise if the 
language of a minority is denied recognition. 
-49- 
2.2.4.4 Behaviour change 
The primary aim of LPP is to change behaviour. Thus, Cooper (1989, p.45) defines 
LPP as involving “deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with 
respect to the acquisition, structure or functional allocation of their language codes”. 
Consequently, any LPP practice, irrespective of its quality and authoritative 
appearance, is effectively unsuccessful if it does not lead to behaviour modification. 
It is, however, one thing to accept that behaviour change is paramount and another 
to achieve it. Substantive, sustained behaviour change (rather than superficial 
behaviour change) is “very difficult to achieve” (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, 
p.414). 
 
An essential prerequisite of behaviour change is social acceptance at a number of 
levels. Ager (2005, p.1039) dismisses as pointless any planning “that is rejected by 
the target group . . . no matter how well researched or technically brilliant”. It is, 
after all, local practices and discourses that are the default policy or policies 
(Johnson, 2009, pp.154-155).89 So, for example, Schiffman (2006, p.116) notes that 
an official Russian-only language policy was subverted by Polish teachers who 
reverted to Polish whenever authorities were not present.  
 
LPP has not been marked by a high level of success. Indeed, Grenoble and Whaley 
(2006, p.ix) have argued that “an honest evaluation of most language revitalisation 
efforts to date will show that they have failed”. In particular, conventional LPP has 
not had much impact on behaviour change, suggesting that its frameworks, 
strategies, tools and levers are inadequate.90 
 
                                                 
89 In response to criticisms regarding the quality and type of the reformed language in modern 
Turkey, Myers-Scotton (2006, p.395) accepts that the paramount consideration is that “the target 
people . . . accept the end product”. 
90  Attitudes are an important indicator of language value and can affect minority language 
reproduction (Baker, 2006, pp.210-211) but this not the same as behaviour or practices (Cooper, 
1989, pp.134-135). For example, Fishman (2001c, p.479) stated that (a) “the discrepancies between 
attitudes and performance are as noteworthy in conjunction with RLS as they are in conjunction 
with all areas of ‘moral behavior’ where ‘the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak’ [emphasis mine]” 
and (b) (p.480) that although “the general climate of opinion . . . has improved in an amorphous and 
largely still ineffectual sense . . . actual RLS prospects and attainments have improved very little, if 
at all . . . and [in some cases] seem even to have deteriorated”. In this regard, it is unrealistic to 
expect that we will always behave in accordance with our attitudes, however attitudes affect 
language behaviour more if the issue is central to our lives. 
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Schiffman (2006, p.114) notes that “implementation is almost always the weakest 
link in language policies”, something that Ricento (2000, p.23) attributes to the fact 
that the following questions remain largely unanswered: “Why do individuals opt 
to use (or cease to use) particular languages for specified functions in different 
domains, and how do those choices influence - and how are they influenced by - 
institutional language policy decision-making (local to national and supranational)?” 
Thus, more attention needs to be paid to those psychological, group-membership, 
cultural, behavioural and contextual variables that directly impinge on individual 
and group language choice and practice. What is known is that a deeper level of 
acceptance of change is more likely when new ideas are constructed in ways that 
allow for their incorporation into existing psychological frameworks (Spillane, 
Reiser & Reimer, 2002, pp.416-418). Haarmann (1990, p.104) asserts that “every 
planning effort . . . has to rely on a kind of psychological background which favours 
an effective implementation of planning goals and which, ultimately, is the most 
crucial variable for the long term success of planning”. Thus, linguistic culture can 
influence the outcomes of policy making just as emphatically and definitively as 
explicit, authoritative decisions (Schiffman, 2006, p.112). 91  In the U.S., for 
example, until recently (due to the growth of Spanish), the need for explicit 
language policy has been negligible (so far as the dominant group is concerned) as 
the dominant linguistic culture has been able to support the use of English to the 
exclusion of almost all other languages (Schiffman, 1996, pp.14-15; 2006, p.121). 
 
If LPP were to fully embrace behaviour change as its fundamental priority, it would 
need a more robust range of policy and planning tools drawn from a range of 
disciplines such as behavioural theory, social learning theory, ethnography, socio-
cultural theory, and CDT (Ricento, 2006a, pp.x-xi). This could result in the 
integration of ‘hard’ compliance policy options (that compel certain types of 
behaviour) and ‘soft’ options that "go with the grain of human nature, rather than 
rubbing us up the wrong way” (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2010, 
                                                 
91 Schiffman sees language policy as ultimately grounded in (1996, p.5) and inextricably connected 
to (2006, p.112) linguistic culture (which he defines as the “sum totality of values, beliefs, attitudes, 
prejudices, myths, religious strictures and all other cultural baggage that speakers bring to their 
dealings with language from their culture” (Schiffman, 2006, p.112). Consequently, language policy, 
is defined by Schiffman (2006, p.112) as “not only the explicit, written, overt, de jure, official, and 
“top-down” decision-making about language, but also the implicit, unwritten, covert, de facto, grass-
roots and unofficial ideas and assumptions”.  
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p.13; Smollan, 2006, p.145).92 Also required would be a system where the value of 
the policy is affirmed and new behaviour patterns are rehearsed and reinforced 
(Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, pp.417-418). 
 
Dolan et al. (2010) recommend MINDSPACE as a potentially useful public policy 
implementation framework (see Appendix 3: Framework 1). MINDSPACE, 
predicated on the belief that sustainable changes in behaviour will come from the 
successful integration of cultural, regulatory and individual change, involves 
enabling, encouraging, engaging, exemplifying, exploring (before policies are 
implemented) and evaluating (following implementation).93 Michie, van Straalen 
& West (2011) provide the Behavioural Change Wheel (BCW) as a comprehensive 
and coherent approach which links to an overarching model of behaviour (see 
Appendix 3: Framework 2). The model of behaviour, “motivation in context”, 
underpins the BCW’s prediction of “what aspects of the motivational system will 
need to be influenced in what ways to achieve a behavioural target” (Michie et al., 
2011, p. 9). Consequently, at the hub of the BCW are three essential prerequisites 
for behaviour change to occur: capability (psychological and physical capacity to 
engage in the activity), motivation (all the brain processes (reflective and automatic) 
that energise and direct behaviour), and opportunity (all the physical and social 
factors that lie outside the individual that make the behaviour possible or prompt 
it).94 The framework also provides a comprehensive range of known intervention 
activities (education, persuasion, incentives, coercion, training, restriction, 
environmental restructuring, modelling, and enablement) and policy categories 
(communication/marketing, guidelines, fiscal, legislation, environmental / social 
planning, regulation, and service provision) (p.7). The BCW goes further than 
simply providing these. In addition, it “forms the basis for a systematic analysis of 
                                                 
92 Thus, for example, drink driving initiatives that integrate stiff penalties with effective advertising 
aimed at shifting social norms and have resulted in significant behaviour change behaviour over the 
last decade (Dolan et al., 2010, p.14). Furthermore, small, incremental changes that do not disrupt 
normal patterns and are perceived to be fair are more likely to be successful over the long term 
(Smollan, 2006, p.149). 
93 For an outline, see Appendix 3: Behaviour change and policy frameworks 
94 These factors and the behaviour itself are all mutually influencing, for example, both capability 
and opportunity can influence motivation while enacting a behaviour can alter all three factors 
(Michie et al., 2011, p.5). This means that, first, the “target behaviour can in principle arise from 
combinations of any of the components of the behaviour system and second, a single intervention 
may have consequences on other parts of the system which may work for or against sustainable 
change” (Michie et al., 2011, p.10). 
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how to make the selection of the interventions and policies” (p.8) so that they match 
the behavioural target, the target population, and the context in which the 
intervention will be delivered (p.2). 
2.2.4.5 Agency and intervention 
The majority of macro-level LPP decisions are made by formal élites, influentials 
and authorities (Cooper, 1989, pp.88-89), that is, by those who have the authority 
and capability to make laws and distribute resources throughout a nation’s complex 
network of domains and institutions (Gruffudd, 2000, p.176; Williams, 2009, 
pp.78-79).95 These élite groups are never devoid of interests and are therefore likely 
to allocate important linguistic roles and scarce resources in directions they deem 
desirable, with certain languages being favoured and others being perpetually 
marginalised (Myers-Scotton, 2006, p.379). Thus Spolsky (2009) stresses that it is 
important to “look behind policy statements to . . . see who is the active agent” 
(pp.225 & 226), noting that “any government agency can establish a de facto 
language management policy, which may or may not reflect official government 
policy” (p. 230). 
 
Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that language planning is only ever a top-
down process. On the contrary, social actors of all kinds can influence LPP in a 
range of ways. In particular, it is important to note that macro-level decisions 
require micro-level consent: language policies and plans can be re-interpreted, 
rejected or ignored at a micro-level (Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.375-376).96 To be 
successfully put into effect, Cooper (1989, p.185) has observed “that decisions 
taken at higher levels of authority require smaller-scale decisions at lower levels of 
authority” (that is, in workplaces, churches, and in families, by radio disc jockeys, 
teachers, sign makers and storekeepers) (Cooper, 1989, pp.160-161). Discourses 
conducted at lower levels can become ‘default policy’. In fact, different ‘grassroots’ 
interpretations of a de jure policy may actually become ‘multiple de facto policies’ 
(Cooper, 1989, pp.38; Johnson, 2009, pp.154-155). Thus, effective LPP addresses 
                                                 
95 Representative governing bodies also have the potential to make policy that best fits the entire 
linguistic ecology rather than one or two interests within it (Lo Bianco, 1990, p.77). 
96  Hornberger (2009, p.199) has observed, for example, that, in some rural schools, the 1994 
Bolivian National Education reform was ignored resulting in "untouched stacks of the Reform’s 
texts remain[ed] in locked cabinets in the director’s office and little effort has been made to 
implement [the reform]”. 
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both top-down and bottom-up influences and aims to combine authority, 
resourcing, and capability with local participation (Cooper, 1989, pp.183-185; 
Crystal, 2000, pp.117-119; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.196-199). Even so, LPP 
frameworks continue, in general, to be technicist in orientation, often locating 
practitioners of the discipline on the side of those élites that hold power (Calvet, 
1998, p.203). 97  Indeed, Williams (2009, p.56) considers language planning 
agencies to be “political rather than professional constructs” which, although 
providing tangible support, “are established, nurtured and operationalised within 
fairly limited confines that have as much to do with political expediency as they 
have with the long-term vitality of the target language”. 
 
Recommending a critical approach to LPP does not necessarily resolve problems 
relating to the positioning of those involved in LPP as an applied discipline since 
all agents are necessarily ideologically motivated. Any assertion of neutral 
positioning is, therefore, naïve, having the effect of simply moving from overt / 
explicit to covert / implicit social, political and ideological positioning (Blommaert, 
1999, pp.436-437; van Dijk, 2008, p.6). Similarly, positioning oneself in relation to 
what is presented as being ‘just’ or ‘right’ ignores the contingency of these 
essentialising positions and, furthermore, may simply invite others to interpret these 
essentially empty signifiers in ways consistent with their own agendas. 
 
Given the difficulty of positioning LPP practitioners in terms of agency, it is 
imperative that the role is re-conceptualised in a way that avoids any assumption of 
neutrality and fully accommodates the value-laden, constructive and dynamic 
processes of political contestation between opposing policy agents (Calvet, 1998, 
pp.202-203; Dorner, 2011; Shohamy, 2006, p.xvii; Spolsky, 2009, pp.181-185). 
Such a reconceptualisation, though far from generally accepted, is not new. It is 
implicit in, for example, Lo Bianco’s (2004, p.751) assertion that the aim of any 
social agent involved in LPP is to “assert deliberative control”, generally with a 
view to disrupting or maintaining ‘natural’ shift processes.98 
                                                 
97  Lo Bianco (personal communication, August 2013) considers LPP practitioners to have an 
important role but not an exclusive one, describing LPP as "a real-world problem solving exercise 
in which experts, politicians and communities interact with each other.” 
98 This should not be new as in some sense intervention of social behaviour is universal to human 
experience (Dolan et al., 2010, p.13).  
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In connection with this, it is relevant to note that Combs and Penfield (2012) have 
called on language stakeholders to consider themselves as language activists, that 
is, as people engaged in “energetic action . . . in order to create, influence and 
change existing language policies . . . [and] who, through various means actively 
defend their right to venerate and freely use their languages in multiple, often public, 
domains” (p.462). Spolsky (2009) describes activists as being linguicentric groups 
or individuals “whose ideology is clearest in support . . . of a threatened target 
language” and, who, because they lack authority, depend on “acceptance of their 
ideology by those they try to influence” and by “supranational” and 
“supragovernmental” proponents of language rights (pp.204 & 205). Activism is 
fundamental to LPP activities such as those involving endangered language 
revitalisation, providing marginalised and grass-roots agents with a way of 
participating effectively in policy making (Combs & Penfield, 2012, pp.467-468). 
Thus, for example, Grin and Vaillancourt (1998, pp.93-94) note the crucial role 
grassroots individuals played in the drive for bilingual signs in Wales, signs that 
"were not put up as the result of a spontaneous choice by British authorities . . . 
[but] like most other positive measures or concessions in favour of the language . . 
. had to be wrested from the government.” 
 
Being an “active agent of social and policy change”, however, is a “challenging 
role” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p.197), and although some LPP practitioners and 
researchers may identify as language activists in particular contexts they may not 
necessarily do so in all contexts. Nevertheless, there are precedents in other areas. 
For example, sociologist (and later “public intellectual”) Pierre Bourdieu (Swartz, 
2003), and liberation-psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994a, 1994b, 1994c)99 
are both academics who have cast off the pretence of neutrality and objectivity, 
actively resisting unjust social arrangements, power abuse or oppression (Fine, 
                                                 
99Martἱn-Baró stated the psychologists must (a) help uncover the “collective lie” – the serious 
problems in society that have been systematically hidden from view (Martἱn-Baró, 1994a, p.188); 
(b) “rethink their image of themselves as professionals”; help people grasp a new practical 
understanding of themselves and a “more autonomous determination of their future” (Martἱn-Baró, 
1994c, p.46) noting that this change in individual consciousness and empowerment should lead to 
more a just and humane societies (Martἱn-Baró, 1994b, p.30). Martἱn-Baró was assassinated by 
Government soldiers in 1989 in a response related to his “steadfast affirmation of fundamental 
human rights” (Mishler, 1994, p.vii). 
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2006, pp.83, 89). Furthermore, van Dijk (2008, p.6) has argued that, within critical 
discourse studies, underlying commitment “to engagement in favour of dominated 
groups” is no less a political choice than not committing oneself politically. 
 
For those who do adopt the position of language activist, however, a central issue 
will be the rationale for this positioning, with rationales such as the achievement of 
language equality or a better future being highly contestable. An acceptable starting 
point, perhaps, an ecological one, one that is based on the desire to maintain an 
ecological stability. For some, the emphasis is on ethical practices, that is, practices 
that do not aim to silence or negatively label any opposition, disguise intentions, or 
frame information in a way that restricts individual choice or reproduce inequalities 
(Shohamy, 2006, pp.131-132; van Dijk, 2008, pp.212-218). Equally important may 
be the recognition that LPP activity has consequences for the entire language 
ecology, an increase of the status of one language in a particular community having 
the potential to produce a corresponding change or reduction in the status of another 
(Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, p.13; Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.751-752; May, 2005, 
pp.1055-1056; Ridge, 1996, pp.20-21). Thus, May (2005, p.1064) notes that the 
goal of LPP activity in the case of threatened languages is not about “replacing a 
majority language with a minority language” but about “questioning and contesting 
why the promotion of a majority (national) language should be necessarily at the 
expense of all the others” (emphasis in original).100 Thus, those LPP practitioners 
who position themselves as language activists need to proceed strategically and 
with caution as the consequences of disadvantaging any group may impact in a 
negative way on the overall long term success of an LPP project (Shohamy, 2006, 
p.40). Notwithstanding the use of strategy in sensitive situations, it is clear that 
awareness of the multitude of covert mechanisms that constitute de facto language 
policy for dominating languages, makes “activism and resistance” inevitable 
(Shohamy, 2006, p.xv). As Calvet (1998, p.203) states: “Once pacifist illusions are 
disposed of, it only remains for the linguist, in the course of carrying out his [sic] 
trade, to behave as a citizen and keep a democratic watch on language policy at all 
times”. 
                                                 
100 Thus, May (2000a, p.123) notes that in the case of Wales, where the English remains dominant 
in all language domains, the requirement to be bilingual in English and Welsh does not threaten 
anyone’s right to use English within Wales concluding that, “The unwillingness to learn Welsh must 
thus be predicated on the long-standing derogation and vitiation of minority languages.” 
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2.2.4.6 Politics, power & ideology 
LPP is one of the most contentious and problematic areas of social policy in 
multilingual societies. 101  This is due to the fundamental connection between 
language and the deeply embedded contestation of identities, power, representation, 
voice and ideology that constitutes the political (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, pp.10 
& 13; Shohamy, 2006, pp.xv-xviii & 22-24). 102  As Shohamy (2006, p.167) 
observes, “Controlling language is a way of controlling us.” For people, though, the 
power of language is also the power to reshape, to protest, to denounce oppression 
and resist its domination”. 
 
From this perspective, LPP can be considered as “a civil war of languages” (Calvet, 
1998, p.203), “a battleground of contending discourses, ideologies and 
interpretations” (Williams, 2000, p.2) involving élites and counter-élites.103 The 
former typically manipulate the power mechanisms of society for their own self-
interest, while the latter typically attempt to reduce or overcome the perceived 
inequalities that result from the status quo (Cooper, 1989, pp.80-87; Kaplan & 
Baldauf, 1997, pp.80 & 195-196). As a result, LPP problems are never objective 
and LPP outcomes are rarely, if ever, the result of rational, scientific endeavour. 
Rather, both are generally forged through political disputation, negotiation and 
compromise (Lo Bianco, 1990, pp.74 & 77; 2001, p.225; Ricento, 2000, p.7). As 
Brock (2001, p.48) notes, initiating policy in a democracy can be a “messy 
business” which involves negotiating complex webs of competing interests and 
issues. Thus: 
                                                 
101 Notwithstanding the existence of LPP activities that are more technical and less contested in 
nature (such as for example, orthographic reform in Sweden) in this section I assert that political 
contestation is a central characteristic of most LPP activities and of all language revitalisation 
efforts. 
102 Language policy outcomes are incredibly salient to society for a number of reasons including: it 
is intrinsic to identity; it is personally experienced by the population; it is a source of high social and 
economic capital; and it reproduces particular values in society (See Chrystal, 2000, pp.36-40; 
Trappes-Lomax, 2004, p.140; Wardhaugh, 2010, p.7). Lo Bianco (1990, pp.73-74) notes that 
language is fundamental to political interests because “it has powerful symbolic importance and 
group identity functions that go beyond its more obvious communicative functions and that, as a 
consequence, the contested, disputed interests of different social groups are inextricably bound up 
with language issues.” Chrystal (2000, p.66) states that “language is the most valuable single 
possession of the human race.” 
103 Even a simple public sign, for example, sends a politically embedded message as to which 
language community is in power and whose language has priority (Shohamy, 2006, pp.xv & 110).   
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[Even a] brilliant, carefully crafted policy proposal could get amended, 
gutted, re-written, shelved or even abandoned at any stage of the process of 
review by [an] immediate superior, by the chief executive officer, by staff 
in the minister’s office, within the cabinet room, or eventually within the 
prime minister’s or premier’s office. 
 
The conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such an 
inherently political discipline, notwithstanding the post-modern critical turn within 
the discipline (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, pp.124-125; McGroarty, 1997, pp.71 & 
85-86; Ó Riagáin, 1997, p.143; Pennycook, 2006, p.71). In fact, Cross (2009, p.23) 
believes that, despite the critiques since the 1990s, LPP practice has “remained a 
largely technocratic exercise”, while Luke, McHoul and Mey (1990, p.27) note that 
LPP has “[failed] to tackle  . . . hidden agendas . . . . [and has] tended to avoid 
directly addressing larger social and political matters within which language 
change, use and development, and indeed language planning itself, are 
embedded”.104 It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the ironies of LPP, as noted 
by Carol Myers-Scotton (2006, pp.375-376), is that politicians rather than LPP 
experts plan language. Thus language professionals are rarely invited to participate 
in policy dialogues and consequently have minimal impact in language matters, a 
fact which represents a tremendous challenge to the discipline (Kaplan & Baldauf, 
2007, p.113; Lo Bianco, 2005, p.255). 
 
Conventional LPP theory provides little assistance for those who wish to engage 
with the political and to successfully navigate decision-making processes. This is 
particularly the case in relation to policy implementation, which Schiffman (2006, 
p.119) describes as “the weakest link in language policies”. Lo Bianco’s (2004, 
p.749) rhetorical question is relevant here: “How many times does it occur that in 
electoral debate concessions are made to publically demanded principles only to be 
denied in practice?” In seeking to address this issue, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, 
p.110) recommend broadening the focus of LPP by combining existing technical 
                                                 
104 Ricento (2006b, p.15) notes a branching in responses to language shift and language death: First, 
a technicist sociolinguistic analysis of its causes, nature and outcomes intended to guide 
revitalisation, and second; a critical analysis of the asymmetrical power relations that exist in the 
structures and ideologies of society. 
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and critical approaches with strategies, disciplines and activism directed at the 
political context. Three areas that have been identified in the literature on LPP as 
having the potential to offer a great deal here are: (a) the navigation of contested 
political processes, (b) the creation of constituencies, and (c) the implementation of 
a range of discourse strategies. 
 
Disciplines such as political science and public policy have the potential to offer 
something of importance to LPP in relation to the navigation of contested political 
processes (e.g. elections and policy cycles).105 There is however, already some 
practical guidance relating to this area within existing LPP literature. Thus, for 
example, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007) argue that LPP is more likely to be successful 
if it:106 
  
• uses long-term strategies that allow for political processes (p.123);107 
• involves the totality of a linguistic ecosystem (pp.124-125);108 
• is effective in a range of demographic and political settings and economic 
situations and in the context of a range of other legislation (pp.111, 122-
123); 
• fits the economic situation and attends to cost benefit ratios (p.123);109 
• is aware of the bias of the key players (pp.124-125); 
• is sufficiently funded and empowered for impact and benefits to be visible 
within the timeframe of a budget cycle (pp.123 & 125);110 
• is explicit since, in the long term, maintaining hidden agendas and 
illegitimate manipulation of the public have the potential to rebound 
(pp.124-125).111 
Understanding the creation of constituencies is also important. Thus, for example, 
Barnaby (1996, pp.217-218) has identified voter strength as one of four key factors 
                                                 
105  Thus, for example, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, pp.118-119) claim the U.S. English Only 
movement was significantly more successful than the English Plus movement because its 
proponents were more organised, more unified and more aware of the initiatives necessary to secure 
political action. 
106 All the references in this list derive from Kaplan and Baldauf (2007) and therefore only the page 
numbers are shown. 
107 See also Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, pp.10-11); Shohamy (2006, pp.xvi-xvii). 
108 See also Grenoble (2011, p.31); Spolsky (2004, pp.7-8). 
109 See also Grin (2005, pp.450-451); Kaplan & Baldauf (1997, p.167). 
110 See also Johnson (2009, p.142). 
111 See also Lo Bianco (1987, p.5). 
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influencing the kind and amount of attention paid to various languages in Canada, 
and Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.3) has observed that the best and most 
successful policies are those that accommodate differences and involve working 
together to produce a shared vision. He has noted the power of this type of unified 
alliance in the case of Australian language groups working together to progress the 
1987 National Policy on Languages: 
  
[W]hen our government realised how powerful we were in a unified way it 
was very clear that those forces within the government didn’t want us to 
have a single voice and started to try and buy off some sectors (and 
ultimately with some success) to divide us because fundamentally our 
interests are not all identical and we have to concede space if we’re going 
to progress the activity of a general language policy (Lo Bianco, 2006, 
November 11, p.3).112 
 
Given their small size, minority language groups need to form (and then sustain) 
alliances with similar groups in the context of a common purpose in order to 
increase their combined political power (Lo Bianco, 1990, pp.67-73; 2006, 
November 11, p.10). Support and consensus may be created by political processes, 
such as the establishment of bi-partisan advisory councils and committees or 
extensive consultation processes (Herriman, 1996, pp.46, 50 & 61; Lo Bianco, 
1990, p.77). In this area, social movement theory may have much to offer since 
effective counter-hegemonic struggle involves “collective challenges by people 
with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with élites, opponents 
and authorities” (Spicer & Böhm, 2007, p.1673). 
 
Public policy making involves, at its core, a discursive struggle (Jernudd, 1993, 
p.134; Lo Bianco, 2001, p.225; 2004, pp.749-751; 2008, pp.157, 164 & 167-168). 
As Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, p.117) note, discourse is fundamental to the 
constitution and transformation of society and so altering the discourse about 
society is the most effective way of changing society. Discourse constructs 
                                                 
112 See also Lo Bianco’s (1990, pp.67-69) description of the process of these groups becoming 
conscious of a single group identity. Another example is the successful 1998 ‘English for the 
Children’ campaign (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, pp.10-11; McGroarty, 1997, p.76). 
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language problems and then determines “which will be elevated for policy attention 
and which will be relegated to the margins” (Lo Bianco, 2005, p.256). Thus, the 
ability to use discourse strategies of various types plays a critical role in the 
effectiveness of LPP, particularly bearing in mind the need to communicate in ways 
that are persuasive to both key decision makers and the wider public (Ager 2005, 
pp.1038-1042; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, p.117). At the very least, therefore, LPP 
practitioners need to be able to communicate in ways that go beyond those which 
are appropriate in the case of readers of academic journals if they are to engage 
effectively in public discourse. Discourse that attracts policy attention is likely to 
be positive, inclusive (Pyles, 2008, pp.448 & 454-456; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 
2002, p.418), well-researched (Ricento, 2006b, p.19; Rybecki & Rybecki, 2000, 
p.80) and aligned to prevailing policy paradigms (Cheyne, O’Brian & Belgrave, 
2008, p.149; Durie, 2003, p.3; McEwan-Fujita, 2011, p.59; McGroarty, 1997, 
pp.85-86). It is also likely to stress economic and inclusive national interest 
justifications and to combine them with “judiciously placed stories that . . . are 
grounded in the personal experiences of people that [politicians] can identify with” 
(Lo Bianco, 2006, November 11, pp.1-2 & 9). 
 
2.2.5 LPP: Towards a critical discourse perspective 
Much of the literature on LPP points to the need for a wider perspective, one that 
accommodates a critical discourse perspective. However, Kaplan and Baldauf 
(1997, p.206) have stated that although post-structuralist critiques “can be powerful 
tools for understanding language planning problems or how language planning 
itself may go wrong”, they are “not helpful for those who actually have to do 
language planning” as opposed to simply providing “armchair comments on it”.  It 
may be partly because of the prevalence of views of this type that there has been 
little motivation to, as Fishman (1994, p.98) puts it, “go beyond  . . . critique”. My 
primary aim in exploring the literature on CDT (Section 2.3 below) is to attempt to 
determine whether it does, in fact, have the potential to offer more to LPP than 
armchair commentary. 
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2.3 Critical discourse theory 
2.3.1 Critical discourse theory: An introductory overview 
Critical discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) is based on the following 
premise: the social world is constructed through articulatory practice rather than 
being anchored in some deeper objective reality. 113  Meanings and identities, 
discoursally constructed on an ongoing basis, are radically contingent, antagonistic 
forces attempting to fix, disrupt and reconfigure them in order to achieve hegemony 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38). Thus critical discourse theory (CDT) highlights 
the relationship between discourse and social movements, “the multifaceted nature 
of human antagonisms and identities, and the penetration of ideology (the symbolic) 
into all social relations” and, hence, the possibility of contesting and transforming 
the political world (Townshend, 2004, p.286).114 In that it has the potential to 
unmask, contest and transform the existing structures of society, CDT is of direct 
relevance to those involved in political struggles, such as the revitalisation of 
minority languages. 
2.3.2 The emergence of critical discourse theory  
CDT emerged at a time when many of the traditional, stable or totalising 
foundations of society were no longer taken for granted (Critchley & Marchant, 
2004, p.1). During the late 20th century, a number of dislocatory events led to a 
deep theoretical and political dissatisfaction with orthodox Marxism which was 
seen as being “unable to develop a plausible account of ideology” because it 
underestimated (a) the extent to which all social relations were ideologically 
constituted and (b) the diversity and strength of non-class-based political identities, 
from populism to the new social movements (Townshend, 2004, p.270).115 In this 
context, CDT emerged as a reformulation of philosophical thought that drew on a 
number of sources including Marxism, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis. It 
                                                 
113 Carpentier and Spinoy (2008, p.5) state that the theoretical starting point of CDT is the . . . 
proposition that all social phenomena and objects obtain meaning(s) through discourse.” 
114 By removing the essentialist aprioristic conviction that “the social is sutured at some point, from 
which it is possible to fix the meaning of any event independent of any articulatory practice”, CDT 
is able “to succeed in founding a political practice fully located in the field of democratic revolution” 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.177). 
115 The dislocatory events include the proliferation of new social groups and alliances in ‘68 student 
revolt, the 1970s crisis of welfare state capitalism, the 1980s working class support for Thatcher’s 
new right government, the end of the totalising ideologies that sustained Cold War; and the 
overdetermined nature of Latin American politics. 
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combines anti-essentialist ontology, anti-foundationalist epistemology, 
contextualised linguistic analysis, and a relationalist and contextualist view of 
identity formation (Torfing, 2005b, pp.13-14). This combination is packaged into a 
consistent and robust critically oriented theory that asserts the primacy of politics 
over the social in determining meaning and identity (Torfing, 2005a, pp.1, 2 & 5). 
As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.120) assert, “political practice does not recognise 
class interests and then represent them: it constitutes the interests it represents.” 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.4) insist that their theory is both ‘post-Marxist’ and 
‘post-Marxist’, their point being that while it takes Marxism as an important starting 
point, it discards Marxism’s limiting essentialist orientations, focusing on the 
plurality of social agents engaged in the struggle for hegemony (Barrett, 1994, 
pp.244-246; Torfing, 2005a, p.5). They radicalise Gramsci’s (1971) concept of 
hegemony, discarding its economic determinism and class reductionism (Barrett, 
1994, pp.244-247; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.65-88; Torfing, 1999, pp.36-45).116 
Thus, Torfing (2005a, p.6) notes that although CDT retains the Marxist concept of 
hegemonic struggle, it is post-Marxist, in that it deprivileges any one group or 
struggle and can therefore apply to all spheres of society.117  As Howarth and 
Stavrakakis (2000, pp.5-6) observe:  
 
[D]iscourse theory conceives of society as a symbolic order in which social 
antagonisms and structural crises cannot be reduced to essential class cores 
determined by economic processes and relations. It also implies that all 
ideological elements in a discursive field are contingent, rather than fixed 
by a class essence, and that there is no fundamental social agency or political 
project that determines processes of historical change in an a priori fashion. 
 
Like Marxism, Saussurean semiotic structuralism (de Saussure, 1916) provides one 
of the starting points for CDT in the sense that it conceptualises meaning and 
identity as being determined by differential relations with other meanings and 
                                                 
116 CDT combines the historical materialism categories of base (material conditions, the economy 
and ownership of the means of production) and super structure (the state, judicial system, the church, 
mass media and schools and the entire production of meaning that goes on in society) into one field 
produced by the same discursive process (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.32). 
117 See also Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.4). 
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identities. However, CDT discards the Saussurean notion of language as a stable, 
unchanging and totalising system, asserting instead that the relationships among 
signs are continually shifting, with the result that meaning, identity and structure 
can only ever be partially fixed.118  
 
Critical discourse theory has also drawn on the decentring of classical Western 
understanding of the individual as an autonomous subject that is particularly 
associated with Foucault (1972; 1980), Althusser (1971) and Lacan (1977; 1993).  
Identities are seen as being ideologically constructed in ways that have associated 
expectations in terms of behaviour and thought (Althusser, 1971, p.174). However, 
CDT radicalises the concept of the constructed identity, holding that there is no 
‘true’ or ‘pre-determined’ identity but, instead, that conflicting discourses strive to 
organise the same social space in such a way that the individual is fragmented and 
overdetermined (e.g. ‘mother’, ‘volunteer’, ‘business person’), with each identity 
construction being associated with different sets of actions (Carpentier & Spinoy, 
2008, p.6; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.41-43; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.97-
105). There is, within CDT, a distinction between subject positions (the positioning 
of subjects within a discursive structure each position having its own expectations, 
characteristics and discourse (e.g. white, mother, middle class, guest)) and political 
subjectivities (the ways in which subjects act or live out their identities which 
emerge from the lack in subject positions) (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.12; 
Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.115). Political subjectivities stabilise into subject 
positions (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13). In times of structural crisis, 
individuals choose to identify with political projects that seem most capable of 
suturing the rift in a symbolic order, despite the fact that the final suture is 
something which “never arrives” (Laclau & Mouffe (1985, p.86).119 
 
There are many theoretical affinities between CDT, the psychoanalytic theory of 
Jacques Lacan (1993) and Žižek’s (1989; 1990) psychoanalytic conception of the 
                                                 
118 For example, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.11-12 & 25) discard the static Saussurean fishing 
net metaphor, preferring instead the inter-net which better explains the issue of change.  
119  Suture, a term derived from Lacanian psychoanalysis, refers to the attempt in hegemonic 
practices to cohere or fill-in the original lack. Nevertheless, given the “ultimately unfixed character 
of every signifier”, a totally sutured society is impossible (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.88, note 1). 
Barrett (1994, p.249) also notes that deconstruction works in opposition to suturing in that it 
paradoxically aims to uncover the buried traces of old, sedimentary practices from what the new 
hegemonic practices are trying to exclude. 
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subject. Thus, for example, concepts such as ‘fantasy’, ‘desire, ‘objet petit à’ and 
‘jouissance’ that derive from psychoanalysis, reverberate in CDT. The concept of 
jouissance, which has, in French, overtones of sexual fulfilment as well as a surfeit 
of enjoyment more generally, was presented by Lacan (1993) in his 1959-1960 
seminars, as ultimately unattainable. Thus the objects (causes) of fantasies (objets 
petit à) are perpetually absent. 120  They stimulate desire with the promise of 
recreating that fullness - that jouissance - which separation from the womb renders 
unattainable. 121  Nevertheless, for Žižek (1989, pp.125-128), once it is 
acknowledged that fantasies mask the fissures in society, it follows that they 
provide a route by which the failure of ideologies may be anticipated. The relevance 
of these concepts becomes clear as soon as it is recognised that the absence of 
completeness is at the very core of CDT. Thus, the promise of jouissance is at the 
core of political articulations and symbolic identifications. The belief that our 
jouissance can be achieved through political action is as unsustainable as the belief 
that it is blocked by some Other who has unjustly obtained that desired jouissance 
(Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2004, p.211). Hegemony, like jouissance, is ultimately 
unattainable. Thus, as Žižek (1997, p.48) observes, “the crucial pre-condition for 
breaking the chains of servitude is . . . to ‘traverse the fantasy’ . . . that keeps us 
attached to the Master [and] makes us accept the framework of the social 
relationship of domination”.122 
 
Many of the words and phrases used by Laclau are transliterations of those used by 
Lacan (e.g. ‘suture’, ‘identity’, ‘identification’, ‘subject-as-lack’ and ‘floating 
signifiers’) or echo, in terms of their use, words and phrases used by Lacan. Thus, 
                                                 
120 Žižek (1997, p.39) states that the objet petit à is “not what we desire, not what we are after but 
rather, that which sets our desire in motion” It is the treasure that is sought within the object / Other 
(or that which we hope to receive as a result of possessing it) which causes desire. Nevertheless, 
although the objet petit à promises to fill the lack it can never do so. 
121 Stavrakakis (2007, p.83) notes Laclau’s insistence that jouissance is “very much present in [his 
work] . . . although, admittedly, sometimes in a sketchy and inchoate way.” 
122 In Lacan’s discourse of the master (based on Hegal), a slave's deferral of his/her own desire (in 
preparing objects of desire for the master’s consumption) not only increases the value of that desire 
(beyond demand) but allows them to govern their desire, to gradually overcome the fear of death 
that lead them to capitulate in battle with the master and thus to move beyond their master/slave 
binary designation. On the other hand, Źiźek (1997, p.46) asserts that a slave’s (fool) inadequate 
subversion of the existing order in snatching a small piece of jouissance from the master (knave), 
“actually serves as its supplement”. An example is where non-élites accept from élites the 
‘fulfillment’ of joy (money, respect, safety) in exchange for behaviour that supports the status quo 
of domination” (Źiźek, 1997, p.48). 
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for example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) use the terms ‘nodal point’, ‘empty 
signifier’, ‘the radically excluded’ and ‘an outside that is constitutive of the inside’ 
in ways that echo Lacan’s (1977) use of the terms ‘point-de-capiton’, ‘master 
signifier’, ‘objet petit à’ and ‘extimacy’ (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2004, p.201). 123 
For Lacan (1977), master signifiers, which are empty of content, structure identity; 
for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) ‘nodal points’, which are linked together through 
‘floating signifiers’, structure discourse. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.125) described antagonism as the blocking of identity 
by the ‘Other’, something which highlights susceptibility to destabilisation and the 
continuing possibility of antagonism. However, in response to Žižek’s (1990, 
pp.249-254) claim that full identity is always impossible, not because it is blocked 
by social antagonisms but because self is always fundamentally split,124 they shifted 
focus, observing that the subject is an empty space or lack, emerging only as 
subjectivity through acts of identification and when dislocating events disrupt the 
existing discursive structure of society (Torfing, 2005b, pp.16-17; Worsham & 
Olsen, 1999, p.137). In exploring the concept of antagonism as outlined by Laclau 
and Mouffe, Žižek, (1990, p.249) observes that it constitutes a reinvention of the 
Lacanian real as a traumatic impossible in a way that makes it “useful as a tool for 
social and ideological analysis”. 
2.3.3 Critical discourse theory: Key concepts 
Critical discourse theory rejects the separation between the discursive and the non-
discursive in favour of a perspective that sees an “interweaving of the semantic 
aspects of language and the pragmatic aspects of action” (Torfing, 2005a, p.7). In 
other words, “whatever we say, or think, or do is conditioned by a more or less 
sedimented discourse which is constantly modified and transformed by what we are 
saying, thinking, and doing” (Torfing, 2005b, p.14). In the absence of a 
transcendental centre or origin, it is through discourse that we fix (partially) 
meanings and identities, create coherent social realities, coordinate social relations, 
                                                 
123 Points de capiton are 'quilting points', that is occasional points where the otherwise perpetual 
movement of signification stops to produce an illusion of a stable meaning. 
124 This is because the negation invoked by an antagonistic force is always the negation of a negation 
(Torfing, 1999, p.52). See Townshend, 2004, pp.275-279 for a discussion on the debates between 
Laclau and Žižek. 
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establish our beliefs and ultimately shape our behaviour (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002, p.35; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.112; Mishak & Grant, 2008, p.35).125 
 
This is by no means meant to suggest that there is no physical reality: 
 
[T]he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with that 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an 
event that certainly exists in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of 
God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is 
not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any 
discursive conditions of emergence (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.108). 
 
Within the context of CDT, articulation is “any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of articulatory 
practice”, and discourse is “[t]he structured totality resulting from . . . articulatory 
practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.105). Thus, CDT is concerned with much 
more than texts (written and spoken). It is concerned with the whole process of 
making meaning, where all social phenomena are seen as acquiring meanings 
through their differences, meanings being constantly rearticulated through social 
practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.111-113). Articulation involves every 
dimension of social practice, including, for example, unconscious practices, rituals, 
and customs, that form and position identities (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, 
pp.12-13), that link signs in the search for coherence (pp.7-8), the overall goal being 
to arrest the flow of differences and achieve hegemony (pp.14-15).  
 
All of this relates in a fundamental way to the notion of deconstruction, a 
philosophical theory initially propounded by Heidegger (1927) and applied by 
                                                 
125 Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.112) repeat Derrida’s (1967, p.280) statement that, “this was the 
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a 
center or origin, everything became discourse”. 
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Derrida (1967) to critical analysis. Deconstruction, which can be seen as 
representing a perpetual challenge to hegemony, aims, through re-examination and 
reinterpretation, to reveal the undecidability of hegemonic interpretations by 
interrogating dominant meanings in ways that identify excluded or repressed 
elements (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13; Torfing, 1999, pp.65-67). Andersen 
(2003, pp.57-58) states that “deconstruction is about showing how differences are 
contingent . . . by showing that they are not differences at all.” In this way, the 
[hierarchical] relationship is usually reversed and what presents initially as a norm 
is recognised as “a game of dominance” (Andersen, 2003, p.58). With reference to 
this process, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp.167 & 192-193) observe that the 
absorption of different perspectives is fundamental to radical democracy.126  
 
The radical contingency of everything social, the irreducible gap between signified 
and signifier, is both the philosophical starting point and the analytical motor of 
CDT (Bridgman, 2007, p.481; Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.5-7; Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p.38; Purcell, 2009, p.150; Torfing, 1999, p.50).127 Identity and 
meaning are seen as being wholly dependent on relationships which are constantly 
in the process of reconfiguration and, therefore, “always temporary and partial 
fixations . . . in a fundamentally undecidable terrain” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
p.39). This ‘undecidability’ is such that signs are ‘overdetermined’, being subject 
to an infinite range of alternative possibilities in each semantic area or ‘field of 
discursivity’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.111). 128  Through these excluded 
possibilities not only can the social consequences of particular discursive 
constructions be pinpointed, but they also create the possibility for the articulation 
of alternative discourses (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9).  
 
Thus, in the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.177): 
                                                 
126 In fact, Howarth (2000, p.271) claims that without these type of “democratic practices being built 
into the [radical democratic] project itself; . . . the project runs the risk of internal incoherence.” 
127 Radical contingency is based on the understanding that there is “no final, absolute ground, 
foundation or essence to identity, except for contingency itself” (Dahlberg and Phelan, 2011, p.16). 
The implication in terms of democratic revolution is that everything is able to be contested. 
128 Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.55-57) state that it is unclear whether the ‘field of discursivity’ 
refers to any meaning whatsoever outside the specific discourses, or if it could be narrowed to any 
related, that is, potentially competing discourses in the same sphere. They propose therefore, the 
addition of an ‘order of discourse’ concept defined as “a social space in which different discourses 
partly cover the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning, each in their own particular 
way”. 
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[The] fundamental obstacle to founding a political practice fully located in 
the practice of democratic revolution is essentialist apriorism, that is, the 
fixation of meaning of any event independent of any articulatory practice. 
 
The paradox inherent in contingency is that it is the condition of both the possibility 
and the impossibility of any identity, that is, it creates the compelling necessity of 
attempting to re-structure dislocated elements towards a complete identity 
(hegemony) whilst also creating the impossibility of ever achieving this completely 
(Laclau, 2005b, p.70; Torfing, 1999, p.51). 
 
Nevertheless, although absolute fixity is impossible, so also is “absolute non-
fixity”, a situation which Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.112) believe “implies there 
have to be partial fixations”. In this regard, notwithstanding their radical 
contingency, most social practices seem so natural, so uncontested and so firmly 
established that there appears to be no alternative. Sedimented discourses, 
discourses that have been validated so often that their politically constructed origins 
have been forgotten or repressed (Torfing, 1999, p.305), are often referred to as 
‘objective discourses’. They reflect (a) the human preference for continuity and 
structure, a preference which limits the possibilities of change and ties potential re-
articulations to existing discourse, and (b) the fact that social fields, while being 
radically contingent in principle, are relatively inflexible in specific situations, 
being subject to localised rules and expectations of any social field (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p.38). Not all possibilities are equally likely. Some meanings are 
more probable than others and the ability of any one group to successfully re-
articulate the political is limited (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.6 & 56). 129 
Accordingly, while it needs to be acknowledged that there is an ever-present 
possibility of sedimented entities being problematised, contested and transformed, 
it also needs to be acknowledged that continuity creates the inverse possibility of 
political discourses becoming naturalised (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.36-37). 
130 
                                                 
129 For example, social relationships where the power relations are rigid such as patient-doctor, 
expert-non-expert, powerful-dominated. 
130 It is extremely difficult to always question everything and generally therefore it is usual for large 
parts of social practice to be taken for granted. 
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Within the context of CDT, the political refers to the primary terrain in which 
hegemonic discourses are contested (Torfing, 1999, p.304). For Gramsci (1971), 
hegemony involves a process in which the values, interests and assumptions of one 
class (the prolateriat) are, through consent or coercion, conceptualised as being 
equivalent to the values, interests and assumptions of society generally.131 Within 
the context of CDT, however, the concept of hegemony is not linked to a class-
based analysis. Instead, it is conceived of as the expression of a collective will 
and/or national and popular character that transcends particular identities or 
interests. Just as the creation of a single discourse involves the articulatory fixation 
of as many floating elements as possible to a nodal point, thus creating a ‘chain of 
signification’, hegemonic inventions achieve a similar fixation across discourses or 
identities within society, the equivalential chain being a response to a discursively 
constructed enemy (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.44-45 & 48; Laclau, 2005a, p.39; 
Torfing, 2005a, p.10). In this process, the nodal point or master signifier of each 
discourse or identity, in order to be linked with a wider range of elements than was 
previously possible, becomes more and more detached from its original meaning 
and is, therefore, emptied of significance, becoming a signifier of the absent content 
(Laclau, 1996, p.44; 2005a, p.42; 2005b, p.71; Townshend, 2004, p.271).132 Thus, 
Torfing (1999, p.101) defines hegemony within the context of CDT as follows: 
 
[Hegemony involves] the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into 
a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating 
unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context criss-crossed by 
antagonistic forces. 
 
                                                 
131 Hegemony is best described as the organisation of consent (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.32). 
However, Barrett (1994, p.239) suggests that Gramsci’s emphasis on consent is partly due to the 
difficulties of getting coercion related arguments through the prison censor. 
132 Torfing (1999, pp.111-112) differentiates between transformism and expansive hegemony. The 
former is a passive, defensive absorption and co-optation of the active elements of both allies and 
antagonistic groups into the hegemonic force. Clinton’s centre-drifting administration is an example 
here. The latter, expansive hegemonies (such as for example Thatcherism’s dismantling of the 
Welfare state by mobilising a whole series of resistances against the bureaucratic nature of the state) 
involve metonymical sliding that displaced existing or traditional meanings, functions and identities 
and taking on expanded ones. 
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Successful articulation, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.189), involves 
establishing a set of viable, yet different, nodal points by which society can be 
reconstructed. In this regard, they assert that hegemonic projects must consist of “a 
set of proposals for the positive organisation of the social” (emphasis mine) and not 
just negative or subversive demands. 
 
The fundamental contingency of the social field, that is, “the vast area of floating 
elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite camps”, ensures that 
hegemonic articulations are impermanent and unstable and therefore creates the 
possibility for both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic articulations (Carpentier & 
Spinoy, 2008, p.9; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.136).133 Thus, Purcell (2009, pp.143-
144) observes:  
 
[Neoliberalism] is one in a long line of hegemonies that successfully (but 
temporarily) establish a particular interest as a universal one . . . . [I]t is 
hegemonic, but it is not invincible. It is merely hegemonic now. Counter-
projects are possible; indeed they are inevitable.  
 
Hegemonic articulations receive different degrees of social consent. Torfing (1999, 
pp.114-115) notes that they may have the status of myths or, where they become 
dominant, as in the case of the European Enlightenment, they may transcend that 
status, becoming social imaginaries. A social imaginary is “a horizon in the sense 
that it is not one object among other objects, but rather the condition of possibility 
for the emergence of any object” (Torfing, 1999, p.115). It thus dominates the 
empirical events it inscribes and appears to be natural, routine, ordained, fully-fixed 
and absolute (Mumby & Clair, 1997, p.184; Torfing, 2005a, p.8), with the closed 
identity of utopian ideals making it less readily susceptible to exposure and 
contestation (Jeffares, 2007, p.48).134 
                                                 
133 In Emancipation (1996), Laclau inverted the universal from its status as the ultimate ground of 
the social, and emptied it of any concrete content. Critchley and Marchant (2004, p.7) state that the 
universal was, thus, reformulated as “the empty horizon of the social . . . which can never be filled 
up by a given particularism even though particular forces and actors will strive to incarnate it.” As 
a result hegemony was reformulated as the relation between the particular and the universal. 
134  Collective social imaginaries, such as the “Enlightenment” or “Positivism’s perception of 
progress” are defined as an unlimited horizon or absolute limit that structures the field of 
intelligibility and therefore can incorporate any number of social demands (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 
2000, pp.15-16). 
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Fundamental to the formation of hegemonies and counter-hegemonies are social 
antagonisms and dislocations. No discourse can ever be fully fixed but is always in 
conflict with other discourses that define reality differently (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002, p.47). Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, p.9) state that, “social antagonisms 
introduce an irreconcilable negativity into social relations . . . because they reveal 
the limit points in society in which social meaning is contested and cannot be 
stabilised.” In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp.124-
125) represented antagonism as being dislocation per se (responsible for the 
impossibility of full constitution of identities); later, they represented it as being a 
discursive response to dislocation. With reference to this, Laclau (in an interview 
with Worsham & Olsen 1999, p.137) makes the following observation: 
 
When Chantel Mouffe and I wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, we 
were still arguing that the moment of the dislocation of the social relations, 
the moment which constitutes the limit of the objectivity of social relations, 
is given by antagonism.  Later on I came to think that this was not enough 
because constructing a social dislocation – an antagonism – is already a 
discursive response. You contrast the Other who dislocates your identity as 
an enemy, but there are other alternative forms. For instance, people can say 
this is the expression of the wrath of God, that this is an expression of our 
sins and that we have to prepare for the day of atonement. So, there is 
already a discursive organisation in constructing somebody as an enemy 
which involves a whole technology of power in the mobilisation of the 
oppressed. That is why in New Reflections I have insisted on the primary 
character of dislocation rather than antagonism.135 
 
Social antagonisms are the result of the innate contestability of the social and are 
situated at the contested points where discourses collide. They involve those who 
are excluded from hegemonic discourses and therefore pose a threat to them (Böhm, 
                                                 
135 Thus, in Lacanian terms, antagonisms are already discursive articulations and therefore fall on 
the symbolic/imaginary order of reality. Dislocations, however, in that they show the impossibility 
of the symbolic representing the real, fall on the side of the real order (Glynos & Stavrakakis (2004, 
p.206). Glynos and Stavrakakis (2004, p.206) go on to state that dislocation [is] . . . the index of the 
negative dimension of the real as limit of discourse.” 
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Dellagnelo & Mendonça, 2010, p.4; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.47 & 56; 
Torfing, 2005a, p.8). Likewise, a hegemonic antagonism provides the constitutive 
“outside” that stabilises the counter-hegemonic identity, and creating a chain of 
equivalence among different elements, which can, temporarily at least, transform 
into a single entity in light of their common opposition to the hegemonic force 
(Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.10). For Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.154) categories 
such as ‘serf’, ‘slave’ and so on “do not designate in themselves antagonistic 
positions”. They are designated in this way only by virtue of “a different discursive 
formation, such as ‘the rights inherent in every human being’”, in relation to which 
“the differential positivity of the categories can be subverted and the subordination 
constructed as oppression”. Thus, one of the aims of CDT is to make the 
antagonistic frontiers visible, thus facilitating discursive challenge, re-negotiation 
and subversion. 
 
Symbolic orders are normally able to cover or suture a wide range of rifts in society. 
They are, however, disrupted when crises arise which cannot be domesticated, 
integrated, or explained by the existing system (Torfing 2005a, p.8). Such crises are 
represented as dislocations, that is, destabilising events that uncover the 
undecidable nature of hegemonic social orders. Dislocations result in a proliferation 
of floating signifiers, that is, terms which assume different meanings depending on 
whether they are ‘articulated’ in, for example, liberal or socialist discourse (Torfing 
2005a, p.8). They open up a terrain for new hegemonic articulations to heal the 
structural rift that is left (Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, pp.25-26). Thus, for example, 
the joint occurrence of rising unemployment and rising inflation in the stagflation 
crisis of the 1970s contributed to the end of Keynesianism as the dominant 
economic paradigm and the subsequent rise of neo-liberalism. 
 
Politics, constructed in and through hegemonic struggles, is the discourses, 
institutions and decision-making practices that seek to constitute (and subvert) 
society and is therefore conceived of as necessarily having primacy over the social 
sphere (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.15; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.36; Torfing, 
1999, pp.69-70). 136  Since politics involves contestation among hegemonic 
                                                 
136 Politics in CDT is more than ‘party politics’. It is the manner in which we constantly organise 
and constitute the social in ways that exclude other possible ways (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.36). 
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discourses, power, conceived of in line with Foucault’s (1977) conceptualisation as 
being both productive and constraining, is fundamental to politics. 137 
 
Also fundamental to politics is representation, that is, the presentation, within a 
context where they are not already present, of the interests, wants or opinions of a 
group. Such presentation, involving “the process through which the unachieved 
particular identities are inscribed within a universal context” (Torfing, 1999, p.183), 
is necessarily representational given the practical impossibility of every person in a 
group presenting in universalising platforms, such as media or in parliament. 
Representation cannot be transparent. It is necessarily hybrid in that it involves the 
reconstruction and re-articulation of interests. It is also subject to the type of 
distortion associated with sell out or betrayal. All of this is of major significance in 
post-modern democracies where people identify themselves as having the 
legitimate authority to represent the interests of others by virtue of signifiers (e.g. 
‘democratic’ or ‘constitutional’) that are empty of content. The only possible 
response, according to Laclau (1993, p.289), is to attempt to ensure that 
participation in representation is as high as possible. 
 
The notion of social antagonism is central to political pluralism, which Torfing 
(1999, p.254) defines as conflict “between different hegemonic forces that are 
fighting over the ‘correct’ interpretation of the empty signifiers of freedom and 
equality”. Thus, Mouffe (1996, p.8) observes that plural democracy 138 is 
intrinsically divisive, as indicated in the significant social antagonisms that have 
characterised the 21st century. It follows, therefore, that two extremes must be 
avoided – (a) the Utopian ideal of perfect unity without conflict (Carpentier & 
Spinoy, 2008, p.11; Mouffe, 2000, p.121), and (b) antagonism, which involves the 
absence of any symbolic common ground, and which characterises actors, such as 
terrorists or fundamentalists, who recognise neither the legitimacy nor the 
principles of pluralist democracy, as enemies rather than adversaries (Álvarez, 2010, 
                                                 
137 Politics and power are two sides of the same coin, where power refers to the production of objects 
such as ‘society’ and ‘identity’, politics refers to the always present contingency of these objects 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38) 
138  Torfing (1999, p.303) defines plural democracy as “a democratic sentiment that carries a 
profound respect for plurality and difference. It is the situation where individuals are able to organise 
their lives as they wish, a situation which inevitably leads to conflict and  antagonisms (Torfing, 
1999, p.252).  
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para. 29). Mouffe argues, however, that a deliberative framework (deliberative 
democracy), involving rational argument aimed at mutual understanding, is not 
only inadequate but can be dangerous in that the elimination or relegation of 
dissenting passions may involve the loss of opportunity to give them a democratic 
outlet and, thus, mobilise them to dislocate society (Álvarez, 2010, para.6-7). What 
is needed, according to Mouffe (2000, p.126), is the domestication of antagonistic 
disputes between enemies (that we aim to destroy) into agonistic ones between 
adversaries (that we disagree with). This requires that opponents recognise the 
contingency of their own beliefs and acknowledge the legitimacy and rights of the 
‘Other’ (Álvarez, 2010, para.16-18) while, at the same time, being willing to engage 
in agonistic articulatory practice with the firm intention of transforming power 
relations and creating hegemony (Alvarez, 2010, para. 16-18 & 25). It is important 
to note here that although supporters of deliberative democracy argue that Mouffe’s 
conception of agonism is no different from deliberative democracy in that argument 
requires a consensus at a basic level (Erman, 2009; Knops, 2007), a thesis with 
which Mouffe (2000, p.126) agrees, the consensus is still bound to be a “conflictual 
consensus.” 
 
Within CDT, elements are signs whose differences are not yet discursively 
articulated, leaving them with multiple, potential meanings in periods of social 
crisis. These elements are referred to as floating or empty signifiers where they are 
particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
pp.28-29; Laclau, 2005b, pp.69-71; Worsham & Olson, 1999, pp.129-130). A 
discourse attempts to turn elements into moments by temporarily stopping the 
fluctuations of meaning, thus presenting the illusion of a unified and meaningful 
system aligned to a nodal point (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.26-29; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985, p.105), that is, to a privileged sign or reference point around which 
other elements are ordered. Thus: 
The practice of articulation . . . consists in the construction of nodal points 
which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of the fixation 
proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant 
overflowing of every discourse to the infinitude of the field of discoursivity 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.113). 
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Nodal points are empty and/or floating signifiers representing universally accepted 
ideals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ which redefine the differential identity of 
terms within that discourse (Torfing, 2005a, p.7; Žižek, 1999, pp.19-20). 
Articulation reflects the distinctive interests of social agents and always involves a 
battle to gain hegemony over the definition of nodal points (Böhm, Dellagnelo & 
Mendonça, 2010, p.4), with hegemonic success occurring when discourses are able 
to crystallise as many floating signifiers as possible into a chain of equivalence 
around a nodal point which stops their sliding and fixes their meaning (Torfing, 
1999, p.303; Žižek, 1989, p.87). 139 A chain of equivalence or chain of signification 
is thus made up of a cluster of moments (with the exclusion of all other elements) 
which are linked to a nodal point:  
 
The articulation of a political discourse can only take place around an empty 
signifier that functions as a nodal point. In other words, emptiness is now 
revealed as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition 
of possibility for its hegemonic success (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9). 
 
The processes involved in building chains of equivalences are fundamental to CDT 
since group formation, the establishment of common identities, involves the 
establishment of chains of equivalences. Group formation involves “splitting a 
system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed 
camps”, thus creating a sharp antagonistic frontier in society (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000, p.11). In the context of a common antagonistic force, a common 
identity is articulated and internal differences weakened until the only thing the 
constituent parts have in common is the common enemy (Torfing, 2005a, p.8).  
Thus:  
 
Despite the different content of the particular demands, they will all be 
united in their opposition to the system . . . . What unites the particular 
groups is the construction of a chain of equivalence that emphasizes a 
universalizing sameness of the negated demands (Torfing, 2005a, p.10). 
 
                                                 
139 Žižek (1989, p.87) states that the nodal point ‘quilts’ the floating signifiers into a pattern of 
meaning. 
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A master signifier, such as ‘feminist’, may be constituted as a group through shared 
opposition to ‘unequal gender relations’, ‘patriarchy’ or ‘male oppression’, the 
threat providing a broadly accepted negative focal point from which a common 
project stabilises its identity. Thus, by positing a common enemy, feminism 
obscures internal differences (e.g. coloured versus white feminists) which threaten 
to weaken ‘feminist’ mobilisation. 
 
The logic of difference is opposite to the logic of equivalence. If oppression 
decreases, the equivalential relations dissolve back into an array of differences 
(Critchley & Marchart, 2004, p.4). This expands the differential space so that the 
former antagonistic division is relegated the margins of society. In post-World War 
II Britain, for example, the defeat of the ‘Nazis’ gave rise to a proliferation of 
different political interests (Torfing, 1999, p.126). 
 
The importance of groups forming alliances of popular resistance to a common 
opposition is highlighted in CDT.140 Such alliances do not simply advance related 
demands in a particular field; they hegemonise these demands. Torfing (2005a, 
p.10) therefore asserts that “we should not deny the particularity of political 
identities, but insist on the possibility of articulating broad popular frontiers based 
on a hegemonic universality.” For Laclau (2005a, p.35), demands, the manifestation 
of a grievance resulting from an unfulfilled request, are the basic unit of analysis: 
 
If, for instance, the group of people in that area who have been frustrated in 
their request for better transportation find that their neighbours are equally 
unsatisfied in their claims at the levels of security, water supply, housing, 
schooling, and so on, some kind of solidarity will arise between them all: 
all will share the fact that their demands remain unsatisfied. That is, the 
demands share a negative dimension beyond their positive differential 
nature (Laclau 2005a, p.37). 
 
                                                 
140 Barrett (1994, pp.254-255) observes that "we have moved from a social order in which subjects 
are differentially, but fatefully, positioned, to a social order in which the democratic project can 
articulate itself in a political discourse which takes those differential positionings as an object of 
struggle". 
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When a series of demands from different discursive origins is articulated as 
equivalent, new discourses (or chains of equivalence) come about. Thus, “[w]hat 
unites the particular groups is the construction of a chain of equivalence that 
emphasizes a universalizing sameness of the negated demands” (Torfing, 2005a, 
p.10). 
2.3.4 Challenges to critical discourse theory 
An exhaustive discussion of the challenges to CDT is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, it is important to address the main arguments. 
2.3.4.1 Idealism 
It has been claimed that CDT is idealist, that is, that it denies the independent 
existence of material. Geras’ (1987, p.65) accusation of ‘shamefaced idealism’ is 
not, however, sustainable. The social constructivist claim that matter can be known 
only as a discursive construct (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.108) is by no means the 
same as a claim that there is no such thing as matter outside of discourse (see 
quotation on Pages 65-66). Nevertheless, Eagleton (2007, p.219) argues that Laclau 
and Mouffe’s materialist position goes too far in eliding the distinction between the 
non-discursive and the discursive. In particular, he argues that in claiming not 
simply that politico-ideological interests are not always tied to class situations but 
that there is “no logical connection whatsoever” between politico-ideological 
interests and class situations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.84-85), they go too far. 
He insists (Eagleton, 2007, p.220), for example, that post-Marxist theory itself, 
being historically grounded in a particular phase of capitalism, is “living testimony 
in its very existence to that ‘necessary’ relation between forms of consciousness 
and social reality which it so vehemently denies”. This results, he argues, in the 
opening up of a space of resistance that is so broadly-based as to become irrelevant, 
impotent, and directionless in relation to the current historical context in which, he 
believes, class struggle is (as he also claims it was in the past) the fundamental 
social antagonism (Eagleton, 1981 p.485). In his view, deconstructionism is 
“simply too weak and theoreticist a basis on which to mobilize one’s political 
forces” (Eagleton, 2007, p.xix). Although arguments such as this may be seen as 
going some way towards undermining what Townshend (2004, p.283) refers to as 
‘thick’ versions of CDT, that is, versions that deny the importance of external socio-
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economic factors in shaping the discursive field, they have limited impact in terms 
of what he refers to as ‘thin’ versions (pp.283-284), that is, versions that 
accommodate socio-economic factors and interests and that, therefore, while  
asserting the primacy of the political over the social, nevertheless allow for a level 
of influence in the opposite direction.  
2.3.4.2 Ant(agonistic) and deliberative democracy 
Antagonism plays a central role in CDT as articulated in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) where it is seen as being fundamental to the 
construction of those alliances upon which resistance depends. Therefore, 
dislocation and antagonism are treated as two sides of the same coin, antagonism 
being a characteristic of dislocation. Later, however, Laclau (2004, p.319) argues 
that dislocation need not necessarily involve antagonism. 
 
As stated earlier, Mouffe observes (Álvarez, 2010, para.7) that deliberative 
democracy can be dangerous in that reliance on achieving mutual understanding 
may involve the loss of opportunity to give dissenting passions a democratic outlet 
and, thus, to be mobilised in a way that dislocates society. The solution, agonistic 
democracy (or plural democracy/ radical democracy) is fundamentally different 
from deliberative democracy in that it is not based on the belief that the inequalities 
inherent in discourse can be overcome. Rather, it is based on the belief that it is 
possible to build democracy around difference and dissent rather than consensus. 
This presupposes that it is possible “to turn ‘enemies’ into ‘adversaries’ who agree 
on the basic rules of plural democracy, while disagreeing on their interpretation and 
their implications for how to organize society” (Torfing, 2005a, p.6). Thus, Mouffe 
(Álvarez, 2010, para. 14–18) asserts that agonism begins, first, by recognising that 
“there are conflicting points of view”, and second, by acknowledging “your 
opponent’s legitimacy.” 
 
Although Knops (2007, p.118) believes that rational consensus is not ‘conceptually 
impossible’ but rather a ‘very difficult’ but useful goal to aim at, Purcell (2009, 
pp.150-153) argues that viewing politics as a search for inter-subjective 
understanding and agreement instead of a hegemonic struggle will inevitably be 
unsuccessful. Furthermore, it could be argued that because “dominant classes, 
genders, races, and sexualities begin with greater epistemological authority before 
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they even open their mouth” (Purcell, 2009, p.155), deliberative processes may 
actually reinforce and legitimise existing power relations, preventing 
disempowered groups from using their most promising political tool - conflict - to 
achieve political momentum and mobilise a social movement (Purcell, 2009, pp.153 
& 155).141  
 
In this context, it is important to note that the aim of agonistic democracy is very 
different from that of deliberative democracy. As Erman (2009, p.1047) observes, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of agonistic democracy is based not on the 
Habermasian 142  ideal of rational consensus through mutual understanding but 
rather on shared understandings of what is at stake. CDT recognises that conflict 
and the human will to power are always present in the political. Therefore, rather 
than attempting to achieve the impossible - a benevolent power-neutral decision-
making environment – it instead challenges existing hegemonies, articulating a 
credible alternative. It is only in this context that the concept of agonism can be 
fully understood.  
2.3.4.3 Relativism and the role of the analyst 
For critical discourse theorists, there is no extra-discursive truth, morality or ethics. 
It is, therefore, not surprising to find that they have been accused of relativism, that 
is, of presenting all perspectives as being equally valid. The only possible response 
to this criticism is to stress the importance of the interaction between decision-
making and cultural and historical positioning. Political decisions are taken within 
the sedimented practices that constitute the normative framework of a certain 
society (Butler, Laclau, & Zižek, 2000, p.82). Thus, we always find ourselves 
placed within a particular discourse that provides us with a set of historically 
contingent criteria for determining what is true, right and good (Torfing, 2005a, 
p.9).143 This has particular implications for the role of discourse theorists who can 
                                                 
141 Thus, while dominant groups may incorporate the concerns of weaker groups into their plans, 
they are unlikely to compromise anything essential to their own welfare (Purcell, 2009, p.157).  
142 Jürgen Habermas is a world renowned German sociologist and philosopher perhaps best known 
for his theories on communicative rationality and the structural transformation of the public sphere. 
His communication framework rests on the assumption that mutual understanding is the goal of all 
speech acts, and that human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about such 
understanding. 
143 As Torfing (2005a, p.9) states “only God is capable of transcending all discursivity; we mortals 
are stuck within particular discursive frameworks that define our criteria for judging something to 
be true, right, or good.” 
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never be neutral spectators who interpret and evaluate society (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.6-7); they must necessarily bring their own discursivity into 
play, implicating themselves in power struggles and therefore not only affecting the 
results but also the discourses that are being researched (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
p.22). 
 
Although Fairclough (1992, p.91) insists on the possibility of producing texts that 
are less invested with ideology than others, Teun van Dijk (2008, p.6) urges critical 
discourse analysts to “commit themselves to an engagement in favour of dominated 
groups in society”. Anderson (2003, p.xvii) observes that, according to CDT, 
‘emancipator’ must be rejected as a neutral domicile of the critic since “there is no 
freedom without power”, and Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p.22) note that nobody 
is “sufficiently liberated from the discursive construction of the world” to make a 
distinction between ideological and non-ideological texts. As Eagleton (2007, p.205) 
notes: 
 
[T]he thesis that objects are constructed entirely internal to the discourses 
which constitute them raises the thorny question of how we could ever judge 
that a discourse had constructed its object validly. How can anyone, on this 
theory, ever be wrong? 
 
In response to these issues, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.203) conceptualise 
constructivist critique as “a positioned opening for discussion”. Thus: 
 
[C]ritical research should explicitly position itself and distance itself from 
alternative representation of reality on the grounds that it strives to do 
something specific for specific reasons…[it] should make it clear that [it] is 
just one among other possible representations, thus inviting further 
discussion (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.205). 
 
Since “truth is always local and mobile” (Torfing, 2005a, p.2), there is in principle 
no objective meta-language, methodology or privileged criteria that can verify the 
truth of propositional statements. It follows, therefore, that critical analysts must 
rely on intellectual honesty, theoretical consistency, transparency of the research 
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steps, replicability, historical consistency of argumentation, the systematic 
adherence to a set of explicit rules, and the offering of empirical support (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2002, pp.206-208). However, such criteria are subject to “constant 
renegotiation as there is no way of protecting them from the politico-discursive 
interventions of competing truth regimes” (Torfing, 2005a, p.2).  
2.3.4.4 Critical discourse theory, critical discourse analysis and analytical 
methodology 
It was noted in the previous section that critical discourse analysts should adhere 
systematically to a set of explicit guidelines. This implies an overall methodology. 
How, then, should such a methodology be established? Laclau and Mouffe’s focus 
is theoretical rather than methodological. In an early work Laclau (1979, pp.60-61) 
asserts that the only way forward from a genuine theoretical problem is to supersede 
the existing theoretical system with a new one. The reason is that if an empirical 
resolution can be achieved within the framework of the existing theory, the problem 
is not, in fact, a theoretical one. Rather, the difficulties encountered relate to 
application of the theory. At first sight, it would appear that any problems associated 
with the application of CDT, that is, with the development of appropriate 
methodologies, has already been solved. After all, what is often referred to as 
‘critical discourse analysis’ is a field that is well established. On closer examination, 
however, critical discourse analysis is generally not directly related to critical 
discourse theory as outlined here although it does share many of its tenets. 
 
Critical discourse analysis, which, according to Flowerdew (2008, p.195), grew out 
of the critical linguistics of Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew (1979), focuses on the 
complex inter-relationships between language use and society (Blommaert & 
Bulcaen, 2000, p.454; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.27). It has a strong orientation 
towards the analysis of texts in context. It is often primarily associated with the 
writings of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995), Wodak (1995; 2001), and van Dijk 
(1997, 2008). 144  It is multi-disciplinary in nature, drawing upon theories, 
approaches, methodologies and strategies associated with a range of academic 
disciplines. Its adherents refer to the social theorizing of many of those whose 
                                                 
144 Other approaches are outlined by Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, pp.451-452), Kendall (2007, 
May, p.4), Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.92) and Wodak and Meyer (2009, pp.11-27). 
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influence is evident in the formulation of CDT as articulated by Laclau and Mouffe 
(including Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas, Gramsci and Giddens) and also, 
sometimes, to the critical discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe itself. However, it 
also refers to and makes use of theories, approaches, methodologies and strategies 
associated with other areas of intellectual activity. 
 
At the very heart of critical discourse analysis is the view that discourse and the 
social world are mutually constitutive, that discourse shapes and constructs ideas, 
social identities and relations rather than simply reflecting them (Jørgensen, & 
Phillips, 2002, pp.5, 9, 62 & 67). Critical discourse analysts attempt to make 
transparent the ways in which discourses may embody and reinforce the misuse of 
power and the reinforcement of discrimination and social inequality (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009, pp.3 & 10-12). They may also engage in emancipatory resistance, 
attempting to contribute to radical social change by turning discourse back on those 
in power (Flowerdew, 2008). 
 
There are many different approaches to critical discourse analysis. Among those 
whose approaches are particularly influential are Fairclough (who focuses on 
dialectal relations), Van Dijk (whose work is socio-cognitive in orientation) and 
Wodak (whose focus is discourse-historical).  
 
Fairclough (1992) proposes a three-dimensional model which is based on the 
principle that texts can never be understood in isolation from webs of other texts 
and the social context. It therefore combines analysis of texts (e.g. how linguistic 
features such as metaphors construct meaning and identities) with analysis of 
discursive practices (e.g. the rules and processes of discourse production) and of 
the wider social context that impinges upon the text (Fairclough, 1992, pp.71-73). 
 
Van Dijk (2008, p.213) focuses on the interaction between society, cognition and 
discourse on the basis that, “[m]anipulation is always between social actors, is 
always exercised through discourse, and always centers on the mind”. For him, a 
primary aim of critical discourse analysis is to deconstruct the two overarching 
goals of mental manipulation, that is (a) the ‘mental models’ of specific social 
structures or events, and (b) the social representations of groups of people 
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(pp.viii,16, 63 & 66). While he believes that both influence attitudes, ideologies and 
social practices, he considers the latter to be particularly important in view of the 
fact that acceptance of the social representations of dominant groups can eventually 
serve as a permanent basis for inequality (pp.222 – 226 & 230).  
 
Ruth Wodak (2001), adopting a discourse-historical approach, attempts to 
understand the multifaceted social phenomena under investigation through 
triangulating data and integrating various perspectives. This triangulatory approach 
involves four levels of context: (a) the immediate text (coherence/cohesion); (b) 
interdiscursive and intertextual relationships among related current or historical 
utterances, texts, genres, and discourses; (c) the extralinguistic sociological 
variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ (for example, 
a party election leaflet), and finally (d) the broader sociopolitical and historical 
contexts within which the discoursive practices are embedded. In collaboration with 
Reisigl (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, pp.93-94), she elaborates five discursive 
strategies: 
 
 Nomination (how the persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and 
actions are named and referred to linguistically); 
 Predication (what characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to 
social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes); 
 Argumentation (what arguments and justifications are used in the discourse); 
 Perspectivisation/framing (from what perspective nominations, attributions 
and arguments are expressed); 
 Intensification/mitigation (whether the utterances are articulated overtly and 
whether they are intensified or mitigate). 
 
The focus of different critical discourse analysts and different schools of critical 
discourse analysis varies, as does their approach to the analysis of texts in context. 
It is, therefore, not possible to relate critical discourse analysis in any direct way to 
the critical discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. Consequently, neither is it 
possible, where the aim is to put CDT into practice, to select any one of the 
analytical approaches adopted by critical discourse analysts. However, as Jørgensen 
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and Phillips (2002, pp.8, 49 & 63) observe, there are no specific methodological 
guidelines and illustrative examples of analysis associated directly with CDT as 
articulated by Laclau and Mouffe. Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, p.5) claim that 
this is due, in part, to (a) a post-positivist disdain for the need for ‘empirical’ facts 
in the analysis of theoretical statements, and (b) the rigid application of pre-existing 
theory, which tends to preclude innovation and to pre-determine the outcomes. 
However, as Torfing (1999, p.292) observes, the critical issue here is the fact that 
although CDT is not content to remain merely theoretical, its analysts avoid 
developing any “all purpose technique” or “totalising master methodology,” 
preferring instead methodological bricolage, whereby the methods used are 
determined in relation to the particular concrete setting. Thus, it has been argued 
that CDT can be viewed as an open and flexible toolbox that can be applied to a 
variety of research areas and theories, including materialist and qualitative forms of 
analysis (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.21; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.5; 
Townshend, 2004, p.286). Even so, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.154-155) 
insist that successful combination requires an explicit and careful integration of 
these research frameworks. 
 
2.3.5 Deriving effectiveness criteria from critical discourse theory 
I have argued that the achievement of hegemony, something that is central to CDT, 
is also central to the successful negotiation of language policy and language 
planning and that, therefore, language policy and planning as a discipline needs to 
be firmly located within the context of CDT. One of the advantages of doing so is 
that it provides us with the possibility of developing criteria based on CDT (referred 
to here as ‘effectiveness criteria’) that will assist those involved in language policy 
and planning to make decisions about the content and organisation of discourse that 
have the express purpose of improving LPP efforts to address language 
revitalisation. 
 
Based on the review of literature on CDT here, I have developed a range of 
effectiveness criteria that are intended to be useful in determining the extent to 
which texts that come within the general domain of LPP are likely to be effective 
in developing hegemony and, therefore, in achieving the policy and planning goals 
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of their authors. These effectiveness criteria are outlined below under five main 
headings: 
Representation of an ‘in-group’ 
1. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with 
the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
2. Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently 
inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that 
group and to resonate positively with them? 
Representation of an ‘other’ identity 
3. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent 
with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
4. Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived as 
inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group? 
Group formation and fragmentation: The logics of equivalence and difference 
5. Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the 
potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims? 
6. Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its 
aims? 
7. Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an 
opposition coalition? 
8. Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by 
articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a 
coalition of different interests? 
Engagement with hegemonic interests / key decision makers145 
9. Are hegemonic interests / key decision makers positioned in a way that is 
likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement 
with them? 
                                                 
145 In the local context of the texts discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, hegemonic interests have been 
interpreted as key decision makers. 
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10. Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests / key 
decision makers? 
Dislocation and deconstruction 
11. Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and 
expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised 
fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and 
exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical 
manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented 
policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies 
between its promises and achievements? 
 
12. Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way 
that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate 
positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership? 
 
These criteria are applied to the analysis of a number of texts that relate directly to 
indigenous language revitalisation in Australia (Chapter 3) and New Zealand 
(Chapters 4 & 5), the findings of the analyses being discussed in relation to the 
ways in which each of these texts was received. 
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Chapter 3 
A criterion-referenced analysis of Our Land Our Languages 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, Our Land Our Languages, a report written by the Australian House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
Affairs (HRSCATSI), is analysed in terms of the criteria outlined in Chapter 2 
(3.3).146 The analysis is preceded by some relevant background to the report (3.2) 
and followed by a discussion of responses to it (3.4) and some concluding remarks 
(3.5). 
 
An electronic copy of this report is available from the Parliament of Australia: 
www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives
_Committees?url=atsia/languages2/report.htm 
3.2 Background to the report 
Indigenous Australian languages are among the most endangered in the world. Of 
the 250 distinct languages that existed prior to colonisation, only a handful are 
expected to survive without substantial and urgent language intervention 
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Social Justice Commissioner (ATSISJC), 
2009, pp.57-58; HRSCATSI, 2012, pp.33-34). Nevertheless, despite a growing 
willingness in much of Australian society to support progressive policies for 
indigenous people, the presence of residual colonist ideologies and attitudes within 
contemporary political and societal institutions, as well as the relative 
powerlessness of indigenous people themselves, have prevented real progress from 
being made (Luker, 2006, pp.48-50 & 285; Moreton-Robinson, 2003, pp.24-26; 
Mühlhäusler & Damania, 2004, p.1).  
                                                 
146 The full title is Our Land Our Languages: Language learning in indigenous communities. The 
HRSCATSI is one of 9 general purpose standing committees within the Australian Parliament which 
hold inquiries into various matters relating to government policy, administration or performance. At 
the time of the inquiry the Committee consisted of 7 members of parliament: four from the governing 
Labor Party (including Chair Shayne Neumann, Sharon Grierson, Ed Husic and Graham Perrett) 
and 3 non-Government Members (including Natasha Griggs (Country Liberal), Dr Sharman Stone 
(Liberal) and Barry Haase (Liberal)). Although no member of this committee is indigenous, there 
is, within the committee, a degree of goodwill towards Indigenous Australians as indicated by the 
references to Aboriginal people and traditional custodians in the majority of this group’s maiden 
speeches in parliament (with Stone and Haase being the exceptions). 
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In this context, the HRSCATSI Committee (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Committee’) approached appropriate Ministers for terms of reference for an inquiry 
into indigenous languages, having stressed in an earlier inquiry relating to youth 
justice that language is “an important component of cultural connection and 
community building” (Neumann, 2011, August 22).147 On 5 July 2011, the Minister 
for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the 
Minister for the Arts jointly initiated the inquiry (Information about the inquiry, 
n.d.). 
 
The Terms of Reference were as follows: 148 
 
The Committee will inquire into and report on Indigenous languages in 
Australia, with a particular focus on: 
 
 The benefits of giving attention and recognition to Indigenous languages; 
 The contribution of Indigenous languages to Closing the Gap and 
strengthening Indigenous identity and culture; 149 
 The potential benefits of including Indigenous languages in early education; 
 Measures to improve education outcomes in those Indigenous communities 
where English is a second Language; 
 The educational and vocational benefits of ensuring English language 
competency amongst Indigenous communities; 
 Measures to improve Indigenous language interpreting and translating 
services; 
                                                 
147 The inquiry report referred to earlier is Doing time—time for doing. It considered indigenous 
youth in the criminal justice system. Neumann (2011, August 22) noted that “[m]any people referred 
to language as playing a significant role in the wellbeing of Indigenous people. Aboriginal elders 
reiterated time and time again that their Indigenous languages keep culture alive”. 
148 The Terms of Reference for this type of review are significant because they provide the scope 
and ethos of the review and therefore tend to prefigure the findings. 
149 Closing The Gap On Indigenous Disadvantage (CTG) is a comprehensive, integrated, long term, 
equality based policy that invests just under A$5 billion per year in basic health, education, 
employment and other services in order to increase life opportunities for ATS people. It derived 
from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) under the Rudd government in 2008 and 
involves formal agreements between national and state governments as well as partnerships with 
corporate and community sectors. 
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 The effectiveness of current maintenance and revitalisation programs for 
Indigenous languages; 
 The effectiveness of the Commonwealth Government Indigenous languages 
policy in delivering its objectives and relevant policies of other Australian 
governments (HRSCATSI, 2012, p.xi). 
 
The inquiry lasted twelve months. There were one hundred and fifty four (154) 
submissions and twenty three (23) consultation hearings throughout the country. Its 
two hundred and fifty six (256) page, seven (7) chapter report, entitled Our Land 
Our Languages, was tabled in Parliament on the 17th of September 2012. 
 
In a speech supporting the tabling of the report in Parliament, the deputy-chair of 
the Committee, Dr. Sharman Stone (2012, September 17), summarised the overall 
intent of the inquiry as follows: 
 
To identify whether it is important to recognise and help to preserve 
traditional languages and, if so, to identify exactly what traditional language 
learning gives to its speakers. We also looked at how the continued 
preservation and use of one's home language - in this case, traditional 
Indigenous language - impacts on other learning by the children, in 
particular their learning of standard Australian English. 
 
In the report, the Committee not only stressed the importance of indigenous 
languages to their speaking communities in terms of cultural connection and self-
identity, but also found that “the use of languages, including Indigenous languages 
and Standard Australian English, can assist in improving education, vocational and 
economic outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (HRSCATSI, 
2012, p.2). Dr. Stone (2012, September 17) made the following observation: 
 
We found overwhelming evidence that there was an enormous benefit when 
the people of any human society, including our Indigenous Australians, are 
able to speak, preserve and indeed restore their native languages. 
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The Committee made thirty (30) recommendations, a number of which focused on 
the need for Government action in relation to recommendations made in previous 
reports. The report’s key recommendations include: 
 
 recognition of indigenous languages in the Closing the Gap 
framework and in the Constitution; 
 Parliamentary leadership in the recognition and acknowledgement 
of Indigenous languages; 
 expansion of the Indigenous Languages Support (ILS) program and 
prioritisation of the development of language nests; 
 updating of the National Indigenous Languages Policy action plan 
with clear goals, accountability and reporting requirements;150 
 enhancement of the capacity of Indigenous language projects to 
maintain and revive languages through greater access to resources, 
including Deductible Gift Recipient eligibility and enabling Torres 
Strait Islander applications for ILS funding; 
 implementation and review of relevant international human rights 
instruments;151 
 resourcing of bilingual education and provision of alternative 
reporting methods for literacy development where children speak an 
Indigenous language as a first language; 
 increased level of cultural awareness among all teaching staff as well 
as compulsory English as an Additional Language or Dialect 
(EAL/D) training for teachers; 
                                                 
150 In 2009, in response to the NILS report 2005, which found that the situation of Australia’s 
Indigenous languages was grave and required urgent action, the Commonwealth Government 
announced a national Indigenous languages policy: Indigenous Languages – A National Approach. 
The objectives include (a) increasing national attention and appreciation of ATS languages; (b) 
supporting the restoration and maintenance of ATS languages; (c) Government recognition and 
investment in interpreting and translating services; (d) strengthening cultural and language esteem 
through language revival; and (e) supporting ATS language programmes in schools. A discussion 
of this policy is found in Our Land Our Languages (pp.50-53). 
151 In 2009, the Australian Government became a signatory of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)(2007), a declaration which reaffirms the right of Indigenous peoples 
to have access to an education provided in their own culture and language (Purdie, Frigo, Ozolins, 
Noblett, Thieberger, & Sharp, 2008, p.ix). 
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 first language assessments of Indigenous children entering early 
childhood education, and alternative NAPLAN methods and 
reporting for students whose first language is not English;152 
 establishment of a national Indigenous interpreting service and 
immediate development and implementation of measures to ensure 
competent interpreting services in the health and justice sectors; 
 development of careers for Indigenous language interpreters and 
translators through improved access to training and accreditation, 
and protocols to ensure that interpreters are used when required; 
 development of strategies for training Indigenous language teachers;  
 creation of a dedicated language archive at AIATSIS and increased 
community access to those materials.153 
 
3.3 Criterion-referenced analysis of the report 
Although there is, inevitably, considerable overlap among categories, each of the 
criteria (and each of the questions relating to each of the criteria), is discussed 
separately in the analysis below. In order to add emphasis, italic print is used in 
sections of some of the extracts from the report cited below.154 
3.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’ 
 
Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
 
Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as 
sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership 
of that group and to resonate positively with them? 
                                                 
152 In 2008, the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) commenced in 
Australian schools. It is a national testing program for all Australian students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 
in reading, writing, language conventions and numeracy. The tests are in English, leading to 
criticism that it gives an inaccurate assessment of the abilities of students with first languages other 
than English as proficiency in English for these students increases dramatically only in the final 
years of primary school. 
153 AIATSIS refers to the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. 
154 In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the Our Land Our Languages report will show 
only the page number. For example, instead of ‘(HRSCATSI, 2012, p.56)’ it will show ‘(p.56)’. 
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The report aims to shift perspectives by re-articulating the strongly held national 
‘Australian’ identity in a way that makes it more inclusive.155 
 
It begins by representing the report writers as members of an all-Australian ‘in-
group’, using the first person plural inclusive pronoun (we) and possessive adjective 
(our), reinforced by the inclusive adjective (all), and thereby ameliorating the 
impact of the moral imperative associated with the choice of auxiliary verb 
(should): 156 
 
We should all have an interest in and where possible learn about and 
incorporate local Indigenous languages into our workplaces, our 
communities and our everyday lives (p.33). 
 
Those who submitted views - views that are included in extracts - are also 
represented as members of this ‘in-group’. Thus, for example, in the extract below, 
we again see the inclusive use of ‘we’ and ‘all’, this time supplemented by reference 
to ‘the broader Australian society’. It is relevant to note that this extract is attributed 
to Dr. Nick Thieberger, the use of the short form of the first name (Nick), which 
gives a sense of intimacy and immediacy, contrasting with the use of the title (Dr), 
which imbues the views expressed with a sense of knowledge and authority – 
which, by association, are shared by those who adopt a similar stance. On this 
occasion, the emphasis is on future benefits for this broadly inclusive ‘in-group’, 
benefits that will involve the re-specification of the in-group itself (the broader 
Australian society) as one that is characterised by the ability to ‘appreciate’ and 
‘understand’: 
 
The value for the broader Australian society is that we will all be able to 
appreciate Indigenous societies in greater depth if we are able to understand 
more of their languages (p.19). 
 
                                                 
155 The term ‘Australia(ns)’ is sometimes used in this section as a short form for both ‘Australia’ 
(nation) & ‘Australians’ (people). 
156 It is acknowledged that the predominant term of self-reference in the report is the formal ‘the 
Committee’. This will be discussed later. 
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In their attempt to strengthen the sense of a common identity shared by this 
(idealised) in-group (Australians), the report writers universalise widespread 
characteristics of Australian society (Australian dialect and culture), referring to 
them as ‘unique’ markers of group identity and therefore, by implication, 
associating them with other unique characteristics of broader Australian society, 
that is, the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples. Reference to the sense 
of otherness experienced by Australians when travelling overseas provides readers 
with an opportunity to identify with that sense of otherness that Indigenous 
Australians may experience at home, a sense of otherness that can nevertheless be 
accommodated within the over-arching in-group Australian identity. Once again, 
the report writers signal their solidarity with an idealised in-group (all Australians) 
by using an inclusive pronoun (we) and possessive adjective (our): 
 
As Australians we are aware of the particularities of our language and 
culture when we travel to places where language and culture differs from 
our own. Even when we might understand the language, for example, when 
travelling to England, America or New Zealand, differences in accents, 
phrasing and colloquial terms can reaffirm our sense of identity as 
Australians through the use of unique elements of Australian English and 
Australian culture. Often we recognise another Australian by the style of 
English language that is used (p.7). 
 
It is important to note that the reference here to an overseas ‘out-group’ provides an 
‘Other’ identity in relation to which the Australian ‘in-group’ can be constructed. 
The effect of this is to strengthen the over-arching Australian in-group identity and, 
in doing so, to reduce any potential focus on internal differences within that identity. 
The important role that indigenous languages play in creating this sense of shared 
identity is repeatedly reinforced: 
 
The chapter discusses the value of promoting Indigenous languages as a 
vital part of Australia’s living cultural heritage (p.4). 
 
Building the recognition and appreciation of [Indigenous] languages will 
also contribute to the national pride of all Australians (p.16). 
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Greater understanding and shared ownership of [indigenous] languages . . 
. will contribute to the Australian identity of all students, schools and 
communities . . . (p.18). 
 
The Committee encourages all Australians to take pride in the Indigenous 
languages that surround us and to value our rich heritage . . . . Each and 
every one of us has a role to play in progressing us along the path of 
reconciliation and in defining what it means to be Australian (p.33). 
 
The indigenous languages of Australia are presented as being valuable to all 
Australians (as part of in-group identity), a source of pride and benefit 157 whose 
loss would “would disadvantage all Australians” (p.27), and, therefore, as being 
worthy of maintenance and revitalisation: 
 
Although it was understood that Indigenous languages are valuable to those 
who are descendants of a particular language group, the benefits of 
maintaining and revitalising Indigenous languages to all Australians was a 
recurrent issue throughout the inquiry (p.15). 
 
Implicit in this conceptualisation of an all-Australian identity is the right of both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people to claim a shared sense of national identity. 
This is a fundamental message of the report as indicated in its presence in the 
report’s title itself (Our Land Our Languages) as well as in the foreword and 
concluding comments: 
 
To all Australians I say: take pride in the Indigenous languages of our 
nation. Indigenous languages bring with them rich cultural heritage, 
knowledge and a spiritual connection to the land (v.iii). 
                                                 
157 The benefits provided to Australians by Indigenous language are referred to at the following 
points in the report: improved educational and social outcomes (p.2); ecological knowledge (p.27); 
historical and cultural knowledge (p.67); heritage and living value (p.72); academic benefit and 
cultural, spiritual connection to the land (p.viii).  
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For all Australians, Indigenous languages are about who we are as a nation, 
about the place we call home, the country we live in, and the land we call 
Australia (p.213). 
 
The answer to the questions that headed this section is affirmative in both cases. An 
inclusive, all-Australia ‘in-group’ is established and implicitly represented as being 
knowledgeable, authoritative, contemporary and enlightened, with Indigenous 
languages articulated as a core and valuable part of the whole. This identity clearly 
serves the overall purpose of the text, that is, to shift perspectives in order to reduce 
opposition and gain as much support as possible for its recommendations. 
3.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity 
 
Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
 
Question 4: Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be 
perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership 
of that group? 
 
The report writers use nomenclature as one way of signalling that those who might 
otherwise be regarded as ‘Other’ must be included in membership of the 
overarching in-group. The default designator used to refer to Aboriginal peoples is 
Indigenous Australians (used 43 times in the report), the word Aboriginal occurring 
only in the context of quotation from, or reference to submissions to the Committee 
or as part of the group designation Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.158  This 
re-articulation of ‘Aboriginal Other’ as part of an ‘Australian Us’ makes the 
Aboriginal people and their perspective more difficult to ignore, particularly for 
politicians who have a specific responsibility to represent the Australian 
constituency as a whole.  
 
                                                 
158 The term Australia’s Indigenous peoples is also used 2 times in the report. 
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The grounds given for this ‘Other as In-group’ claim, as well as the associated 
assertion that Indigenous languages are central to this identity, include Indigenous 
Australians’ authentic connection to Australia, through land occupation and 
ownership. For example: 
 
This report builds on [the Mabo decision] and recognises and celebrates the 
languages of Australia’s Indigenous peoples who have lived in this land for 
over tens of thousands of years (pp.vii-viii).159 
 
This report recognises and celebrates the languages of Australia’s 
Indigenous peoples who were the original owners of this land for tens of 
thousands of years (p.1). 
 
The deep connection that the languages have to Australia is also highlighted: 
 
[I]t is equally important for all Australians to recognise the several hundred 
unique Indigenous languages that were spoken for tens of thousands of 
years in Australia (p.8). 
 
There is a potential danger in the stratagem of including indigenous peoples in an 
overarching in-group identity (rather than presenting them as being the Other). The 
danger is that this will lead to the suppression of their unique voices and concerns 
and appropriation of their languages and cultures. Thus, for example: 
 
The NILS report 2005 emphasised the urgency of the problem facing all 
Australians to keep many of the endangered Indigenous languages alive 
(p.40). 
 
This danger is offset by the inclusion of a large volume of direct quotation from 
submissions by indigenous people themselves. These quotations provide a 
humanising insight into Indigenous perspectives and values (“what their languages 
mean to them” (p.4)), as well as reasserting a parallel sense of separate (and 
                                                 
159 The Mabo decision recognised that ‘terra nullius', the concept that Australia was unoccupied at 
the time of colonisation, is a fiction" (p.1). See pages 103-104 for more information on this decision. 
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included) identity. Here, inclusive pronouns are used with more restricted reference, 
as in the examples below: 
 
[O]ur language helps us with our identity and our culture, and helps us work 
out where we fit in society, for example who we are related to (pp.9-10). 
 
With our language we know where we belong, we know the names from our 
country (p.11). 
 
You heard the old people talk about what language means to us. Once the 
language is taken away then our country and our culture are taken away. We 
will be nobody (p.15). 
 
The report establishes an overall set (an ‘in-group’ made up of all Australians) and 
a particular sub-set (part of that ‘in-group’) whose members also identify as 
belonging to an ‘other group’ made up of Indigenous Australians. This has the effect 
of recognising and respecting their right to assert their essential indigenous 
otherness at the same time as recognising and respecting their right to membership 
of the overarching insider group. This way of constructing the identity of 
Indigenous Australian is wholly consistent with the purpose of the text and is, in 
addition, unlikely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive, 
particularly in view of the following extract from the beginning of the report: 
 
Throughout this report the use of the word ‘Indigenous’ respectfully refers 
to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people of Australia (p.2). 
 
Furthermore, on those few occasions when indigenous people are referred to by the 
authors as ‘Other’ (‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their/s’), there is a clear intention to redress 
the usual imbalanced representation, the standard fare negative portrayal being 
replaced by a positive portrayal: 
 
Sadly, it is these tragic outcomes that dominate many media stories. 
However there are positive stories that are not being heard – and many of 
these stories are about language and about communities working together 
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to preserve, revitalise and sustain their Indigenous languages. These 
communities are raising their children strong in first language and able to 
speak SAE and make choices for their future (p.64). 
 
Another excellent example of achievement is the 2012 Senior Australian of 
the Year Laurie Baymarrwangga, who was recognised for ‘almost 
singlehandedly nurturing the inter-generational transmission of local 
ecological knowledge through a lifelong commitment to caring for kin, 
culture and country’ (p.20). 
 
Another excellent example of an organisation working within a region to 
support a range of communities to preserve their languages was the Papulu 
Apparr-Kari Aboriginal Corporation based in Tenant Creek (p.191).160 
 
The inclusive all Australia in-group is so strongly formulated that the only out-
group detectable, with one important exception (which is discussed below), is that 
group which is made up of non-Australians, that is, those who do not share in that 
heritage of which indigenous language and culture constitute a major part. As 
indicated in Section 3.3.1, this group includes those from “places where language 
and culture differs from our own . . . for example . . . England, America or New 
Zealand, [where] differences in accents, phrasing and colloquial terms can reaffirm 
our sense of identity as Australians (p.7).  
 
The exception referred to above is the group whose members are associated with a 
‘monolingual mindset’, representing dissent from the Committee’s aims (a common 
adversary/ other identity). However, the existence of such a group is generally 
inferential and often historical and depersonalised (e.g. Government policies of the 
past) rather than the subject of direct reference, as in the following extracts: 
 
                                                 
160 This corporation is also commended earlier in the document: “The Papulu Appar-kari Language 
centre produces excellent children’s books” (p.60). 
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Chapter 3 examines the policy context for Indigenous languages in 
Australia, including the limited support those languages have received from 
Australian governments in the past (p.4). 
 
These languages have not always received due recognition in the past (p.8). 
 
Past policies of Australian governments have contributed to the loss of 
language and culture in many Indigenous communities.  . . . The Committee 
believes successive governments have failed to prevent the continued 
decline of Indigenous languages (p.30). 
 
The implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern 
Territory has received varying levels of Northern Territory Government 
support through to the present day (p.46). 
 
Limited recognition of Indigenous languages occurred in the 1960s . . . The 
implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern Territory 
has received varying levels of Northern Territory Government support 
through to the present day (p.46). 
 
In addition, where the monolingual mindset is directly associated with particular 
people, amelioration is generally provided and the report’s authors are careful not 
to identify these people as belonging to an ‘out-group’: 
 
However, many non Indigenous Australians may not have considered the 
critical importance of language to a persons’ identity, sense of belonging 
and cultural connection (p.9). 
 
The fact that many Australians are unaware of the rich diversity of 
Indigenous languages that have existed in Australia is an area that should 
be improved (p.31). 
 
The report identifies Indigenous people as an integral and valued part of the 
Australian in-group without undermining their sense of uniqueness. The only real 
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‘out-group’ detectable (other than non-Australians) is those with a ‘monolingual 
mindset’. However, the abstract way in which this is presented, together with the 
fact that none of these people is identified (named and shamed), means that offence 
is unlikely to be taken. The answer to the questions with which this section began 
is therefore in the affirmative in both cases. 
3.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation 
There are four questions under this heading. Each is considered separately below. 
 
Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to 
increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support 
for its aims? 
 
A central aim of Our land Our Languages is to challenge the notion that “Australia 
is a monolingual nation”, one in which “only standard Australian English can 
benefit a person” (p.1). Synonymous with this notion is what is referred to by Greg 
Dickson (2012, September 17) and Lisa Waller (2012, September 26) as a 
‘monolingual mindset’, that is, the ideological source of opposition to policies that 
encourage the maintenance or revitalisation of languages other than the dominant 
one. It is this mindset that is identified as the common adversary in the report.161 
 
As indicated in Section 3.3.2, while a common adversary/ out-group is identified, 
the writers are careful not to cause offence. Thus, the adversary is represented in 
terms of a particular mindset, one which is located largely in the past and associated 
with institutional decision-making rather than with individuals. The writers avoid 
any direct reference to Australians who do not support positive intervention. They 
also, wherever possible, avoid direct attribution of blame. Rather, the preference is 
to omit any statement of agency by using (a) non-agentive passive constructions 
(e.g. These languages have not always received due recognition in the past) or (b) 
nouns that have negative senses or connotations in association with particles that 
signal forward movement (e.g. changing attitudes, healing scars). Potential 
negatives are de-centered, the emphasis being placed on implied ameliorative 
                                                 
161 It is indicative of the overall positive tone and purposes of the report that the Committee do not 
refer to this mindset as xenophobia. 
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reasons (e.g. . . . many Australians are unaware of the rich diversity of Indigenous 
languages).  
 
The difficulty for members of the Committee, however, is that they would be remiss 
if they did not identify the cause of the poor state of indigenous languages, and 
although blaming Government would provide a common adversary in opposition 
to which further support might be rallied, to do so would have had the potential to 
alienate those best positioned to give effect to the report’s recommendations. The 
Committee finds the perfect culprit – past governments (small ‘g’ and plural 
number): 
Chapter 3 examines the policy context for Indigenous languages in 
Australia, including the limited support those languages have received from 
Australian governments in the past (p.4). 
 
Twenty years later, this Committee is appalled that it is faced with making 
the same recommendations to government and trusts it will not be met with 
the inaction that has characterised successive governments (p.184). 
 
Past policies of Australian governments have contributed to the loss of 
language and culture in many Indigenous communities . . . . The Committee 
believes successive governments have failed to prevent the continued 
decline of Indigenous languages (p.30). 
 
Thus, although there is evidence of a common adversary - a combination of a 
monolingual mindset and past governments - against which the views of Committee 
members and, by implication, those of ‘broader Australian society’ can be offset, 
depersonalisation and historical distancing function to reduce or remove any sense 
of personal opprobrium which would be likely to result in the hardening of 
opposition. In this way, a space is created in which adversaries have an opportunity 
to rethink their positioning without loss of face and, in doing so, associate 
themselves with views that are presented as being contemporary, enlightened, 
knowledgeable and authoritative. 
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Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of 
support for its aims? 
 
The report makes reference to twenty three (23) public hearings and receipt of over 
one hundred and fifty four (154) submissions, recording thanks to “those people 
who put much time into their excellent contributions to submissions and during 
hearings” (p.viii) and quoting extensively from these contributions and 
submissions. It uses the names of submitting organisations and the titles of 
submitters (e.g. Doctor; Professor) along with the evidence they provided in a way 
that gives credibility by association to the recommendations of the Committee. The 
writers of the report comment favourably on the activities of several individuals and 
groups, including governments, as exemplified in the extracts below: 
 
The Committee praises the work of all organisations, communities and 
individuals who are striving, often with very limited resources, to preserve 
Indigenous languages for future generations (p.198). 
 
The Committee commends AIATSIS . . . commends the staff . . . and the 
researchers who have been responsible for generating much of the material 
held in the AVA (p.209). 
 
There has been considerable funding and effort by all governments and 
community groups in assisting with the Closing the Gap strategy (p.30). 
 
The Committee commends the New South Wales government’s ongoing 
commitment to supporting Indigenous languages (p.58). 
 
The Committee commends the Western Australian government for the 
development of the limited authority to teach qualification being offered to 
Indigenous language teachers (p.135). 
 
As well as emphasising the variety of institutions and individuals within the 
coalition of support, the report emphasises the geographical breadth of that support:  
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In Adelaide the Committee heard from an ex-principal, Alitya Rigney, of 
the Kaurna Plains School (p.14). 
 
In Darwin, Maratja Dhamarrandji commented on the importance of 
language as a tool for good education (p.14).  
 
Across Australia, there has been a groundswell of activity in the area of 
language maintenance and revitalisation (p.2). 
 
The Committee thanks those that provided examples of the many language 
resources being developed around Australia (p.4). 
 
The Committee held public hearings in various locations throughout 
Australia  . . . and received evidence from many Indigenous people (p.9). 
 
In addition, the report draws heavily on decisions, reports, surveys, and policies by 
influential bodies in a way that suggests that its own findings and recommendations 
are merely a reiteration of those of others. One of the most important references is 
to the 1992 Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia which is positioned as 
foundational to the report, thereby making the judiciary a powerful ally for its 
aims:162 
 
This report builds on the Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia in 
1992 which recognised the occupancy of the Indigenous peoples and their 
on-going connection to the land. That decision was a vital step in redressing 
past wrongs and it acknowledged the richness of Indigenous heritage and its 
place as a living culture . . . . However, twenty years on from that decision 
and we have failed to close the gap on Indigenous disadvantage . . . . It is 
                                                 
162 The 1992 Mabo Decision was a highly controversial landmark decision that recognised, for the 
first time, that native title rights survived colonial settlement (albeit subject to the sovereignty of the 
Crown), thus rejecting the doctrine that pre-colonisation Australia was 'terra nullius' (a land 
belonging to no one). Although the decision caused widespread concern among non-aboriginal 
Australians at the time – a fear that they might lose their houses, for example - the impact on them 
has been minimal. By linking this report with the Mabo judgement, the Committee is suggesting 
that the recognition of Indigenous languages is both as equally justified and as equally 
nonthreatening. 
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the desire of this Committee that in 2012, twenty years since the Mabo land 
decision, the next vital decision is made by governments and by all 
Australians to recognise and value Indigenous languages. Through land and 
language we can close the gap (p.212).163 
 
A prominent supporter of the Committee’s work is the Minister of the Arts, one of 
those who supported the call for an inquiry: 
 
These issues [deductible gift recipient eligibility] were examined in the 
2011 Review of Private Sector Support for the Arts, which was undertaken 
by Mr Harold Mitchell AC and commissioned by the Minister for the Arts . 
. . . [T]he Committee strongly supports the changes to the ROCO as 
recommended by the Mitchell review (p.72). 
 
Some other examples of an influential coalition of support for the Committee’s 
positioning are included below: 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics released research highlighting the 
benefits of maintaining Indigenous languages to enhance young peoples' 
wellbeing (p.26). 
 
In 2012, the United Nations held a forum on ‘The Study on the role of 
languages and culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and 
identity of indigenous peoples’. The importance of language is summed up 
in the following quote . . . (p.8). 
 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman reported in its March 2011 report Talking 
in Language: Indigenous Language Interpreters and Government 
Communication that. . . . (pp.164-165). 
 
                                                 
163 Also worthy of note is the use of the full name, High Court of Australia, which although a 
convention for these reports, resonates with the report’s focus on representing Australia as 
supportive to its aims. 
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A report published by the World Bank in 2006 supported the need to teach in 
first language  . . . (p.113). 
 
The very fact that the Committee includes members of opposing political parties is 
itself a significant signal of a widespread coalition of support, something that is 
reinforced near the end of the foreword of the report when the Committee’s 
chairperson (Labor party MP, Shayne Neumann) thanks the deputy chairperson 
(Liberal party MP, Dr. Sharman Stone). 
 
Our Land Our Languages provides quotations from a large number of credible 
submissions and witnesses as well as influential national and international identities 
that support it aims. Indeed, its recommendations sometimes echo those of these 
influential groups. Individuals and groups within this coalition are not only referred 
to respectfully but often in highly positive ways, and are therefore likely to form a 
coalition of support for the aims of the report. 
 
Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the 
creation of an opposition coalition? 
 
This report employs a wide range of strategies which would appear to be calculated 
to avoid the creation and/ or reinforcement of an opposing coalition. These include, 
as indicated above, the positive representation of Australians as knowledgeable, 
authoritative, contemporary and enlightened and the efforts not to cause offence by 
associating the ideological adversary with any contemporary individuals. Indeed, 
that the writers are at pains to avoid alienating any potential opposition coalition is 
clearly evidenced in their determination to avoid causing offence to those most 
likely to form one, such as the supporters of the much maligned Northern Territory 
Compulsory English Teaching in English in the First Four Hours of Each School 
Day policy (hereafter referred to as the ‘English in the First Four Hours’ policy). It 
was noted in one submission that “[the] policy has been criticised widely by 
politicians, educators, Indigenous leaders, Indigenous language speakers, linguists 
and human rights advocates” (p.116). Nevertheless, in referring to it, the report 
writers focus on what they choose to represent as laudable intentions: 
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After reviewing the evidence and speaking with the Northern Territory 
Government representatives in Darwin, the Committee believes the 
Northern Territory Government had the best of intentions in 2008 when it 
announced the Compulsory Teaching in English for the first four hours, in 
order to improve English competency and NAPLAN results. However the 
Committee believes this policy was not successful in achieving its aims of 
improving educational outcomes for Indigenous students in the Northern 
Territory (p.119). 
 
In a further example, the authors avoid direct criticism indicating their acceptance 
of the fact that not all responses were necessarily negative. See below 
 
The implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern 
Territory has received varying levels of . . . support through to the present 
day (p.46). 
 
Another stratagem aimed at avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition of 
support is the provision of reassurance to those concerned about the potential 
impact of the Committee’s recommendations on the majority language: 
 
The importance of learning and speaking English competently for all 
Australians is not disputed (p.8). 
 
Central to the idea of giving attention and recognition to Indigenous 
languages is that it will strengthen Indigenous culture and identity which 
will lead to improvements in Standard Australian English competency and 
socio-economic factors including improved measurements of wellbeing 
(p.13). 
 
Furthermore, the provision of incentives (including, for politicians, the possibility 
of improved image and, hence, greater support) are likely to reduce opposition to 
the recommendations: 
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The Committee considers that Parliamentarians are in unique positions to 
demonstrate leadership in promoting the benefits of strengthening and 
recognising the languages and culture local to their electorate, and therefore 
build on the reconciliation path between Indigenous Australians and non 
Indigenous Australians (p.32). 
 
The Committee recommends the Minister for Education work through the 
Standing Council on School Education and Early Childhood to develop 
incentives for teacher training institutions to offer Indigenous language 
teacher training, such as a limited authority qualification to teach . . . . [and] 
to develop strategies for training Indigenous language teachers to improve 
access to qualifications, full accreditation and career pathways as well as 
providing school support and mentorship where required (pp.xx,136 & 
142). 
 
The Committee recommends the Commonwealth Government . . . allocate 
resourcing to provide Indigenous interpreters with accessible training . . . 
(pp.xxi & 187). 
 
The Committee recommends the Commonwealth Government consult with 
the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies to 
determine an appropriate and sustainable funding model in order for it to 
recommence its research grants program in the 2013-14 Budget (pp.xxii & 
210). 
 
One further stratagem is to place emphasis not only on the value of indigenous 
languages in and of themselves, but on the many indirect advantages (social, 
cognitive, economic, educational, occupational, health) associated with their 
acquisition and retention, indirect advantages that are likely to have considerable 
appeal for some of those for whom arguments relating to language rights and social 
justice may be less convincing. Thus, for example: 
 
The maintenance and use of Indigenous languages has positive implications 
for capacity building in Indigenous communities, particularly through 
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community involvement and employment in resource management, art and 
tourism, broadcasting and interpreting (p.26). 
 
The Committee recognises the significant role that languages play in 
assisting to improve health, education, employment and general wellbeing 
indicators within Indigenous communities (p.43). 
 
There is a wealth of evidence that supports the positive associations of 
health, education and employment outcomes as well as general wellbeing 
with language and culture (pp.7-8). 
 
Professor Mühlhäusler et al, in the 2004 Economic Costs and Benefits of 
Australian Indigenous Languages report highlighted a range of economic 
and social benefits for Australia from the enhanced knowledge of complex 
phenomena gained from Indigenous languages (pp.27-28). 
 
The Indigenous tourism industry offers Aboriginal language speakers 
significant opportunities for employment. An increase in tourist numbers 
may reflect a heightened interest among overseas tourists in Aboriginal 
culture. Any increase in tourism benefits the whole community (p.28). 
 
Raising the profile of Indigenous languages through the use of interpreters 
for government interaction in sectors such as health, legal and education can 
be beneficial for Indigenous and non Indigenous Australians (p.18). 
 
In addition to their generally positive tone and effort to avoid direct criticism, the 
authors have attempted to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition by (a) 
providing incentives to encourage acceptance of their recommendations, (b) 
providing reassurance in connection with their potential impact, and (c) 
emphasising the indirect benefits associated with retaining indigenous languages. 
 
Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening 
differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the 
potential to create a coalition of different interests? 
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Almost everything that has been discussed thus far points to considerable effort on 
the part of the report writers to articulate a broad inclusive agenda which has the 
potential to create a coalition of interests, including, for example, indigenous groups, 
health professionals, social workers, educationalists, politicians and, indeed, all of 
those Australians who wish to associate themselves with views that are presented 
as being contemporary, enlightened and endorsed by those who are both 
knowledgeable and authoritative. Furthermore, expanding the Australian in-group 
identity not only lifts the status of Indigenous people and languages, it also affirms 
the non-indigenous sense of belonging to the land. In connection with this, it is 
important to note that persistent themes throughout the report are reconciliation and 
cultural heritage, themes that are likely to have widespread appeal: 
 
The Committee sees the benefits of greater recognition of Indigenous 
languages as having a positive impact on slowing the rapid decline of 
Indigenous languages, improving self-esteem and identity for Indigenous 
Australians, assisting in all areas of Closing the Gap on Indigenous 
disadvantage and improving reconciliation outcomes for all Australians 
(p.2). 
 
Each and every one of us has a role to play in progressing us along the path 
of reconciliation and in defining what it means to be Australian (p.33). 
 
In targeting the ideology associated with the ‘monolingual mindset’ referred to 
earlier, the report writers also create an opportunity to gather support from the large 
number of Australians who have strong linguistic and cultural ties with languages 
other than English. This was reinforced in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald 
(Hall, 2012, September 18) in which Dr Sharman Stone, the Committee’s 
chairperson, was reported as making the following point: 
 
Whatever home language you bring to that school in the first instance, or 
that preschool, you should be taught in that language. And I include other 
language speakers in that as well, if you speak Sudanese or Congolese, but 
you work from there, so the child has the best chance. 
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There is evidence of considerable efforts to articulate a broad inclusive agenda, 
allied to the all-Australian identity they have articulated, an agenda that offers a 
number of benefits for all, having, therefore, the potential to create a coalition of 
different interests. 
 
The report writers have used a range of strategies to avoid the creation of an 
opposition coalition. This is achieved primarily through the creation of positive 
identities and the avoidance of any discourse with the potential to offend.  Also 
relevant are strategies that include providing reassurance to potential adversaries 
regarding the potential impact of the recommendations, the respectful and positive 
positioning of a wide range of groups, the careful identification of a 
(depersonalised) common adversary, and the use of influential evidence sources. 
Above all the broad inclusive agenda that is presented as having potential benefits 
for all creates the sense of a large coalition of support for the report. The answer for 
each of the questions included in this section is - yes. 
3.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-
makers 
 
Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a 
way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic 
engagement with them? 
As indicated and exemplified earlier, the agonistic tone of report has the effect of 
positioning groups, including key decisions makers, in a way that is least likely to 
lead them to adopt an oppositional stance in relation to the report’s 
recommendations. Wherever possible, the report writers include praise for positive 
and effective government initiatives. Where negative evaluation of government 
policies is unavoidable, it is presented in a way that is as matter-of-fact and as 
distanced from current decision-makers as possible, as in the case of the Northern 
Territory’s policy regarding the teaching in English in the first four hours of each 
school day, a policy which is described simply as being “unsuccessful in achieving 
[its] aims”. 
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In line with their attempts to adopt an approach that appears as objective and 
agonistic as possible (as noted above), where Committee members record negative 
judgments or dire warnings about the dangers it perceives as being inherent in the 
neglect of indigenous languages and cultures and/or attempts to suppress them, 
these judgments are generally attributed to others, the report writers either simply 
reiterating them or (as indicated in the second example – below) adding their own 
judgment to those of others. 
 
The Committee received a lot of evidence that described the negative impact 
of NAPLAN testing for children who learn English as an Additional 
Language (p.123). 
 
The NILS report 2005 concluded that the situation of Australia’s languages 
is grave and requires urgent action. Without intervention the language 
knowledge will cease to exist in the next 10 to 30 years (p.35). 
 
There are a few occasions when judgments and experiences of committee members 
are presented without direct reference to the judgments and experiences of 
submitters. In such cases, as in the extract below, a negative evaluation may be 
accompanied by a statement that ensures that no blame is attached to a particular 
office or individual – in this case, the Office of the Arts and its Minister who is a 
key decision maker and potential supporter: 
 
As the lead agency responsible for administering the National Indigenous 
Languages Policy and the ILS program, the Office for the Arts is 
oversubscribed and inadequately funded and levels of funding have been 
static since 2005-06 . . . . This equates to a slow death by neglect for many 
Indigenous languages (p.67). 
 
Similarly, in the following extract, the report, while noting government’s overall 
failure to ‘close the gap’, nevertheless recognise the efforts made by government 
representatives. In doing so, they identify with them (we) and appear to echo the 
frustration that many government representatives have expressed in the past. In the 
context of the report as a whole, which holds out the prospect of greater success if 
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its recommendations are followed, this appearance of empathy is likely to resonate 
positively with key decision makers: 
 
However, twenty years on from that decision and we have failed to close the 
gap on Indigenous disadvantage. Over these two decades billions have been 
spent providing various services, assistance and programs to improve 
outcomes for Indigenous peoples. We are making progress, but progress is 
slow (p.212). 
 
The report writers’ self-positioning is critical in relation to the positioning of key 
decision-makers. Throughout the report, personal pronouns referring to committee 
members is eschewed, reference to the writers being through exclusive use of the 
formal designator ‘the Committee’. In this way, emphasis is placed not on the 
opinions of individual members of the Committee but on their fulfilment of the role 
assigned to the group by virtue of government appointment. This not only enhances 
the aura of objectivity that permeates the report but also reinforces the fact that 
decision-making power (including the power to call for the inquiry) rests elsewhere: 
 
The Committee Chair approached appropriate Ministers for terms of 
reference for an inquiry into Indigenous languages. On 5 July 2011 the 
Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
and the Minister for the Arts jointly referred the inquiry (p.2). 
 
Fundamental indications of the Committee’s appropriate positioning in relation key 
decision makers include the thorough and systematic treatment of the eight tasks 
set them in the Terms of Reference164 and the provision of evidence that is highly 
salient and influential to key decision makers (this will be discussed in relation to 
Question 10 below). The report writers have taken care not to appear to over-step 
their authority, as indicated in the selection of main verbs such as ‘encourage’ and 
‘urge’ rather than modals expressing obligation or necessity (e.g. ‘must’; ‘should’; 
‘ought to’): 
 
                                                 
164 The report addresses these tasks in a slightly different order to that of the Terms of Reference. 
The impact of this will be discussed in Section 3.3.5 
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The Committee encourages the states and territories to work with the 
Commonwealth to improve language learning in Indigenous communities 
across all portfolio areas (p.58). 
 
The Committee encourages the Commonwealth Government to develop an 
implementation plan to give effect to its endorsement of the Declaration 
(p.76). 
 
The Committee urges state and territory governments to continue to support 
strategies that focus on building Indigenous community partnerships with 
schools and recognise the importance of Indigenous languages within these 
partnerships (p.86). 
 
These are critical recommendations and the Committee urges the 
Commonwealth Government to act quickly to announce their 
implementation (p.212). 
 
On the one occasion when members of the Committee make a comment on 
something that is beyond their remit, they make it clear that they are aware of this 
and use an indirect form of recommendation: 
 
The Committee notes that the Commonwealth Government’s ratification of 
the Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
extends beyond the terms of reference for the present inquiry. However, the 
Committee sees merit in a review being conducted (p.77). 
 
The sense of objectivity that is associated with use of ‘the Committee’ is reinforced 
by the inclusion on several occasions of differing perspectives, different scenarios 
or both sides of an argument. This increases the overall sense of agonistic debate as 
opposed to antagonistic accusation:  
 
The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples . . . expressed its 
‘disappointment that . . . a National Indigenous Languages Centre has not 
been acted upon by the Australian Government’. . . . Conversely, Ms Sally 
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Basser from the Office for the Arts did not see a need for a new national 
centre, and said that: ‘our view would be that there is an existing body called 
AIATSIS which  . . . could perform that role in the future. There is an 
organisation that we have. We do not need a new one’ (p.196). 
 
In New South Wales Aboriginal teachers are able to apply for sponsorship 
from the Aboriginal Education and Training Directorate for HECS 
contributions and relief payments to attend study blocks in order to complete 
the postgraduate Master of Indigenous Language Education program. In 
contrast, the Committee received some evidence that teachers are unable to 
be released from their workplaces to take further study in teaching 
Indigenous languages (p.139). 
 
While the weight of evidence supported constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous languages, the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre (TAC) urged for 
legislative changes and increased funding instead. They did not support 
constitutional recognition, and said that it: would not provide any effective 
mechanism for strengthening languages and would be purely tokenistic 
(p.74). 
 
With respect to Question 9, in addition to the agonistic positioning of key decision 
makers, including, in particular, the restrained and objective self-positioning of the 
Committee in relation to the tasks it was set, makes it more likely that the report 
will gain the approval of key decision makers. 
 
Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic 
interests/ key decision makers? 
 
The writers have ensured that evidence-based arguments are central to the report: 
 
In view of the evidence received during the present inquiry, it is clear that 
the need for a national Indigenous interpreter service cuts across all 
government jurisdictions (pp.184-185). 
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The research demonstrates that educational outcomes for students are 
higher when the mother tongue or first language is incorporated into early 
education . . . . (p.118). 
 
The overwhelming evidence was that children learning in a bilingual 
environment can grow and prosper in a bilingual or multilingual way and 
have improved Standard Australian English outcomes (p.211). 
 
The Committee received a lot of evidence that described the negative impact 
of NAPLAN (p.123) 
 
The sources of evidence selected by the report writers are frequently of a kind that 
is likely to be convincing so far as key decision makers as concerned. In particular, 
research that is either commissioned by government bodies or funded from 
government sources is repeatedly referenced. Not only is this likely to be 
persuasive, it also (see previous question) positions key decision makers in a 
positive way - see excerpts below: 
 
Professor Mühlhäusler et al, in the 2004 Economic Costs and Benefits of 
Australian Indigenous Languages report highlighted a range of economic 
and social benefits for Australia from the enhanced knowledge of complex 
phenomena gained from Indigenous languages (pp.27-28). 
 
In 2005, the National Indigenous Languages Survey (NILS) report 
recommended increasing translating and interpreting services in regional 
centres with large numbers of Indigenous people who do not speak English 
well (p.173). 
 
In 1992 the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs tabled the report Language and Culture – 
A Matter of Survival (p.47). 
 
The Social Justice Report 2009 supported the use of language nests and 
made the following comment about resourcing them effectively (p.101). 
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Where the findings of local research are consistent with or reinforce international 
research findings, they are likely to be even more persuasive. Thus, the report 
frequently balances national and international research findings, as in the following 
examples: 
 
The research undertaken in this area within Australia and internationally 
clearly states the dual benefits of first language learning in schools (p.119). 
 
The Committee received convincing evidence for bilingual education. This 
evidence is supported nationally and internationally by numerous studies . 
. . . (p.118). 
 
Since governments have a vested interest in being able to produce statistics that 
indicate that they are doing well in terms of comparative measures of health, 
education, employment, welfare and social stability, arguments that indicate that 
indigenous language maintenance and/or revitalisation has a positive impact in all 
of these areas are likely to appeal to key decision makers who are government 
representatives. Hence the emphasis in the report on all of these areas including the 
existing Closing the Gap initiative (see examples below): 
 
The Committee views the link between Indigenous languages and 
improvements to overall wellbeing as an essential element that will continue 
to help meet governments’ targets of Closing the Gap (pp.30-31). 
 
 [T]here needs to be dramatic progress in regard to training Indigenous 
language interpreters for working in technically difficult specialist areas, 
such as justice and health. With health targets a large factor in Closing the 
Gap, interpreting and translating is of urgent importance. (pp.186-187). 
 
Knowledge of Indigenous languages provides opportunities for Indigenous 
people to be employed as translators and interpreters (p.29). 
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Health advantages including mental and physical health have been linked 
to learning and retaining one’s own language (p.25). 
 
There are strong potential employment outcomes for Aboriginal 
communities through language acquisition (p.27). 
 
The maintenance and use of Indigenous languages has positive implications 
for capacity building in Indigenous communities, particularly through 
community involvement and employment in resource management, art and 
tourism, broadcasting and interpreting (p.26). 
 
As an additional trigger for gaining support from key decision makers, the report 
writers repeatedly stress the potential dangers of continuing neglect of indigenous 
languages, dangers that are presented, often simply through juxtaposition, in a way 
that represents an implicit threat to the success of the Closing The Gap policy: 
 
And over these two decades we have seen the decline of many Indigenous 
languages just as we have seen the rise of Indigenous youth disconnected 
from their culture, failing at schooling, lacking a sense of identity or future, 
and ending up in the criminal justice system (p.212). 
 
The Committee was disturbed to realise the dramatic decline in Indigenous 
languages that is continuing within each generation. The Committee 
recognises the significant role that languages play in assisting to improve 
health, education, employment and general wellbeing indicators within 
Indigenous communities (p.43). 
 
The important role that Indigenous languages play in terms of a connection 
to culture, kinship, land and family was highlighted during the Committee’s 
inquiry, as was the devastation to communities that results when language 
is lost (p.vii). 
One further policy trigger for key decision makers relates to the use of economic 
rationales and effectiveness indicators. The report includes both, as seen in the 
following excerpts: 
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The Committee views a ‘top down’ hierarchical arrangement between a 
new national centre and the pre-existing, grass-roots network as inherently 
complicated, potentially wasteful in terms of the limited resources dedicated 
to Indigenous languages, and potentially damaging for programs that 
currently are working well. The Committee believes that effort should be 
focused on enhancing existing networks and organisations to improve their 
capacity to conduct language preservation and revitalisation work (p.198). 
 
The Committee agrees . . . that there is no evidence of an effective action 
plan for the implementation of the objectives of the National Indigenous 
Languages Policy (p.57). 
 
While Indigenous languages policy is an integral issue in education, as Dr 
William Fogarty told the Committee, it is also fundamental ‘for Indigenous 
identity, cultural reproduction and the aspirations for Indigenous economic 
and social development’ (p.45). 
 
The Committee has presented a set of recommendations that chart a future 
for Indigenous languages and assist our Indigenous youth to grow strong in 
culture and in heritage and with the skills and opportunities to participate 
fully in the Australian society and economy (p.211). 
 
Given that there is less political risk for key decision makers in agreeing to/ 
extending what has already been agreed and in gaining part of the funding required 
from non-government sources, the report aligns its recommendations with existing 
government policies, with on-going policies implemented by previous governments 
and with existing structural arrangements. In this way, it avoids giving the 
appearance of requesting expensive, complicated and politically risky changes. At 
the same time, it includes praise for government wherever possible: 
 
The Committee has recommended an increase in funding . . . . However . . 
. it is not governments’ responsibility wholly to fund language centres . . . . 
recommendations in this report work towards opening up market 
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opportunities for language centres through increasing the use of interpreting 
services, opening opportunities for philanthropic and private sector 
contributions, creating demand for the production of resources and 
collaboration with schools (pp.199-200). 
 
The Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia in 1992 recognised the 
occupancy of the Indigenous peoples and their on-going connection to the 
land. This report builds on this connection to land and recognises and 
celebrates the languages of Australia’s Indigenous peoples who have lived 
in this land for over tens of thousands of years (pp.vii-viii). 
 
The Committee observes that the Commonwealth Government formally 
endorsed the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2009. The 
Committee encourages the Commonwealth Government to develop an 
implementation plan to give effect to its endorsement of the Declaration 
(p.76). 
 
The Committee strongly supports the development of the [Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Languages] Framework and its inclusion in the 
Australian Curriculum. Given the importance placed on these initiatives by 
Indigenous communities, the Committee considers there would be value in 
specifying dates for the proposed implementation of the Framework . . . on 
its website (p.97). 
 
The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government review 
make publically available by March 2013 an updated action plan with clear 
goals, accountability and reporting requirements to implement its National 
Indigenous Languages Policy. The Committee further recommends that 
relevant Commonwealth Government agencies are required to report 
annually on outcomes of the action plan (p.xviii). 
The Committee recommends the Commonwealth Government include in the 
National Indigenous Languages Policy 2009 a commitment to support and 
-120- 
progress signage of place names and landmarks in local Indigenous 
languages (p.xvii). 
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Education work through 
the Standing Council on School Education and Early Childhood to develop 
a National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) 
alternative assessment tool for all students learning English as an Additional 
Language/Dialect. 
 
The report is heavily evidence-based, referring repeatedly to influential sources of 
evidence. In addition, it includes policy triggers and rationales that are highly 
salient so far as key decision makers are concerned. This, combined with the 
minimalisation of political risk associated with the alignment of the report’s 
recommendations with existing policy, is likely to be convincing so far as key 
decision makers are concerned. The answer to both of the questions included in this 
section is therefore, yes. 
3.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction 
 
Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo 
hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire 
and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events 
and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its 
rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as 
implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the 
discrepancies between its promises and achievements? 
 
Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of 
signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and 
likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider 
readership? 
 
The key signifiers that are contested and redefined in Our Land Our Languages are 
‘Australia’ and ‘Australians’. The status quo hegemonic discourse associated with 
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these signifiers links them to an English-language-based cultural paradigm. A 
corollary of this is that Aboriginal people are an ‘Other’ whose culture and 
languages have little or no value to Australia and are, in a sense, foreign to it.  
Within the context of this hegemonic discourse, which is referred to above as 
involving a ‘monolingual mindset’, the report’s recommendations could represent 
a threat to the possession of the objet petit à, that is, the total hegemony of English 
(which necessarily involves the removal of Aboriginal languages from Australian 
public life). This discourse is, therefore, the primary barrier to the report’s achieving 
its purposes. 
 
Contesting the key signifiers of this monolingual and monocultural mythology 
involves exposing its contingency, something that is achieved through reference to 
the Mabo decision: 
 
The Mabo decision recognised that ‘terra nullius', the concept that Australia 
was unoccupied at the time of colonisation, is a fiction. Similarly, the notion 
that Australia is a monolingual nation and that only Standard Australian 
English can benefit a person is a fiction (p.1). 
This is reinforced by the repeated provision of counter-evidence, as in the following 
examples: 
 
In present day Australia there are children from a vast array of cultures and 
first languages or dialects. This is the rich tapestry of culture prevalent in 
today’s society and is not confined to remote areas or to areas of high 
Indigenous populations (p.156). 
It is important to emphasise that Australia is not a monolingual society. 
Since British settlement English has been the main language in Australia. 
The importance of learning and speaking English competently for all 
Australians is not disputed. However it is equally important for all 
Australians to recognise the several hundred unique Indigenous languages 
that were spoken for tens of thousands of years in Australia (p.8). 
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In the following extract, it initially appears that the report writers endorse the status 
quo discourse that the English language alone is important in Australia. However, 
as the last three sentences indicate, what we actually have here is a type of partial 
acceptance of the status quo which effectively exposes the racist ideology that 
underpins it, therefore undermining the entire discourse: 
 
Abilities to read and write in English 165 and to be numerate are critical if 
young people are to complete their schooling successfully in Australia, 
exercise choice about what they do in life beyond school and participate 
fully in the economic and social development of their local communities 
and the broader Australian society. All students in Australia have the right 
to be taught to communicate effectively in Standard Australian English, to 
understand how the English language works, to think and learn in and 
through English, and to be given access to the cultural understandings it 
carries. But Standard Australian English learning should not be at the 
expense of Indigenous languages and cultural learning. Neither should 
Indigenous languages and cultural learning be to the detriment of English 
language learning. Both should act as bridges to succeed in the other rather 
than creating barriers (p.120). 
 
The report exposes the unbalanced representation of Indigenous Australians by 
noting the focus on ‘tragic outcomes that dominate many media stories” while there 
are “positive stories that are not being heard . . . about language and about 
communities working together to preserve, revitalise and sustain their Indigenous 
languages” (p.64). 
 
Not only do the writers of the report expose the contingency of these hegemonic 
conceptions of the key signifiers ‘Australian’ and ‘Australia’, they redefine them, 
including Indigenous people and their languages as an essential and beneficial part 
of ‘Australia(ns)’. Thus, for example, the writers consistently use the term 
‘Indigenous Australians’ to contest the idea of ‘Aboriginal Other’ (see 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2 above). Indeed, the report sets out to demonstrate the exemplary ways in 
                                                 
165 The use of ‘English’ (instead of SAE) here shows that this statement is expected to be true in a 
global sense. 
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which many Indigenous Australians and their languages have contributed/ are 
contributing to Australian society, culture and economy as indicated in the long 
extract below (pp.19-20): 
 
Greg Dickson provided the Committee with the following examples to 
demonstrate social, cultural and economic benefits that are gained from 
recognising and valuing Indigenous languages. These benefits are 
evidenced at local community levels, regionally, nationally and 
internationally. The examples provide a window into what is possible when 
the potential of Indigenous languages is harnessed: 
 
 Australian of the Year recipients who speak an Aboriginal language 
as a first language: Galarrwuy Yunupingu (1978), Mandawuy 
Yunupingu (1992) 
 National TV shows in Indigenous languages e.g. Bush Mechanics 
(Warlpiri, ABC TV 2001),Women of the Sun (Yolŋu Matha/English, 
ABC/SBS 1981) 
 Top-selling, award-winning recording artists who speak and sing in 
Indigenous language/s (e.g. Yothu Yindi, Geoffrey Gurrumul 
Yunupingu) 
 Indigenous language-speaking AFL stars: e.g. Liam Jurrah, Liam 
Patrick (both Warlpiri) 
 Award-winning feature film Ten Canoes (2006 – Ganalbingu and 
other languages) 
 Theatre productions, e.g. Ngapartji Ngapartji (Big hART, 2007 - 
Pitjantjatjara language) 
 National advertising campaign (Qantas 2009 – Kala Lagaw Ya 
language) 
 Award-winning journalism (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009 
‘Language is Power – Let us have ours’, in English and 
Gumbaynggirr, received UN Media Peace award, 2010) 
 Tertiary education courses e.g. Graduate Certificate in Yolngu 
Studies (Charles Darwin University), Certificate 1, 2 and 3 in 
-124- 
Aboriginal Languages e.g. Gamilaraay, Gumbaynggirr (TAFE  
NSW) 
 Academic writing in Indigenous languages, e.g. Bani, E. (1987), 
'Garka a ipika: masculine and feminine grammatical gender in Kala 
Lagaw Ya', Australian Journal of Linguistics 7(2):189-201.31. 
 
Another excellent example of achievement is the 2012 Senior Australian of 
the Year Laurie Baymarrwangga, who was recognised for ‘almost 
singlehandedly nurturing the inter-generational transmission of local 
ecological knowledge through a lifelong commitment to caring for kin, 
culture and country’ in the Crocodile Islands of the Northern Territory. 
 
Ms Baymarrwangga initiated the Yan-nhangu Dictionary project in 1994, 
and continues to pass on her language and culture through the Crocodile 
Islands Initiative, which includes a ranger program, a language nest and a 
web-based ecological knowledge base for schools. 
 
Evident in Our Land Our Languages is a progressive undermining of the linguistic 
status quo. Indigenous languages are re-articulated as ‘Australian’ and promoted as 
being beneficial to all Australians (see discussion earlier). Likewise, references to 
‘Standard Australian English’ (SAE) serve not only to reinforce the all-Australia 
identity represented but also to remind readers of Anglo-Saxon heritage that they 
are themselves in some senses ‘Other’: 
 
But Standard Australian English learning should not be at the expense of 
Indigenous languages and cultural learning (p.120). 
 
[T]he notion that Australia is a monolingual nation and that only Standard 
Australian English can benefit a person is a fiction (p.1). 
 
In addition, the report’s recommendation that there should be bilingual place names 
involves the de-centring of English in Australia’s linguistic landscape, something 
that would be likely to have much more than merely symbolic impact: 
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While dual naming or Indigenous naming may be viewed by some as merely 
symbolic the Committee is convinced of the value and place of symbolism 
in changing attitudes, healing scars and forging new futures (p.32). 
Related to the deconstructing and redefining of the key signifiers ‘Australia’ and 
‘Australian’ is the re-articulation of the concept of value. It is widely believed by 
governments and individuals, in Australia and elsewhere, that indigenous languages 
have little or no value, even for indigenous peoples, value being conceptualised 
largely in economic terms. Although the Committee’s Terms of Reference include 
inquiry into the role of indigenous languages in ‘strengthening Indigenous identity 
and culture’, there is an underlying assumption that this, and other potential benefits 
(educational and vocational), must be driven by a value for money equation. In 
reorganising the Terms of Reference, the report writers effectively reconceptualise 
them. Thus, for example, ‘strengthening Indigenous identity and culture’ (the 
second part of the second Term of Reference) is elevated into initial position. It is 
the first item dealt with in the report (Chapter 2) and it is articulated initially 
through the evidence provided by Indigenous Australians themselves (“what their 
languages mean to them”), indicating that: 
 
(a) issues of partnership and self-determination are to be treated as more 
than rhetorical concessions; and 
(b) the strengthening of culture and identity that is associated with 
indigenous language revitalisation is fundamental, with all of the other 
benefits (educational, vocational, social and economic) flowing from 
it and clustering around it. 
 
The report writers associate Indigenous Australian languages, and bilingualism 
generally, not only with a wealth of benefits for Indigenous Australians, including 
economic ones, but with benefits for all Australians, in particular, those benefits 
that relate to cultural identity and reconciliation (the latter being referred to 31 times 
throughout the report): 
 
[The] benefits of maintaining and revitalising Indigenous languages to all 
Australians was a recurrent issue throughout the inquiry (p.15). 
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The Committee considers that Parliamentarians are in unique positions to 
demonstrate leadership in promoting the benefits of strengthening and 
recognising the languages and culture local to their electorate, and therefore 
build on the reconciliation path between Indigenous Australians and non-
Indigenous Australians” (p.32). 
 
The value of languages was discussed from the perspective of reconciliation 
numerous times throughout the inquiry (p.15). 
 
The Committee sees the benefits of greater recognition of Indigenous 
languages as having a positive impact on slowing the rapid decline of 
Indigenous languages, improving self-esteem and identity for Indigenous 
Australians, assisting in all areas of Closing the Gap on Indigenous 
disadvantage and improving reconciliation outcomes for all Australians” 
(p.2). 
 
The Committee is of the view that constitutional recognition of Indigenous 
Australians, and their unique cultures, languages and heritage is an 
important step forward for the nation as a whole (p.74). 
 
The Committee has presented a set of recommendations that chart a future 
for Indigenous languages and assist our Indigenous youth to grow strong in 
culture and in heritage and with the skills and opportunities to participate 
fully in the Australian society and economy (p.211). 
 
International research has demonstrated that bilingualism also has cognitive 
and developmental benefits. Internationally, there has been recognition of 
the value of bilingualism in preserving and valuing traditions, enriching 
individuals, and in creating modern flexible and tolerant societies (p.19). 
 
The overwhelming evidence was that children learning in a bilingual 
environment can grow and prosper in a bilingual or multilingual way and 
have improved Standard Australian English outcomes (p.211). 
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One further barrier to the implementation of the report’s recommendations is the 
assumption that government policies, practices and funding have been adequate, 
and that there is, therefore, no need to change the status quo. This perspective is 
revealed, in part, in the following excerpt:  
 
The Committee cannot reconcile the statement made by the [National 
Indigenous Languages Policy] under its ‘actions’ that greater attention and 
support is being provided for Indigenous languages, when funding for 
language projects has declined effectively in real terms (p.67). 
 
The report identifies a number of dislocatory events, particularly highly criticised 
policies, where evidence of their ineffectiveness is conclusive. For example: 
The Committee experienced first-hand difficulties with the supply and 
service of Indigenous interpreters during the inquiry (p.168). 
 
[T]he Committee believes this policy [English in the First Four Hours] was 
not successful in achieving its aims of improving educational outcomes for 
Indigenous students in the Northern Territory (p.119). 
 
The Committee received a lot of evidence that described the negative impact 
of NAPLAN testing for children who learn English as an additional 
Language (p.123). 
 
The government’s assumptions regarding its own effectiveness are further 
undermined through the highlighting of discrepancies between promises and 
achievements: 
 
In 2009 the Commonwealth Government announced a national Indigenous 
languages policy: Indigenous Languages – A National Approach. The 
policy was a response to the NILS Report 2005, which found that the 
situation of Australia’s Indigenous languages was grave and required urgent 
action. . . . In the policy announcement, the Government stated that it was 
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committed to addressing the serious problem of language loss in Indigenous 
communities . . . . The Committee received substantial evidence about the 
National Indigenous Languages Policy. A common theme was that while 
stakeholders welcomed the announcement of the policy, there was little 
evidence that it was being fully implemented (p.11). 
 
Other responses highlighted that few concrete or newly funded activities 
have resulted from the policy. For example, the AEU asserted that ‘there 
appears to be a significant disjuncture between policy statements and actual 
practice’ (p.54). 
 
The report writers also draw attention to repeated failure on the part of governments 
to accept and implement recommendations of bodies they themselves established. 
Extracts such as the following one highlight the primarily rhetorical nature of 
responses to some of these recommendations by previous governments: 
 
In 1992 the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs recommended the establishment ‘of a 
national interpreter service for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
languages to ensure that people have reliable access to trained interpreters 
and translators’. Twenty years later, this Committee is appalled that it is 
faced with making the same recommendations to government and trusts it 
will not be met with the inaction that has characterised successive 
governments (p.185). 
 
In a similar example, Committee members not only draw attention to repeated 
failures to follow recommendations but also to the negative (or in this case 
discriminatory) implications of such failure: 
 
The Committee reiterates its recommendations from its 1992 and 2011 
reports that a national Indigenous interpreting service is established to 
ensure Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are allowed the same access 
to interpreting services as other Australians (p.185). 
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In addition to exposing the government’s inaccurate perception of its own 
effectiveness, the Committee also redefines the concept of ‘effective language 
revitalisation’, a concept that is, within the context of the hegemonic discourse, 
assumed to be ‘top-down’. Critical success indicators become partnership, 
community ownership of language revitalisation and appropriately supported self-
determination: 
 
Indigenous Languages policy writers will need to work closely with 
Aboriginal communities and educational institutions to ensure engagement 
in decision making for the provision of effective outcomes in this arena 
(p.96). 
 
The Committee sees the inclusion of Indigenous languages in the Closing 
the Gap targets as an essential acknowledgement of the collaborative 
approach that must take place between governments and Indigenous 
communities. The role of governments is to assist Indigenous communities 
to achieve the same opportunities and wellbeing outcomes as non-
Indigenous Australians. Indigenous Australians must continue to 
demonstrate a commitment to develop partnerships with governments to 
preserve and maintain languages within communities (p.31). 
 
The Committee believes that community ownership of Indigenous language 
programs is essential for the successful maintenance and revival of 
Australia’s Indigenous languages (p.67). 
 
The Committee believes that the term ‘bilingual education’ in the past has 
received negative connotations due to the fact that bilingual programs have 
lacked thorough community consultation  . . . Careful consideration should 
be given to the process of delivering bilingual programs and most 
importantly real local community consultation is required to successfully 
implement bilingual programs (p.120). 
 
The Committee does not see it as the role of the government to teach a child 
their culture or their first language. However, there is a role for governments 
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to assist communities to take on this responsibility when a history of social 
problems has diminished the current capacity of a community to be able to 
do so for itself (p.30). 
  
The Committee’s long term vision is for community owned and operated 
language centres, which respond to the increased demand for Indigenous 
languages services and for these services to be valued nationwide (p.200). 
 
We see that valuing and supporting the use of Indigenous languages . . . has 
enormous impacts on . . . and a sense of empowerment to control their own 
future (p.22). 
 
While retaining their general agonistic tone, 166 the report writers provide a wealth 
of counter-evidence and argument in order to subtly expose and undermine some 
of the critical ideological barriers to accepting the report’s recommendations. They 
also discursively re-create key signifiers, such as Australia(ns), value, benefits, 
community ownership, self-determination and effectiveness, in ways that both 
counter the purposes of potential adversaries and improve the likelihood of 
acceptance of the report’s recommendations. The answer to Questions 11 and 12 is, 
therefore, yes. 
3.4 Responses to Our Land Our Languages    
3.4.1 Non-government responses 
3.4.1.1 Positive responses 
Following its release on September 17th 2012, Our land Our Languages was met 
with very positive media coverage and the unanimous support of insider 
organisations. On the day of its release, Amnesty International Australia (2012, 
September 17) and the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples (2012, 
September 17) released media statements welcoming the findings, while Greg 
Dickson, an academic at the Australian National University (2012, September 17) 
described it as “a thorough, measured, yet still ambitious document”. Charis Palmer 
                                                 
166 Even so, these reformulations do have the potential to represent a significant threat to those of a 
monolingual and monocultural mindset. 
-131- 
(2012, September 17), news editor of The Conversation, observed that the report 
has been welcomed by “language and Indigenous experts”, and Emma Murphy 
(2012, September 20), of Green Left, noted the positive response of “bilingual 
education advocates.” One week after its release, Lisa Waller (2012, September 26), 
writing for Inside Story, was in a position to assert that the “recommendations have 
met with overwhelmingly positive news coverage and public discussion in social 
media”. Furthermore, several respondents commented favourably on the bipartisan 
nature of Committee membership (ABC News, 2012, September 17; Amnesty 
International Australia, 2012, September 17; Karvelas, 2012, September 18), with 
‘Frank Baarda’ 167  (2012, September 17) describing the report as being 
“intelligent[ly] bi-partisan”.168 
 
Particularly noteworthy were responses that referred to the report as being truly 
different and/or of major significance. Thus, Lisa Waller (2012, September 26), 
noted that it “proposes a major shift in the way the nation understands and 
recognises Indigenous languages”, with “constructive recommendations” which 
“signal an encouraging shift in attitudes”. Rosa McKenna, former principal at the 
Yolŋu school in North-East Arnhem Land, who had found herself out of a job after 
commenting on the negative impact the English in the First Four Hours policy in a 
Four Corners programme, commented on the report’s negative response to that 
policy, adding: Isn’t it interesting that with the flow-on from one positive report the 
whole discourse changes (Waller, 2012, September 26). The extract below is from 
an entry by Professor Claire Bowern (2012, September 18) of Yale University on 
the language blog Fully (sic): 
 
We’re all in a tizz at Fully [sic] over the new report Our land our languages. 
We’re usually pretty mellow when it comes to government releases but this 
one is worth taking up some pixel space over  . . . .  It is not often that the 
opportunity comes along to make a real difference, but a new report into 
Indigenous languages in Australia has the potential to do just that. . . . We 
                                                 
167 The author names provided in online comments that are cited in this thesis are assumed to be 
pseudonyms. They will be identified with single quotation marks and referenced accordingly. 
168 This importance of bipartisan support is seen in a comment by Andrew Lynch and Jennifer Goh 
(2012, September 21) that it was “the lack of bipartisan support” that had caused the proposal for 
constitutional recognition of Indigenous people to drift. 
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have seen many reports on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and their 
lives . . . . This report is different. 
 
There are a number of reasons for such positive insider and media responses. One 
is the fact that, as several commentators noted, the report fully reflects the 
submissions made to the Committee. Thus, for example, a National Congress of 
Australia’s First Peoples (2012, September 17) response stressed that “[the] 
Committee has listened” and noted that “almost every point in the Congress 
submission is included in the Committee’s recommendations”. Similar sentiments 
were expressed by Bill Fogarty (Palmer, 2012, September 17), research associate 
at the Australia National University, who observed that “it was nice to see the 
Committee taking on board evidence provided”, adding that “[in] Indigenous affairs 
it sometimes feels like submissions are ignored for policy and political expedience 
purposes”. 
 
Another reason for the positive nature of most insider responses to the report is the 
fact that it was seen as being oriented towards indigenous self-determination. Thus, 
for example, Bowern (2012, September 18) wrote that it is unlike other Government 
responses to Indigenous disadvantage in that solutions are found within Indigenous 
communities rather than being imposed upon them:  
 
Rather than treating Aboriginal people as a problem to be solved, or adding 
yet another layer of bureaucracy onto already micro-managed lives, this 
report is about finding solutions within communities. Many previous reports 
have exposed a shameful history of abuse and neglect. This time, we see 
case after case of people doing the best they can under extraordinarily 
difficult circumstances. The findings should not be another opportunity for 
white Australia to spend a week of soul searching and brow beating before 
forgetting yet again about our vow that this time we’ll be different. It’s a 
chance to see what local communities have been doing and to support those 
efforts. . . .  
 
Much of the commentary stressed the thorough, measured, ambitious and research-
based nature of the report’s recommendations. Thus, ‘wamut’ (2012, September 
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17), a contributor to Greg Dickson’s article in the Crikey blog, commented that 
“[the] report is the product of a lot of research and investigation” and that “[they] 
know what they are talking about” As Professor Bowern (2012, September 18) 
observes: 
 
These recommendations are not shots in the dark; they are not guesses at a 
solution. They are the outcomes of a year of interviews and sifting of 
research which shows what communities have done to help their languages 
survive. The committee has documented what can be achieved on a shoe-
string and in the face of national apathy and often unhelpful or hostile 
policies. 
 
In a further response, Bowern (2012, September 21) asserted that the reason why 
the report is so important is that its writers understand what is fundamentally 
required to save a language. She notes that its thirty recommendations “cover a very 
broad range of activities . . . a great example of ‘thinking big”, a point also made 
by Bianca Hall (2012, September 18), who referred to the “wide-ranging’ nature of 
the report”. 
 
The committee also received praise for its strategic approach. Thus, for example, 
Greg Dickson (2012, September 17) made the following observation: 
 
Perhaps in the report’s favour is that many recommendations target 
education and will bypass Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin. 
Instead, Peter Garrett and state education ministers are being asked to look 
carefully at how schools handle indigenous languages.169 
 
A wide range of organisations and individuals appear to have found in the report 
ample evidence of attention to those things that particularly concerned them. Thus, 
                                                 
169  Dickson (personal communication, 2012, March 3) explains that “Jenny Macklin has a 
reputation . . . for not being terribly sympathetic to the plight of Indigenous people” and cites her 
hard line in pushing through the recent intervention-like Stronger Futures legislation as an example. 
Stronger Futures is considered by many as a continuation of the Northern Territory’s Intervention. 
Dickson also states that “Peter Garrett has a history of being more sympathetic to Indigenous issues” 
although he notes that most of that reputation stems from his pre-politics career in music and 
environmental activism. 
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for example, Amnesty International Australia (2012, September 17) picked out six 
recommendations (9, 14, 21-23 & 25) of direct relevance to their own stance. Tim 
Gartrell, Director of You Me Unity, the campaign for constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous Australians, was reported (in Karvelas, 2012, August, 18) as expressing 
strong support for the recommendation relating to recognition of indigenous 
languages in the Constitution; and academics Bill Fogarty and Claire Bowern 
(Palmer, 2012, September 17) stressed their support for the recommendations 
relating to language archiving.  
 
Overall, the recommendations that received the most frequent positive comments 
were those relating to Indigenous and bilingual school programmes and the 
provision of an alternative assessment tool for students learning English as an 
additional language or dialect.170 Support was often unequivocal, as in the case of 
endorsement of the Committee’s position on the use of children’s first language in 
the early years of schooling by, for example, Aidan Wilson (2012, September 18), 
Nikki Hatfield (in Adcock and Whop, 2012, September 18), Gregoriana Parker 
(Australian Associated Press, 2012, September 17), Warren Mundine (Karvelas, 
2012, September 18), ‘Catherine.Cox@sa.gov.au’ (2012, September 18) and 
‘wamut’ (2012, September 17).171 
 
Many of the respondents called on the Government to act on the recommendations 
or, at least, expressed the hope that they would do so. Professor Gillian 
Wigglesworth, Director of the University of Melbourne’s Indigenous Language 
Research Unit, expressed “hopeful optimism that the report would have an impact” 
and noted that “various governments will see that the weight of evidence supports 
measures” (University of Melbourne, 2012, September 26). She concluded: 
 
                                                 
170 Other recommendations that received particular support include: (a) language to be considered 
part of identity and well-being and therefore as critical to Closing the Gap (see Mick Dodson quoted 
in Karvelas, 2012, September 18; and National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, 2012, 
September 17); (b) that Indigenous languages are endangered through Government neglect (see Jody 
Broun quoted in ABC News, 2012, September 17); (c) that Australian multilingualism is a positive 
(‘Frank Baarda’, 2012, September 17; ‘jon Altman’, 2012, September 28; and ‘Secomb Michael’, 
2012, September 18).  
171 Nikki Hatfield is an Aboriginal elder and teacher; Gregoriana Parker is a Tiwi Islander; Warren 
Mundine is a former Labor Party president. 
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We have a real chance of improving the lives of the tens of thousands of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people . . . But for that to happen, we 
need the governments to get behind the committee's findings and act 
immediately. 
 
Kerry McCallum (Waller, 2012, September 26), lead researcher on an Australian 
News Media and Indigenous Policymaking 1988–2008 project at the University of 
Melbourne, referred to the overwhelmingly positive response to the report, asking: 
Can the rhetoric be translated into political action? She added: 
 
Governments will only bring about positive change in Indigenous affairs by 
leading public opinion, not following it . . .Governments are the most 
powerful players in society . . . If they want positive change in Indigenous 
affairs they have to drive it by deliberately framing the debate in positive 
ways and working to bring the community along with them. 
 
Media releases from organisations were most direct in urging the government to 
act. Amnesty International Australia (2012, September 17) called on the 
government “to accept and implement the recommendations”; the National 
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples (2012, September 17) noted that it awaited 
“the Government’s response as to how it intends to implement the recommendations 
from the report, and urge[d] them to significantly increase language resourcing 
accordingly”.  
 
Related to calls for action was the sober reflection in a number of articles that 
recommendations such as those included in the report have been made before and 
not acted on, something that was often presented as an additional reason why there 
should be an immediate and positive Government response in this case.172 One of 
                                                 
172 Lisa Waller (2012, September 26) for example, wrote that “history and contemporary politics 
suggest that transforming them [the recommendations] into statutory recognition and policy action 
will be a challenge”. Professor Claire Bowern was quoted by Palmer (2012, September 17) as stating 
that “we’ve been here before” in the context of identifying recommendations going back to the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in the late 1980s and the ‘Ampe Akelyernemane 
Meke Mekarle’ (Little Children are Sacred) report. Bill Fogarty (also in Palmer, 2012, September 
17) agreed with Bowern that the recommendations could be found in a string of other reports on 
Indigenous communities. In Bowern’s own article a day later (Bowern, 2012, September 18), she 
recalled former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s statement in his 1992 landmark Redfern speech that 
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the most recent of these previous reports is the Gonski review of school funding 
(Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2011, p.xi). In 
his report on that review David Gonski insisted that differences in educational 
outcomes should not be the result of differences in wealth, income, power or 
possessions and, therefore, that reducing educational disadvantage, which severely 
affects children from Indigenous backgrounds, should be a high priority in a new 
funding model. It is not surprising then that Fogarty (Palmer, 2012, September 17) 
noted that the recommendations included in Our Land Our Languages were “well-
timed given the Federal Government’s response to the Gonski review of school 
funding”. 
 
Our Land Our Languages leaves us in no doubt that it had a constituency of support, 
something that is borne out by, for example, the following excerpt from an article 
by the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples (2012, September 17): 
 
Congress worked hard to ensure our members and member organisations 
who are experts in these areas were instrumental in developing a strong, 
evidence based report to the committee.  
 
There is evidence in several of the responses to the report of a direct attempt to 
extend and act upon this constituency of support, as indicated in the following 
extract from an article by Green Left’s Emma Murphy (2012, September 20): 
 
The task now for Aboriginal communities and defenders of bilingual 
education will be to make sure governments start putting funding and 
resource commitments on the table  . . . . We must ensure governments don’t 
adopt the easier, more symbolic recommendations and let the actual hard 
work fall by the wayside  
 
                                                 
the treatment of Australia’s Indigenous people was “the test which so far we have always failed”. 
She added: “Twenty years later, we are still failing. But now is an incredible opportunity to do better. 
Let’s not waste it.”  
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Thus, the report appears to have been a catalyst for renewed efforts from supporters. 
Also appearing to act as a catalyst are comments, relating to one another and to the 
report, by members of the Committee itself.173  
3.4.1.2 Positive responses with reservations 
A number of responses to the report, while being largely positive, expressed 
reservations about certain aspects of it, particularly in terms of practicality. Thus, 
for example, Adcock and Whop (2012, September 18) reported that the principal of 
Cherbourg State School had stated that although attempting to accommodate 
different languages “is a good initiative . . . it may not be practical in some schools”, 
noting that the local Wakka Wakka language had very few speakers and that over 
40 different languages were represented in that particular school alone. Similarly, 
Wilson (2012, September 18) reported that one commentator had observed that 
“finding teachers able to teach in indigenous languages will be fearsomely difficult 
and likely to lead to language proficiency trumping any real aptitude to teach”. 
‘Singer Ruth’ (2012, September 18), while supportive of bilingual education, noted 
that the number of distinct languages and the ‘high mobility’ of communities would 
be problems, and ‘janis price’ (2012, October 27) observed that “[m]ost . . . ‘Grow 
your Own’ indigenous teachers have great difficulty with the jargon of curriculum 
and assessment”. For Waller (2012, September 26), an important issue was the 
report’s failure to identify a role for the news media which “have a key role to play 
in fostering a more positive national conversation about Indigenous language 
                                                 
173 Shane Neumann (see Neumann, 2012, September 17; ABC News, 2012, September 17; and 
Karvelas, 2012, September 17) made positive reference to “the deputy chair, the Hon. Dr Sharman 
Stone [a liberal Party MP], and the cooperation all committee members on both sides of politics for 
this bipartisan report”. In a speech to Parliament, Stone (2012, September 17) endorsed Neumann’s 
assertion that the inquiry was “a most important [one]”. Labor MP Graham Perrett (2012, September 
17) exclaimed in a speech in parliament (in the Federation Chamber) that “[this] was a unanimous 
report - a unanimous report”, adding that  “[d]espite the range of political views in that committee, 
we were able to come up with a report in which we all agreed that this was an important thing to 
do”. The following day Sharon Grierson (2012, September 18), referring to what she called “a 
wonderful report”, commented, before going on to acknowledge the work the other members of the 
Committee, that it was “a great privilege - a real personal privilege - to be a member of the committee 
and a member of the inquiry that led to this report”. This sense of internal coalition is reinforced by 
the fact that the Committee’s media statements following the release of the report, all align with 
each other and the report’s recommendations. It is also reinforced in statements by the Committee 
urging the Government to act on the recommendations. Graham Perrett (2012, September 17), for 
example, insisted that recognising and preserving indigenous language “is the right thing to do and 
we should do it”. Similarly, in concluding his speech tabling the report, Shane Neumann made the 
following statement: [I]f we want to celebrate and recognise our Indigenous languages, we must 
take action and we must take action now. For too long we have failed. It is tragic. It is dire. Action 
is required. I urge the government to take that action and I am pleased to support this report. 
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policies”. For Nicolas Biddle (2012, October 3), the report did not resolve the 
fundamental dilemma of “how to improve the health, education and employment 
prospects of Indigenous Australians without sacrificing the enduring differences in 
language and culture valued by Indigenous Australians and the majority of the rest 
of the population”. 
3.4.1.3 Negative responses 
There were, as one would expect, some detractors. Thus, for example, Karvelas 
(2012, September 17), writing for The Australian (a centre right publication), 
described the Committee as being ‘Labor-dominated’, and right wing commentator 
Andrew Bolt (2012, September 24), in an article critical of the report, described it 
as being “teary-eyed”. Bolt’s primary complaint, notwithstanding the report’s 
endorsement of the universal need for English language competency, was that the 
report’s recommendations would lead to a lowering of English language 
competence among ‘Aboriginal children’ and consign young indigenous people to 
the status of “exhibits in a cultural museum”. Interestingly, despite the evidence 
presented in the report, he refers to certain aspects of the recommendations as being 
‘pure guesswork’ and ‘against common sense’ and to the support that the report had 
had from opposing sides of the political arena as ‘tragic’. 
 
Those aspects of the report that received most negative criticism were: (a) its 
assertion that indigenous languages are valuable in the contemporary world, (see, 
for example, ‘Linus Bowden’ (2012, September); Peter Gerard (2012, 
September))174, (b) its insistence that teaching through home languages in the initial 
years of schooling can have a positive impact on educational achievement generally 
and on English language proficiency in particular (see, for example, Scott (2012, 
September 17) and ‘Warren Joffe’ (2012, September), and (c) the assertion that 
there are benefits for non-Indigenous Australians in indigenous language 
revitalisation (see, for example, ‘John Coochey’ (2012, September) and ‘Steve 
Hindle’ (2012, September). Finally, ‘Arthur Bell’ (2012, September 18), who 
                                                 
174 The type of assertion underpinned all six comments to Karvelas (2012, September 18) as well 
the sole comment to Altman (2013, April 19). A typical example is the comment by ‘Botswana 
O’Hooligan’ (2012, September 18) that “Aboriginal people must realise . . . it's fine to speak your 
mother tongue at home but if you want to get ahead at anything in Australia you must be fluent in 
English and able to communicate in English, not some esoteric Aboriginal language or any other 
language, but English.” 
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described himself as being “of obvious Aboriginal heritage”, referred to the report’s 
association of indigenous languages with identity as being “sickening and More 
Humbug and Waffle!” 
3.4.2 Government responses 
The value of the report appears to have been endorsed by the main ’right’ and ‘left’ 
wings of Australian politics. Even the negative article by Andrew Bolt (2012, 
September 24) despaired that both sides were “tragically . . . backing” the report. 
 
Emma Murphy (2012, September 20) reported that “Labor and the Coalition were 
quick to welcome the report”, adding, however, that agreement was ‘in principle’.  
Committee member Graham Perrett (2012, September 17) stated that both 
Education Minister Peter Garrett and the Minister of the Arts had ‘embraced’ the 
report and shown “a willingness . . . to further [it]”, although he noted that 
embracing it does not constitute a “formal governmental response”. Patricia 
Karvelas (2012, September 18) of The Australian, reported that (a) Education 
Minister Peter Garrett’s spokeswoman had stated that the government “welcomes 
this report and recognises the importance of preserving indigenous languages”, and 
(b) Garrett himself had “declared he [would] talk to state governments about 
adopting bilingual education for indigenous children” and had begun work on a new 
Indigenous languages framework for the new curriculum. She also reported 
(Karvelas, 2012, September 18) that Nigel Scullion, opposition indigenous affairs 
spokesperson (representing the Liberal coalition), had welcomed the report, making 
some supportive comments about transitional bilingual education. 
 
The first positive Government response was in March 2013, with the formal 
agreement by the speaker of the House of Representatives (Parliament of Australia, 
2013, March) to recommendation 3, that is, the recommendation that the 
Commonwealth Parliament demonstrate leadership in recognising and valuing 
Indigenous languages within its building and operations and encourage Members 
of Parliament to do the same in their electorates (pp.xvii & 32). In particular, the 
speaker agreed to ensure that signs or documents that accompany Indigenous 
artefacts or references in Parliament house would be expressed in the relevant 
Indigenous language(s) in addition to English. This recommendation was referred 
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to the Standing Committee on Procedure to consider how best to further respond to 
all aspects of the recommendation. 
 
A further positive response to some of the recommendations was included in a 
National cultural policy, entitled Creative Australia, which was released on 13th 
March 2013. This comprehensive policy ties Australian creativity to job creation, 
prosperity and national identity and provides A$235 million in new funding to a 
wide range of arts and cultural areas, including a small number of areas that clearly 
derive from Our Land Our Languages.175 For example, it is noted that the A$13.983 
million new funding extension for community-driven language resources and 
activities under the ILS programme “responds to key findings of the Our Land Our 
Languages report” (Australian Government, 2013, p.19). This funding has been 
generally welcomed by indigenous language supporters (see, for example, Arnost, 
2013, March 15). However, Greg Dickson (2013, March 13) notes that this level of 
funding is unlikely to go far in relation to the revitalisation of more than 250 
indigenous languages: 
  
While I’m loathe to look a gift horse in the mouth, I’m not sure that this 
increase in funding is significant enough to tackle the attrition of Aboriginal 
languages in Australia or bring about significant community development 
outcomes, employment or other measures that will contribute to the Closing 
The Gap framework. 
 
Other elements of Creative Australia that link to recommendations made in Our 
Land Our Languages include (a) the goal of updating the National Indigenous 
Language Policy, (b) the A$12.8 million (albeit over two years – see Altman, 2013, 
April 19) of additional funding provided to the AIATSIS for “further digital 
preservation of collections at risk of permanent loss, and, (c) the promise to 
“consider amendments to the definition of a cultural organisation under the Register 
of Cultural Organisations (ROCO) program so as to include Aboriginal and Torres 
                                                 
175 Creative Australia was influenced by a number of sources including its own consultation process. 
Other sources that are referenced include an independent review of the Australian Council of the 
Arts, the Review of Private Sector National Arts and Disability Strategy, the Industry and Innovation 
Statement and the Australia in the Asian Century white paper (Meyrick, 2013, March 20). 
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Strait Islander languages” (Australian Government, 2013, pp.3, 78, 85, 93 & 
146).176 
 
The Australian Government’s formal and comprehensive response to the Our Land 
Our Languages report was tabled in the House of Representatives on the 6th of June 
2013. In this response the Government acknowledges “the importance of the 
committee’s research” and the “value of its findings” and agrees with the following 
assertions made in the report: (a) that indigenous languages are intrinsically 
connected to “educational, vocational and economic outcomes . . . improving self-
esteem and identity of Indigenous Australians . . . assisting in all areas of closing 
the gap on Indigenous disadvantage and improving reconciliation outcomes”, and 
(b) that the Government “has an important ongoing role in supporting Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander communities” (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, 
p.2). 
 
Of the 30 recommendations, six (6) were agreed to, twelve (12) were agreed to in-
principle, two were agreed to in-part (2); and nine (9) were noted, with the only 
recommendation that was rejected outright being the recommendation that an 
alternative testing tool for NAPLAN be developed. In addition to Parliamentary 
recognition of Indigenous languages (recommendation #3) and the proposals which 
form a part of the Creative Australia cultural policy (recommendations #4, 5, 7 & 
28) (which had already been announced),177 the Government agrees to acknowledge 
Indigenous languages as a fundamental part of the Closing the Gap framework 
(recommendation #1), to support and progress bilingual signage of place names and 
landmarks (recommendation #2) and to support Torres Strait Islanders’ languages 
                                                 
176 There was some concern that the sacking of Arts Minister Simon Crean (for a failed leadership 
coup that occurred shortly after the announcement of this policy) may affect the implementation of 
this policy (Brandle, 2013, March 22; Eltham, 2013, March 22). However, the new Minister for the 
Arts, Tony Burke was reported (Westwood, 2013, March 26) as stating that "those commitments are 
government policy ... and I am getting ahead with implementing them." 
177 The formal response also provides additional information in relation to the update of the National 
Indigenous Languages Policy and Action Plan (recommendation #4), which was part of the Creative 
Australia annoucement. This information includes the fact that (a) the Policy and Action Plan will 
be completed by the end of 2013 and (b) the recommendations made in the Our Land Our Languages 
report will be taken into account in its development (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, p.4). 
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activities through the Indigenous Languages Support Program (recommendation 
#6). 178 
 
Where recommendations have been agreed in-principle or noted, the Government 
generally identifies existing or pending frameworks, policies or strategies which 
either already align to the recommendations or will be impacted by the 
recommendations. For example, the responses to recommendations 23, 24, 25, 26 
and 27 (relating to the development of Indigenous interpreting and translating) refer 
to a “national framework for the effective supply and use of Indigenous language 
Interpreters . . . [that] is expected to be completed in 2013.” In a similar way, the 
development of the Framework for Aboriginal languages and Torres Strait 
Islander languages (also due in 2013) is expected to meet the requirements of 
recommendations 11 and 20 (which relate to teaching resources and the curriculum). 
Furthermore, it is explained that a number of the action points (or initiatives that 
have resulted from them) that are a part of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Education Action Plan 2010-2014 closely correlate with a number of 
recommendations included in Our Land Our Languages that relate to Indigenous 
education and Indigenous teacher training (#16, 17, 19, 21 & 22). Other examples 
of explanations of the ways in which recommendations included on Our Land Our 
Languages will be/are accommodated within the context of other Government 
initiatives are outlined below: 
 
 Recommendation #16 relating to limited authority qualifications to teach 
will be drawn to the attention of the organisations that are considering the 
development of a National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Educator 
Workforce Strategy (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.10) 
 Recommendations #18 and 19 relating to training and career pathways for 
indigenous language teachers are being addressed through systemic reforms 
that are driven by Smarter Schools – Improving Teacher Quality National 
Partnership as well as the More Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Teachers Initiative (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.11). 
                                                 
178 The commitment to bilingual signage will be included in the update of the National Indigenous 
Languages Policy action plan (Australian Government, 2013, June 6), p.4). 
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 Recommendation #22 relating to in-service EAL/D and cultural awareness 
training is achieved by The Australian Professional Standards for Teachers 
(to be implemented nationally from 2013), the Teach Remote initiative and 
the Senior Officers National Network of Indigenous Education (Australian 
government, 2013, June 6, p.13). 
It is worth noting the Government is careful not to agree to implement 
recommendations or parts of recommendations that could transgress the jurisdiction 
of another Governing body or could be seen as ‘one-size fits all’ solution for 
communities. Thus for example, 
 
States and territories are primarily responsible for the provision of teacher 
professional development in schools (Australian government, 2013, June 6, 
p.11). 
 
State and territory governments are responsible for key elements of the 
health and justice systems . . . . Recognising the need for a coordinated 
approach, the Australian Government is currently seeking support of 
jurisdictions to develop a National Framework for the supply and use of 
Indigenous language interpreters (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, 
p.11). 
 
Language Nest activities may not be the best approach . . . in every language 
situation in Australia. The Australian Government will continue to work 
with communities to assist them to make informed decisions about the 
methods . . . most suited to their language situation and to support capacity 
building in communities to enable them to deliver strong and effective 
language activities, including Language Nests (Australian Government, 
2013, June 6, p.8). 
 
3.5 Some concluding comments 
In terms of all of the criteria derived from CDT that are applied here, Our Land Our 
Languages would be difficult to improve on. All of the questions posed can be 
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answered with a resounding yes. In the next two chapters, two New Zealand-based 
reports are analysed in terms of the same criteria. One of these (Ko Aotearoa Tēnei) 
is a Waitangi Tribunal report relating to indigenous flora and fauna and including a 
chapter dealing with the Māori language; the other (Te Reo Mauriora) is a 
government sponsored report on the Review of the Māori language sector and the 
Māori Language Strategy.  
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Chapter 4 
A criterion-referenced analysis of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A report into claims concerning New Zealand 
law and policy affecting Māori culture and identity, released by the Waitangi 
Tribunal in 2011 is analysed in terms of the criteria outlined in Chapter 2. The 
chapter begins with the provision of some background information (4.2) before 
going on to the analysis itself (4.3) and discussion of the report’s reception (4.4). 
 
An electronic copy of this report is available from the Waitangi Tribunal website: 
www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/downloadpdf.asp?reportid={BF981901-
5B55-441C-A93E-8E84B67B76E9}.pdf 
4.2 Background to the report  
The WAI 262 claim (Indigenous flora and fauna, cultural intellectual property) 
was lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal on the 9th of October 1991 by 6 claimants 
on behalf of themselves and their iwi.179 The other party to the claim, the Crown, is 
both defendant and eventual arbiter of the report. 180 
 
The claim arose from concerns that mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge and ways 
of knowing) in relation to Māori taonga - including indigenous flora and fauna as 
well as Māori dialects - was being lost, as were the taonga themselves, and that the 
control guaranteed to Māori in the Treaty was being denied to them as a result of 
legal or policy decisions (Waitangi Tribunal (WT), 2011a, pp.17, 19). The overall 
direction of the claim is outlined in the preface to the report: 
 
[T]he Wai 262 claim is really a claim about mātauranga Māori – that is, the 
unique Māori way of viewing the world, encompassing both traditional 
                                                 
179 The claimants included Haana Murray (Ngāti Kurī), Hema Nui a Tawhaki Witana (Te Rarawa), 
Te Witi McMath (Ngāti Wai), Tama Poata (Ngāti Porou), Kataraina Rimene (Ngāti Kahungunu), 
and John Hippolite (Ngāti Koata). 
180 See Section 1.3.2.1 for a background on the Waitangi Tribunal. The panel for the WAI 262 
Inquiry was Justice Joe Williams (presiding officer from 2006), Keita Walker, Pamela Ringwood 
and Roger Maaka. The first presiding officer, Judge Richard Kearney, died in 2005. 
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knowledge and culture. The claimants, in other words, are seeking to 
preserve their culture and identity, and the relationships that culture and 
identity derive from (WT, 2011a, p.xxiii). 
 
Given the centrality of the Māori language to Māori culture, identity and knowledge 
(WT, 2011a, p.154), as well as its already accepted status as a taonga (see below), 
it was also included in the scope of the claim. The initial focus was on tribal dialects 
and inappropriate or offensive uses. However, this was quickly discarded in favour 
of a focus on the protection of the language as a whole.181 
 
There are a number of precedents to the WAI 262 claim, most of which are 
discussed in Section 1.3.2.1, that are referenced throughout the report and therefore 
are worth noting briefly here. They include, for example, the 1986 WAI 11 Te Reo 
Māori report (WT, 1986) which found that the Māori language was a taonga and 
therefore that the Government had an obligation to protect it, and the resulting 
Māori Language Act 1987 which, although providing official (if vague) status for 
the language and establishing what is now called Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori 
(Te Taura Whiri), omitted key WAI 11 Te Reo Māori recommendations. Another 
precedent that is referenced is the 1994 Privy Council decision that the Government 
should take steps to protect Māori interests in the broadcasting spectrum.182 The 
findings and recommendations of the 2007 report of the Office of the Auditor 
General on progress towards the implementation of the Māori Language Strategy 
is also discussed in Te reo Māori chapter of the WAI 262 report, and appears to 
have had an influence on some of its recommendations.183 Finally, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), endorsed by 
                                                 
181 It was discarded as it was seen that the protection of the dialects cannot be divorced from 
protection of the whole (WT, 2011a, p.154). 
182 The Privy Council decision is referenced in the Reo Māori chapter to support the report’s 
assertions regarding its vulnerable state of the language (WT, 2011c, p.401 & 452); the Crown’s 
obligation to preserve the language (2011c, p.442); the importance of Māori participation in decision 
making (WT, 2011c, p.453); the ability of shareholding ministers (in TVNZ) to accept a lower 
financial return (WT, 2011c, p.457). 
183 In re-positioning the Te Taura Whiri as lead sector agency the Tribunal states that “This will 
address the problems . . .  identified by the OAG” (WT, 2011c, p.471). The Taumata II (V2) version 
includes a 2 page discussion on the Office of the Auditor-General findings (WT, 2011c, pp.462-
464). This section also features a picture of the OAG report with the comment “The report paints a 
picture of lost opportunities due to poor communication and coordination, unrealistic expectations, 
and deprioritising within agencies.”  
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New Zealand in 2010, is expected to have a large, albeit as yet unspecified, future 
influence on Crown/Māori relationships.184 
 
The WAI 262 claim report was released on the 2nd of July 2011. Its title - Ko 
Aotearoa Tēnei (KAT) - meaning ‘This is ‘Aotearoa’ or ‘This is New Zealand’ - is 
intended to be a reminder that Aotearoa and New Zealand must be able to co-exist 
in the same space. The report was published in two versions: a two volume, in-
depth 884 page version (Taumata II), and an abridged 322 page version (Taumata 
I) which aims to be accessible to a general readership. Both are organised into 8 
thematic chapters, the fifth of which has the following title: Te reo Māori. 185 
 
Both versions of the report were accompanied by two page summary sheets for each 
chapter, one page press releases, and FAQ sheets available on the Tribunal 
website.186 
 
Although historical grievances are considered, the WAI 262 findings and 
recommendations for each chapter focus on the contemporary relationship between 
the Crown and Māori. Thus, recommendations include, for example, infrastructural 
changes, such as the establishment of new partnership bodies and funding agents as 
well as expanded roles for other bodies, improved support for some areas, and 
amendments to laws covering a wide range of issues. 
 
                                                 
184 Although John Key emphasised the non-binding and aspirational nature of the UNDRIP, and 
New Zealand’s 2010 statement of acceptance was limited, its affirmation of the central role of the 
Treaty (and principles) has led political commentators such as Chen (2010, April 28); Sir Eddie 
Durie (2010, April 22); and Mutu (2011) and the Government (Sharples, 2010, April 20) to accept 
that UNDRIP will influence future policy. Moreover, a key Government briefing paper to the 
Attorney General regarding the Ko Aotearoa Tēnei report (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2010, October 6, p.4) 
expressed the view that UNDRIP would “form an important component in the development of the 
Government response to the WAI 262 report.” Finally, the Waitangi Tribunal has referenced the 
UNDRIP throughout this report, including the Te reo Māori chapter (see for example, the quotation 
of Article 13 in WT, 2011c, p.442). The Tribunal states that it views UNDRIP as a “significant 
development . . . that as a universal human rights instrument it binds all UN member states morally 
and politically to comply fully with its contents . . . [and] can become customary international law 
over time” (WT, 2011c, p.674). 
185 A prepublication version of this chapter was released in October 2010 in order to make their 
analysis available to the Review of the Māori language sector and Māori Language Strategy, which 
had commenced in July that year. There was very little difference between the draft and final 
versions. The final version was not updated to 2011 and any changes were minor only, relating to 
matters of report-wide consistency and cross-referencing (WT, 2011a, p.153). 
186 FAQ = frequently asked questions 
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The final version of the Te reo Māori chapter found that “the notion is that te reo is 
making steady forward progress, particularly amongst the young, is manifestly 
false” (WT, 2011c, p.467), that the health of the Māori language was “approaching 
a crisis point” (WT, 2011, July 2, p.1) and was unequivocal in identifying 
Government policies and practices as the primary cause. Reference was made to a 
lack of imagination, ambition and commitment in relation to the Māori language on 
the part of government. The report noted that there was little evidence of true 
partnership and that there had been repeated policy failures, a lack of commitment 
to the implementation of the 2003 Māori Language strategy, and inadequate 
resourcing. It also questioned why key WAI 11 recommendations had still not been 
implemented twenty five years after the 1986 report. The report’s main 
recommendations are intended to lead to a strengthening of Te Taura Whiri, which, 
it is claimed, “has largely been relegated to the role of a stable of language 
Technicians”. 
 
[Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori should become] the lead Māori language 
sector agency . . . . function as a Crown–Māori partnership with equal 
numbers of Crown and Māori appointees on its board . . . have greater 
powers, including the authority to require Māori language plans of . . .  
public agencies and authorities . . . and the authority to approve [Māori 
language] curricula . . .  and set targets for the training of Māori language 
and Māori medium teachers (WT, 2011c, pp.477-478). 
 
The report also recommended that authorities and agencies in districts that meet a 
specified Māori speaker number threshold, as well as schools that have a specified 
number/ percentage of Māori pupils, consult with local iwi in the formulation of 
their [Māori language] plans (WT, 2011c, p.478). 
4.3  Criterion-referenced analysis of the report 
Where italic print is used in extracts from the report, this is intended to draw 
attention to particular sections.187 
 
                                                 
187 In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the report will show only the year and page 
number. For example, instead of ‘(WT, 2011a, p.56)’ it will show ‘(2011a, p.56)’. 
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4.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’ 
 
Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
 
Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as 
sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership 
of that group and to resonate positively with them? 
 
The report constructs a future, inclusive ‘all New Zealand in-group’, which involves 
identifying New Zealand as an equal partnership between two founding cultures, 
which began with the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.188 The partners within the ‘New 
Zealander’ in-group (consisting of Māori New Zealanders (also referred to as 
tangata whenua) and non-Māori New Zealanders (including Pākehā and others)) 
are represented by the Crown / government.189 Thus: 
 
Will it be possible to normalise Crown–Māori relations as the architects of 
the Treaty settlement process intended? (2011a, p.16). 
 
[T]he promise that was made when the Crown and tangata whenua entered 
their partnership at Waitangi (2011c, p.715). 
 
Māori (and Māori language and culture) are an integral part of the partnership and 
are, therefore, central to the culture and identity of the country as a whole and their 
interests as well as the interests of others, are acknowledged: 
 
Most non-Māori New Zealanders like the fact that Māori identity and 
culture is now a vital aspect of New Zealand identity and culture (2011a, 
                                                 
188 This equal partnership paradigm is developed in the report by a creating mirror image migration 
myth for both Kupe’s people (Hawaikians who became Māori) and Cook’s people (British who 
became Pākehā) and then by positing the Treaty as the formal agreement to begin the partnership 
(2011a, p.14). 
189 Tangata whenua means person of the land, that is, a native or indigenous person. Non-Māori New 
Zealanders are also called tangata tiriti , ‘treaty person’, that is someone who belongs to New 
Zealand by virtue of the Treaty (see 2011b, p.495). The term Pākehā generally refers to fair-skinned 
non-Māori New Zealanders: See footnotes in Section 1.2.2 for more information. 
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p.15). 
 
New Zealanders are unconsciously and organically building a new and 
unique national identity. It will, we suggest, come to be based on two things: 
the extraordinary natural beauty and wealth of these islands, and the 
partnership between our two founding cultures (2011a, p.16). 
 
Such a commitment will not only fulfil – at last – the promise that was made 
when the Crown and tangata whenua entered their partnership at Waitangi 
. . . (2011c, p.715). 
 
The Māori language is important for Māori and is also an important part of 
New Zealand’s culture and identity (2011, July 2, p.1). 
 
As New Zealand becomes more ethnically diverse, it is likely that our 
indigenous culture can help unify us and define our national identity. Te reo 
Māori will be a critical aspect of this (2011a, p.177). 
 
[Māori interests have] to be . . . balanced against any valid interests of other 
New Zealanders and of the nation as a whole, if those interests are in tension. 
As we have said elsewhere, conflict between Māori and New Zealand 
interests is not to be assumed (2011a, p.237). 
 
This partnership to date is seen as having been characterised by disharmony, a 
situation that, “continue[s] to test our collective comfort zones” (2011a, p.14). In 
that Māori are presented as having “largely met their obligations” (2011c, p.470), 
it is the lack of non-Māori commitment to partnership that is seen as having created 
this disharmony. So far as the report writers are concerned, the pathway to national 
harmony is one that involves acceptance of and, more importantly, commitment to 
a restructured national identity based on the equal partnership: 
 
[S]uch a commitment will not only fulfil – at last – the promise that was 
made when the Crown and tangata whenua entered their partnership at 
Waitangi. It will also pave the way for a new approach to the Treaty 
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relationship: as a relationship of equals, each looking not to the grievances 
of the past but with optimism to a shared future. (2011c, p.715). 
 
Over the next decade or so, the Crown–Māori relationship, still currently 
fixed on Māori grievances, must shift to a less negative and more future 
focused relationship at all levels (2011a, p.16) 
 
This restructuring of the (future) national identity necessarily involves the creation 
of potential new identities for each ‘partner’. Thus Pākehā are presented as ‘native’ 
New Zealanders who are different from the colonial Other in that their identity is 
created, in part, with reference to Māori. At the same time, Māori indigeneity, while 
still asserted, is now framed within partnership terms: 
 
It is clear that slowly the British became Pākehā, native sons and daughters 
of these soils in their own right – a distinct people (2011a, p.14). 
 
In this way, we reject the old colonial label of little Britain in the south 
Pacific and express our unique heritage (2011a, p.15). 
 
Although this all-Aotearoa/ New Zealand partnership configuration has the 
potential to undermine the widely accepted discourse of Māori as the sole 
indigenous people, it does not do so. Indeed, the unique indigenous character of 
Māori is placed at the very core of this new sense of genuine partnership identity: 
 
. . . Māori culture is our national culture – it helps give all New Zealanders 
a sense of who they are (2011a, p.245). 
 
[T]he Treaty principle of partnership between the Crown and Māori. . . . 
reminds us . . . that Kupe’s people are at the core of New Zealand’s unique 
identity as a nation (2011a, p.24). 
 
Bicultural fusion gives our vibrant multicultural reality a solid core with 
enough gravity to pull later immigrant cultures into orbit around its vision, 
values, and expectations. A nation cannot sustain itself without that solid 
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core (2011a, p.16).  
 
. . . the Treaty of course also grants the Māori interest a greater status than 
simply that of a minority group within society (2011c, p.442). 
 
A further strand of this national partnership discourse is the re-identification of the 
Government as being potentially thoroughly representative and reflective of Māori, 
even to the point of aiming to be Māori speaking: 
 
On the Crown’s part there needs to be a mind-shift away from the pervasive 
assumption that the Crown is Pākehā, English-speaking and distinct from 
Māori (2011a, p.167). 
 
The Government itself has failed to become more Māori speaking and thus 
reflect the aspirations of a growing number of the citizens it represents 
(2011c, p.470). 
 
. . . there is no reason why the Crown must be monolingual in English. In 
referring to the relationship between ‘the Crown and Māori’, it is important 
not to overlook the fact that the Crown represents Māori too – it is not a 
Pākehā institution, even if that has been its character for much of the past 
(2011c, p.457). 190 
 
In drawing on the hegemonic ‘New Zealand as state’ identity to make its point, the 
Tribunal appears to implicitly acknowledge a fundamental contest over the key 
signifier ‘New Zealand’, one that relates to the overdetermined Crown being 
identified both as ‘equal partner’ and final arbiter (of the Tribunal’s 
recommendations). Central to this contest is the fact that the ‘New Zealand as state’ 
identity is considered, by the Crown, to be more representative and inclusive than 
is the ‘New Zealand as an equal partnership’ identity: 
 
                                                 
190 Furthermore, the assumption that the Crown is Pākehā’ is linked to a lack of support for the Māori 
language movement (WT, 2011c, pp.407, 469-470 & 477). 
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The core of the Crown’s position was that protecting what the claimants 
seek is impractical, and has consequences for New Zealand and New 
Zealanders that must be considered (2011b, p.71) 
 
In light of this, an implicit characteristic of the New Zealand partnership-based in-
group proposed in the report is that it is self-selected. That is, New Zealanders are 
metaphorically offered the choice of belonging to this partnership-based in-group 
(or not): 
 
New Zealand sits poised at a crossroads both in race relations and on our 
long quest for a mature sense of national identity (2011a, p.xvii). 
 
. . .this country began in consensus as two peoples, and  . . . now, as many 
peoples, must continue on that path (2011a, p.24). 
 
Given that some New Zealanders, may “feel a sense of unease about these ideas 
[equal partnership]” (2011c, p.715), not to mention “the corresponding claim [by 
Māori] to resources, both fiscal and otherwise” (2011c, p.442), this partnership-
based identity may be rejected. The Tribunal is aware of this possibility and 
forwards a number of arguments in favour of its acceptance, not least of which is 
the fact that: 
 
Altered demographics mean we must do this in any event. In the life of the 
nation Māori are now much more to the fore and there is no turning back 
from that. So, while the Treaty makes it a constitutional responsibility to 
adjust the Crown–Māori relationship, even without the Treaty the country 
would have a social and political responsibility to do so. The number of 
Māori is predicted to rise to over 800,000 by 2026, which suggests that the 
total will nudge one million by mid-century. 
 
Tribunal members have attempted to discursively create a new ‘in-group’ identity, 
one that is rooted in genuine equal partnership. In doing so, they grant to Pākehā a 
‘native’ status while reinforcing Māori as the sole indigenous group. This is 
combined with the articulation of Government as potentially thoroughly 
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representative of Māori. However, as the extracts above indicate, in-group identity 
as represented in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei is largely potential rather than actual.191 This 
in-group is made up of those people, including representatives of government, who 
are committed to securing genuine partnership. The report writers are implicitly 
represented as already having opted for membership of this group. Otherwise, 
membership is open to both Māori and non-Māori in a process of self-selection. 
Thus, although it is potentially a fully inclusive group, it differs from the all-
Australia ‘in-group’ presented in Our Land Our Languages in a fundamental way: 
the presupposition there is that Australians have already, in general, committed to 
membership. 
 
Thus, although the construction/ representation of an ‘all New Zealand in-group’ is 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context, and 
although it is certainly inclusive, it is presented as being potential rather than actual. 
It is not only predicated on a major attitudinal shift, but on one that represents a 
clear threat to hegemonic ‘statehood’ discourse. This remains the case irrespective 
of the ways in which the report writers present the negative consequences of failure 
to commit to this inclusive identity. Those New Zealanders who fear the loss of 
control that would be associated with genuine partnership (including government 
representatives) are unlikely to endorse the report’s recommendations. Those Māori 
who remain unconvinced that any major repositioning by the Crown is likely in the 
foreseeable future and may, therefore, feel that acceptance of the report’s 
recommendations could lead to a lessening of Māori resistance, are equally unlikely 
to endorse them. The answer to the two questions with which this section began 
must be, for the present at least, no. Nevertheless, the vision of a future based on 
genuine partnership rather than ongoing dispute is one that is likely to have 
considerable appeal for many and may, in time, gain more widespread acceptance. 
4.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity 
 
Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
                                                 
191 One extract that does signal a little more than potentiality is: New Zealanders are unconsciously 
and organically building a new and unique national identity (WT, 2011a, p.16). 
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Question 4: Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be 
perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership 
of that group? 
 
As part of the attempt to create a New Zealand in-group, the report writers seek to 
dissociate Pākehā New Zealanders from both colonial and British identities: 
 
But Cook’s people did not stay British. They succumbed to the whenua’s 
slow seduction just as surely as Kupe’s people had. The transplanted British 
institutions and ideas took root in the soil, but the soil changed them (2011a, 
p.12) 
 
Certainly their rejection of Europe’s stifling social stratification did. 
Whatever the multiple causes, it is clear that slowly the British became 
Pākehā, native sons and daughters of these soils in their own right – a 
distinct people. And though comfortingly familiar, the British, their ideas, 
and their institutions eventually became ‘other’. 
 
In this way, we reject the old colonial label of little Britain in the south 
Pacific and express our unique heritage (2011a, p.15) 
 
[I]t is changing from the familiar late-twentieth century partnership built on 
the notion that the perpetrator’s successor must pay the victim’s successor 
for the original colonial sin (2011a, p.15). 
 
Tribunal members attempt to avoid representation of any New Zealanders as an 
‘out-group’, the aim being to strengthen the potential coalition of support. Every 
New Zealander is presented as having the potential to be involved in a positive way 
in the creation of a better future, one that will benefit everyone. In fact, wherever 
possible, the Tribunal makes positive comments about Crown agencies, for 
example: 
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First and foremost, we note that every one of the agencies we reviewed is 
doing something for mātauranga Māori. Some may not be doing enough, 
some may not be doing it very well; but at least they are doing something. 
This, in itself, is a considerable advance from the situation 20 years ago 
(2011c, p.582). 
 
We do not mean to diminish the Crown’s now significant commitment to 
Māori language broadcasting . . . (2011a, p.155). 
 
Where critical comments are made, they are often ameliorated, as in the case of the 
inclusion of ‘benign neglect’ and ‘belated move’ as possible alternatives in the first 
two extracts below, and the acknowledgement of good intentions in the third: 
 
After decades of active suppression or, at best, ‘benign neglect’, te reo 
Māori had reached a perilous state by the 1970s (2011c, p.407). 
 
There has been a profound failure (or, at best, a belated move) to develop 
policy that will assist in the revival of te reo and the safeguarding of dialect 
(2011c, p.470). 
 
It was a standard piece of pre-consulted Crown policy for the good of 
Māori, admittedly promulgated by officials committed to the survival and 
growth of te reo, but sitting in sharp contrast to the grassroots momentum 
of the kōhanga reo . . . (2011a, p.455). 
 
Where there is attribution of blame, it is sometimes detached from current Ministers 
or takes the form of characteristics (expressed through nominalisation) rather than 
being attached directly to individuals or groups:192 
 
                                                 
192This is not always the case as is indicated in the following extracts: “By late 2007, however, Te 
Puni Kōkiri had still not undertaken [the MLS] evaluation according to the terms set out in its own 
draft implementation plan”(WT, 2011c, p.463); “Indeed, it is already clearly failing to maintain the 
2006 levels – or its own strategy follows the lack of ambition in the MLS” (WT, 2011a, p.166); 
“Inadequate priority accorded te reo in resourcing as a result of this policy failure (WT, 2011a, 
p.169). 
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We conclude that a failure of imagination and planning in the education 
sector led to the major gulf between Māori-medium education supply and 
demand (2011a, p.165). 
 
[B]ureaucracy’s efforts to put in place measures to deal with . . . Māori 
language renaissance were decidedly leaden-footed. . . . pedestrian . . . 
(2011c, p.458). 
 
On other occasions, Tribunal members attempt to avoid making direct criticism 
themselves by reiterating a criticism from another source: 
 
ERO reviews in the 1990s showed that the quality of teaching and even the 
use of te reo at many kohanga was distinctly lacking. Similarly, concerns 
about child safety and financial mismanagement at various kohanga have 
commanded a good deal of media attention . . . . (2011c, p.458). 
 
The 2006 Te Puni Kōkiri-commissioned Māori language survey showed 
much more positive results than the 2006 census, but it has been strongly 
criticised by a  leading scholar for its lack of reliability (2011c, p.440).193 
 
Māori language revivalists must also be open-minded about what kind of 
Māori language education is appropriate. However, we have seen some 
adopting a relatively purist position, and contending that immersion is the 
only remedy. Writing in 1988, for example, former Māori language 
Commissioner Timoti Karetu and his colleague Jeffrey Waite argued that 
the establishment of ‘exclusively Māori-medium schools’ was ‘the only 
way’ for the language to be retained. . . . Others, however, are not so sure 
that this is the right approach. . . . (2011c, p.468). 
 
In spite of all of this, there remains a considerable amount of explicit and implicit 
criticism – criticism of government, of organisations and of individuals (including 
Māori organisations and individuals) - criticism that effectively characterises them 
                                                 
193 Te Puni Kōkiri is also referred to as The Ministry of Māori Development 
-158- 
as ‘out-groups’. Thus, for example: 
 
The Crown has clearly not yet adequately responded to the Tribunal’s 
recommendation about the use of te reo by Government departments and 
public bodies (2011c, p.455). 
 
In 2001 only 18 out of around 100 Crown agencies claimed to have 
completed Māori language plans. Of these, only four were provided to Te 
Puni Kōkiri and only two were of a sufficient standard. Although we were 
told that Te Puni Kōkiri intended to publish an update, its 2006 inventory of 
Māori language services (released in April 2008) was silent on the matter. 
Te Puni Kōkiri has since confirmed it is unable to provide any update of the 
2001 situation (2011c, p.456). 
 
Te Taura Whiri and Te Puni Kōkiri have joint responsibility under the MLS 
for the provision of public services in Māori. In November 2007, the Office 
of the Auditor General noted in its report on Implementing the Māori 
Language Strategy  . . . that both agencies had deprioritised this activity:  . 
. . (2011c, p.456). 
 
Looking back, the bureaucracy’s efforts to put in place measures to deal 
with and encourage the Māori language renaissance were decidedly leaden-
footed . . . . the reaction was pedestrian (2011c, p.458). 
 
Within the context of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, those who are not committed to genuine 
partnership represent, by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Most notable among them 
are government representatives since it is the actions and failures to act of 
government that are most severely criticised throughout the report. Criticism for 
lack of commitment to genuine partnership is seen clearly in the following excerpt: 
 
[W]e saw repeated failures of policy. The most profound was the failure to 
train enough teachers to meet the predictable demand for Māori-medium 
education . . . . The Government’s 2003 Māori language strategy has been 
another failure. It is too abstract and has been constructed within a 
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bureaucratic comfort zone. There have been genuine problems with its 
implementation due to a lack of leadership and commitment amongst the 
responsible Crown agencies. It is also an example of the lack of true 
partnership between Māori and the Crown in language policy: it is a well-
meaning but essentially standard and pre-consulted Crown policy that does 
nothing to motivate Māori at the grassroots (2011a, p.708). 
 
It is, furthermore, government representatives who are most often associated with 
the type of mindset that is presented as being more consistent with an adversarial 
past than a (hypothetical) future characterised by genuine partnership: 
 
. . . what we believe is needed more than anything is a change in mindset – 
a shift from the ‘old’ approach that valued only one founding culture to one 
in which the other is equally supported and promoted and the advantage 
New Zealand would hold by its embrace of both . . . is widely recognised 
(2011c, p.699). 
 
Our point relates to the mindset the Crown brings to the discussion . . . .  The 
correct mindset, in our view, is that every reasonable effort will be made to 
reach agreement, and that resort to the right to govern will occur only when 
all other reasonable options have been explored. The purpose of the 
partnership model is to provide a platform in which agreement is expected 
and encouraged. It requires a readiness to compromise from the outset. Too 
often this readiness is absent (2011c, p.581) 
 
The Crown’s defensive mindset must shift (2011c, p.657) 
 
Within the context of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, those who are not committed to genuine 
partnership represent, by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Notwithstanding some 
attempt to be both inclusive and positive, Tribunal members make it clear that the 
Crown has provided little or no evidence of being committed to equal partnership 
and that, therefore, should the mindset of its present and future representatives fail 
to change, they would be perceived being part of an ‘other’ (together with past 
representatives of the Crown). Even so, a number of positive and ameliorating 
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observations signal that current and future government representatives are only 
potentially assigned to an ‘other’ identity group. While this does not seem to be 
wholly consistent with the overall purpose of the text, that is, to persuade key 
decision-makers (largely government representatives) to accept, and act upon the 
report’s recommendations, it is not wholly inconsistent with it. In addition, the 
frequent attribution of negative judgments to others, combined with the inclusion 
of evidence and careful argument (evidence and argument that are nevertheless 
sometimes open to a different interpretation from the one provided) mean that it 
would be difficult to interpret these judgments as being disrespectful or offensive. 
Thus, the answer to both questions that began this section is a qualified – yes. 
4.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation 
There are four relevant questions here. Each is considered separately below. 
 
Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to 
increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support 
for its aims? 
 
As indicated in the previous section, where there is negative criticism in the report, 
it is largely targeted at government agencies and government representatives. To 
identify these agencies and representatives as a common adversary would, however, 
as indicated above, be difficult for a number of reasons. Some attempt, therefore, 
appears to have been made to establish as a common adversary, that is, a particular 
mindset/ those who continue to subscribe to it: [W]hat we believe is needed more 
than anything is a change in mindset (2011c, p.699). As noted in the previous 
section, that mindset is associated with a lack of genuine commitment to equal 
partnership. The problem here, however, is that the authors of this report, unlike the 
authors of Our Land Our Languages, clearly associate that mindset, in part, with 
the Crown and it is therefore very difficult to separate it from Crown 
representatives: 
 
Fundamentally, there is a need for a mindset shift away from the pervasive 
assumption that the Crown is Pākehā, English-speaking, and distinct from 
Māori rather than representative of them (2011c, p.451). 
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[T]he Government must shift its mindset so it comes to see Māori not as 
external to itself but as part of its very own make-up (2011c, p.457). 
 
As a result, although Ko Aotearoa Tēnei identifies an abstraction (a particular 
mindset) as a common adversary, the fact that it is closely associated with the 
Crown does not greatly increase the potential for the extension of an existing 
coalition of support for the report’s aims to government officials/ representatives. 
 
Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of 
support for its aims? 
 
Tribunal members make considerable effort to create a wide support base for their 
recommendations through positive, well-argued and inclusive discourse, something 
that is particularly important given the non-binding nature of its recommendations 
and the dual roles of Government as both defendant and final arbiter. 
 
Current Government representatives, including current Ministers (particularly 
where they are Māori) are often presented in a neutral or positive light. Thus, for 
example, the writers make a point of acknowledging the statutory roles of the 
Minister of Māori Affairs (2011a, pp.154-155) and also of linking the current 
Minister of Māori Affairs (and co-leader of the Māori party), Peter Sharples,194 to 
the revitalisation movement, twice including a photograph of him speaking at the 
opening of New Zealand’s first kura kaupapa Māori (2011a, pp.156 & 172).195 They 
also make a point of complimenting him: 
 
                                                 
194 Dr. Peter (Pita) Sharples is the Member of Parliament for Tamaki Makaurau (the Auckland Māori 
electorate). He is the co-leader of the Māori Party with Tariana Turia. In the National-led minority 
Government, Sharples holds the portfolio of the Minister of Māori Affairs as well as the Associate 
Minister for both Education and Corrections (all outside of cabinet). He is a fluent speaker of the 
Māori language and has participated widely in Māori cultural and language events. 
195  This reduces the potentially negative impact of a reference to the “apparent ministerial 
satisfaction with a Māori language Act that is clearly failing to stimulate the Government’s own 
efforts to speak te reo” (WT, 2011c, p.470). There are also two pictures, in chapter 8, of Peter 
Sharples at the Permanent United Nations forum on Indigenous Peoples in relation to the UNDRIP 
(see WT, 2011a, p.232; WT, 2011c, pp.672-673). In addition, the covering letter of this report is 
addressed first to Peter Sharples, then to Prime Minister John Key and then to the other Ministers of 
the Crown (WT, 2011a, p.xvii). 
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In announcing the Tamati Reedy-led review of the MLS, Minister Sharples 
said on 29 July 2010 that a ‘more coordinated approach’ was needed . . . . 
We are glad that the Minister has identified what had become quite 
apparent to us, and we trust this report will be of benefit to his review 
(2011c, p.469). 
 
Related to this is the way that the Tribunal acknowledges difficulties and constraints 
experienced by the Crown (albeit without accepting these as an excuse): 
 
There was certainly no surplus of Māori-speaking teachers in the 1980s that 
could have been tapped into. But that made it a genuine challenge, not an 
insurmountable obstacle. (2011a, 164). 
  
We acknowledge that a balance must be struck between investing in public 
services in te reo Māori and other vital activities, such as training Māori-
medium teachers, and we know the Crown cannot do everything. But we do 
believe the Crown can and should do more about the use of te reo by its own 
agencies (2011c, p.457). 
 
Also evident is an attempt to highlight the fact that there is an existing coalition of 
support for the Tribunal’s recommendations by using extensive referencing of 
authoritative sources, as in the following example: 
 
This view is backed up by well-regarded international research. Stephen 
Cornell, writing for the influential Harvard Project on American Indian 
economic Development, has commented that  . . . (2011c, p.454). 
 
As the Privy Council said in the Broadcasting Assets case, where a taonga 
is in a vulnerable state, the Crown may well be required ‘to take especially 
vigorous action for its protection’ (2011c, p.452). 
 
As the Privy Council has said in the context of te reo Māori, where a 
Government has previously acted to suppress, its obligation now to protect 
is all the greater. (2011c, p.568). 
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As indicated earlier, however, the amount of explicit and implicit criticism of 
existing and potential allies, including Māori organisations, serves to undermine the 
efforts made to build a coalition of support:196 
 
Dogmatic approaches that risk alienating even fellow Māori must be kept in 
check. It seems likely to us that a flexible stance will sometimes be required, 
in the interests of the language (2011c, p.452). 
 
In the running of kohanga and kura, Māori must also strive to get along with 
each other (2011c, p.452). 
 
With respect to Te Taura Whiri’s work on standardising te reo  . . . we are 
unclear as to whether Te Taura Whiri has been acting in accordance with 
Māori wishes or contrary to them (2011c, p.465). 
 
So far as indicating an existing coalition of support for its aims is concerned, the 
inclusion of records of hearings and submissions (as appendices) serves this 
purpose to some extent, as does referencing of authoritative sources. However, 
although the report quotes from a number of sources that appear to be broadly 
supportive of its general direction, there is little evidence in the report of an existing 
coalition of support for its more specific recommendations. Indeed, while it 
recommends increased powers for Te Taura Whiri, it also criticises Te Puni Kōkiri. 
Overall, there is an absence of that overwhelming sense of support for the report’s 
aims that is evident in Our Land Our Languages. 
 
Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the 
creation of an opposition coalition? 
 
The Tribunal’s decision to significantly broaden the scope of the original claim in 
responding to it had the potential to create opposition from all the parties involved. 
Tribunal members may have been attempting to avoid this potential pitfall when 
                                                 
196 This is in contrast to Our Land Our Languages, which made a point of praising indigenous 
organisations. 
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they (a) declared that their recommendations should be regarded as provisional in 
view of the negative impact that the inclusion of the Māori language as a whole 
(rather than dialects only), combined with the brief submission period, may have 
had on the breadth of evidence and quality of insights, and (b) indicated at the 
beginning of the relevant chapter that, in broadening the scope of the report, the 
authors were, in fact, in accord with both the approach of the Crown and the 
evidence presented by the Crown. However, in that it is likely that Crown witnesses 
will resent having their own words used against them, the second of these strategies 
had the potential to backfire: 
 
In recognition . . . that a brief period for submissions did and could not 
constitute a full inquiry into the reo issues we covered, our findings and 
recommendations should rightly continue to be regarded as provisional 
(2011c, p.387). 
 
We also declared our findings and recommendations to be provisional only. 
We did so mainly because the chapter addressed matters that went beyond 
the narrow set of reo issues agreed to earlier . . . (2011c, p.387). 
 
The Crown gave evidence about its entire range of reo initiatives . . . . Some 
claimant groups took a similarly expansive approach. We were somewhat 
surprised by this, given the agreed narrowing of the issues. . . . Our concern 
resolved itself when . . . the Crown’s leading Māori-language policy witness 
. . . replied, ‘I think there’s a clear relationship between . . . Te Reo Māori 
[and the dialect of Ngāti Koata] . . . This exchange confirmed for us that the 
agreed restriction to tribal dialect was unworkable. The Crown witness was 
right: loss in one would affect the other, and vice versa (2011a, p.154). 
 
The authors of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei appear to attempt to minimise the number of 
potential adversaries by maintaining, for some of the time at least, a positive stance 
towards the Crown as well as to non-Māori and by including ameliorating 
comments where criticisms are made. 
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Although there are proposals that have the potential to alienate some, such as the 
proposed revamping of Te Taura Whiri, strategies are employed to ensure that 
everyone involved is given a voice, albeit not to the same extent as is the case in 
Our Land Our Languages.197 Thus, for example, included in the report are records 
of hearings (2011c, pp.717-732) and submissions (WT, 2011c, pp.733-742); as well 
as summaries of the main arguments of each party (2011c, see pp.389-392).198 
Furthermore, the opinions and fears of those with differing views are acknowledged 
throughout the document.199 For example: 
 
Pākehā, and now other New Zealanders, fear that Māori will acquire 
undeserved privileges at their expense. . . . Māori New Zealanders, on the 
other hand, are fearful that their unique place as first people will not be 
respected by other New Zealanders. They fear that the majority would 
prefer Māori were simply assimilated into an imagined utopian 
‘mainstream’. Some Māori (though again, by no means all) argue for an 
entirely separate Māori future in which the non-Māori majority no longer 
has a veto over their aspirations (2011a, p.15). 
 
Consistent with the qualification of its findings as provisional, the Tribunal is 
careful to acknowledge the parameters of its own role and authority and to explicitly 
pull back from transgressing the role and authority of other groups:200 
 
It is not our place to dictate which should take priority – hip replacements 
                                                 
197 Any loss of funding or functions is likely to be unpopular with these agencies irrespective of the 
strength of the argument. Nevertheless, the aim of the recommendations seems to provide Te Taura 
Whiri with more capacity to keep other agencies accountable for aligning their work with an overall 
Māori language strategy rather than taking over their functions, particularly setting the curriculum 
or teacher targets. Although Taumata I does not elaborate, Taumata II shows that the setting of 
teacher targets, for example, is to be done “after consultation with the secretary for education” (WT, 
2011c, p.476). 
198 The report (WT, 2011c, p.xxvi) also states that a full copy of the record of inquiry is available on 
request from the Waitangi Tribunal. 
199 This is the case even where these opinions are rejected. Thus, for example: “The Crown attached 
a lengthy statement, written by Te Puni Kōkiri, which set out ‘factual points’ that the Tribunal should 
address. Ngāti Koata and Ngāti Porou both supported the Tribunal’s findings but disagreed with its 
recommendations . . . After due consideration, we were not convinced by these submissions that the 
chapter needed to be amended” (WT, 2011c, p.387). 
200 Justice Joseph Williams (2005, p.237), the presiding officer of WAI 262, stated that although the 
Tribunal members aim to “influence a larger political game to produce a result”, [t]hey are not 
decisive players in it.” 
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or reo teachers (2011a, p.166). 
 
[I]t would have been an abdication of responsibility to fail to offer our view 
. . . . In the end, though, these are recommendations, not orders or directions 
(2011c, p.701). 
 
The Reedy review may itself come to similar conclusions . . . . it is open to 
them to take account of our position as they formulate their own report 
(2011c, p.470). 
 
We also make a tentative suggestion to address the strong desire in certain 
communities for local control. . . . This is of course a matter for Māori rather 
than the Crown, but we raise it nonetheless (2011c, p.478).  
 
As in the case of Our Land Our Languages, the authors of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
attempt to avoid creating an opposition coalition by (a) drawing upon an inclusive 
sense of national identity and (b) emphasising the fact that there are advantages for 
all citizens in adopting their recommendations. As already indicated, the first 
strategy seems less successful than in the case of Our Land Our Languages because 
the all inclusive identity called upon is presented as being potential rather than 
actual. So far as the second strategy is concerned, it appears, once again, to be 
applied less successfully than it was in the case of Our Land our Languages. This 
is because references to the advantages for the country as a whole are not only less 
pervasive but also more tentative/ speculative or set in the distant future: 
 
Māori educational achievements remain poor, but more teaching of te reo 
and in the medium of te reo may encourage Māori students to perform better, 
as the Ministry of education suggested in its annual report on Māori 
education for 2006–07 (2011c, p.443). 
 
There is also evidence that Māori in immersion and bilingual schools  . . .  
are significantly less likely to be stood down, suspended, unjustifiably 
absent or truant than Māori in decile 1–4 mainstream schools. . . . [But] low 
truancy rates may show that Māori-medium schools are performing their 
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custodial functions well, but do not necessarily mean that the quality of 
learning is high. However, and despite these cautions, such results give 
some cause for optimism. This is because, as the relatively youthful Māori 
ethnic group becomes a larger share of the overall population, such 
improvements are clearly in the national interest (2011c, p.443). 
 
It is also well accepted by scholars that being bilingual is beneficial for a 
child’s cognitive development and communicative ability. . . . learning 
Māori can also help deliver developmental benefits (2011c, p.443). 
 
Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does appear to employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the 
creation of an opposition coalition. These include repeated acknowledgment of the 
limitations of their own role/ function and the fact that certain Crown actions may 
have been well intended, inclusion of points of view that differ from their own, and 
drawing upon an inclusive representation of national identity while stressing that 
there are advantages for all New Zealanders in adopting the course of action they 
recommend. However, these attempts are counter-balanced by other aspects of the 
report, including using the evidence of Crown witnesses to justify extending its 
scope and including negative evaluation of many Crown actions (and lack of action) 
and of a number of organisations (including Māori organisations). Above all, the 
vision of a future based on genuine partnership is one that is likely to be perceived 
as representing a significant threat to those in power. Overall, therefore, while 
strategies whose aim is to avoid creating an opposition coalition do appear to be 
employed, these do not appear to be sufficient to the achievement of their aim. 
 
Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening 
differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential 
to create a coalition of different interests? 
 
In seeking to articulate a broad inclusive agenda, the report writers emphasise the 
advantages for all New Zealanders of a new partnership orientation and presents 
the government as being in a position to secure these advantages: 
 
There is a growing community realisation that New Zealand wins when 
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Māori culture is strong (2011c, p.715) 
 
Can it evolve from one based on past grievance to one that is forward-
looking and based on mutual benefit? (2011b, p.19)  
 
The survival of te reo Māori is no longer just of deep interest to Māori 
people – it is a matter of national pride and identity for all New Zealanders. 
Everybody wins when the Māori language thrives (2011a, p.161). 
 
There are signs it is changing from the familiar late-twentieth century 
partnership built on the notion that the perpetrator’s successor must pay the 
victim’s successor for the original colonial sin, into a twenty first century 
relationship of mutual advantage in which, through joint and agreed action, 
both sides end up better off than they were before they started. This is the 
Treaty of Waitangi beyond grievance (2011a, p.17). 
 
In taking such steps the Government would be fulfilling its Treaty duties 
while also acting in the best interests of all (2011c, p.699). 
 
In attempting to signal the possibility of achieving the type of genuine partnership 
they recommend. Tribunal members stress the fact that there is already evidence of 
respect and goodwill between Māori and Pākehā relating, in particular, to Treaty 
settlements over the past few years: 
 
Such a large area of common ground can only have arisen from a solid 
basis of mutual respect . . . . This respect between Māori and Pākehā made 
possible the watershed Treaty settlements process of the last 25 years 
(2011a, p.15). 
 
There is a deep reservoir of goodwill between our cultures, and much 
commonality (2011c, p.715). 
 
We sometimes forget that between these two poles there is in fact a much 
greater degree of goodwill than New Zealanders give themselves credit for 
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(2011a, p.15). 
 
Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does move beyond personal interests and weaken differences 
by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition 
of different interests. Certainly, it attempts to do so. However, repeated criticism of 
Government actions (and inaction), the hypothetical nature of the all-inclusive New 
Zealand identity formulation and the tentative way in which the benefits for the 
country as a whole are often presented, considerably reduce the impact of that 
attempt. 
4.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests / key decision-
makers 
The first question relating to this criterion is: 
 
Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a 
way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic 
engagement with them? 
 
Despite criticising a number of government agencies, there are clear attempts in Ko 
Aotearoa Tēnei to engage with key decision makers in an agonistic way. Fears are 
acknowledged, possible ameliorating reasons for some actions and lack of action 
are provided, and key decision makers (rather than the report writers) are presented 
as those who have the power to move the country towards the new, positive 
partnership agenda proposed and, in doing so, benefit all New Zealanders. Thus, 
critical comments are frequently softened (e.g. ‘benign neglect’ – 2011c, p.407), 
individuals are sometimes praised (e.g. Peter Sharples is complimented on his 
acknowledgement of the need for better co-ordination – 2011c, p.469), and the 
competition for resources faced by successive governments is recognised (2011a, 
p.166). 
 
The report writers acknowledge the Crown’s treaty-derived right to govern, 
positioning it both as an equal partner and as a representative of Māori, (although 
still asserting and defining the obligations that are inherent in these positions). Key 
decision makers, along with the people of the country as a whole, are positioned as 
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being on a metaphorical journey, one which began with the Treaty and has arrived 
at a crossroads, the most positive of the routes forward resting with key decision 
makers to secure. For example: 
New Zealand sits poised at a crossroads both in race relations and on our 
long quest for a mature sense of national identity (2011a, p.xvii). 
 
A crossroads in history offers choices. The Wai 262 claimants really asked 
which of the many possible paths into the future New Zealand should now 
choose, and in this report we provide an answer based on the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi (2011a, p.xxiv). 
 
A crossroads? So where do we go from here? (2011a, p.14). 
 
[T]his country began in consensus as two peoples, and  . . . now, as many 
peoples, must continue on that path (2011a, p.24). 
 
[I]t would have been an abdication of responsibility to fail to offer our view 
of the many pathways forward in each of the claimed categories (2011c, 
p.701). 
 
This journey/cross-roads metaphor is combined with the presentation of normalised 
equal partnership (a permanent solution) as the best and most reasonable way of 
‘moving forward’ to a better and more peaceful future. The consequences of not 
having done so in the past - in particular, the consequences of having ignored earlier 
recommendations and having failed to implement some agreed policies adequately 
- are spelt out throughout the report. So, too, are the probable consequences of 
failing to do so in the future. The status quo is presented as a dystopia, and any 
failure to act in a positive way as a journey backwards towards ‘inter-racial 
rancour’, ‘conflict,’ ‘discontentment for all’, ‘squandering [of] Māori potential’ and 
‘a seemingly endless stream of [non-productive] taxpayer-funded programmes’ 
(2011a, p.xviii). 
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However, while there is some evidence of agonistic engagement with key decision 
makers, there is little evidence that they are positioned in a way that is likely to gain 
their approval although there are some clear attempts to do so. Thus, for example, 
it is acknowledged that there are differing interests and perspectives (2011c, 
pp.389-393) that must be acknowledged: 
 
Where relevant, we have . . . considered what other interests might be at 
play and how those interests might be fairly and transparently balanced 
alongside the Treaty-protected interests (2011b, pp.23-24). 
 
Opponents of the teaching of mātauranga Māori within the state system 
might contend that there are worthier recipients of the limited education 
dollar . . . . These sorts of opinions are often to be heard in public debates. . 
. .  We do not simply dismiss such ideas, for there is something to them if 
one sets aside the various prejudices at work. Affordability, for example, is 
certainly an issue that invites scrutiny of any spending (2011c, p.557). 
 
Furthermore, frequent use of the obligative auxiliaries ('must' and 'have to') tends 
to undermine the potentially positive impact (so far as key decision makers are 
concerned) of the report's insistence that it is government rather than the Tribunal 
that has the final say. Thus, for example: 
 
This weight of obligation, coupled with the Crown’s duty to act in favour of 
te reo as a simultaneous matter of national interest, must be met with 
commensurate action – the development of a modern, Treaty-compliant 
regime to ensure the survival of the Māori language (2011c, p.443). 
 
[T]he Crown must transfer enough control to enable a Māori sense of 
ownership of the vision, while at the same time ensuring that its own 
expertise and  resources remain central to the effort (2011c, p.450). 
 
The Government must accept the idea that it should not be an English 
speaking monolith (2011c, p.450). 
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If the Crown is serious about preserving and promoting the language it must 
also endeavour to speak te reo itself (2011c, p.451). 
 
The Crown must commit to working with Māori in ways that go beyond, 
say, a few consultation hui and a reference group (2011c, p.451).201 
 
[T]he Crown must also spend money better, through better coordination and 
greater motivation within the Government Māori language sector. The 
[Office of the Auditor General] report makes this clear (2011c, p.464). 
  
This has to change (2011c, p.469). 
 
Although criticism of government is not accompanied by the explicit identification 
of specific Ministers, it is sometimes clear who they are: 
 
We have also seen apparent ministerial satisfaction with a Māori language 
Act that is clearly failing to stimulate the Government’s own efforts 
 to speak te reo; endless teaching scholarship plans that may be linked to 
perceived demand issues but are not necessarily linked to long-term 
 goals about language health and vitality; and a survey that may not be giving 
the most accurate information but has nevertheless provided 
 opportunities for positive media statements (2011c, p.470).  
 
The turning of Crown evidence against the Crown referred to earlier with reference 
to the extension of the Tribunal’s remit, is also in evidence elsewhere:  
 
. . . looking through the record of the last 20 years, it is difficult to find many 
affirmations that the Māori language revival effort is well funded – unless 
of course they come from the Government itself.. . . . Even Crown witnesses 
also made frequent reference to the limited resources available to them. Mr 
Chrisp of Te Puni Kōkiri, for example, explained that ‘One of the dilemmas 
that we face is there is a finite pool of resources’. . . . Ms Sewell said that 
                                                 
201 Hui is a gathering or meeting. 
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the amount of support the Ministry of Education could provide for Māori 
language initiatives was impacted upon by factors including ‘the allocation 
of finite resources’. . . . Alexander  Turnbull Library chief librarian 
Margaret Calder explained, with respect to Māori language materials held 
by the National library, ‘The decisions about where resources go of course 
is made at a library-wide level, given that there never are enough resources. 
. . . [The] Crown’s own witnesses did not seem to be convinced that the 
funds they had to work with were enough – even for what strikes us as an 
inadequate agenda (2011c, pp.465-466). 
 
While some attempt appears to have been made in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei to position 
key decision makes in a way that is likely to gain their approval, overall, the ways 
in which they are presented appears unlikely to do so. 
 
Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic 
interests/ key decision makers? 
 
The Tribunal’s approach to the provision of evidence and its appeal to enlightened 
government are likely to be appreciated by key decision-makers. So far as the first 
of these is concerned, it is relevant to note that the Te reo Māori chapter (Taumata 
II version) has 276 references and explanatory notes, 2 maps, 13 statistical tables, 
and 17 graphs or diagrams. Of particular relevance is the fact that the tribunal also 
quotes (and aligns itself with) statements or findings from government agencies and 
Crown witnesses, a source of evidence that decision makers are likely to find 
difficult to refute. Even so, the fact remains that criticism is often severe and, as 
noted above, the writers turn Crown evidence against the Crown: 
 
More teaching of te reo and in the medium of te reo may encourage Māori 
students to perform better, as the Ministry of Education suggested in its 
annual report on Māori education for 2006–07 (2011c, p.443). 
 
Even Crown witnesses also made frequent reference to the limited resources 
available to them. Mr Chrisp of Te Puni Kōkiri, for example, explained that 
‘One of the dilemmas that we face is there is a finite pool of resources’. 
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Likewise, Alexander Turnbull library chief librarian Margaret Calder 
explained, with respect to Māori language materials held by the National 
library, ‘The decisions about where resources go of course is made at a 
library-wide level, given that there never are enough resources (2011c, 
p.466). 
 
[T]he Crown must also spend money better, through better coordination and 
greater motivation within the Government Māori language sector. The 
[Office of the Auditor General] report makes this clear (2011c, p.464). 
 
Unfavourable positioning of New Zealand in relation to some other polities might 
have the effect of encouraging some key decision makers to accept the need for 
change. The danger is, however, that it could lead to retrenchment of existing 
attitudes: 
 
These provisional recommendations . . . would only bring New Zealand into 
line with regimes applied in comparable countries overseas (2011c, p.476). 
 
Members of the Tribunal are also clearly aware of the fundamental importance to 
decision makers of an economic rationale: 
 
This calculation becomes more difficult when there are (and there always 
are) competing priorities for the same dollar (2011a, p.166). 
 
There is acknowledgment of the fact that there are currently some major issues that 
government must address: 
 
We acknowledge that there will be some unavoidable cost in our proposals 
for new bodies and regulatory frameworks. We accept that the 
Government’s coffers are not full after the combined effects of worldwide 
recession and a devastating earthquake. . . . We would . . . be neglecting 
our duty to issue a report that called for a lesser standard of compliance with 
Treaty obligations given the straitened financial conditions (2011a, p.246). 
 
Nevertheless, it is important that they clarify the position on some aspects of 
government expenditure: 
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A vast amount of money – nearly $12 billion per annum – is expended on 
the education system, and every dollar has to be carefully allocated. But the 
cost of ‘kaupapa Māori’ education is not a burden on the budget. That is 
because the expenditure on providing kaupapa Māori students with an 
education would have occurred anyway, regardless of their choice of school 
(2011a, p.199). 
 
The state’s resourcing of te reo Māori was estimated at . . .  $226.8 million. 
It has been defined as resourcing both for ‘services and programmes that 
[contribute] more or less directly to supporting the health of the Māori 
language’ and for ‘activities that are being undertaken by . . . government 
agencies to support the growth and development of the Māori language’ 
(2011c, p.407). 
 
There will always be issues around affordability and cost. Potentially, 
though, it may be unaffordable not to continue supporting the growth in 
knowledge and use of te reo (2011c, pp.442-443). 
 
The terms of the Treaty clearly set out that the Crown’s right to make laws 
carries a reciprocal obligation to accord the Māori interest an appropriate 
priority . . . . In the context of te reo, the Crown must therefore recognise 
that the Māori interest in the language is not the same as the interest of any 
minority group in New Zealand society in its own language. Accordingly, 
in decision-making about resource allocation, te reo Māori is entitled to a 
‘reasonable degree of preference and must receive a level of funding that 
accords with this status (2011c, p.452). 
 
. . . the provision of options that promote mātauranga does not necessarily 
take resources away from mainstream education, because the cost of 
educating a child is relatively similar no matter which school they attend 
(2011c, p558). 
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The expenditure required for the revitalisation of the Māori language is not 
specified. Instead, an association is made with ‘wise policy’, something that, in 
association with repeated references to inadequate expenditure in the past, involves 
the implication that policy has not been based on wisdom in the past: 
 
Of course, this priority should be reflected, in the first instance, in the 
formulation of wise policy. In theory, the required level of funding should 
simply flow from that – that is, the funding allocated should be whatever is 
sufficient to implement the policy (2011c, p.452). 
 
Some of the arguments forwarded in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei are likely to be convincing 
so far as hegemonic interests/ key decision makes are concerned, particularly where 
they are based on statements or findings from government agencies and Crown 
witnesses and/or include some recognition of the salience of economic 
considerations. Even so, the appeal to wise policy and, associated with it, the 
assertion that the expenditure required to revitalise te reo Māori should be 
determined in full collaboration with Māori and should take precedence over other 
types of expenditure seems unlikely to gain the approval/ support of key decision 
makers. 
4.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction 
The following are the two questions relating to the criterion of dislocation and 
deconstruction: 
  
Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo 
hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire 
and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events 
and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its 
rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as 
implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the 
discrepancies between its promises and achievements? 
 
Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of 
signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and 
likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider 
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readership? 
 
In the Te reo Māori chapter of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, the Tribunal, after establishing 
that there is in fact a significant Treaty obligation on the Crown to protect the Māori 
language, identifies four ‘self-evident’ obligations (partnership, wise policy, 
appropriate resourcing, and a Māori speaking government) that form the basis of “a 
genuinely Treaty-compliant modern Māori language regime” (2011c, p.441). It is 
these principles that provide the report with its overall structuring. They are used to 
interrogate government actions and as a basis for recommendations. 
 
The introductory section of Chapter 5 deals with: (a) submissions to the panel; (b) 
the findings of WAI 11; and (c) identification of the issues. The main part of the 
chapter has four sections: 
 
·  a brief account of historical decline and post 1986 revival; 
· a summary of health of reo in 2010; 
· an analysis of Treaty interest in reo and obligations; and 
· an assessment of Crown’s current reo policy 
 
Arising out of the introduction and the four main sections are the four key 
principles, each representing a critical government obligation and each contesting 
a nodal point in Crown discourse. They are: 
 
 genuine partnership (contesting the Crown’s claim to engage with and 
represent Māori ) 
 wise policy (contesting the Crown’s claim to have implemented effective 
strategies, policies and procedures) 
 adequate resourcing (contesting the Crown’s assertion that it has been 
diligent in ensuring, within the context of financial constraints, that the 
Māori language revival movement is adequately resourced) 
 a Māori speaking government (contesting the Crown’s claim to fully 
represent Māori) 
It is these four critical requirements that provide the central chains of signification 
-178- 
on which the chapter’s coherence relies. In each case, statistical evidence indicating 
a failure on the part of the Crown is provided. This evidence leads to conclusions 
that clearly undermine the Crown’s “rhetoric about forward progress”, highlighting 
the fact that even the Crown’s key witness “conceded that there was a need for ‘life 
support’” (WT, 2011a, p.168). 
 
In relation to the issue of genuine commitment to the Treaty relationship 
(partnership), it is observed that even in the area of the Māori language 
regeneration, which is of fundamental concern to Māori, the Crown has failed to do 
more than pay lip service to consultation. This lack of ‘genuine’ partnership, that 
is, partnership in which “Māori . . . play a leading role in setting and owning the 
agenda, and share in the decision-making about Māori language goals and policies” 
(2011c, p.453), is considered a primary cause of the continued decline of the 
language. It is noted that this must be addressed as “[i]t is only through a joint effort 
by two partners in a quality relationship that te reo stands any chance at all” 
(2011c, p.450).202 
 
A particularly telling dislocatory event to which attention is drawn is the 
development of the 2003 Māori Language Strategy: 
 
Again, the problem is an absence of Māori ownership, which is crucial to 
success since Māori themselves are the key actors in the revival process.  . . 
. [Their] effort was not honoured in the process by which the MLS was 
formulated – a quick round of consultation hui, then the development of 
goals whose wording appears to reflect Crown rather than Māori 
preferences (2011c, p.454). 
 
In examining the Crown’s performance we have found a fundamental 
problem with the MLS 2003. It is not a partnership document. . . . No doubt 
the contribution made by these individuals and groups was valuable. But 
consultation with them does not represent a partnership with the Māori 
                                                 
202 The Tribunal states that “There is in our view no area of Crown–Māori relations more appropriate 
for [the application of partnership] than the future of the Māori language. That future cannot be made 
secure by Māori efforts alone or Crown efforts alone. It will depend on the ability of both sides to 
co-operate, participate, and contribute” (WT, 2011a, p.161). 
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community . . . . The fact that the MLS was not developed through this kind 
of genuine partnership makes it a strategy by bureaucrats for Māori, and in 
our experience that never works (2011a, p.163). 
 
[The MLS] was a standard piece of pre-consulted Crown policy for the good 
of Māori (2011c, p.455). 
 
Another dislocatory event that is highlighted is the lack of response to the 1995 Hui 
Taumata Reo call to government for “a wholehearted commitment by words and 
deeds to work in partnership with Māori for the protection and promotion of Māori 
language”, and “an end to inaction and unilateral decision-making” (2011c, p.455). 
 
The report draws attention to the length of time that has passed since 1995 in order 
to emphasise the fact that government has ignored the call: 
 
Fifteen years later, that criticism will resonate with many Māori arguing for 
a greater role in setting the policy agenda for their language (2011c, p.455). 
 
One further symptom of the absence of genuine partnership is rhetorical 
manipulation. The Tribunal provides several examples of this in the excerpt below: 
 
The received wisdom is that the revival of te reo over the last 25 years is 
nothing short of a miracle. There is an element of truth in that. But the notion 
that te reo is making steady forward progress, particularly amongst the 
young, is manifestly false. The government bears significant responsibility 
for this misconception. In its report on the Health of the Māori Language in 
2008, Te Puni Kōkiri concluded that ‘it is apparent that the health of the 
Māori language in relation to all three language variables analysed (status; 
knowledge and acquisition; and use) has improved markedly since 2001’. 
While this claim was accompanied by the usual rejoinder about the need to 
maintain vigilance and effort, the key message was that the Government’s 
efforts had been a success. In fact, the very next sentence suggested that 
credit was due to Government initiatives to support language revitalisation 
since 2001. Even Te Taura Whiri – whose chair was scathing of government 
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efforts to revitalise te reo during the 2009 Māori language week – has been 
susceptible to this kind of embellishment. In its brief to the incoming 
Minister in 2008 it wrote of reaching ‘a turning point in this journey, and 
the corner is one of anticipation as the 150,000 Māori and 30, 000 non-Māori 
who now use the Māori language in some way, continue moving forward’. 
A change in government initially brought no break in the official line: in 
July 2009 the Minister of Māori Affairs announced that it was ‘great to be 
able to say that the Māori language is in a healthier state than it was five 
years earlier’. A year later, however, the mood had changed. In announcing 
the Tamati Reedy-led review of the MLS, Minister Sharples said on 29 July 
2010 that a ‘more coordinated approach’ was needed that ensured ‘the 
programmes and expenditure across the whole of government are responsive 
to Iwi/Māori aspirations’. Expanding on his motivation for the review in a 
speech the same day, he remarked that ‘We have a Māori language strategy 
that is not up-to-date and has largely not been implemented (2011c, p.469). 
 
According to the Tribunal, wise policy for the revitalisation of the Māori language 
will derive from engagement and consultation with Māori. That this type of wise 
policy has not guided actions in the past is indicated in a number of places – see 
examples below: 
 
The fact is, if the MLS does not capture the imagination of grassroots Māori 
communities, and of Crown agencies, what is its point? It is after all a 
leadership document, and those who would follow it need to be inspired by 
it. We are not even satisfied that they know about it (2011a, p.163). 
 
The Crown has clearly not yet adequately responded to the Tribunal’s 
recommendation about the use of te reo by Government departments and 
public bodies (2011c, p.455). 
The report further exposes the separation between rhetoric and reality, locating 
inadequate policy aims and ineffective administration as factors that have 
contributed to the continuing decline of the Māori language: 
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The Ministry of education wishes to increase Māori participation rates in 
early childhood education, but would appear content for this increase to be 
in centres that are typically English medium (2011c, p.441). 
The draft of the MLS sent out for consultation in early 2003 set a goal to 
double Māori language use in national and local government (including 
hospitals) by 2008. However, this wording was absent from the version of 
the MLS endorsed by Cabinet in July of that year and the final document 
does not set a definite target for increased reo use in Government agencies 
(2011c, p.456). 
 
Officials needed to have taken proper and rigorous steps in the early 1980s 
to estimate kōhanga demand. Had they done so, it seems likely that they 
could have foreseen the massive up-take of kōhanga reo through the 1980s 
and into the next decade . . . (2011a, p.165). 
 
The teacher supply issue remained a perennial problem; the 2001 census 
showed a marked decline in speakers aged zero to nine; and Māori-medium 
school numbers had dropped. Instead, the 2003 MLS was intentionally high 
level, and so lacking in ambition that its goals were either easily achievable 
or so vague as to be meaningless. For example, it proposed that the majority 
of Māori should be able to speak Māori ‘to some extent’ by 2028. This goal 
will be measured by Te Puni Kōkiri’s five-yearly language survey, the 
majority of whose respondents – by Te Puni Kōkiri’s own definition – 
already reach that level. Its aim for tribal dialects was simply that they be 
‘supported’ by 2028. (2011a, p.165). 
 
 Looking back, the bureaucracy’s efforts to put in place measures to deal 
with and encourage the Māori language renaissance were decidedly leaden-
footed . . . . the reaction was pedestrian . . . (2011c, p.458). 
 
It was the failure of Government supply that accounted for the eventual 
decline in student numbers and not the failure of the language movement 
(2011c, p.458). 
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There has been a profound failure (or, at best, a belated move) to develop 
policy that will assist in the revival of te reo and the safeguarding of dialect 
(2011c, p.470). 
 
. . . [L]ooking through the record of the last 20 years, it is difficult to find 
many affirmations that the Māori language revival effort is well funded – 
unless of course they come from the government itself. . . . even Crown 
witnesses . . . made frequent references to the limited resources available to 
them (2011c, p.465). 
 
Given the policy failure, the priority accorded te reo in resourcing has also 
been inadequate (2011c, p.470). 
 
The case for a Māori speaking government is underpinned by re-definition of the 
key signifier ‘government’ - not only as a body that represents Māori citizens but 
as one that includes Māori citizen representation. The report notes the fact that for 
much of its past, and currently, the Crown has been a monolingual English 
speaking, Pākehā institution: “[t]he Crown has clearly not yet adequately responded 
to the Tribunal’s recommendation about the use of te reo by Government 
departments and public bodies” (2011c, p.455). This view is reiterated in the 
following extract: 
 
If the Crown is serious about preserving and promoting the language it must 
also endeavour to speak te reo itself. This not only leads by example but 
provides symbolic as well as tangible support to keeping the language alive. 
Māori should be able to use their own language, given its official status, in 
as many of their dealings with the New Zealand state as practicable – 
particularly since the public face of the Crown will often be a Māori one 
(2011c, p.451). 
 
This re-identification of ‘New Zealand’ as a partnership ‘of equals’ (2011a, p.248) 
has an impact on the entire report. It is the overarching conception that redefines 
the four key government obligations (above). In emerging as a nodal point of the 
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report’s discourse, partnership subsumes other important Treaty principles such as 
kāwanatanga (the Crown’s right to govern) and tino rangatiratanga (the autonomy 
or self-government of iwi and hapū), thus creating an inclusive framework for the 
report’s argumentation and counter-hegemonic positioning. 203 The Tribunal 
discards alternative conceptions of what partnership entails such as, for example, 
partnership as consultation or the Crown-as-senior-partner, instead elevating the 
status of Māori to that of decision-maker.204 For example:  
 
Throughout this report, the essential questions that arise are about the 
nature of that partnership, and about where the power lies within it. . . . The 
conceptual framework within which these issues are to be resolved is the 
Treaty principle of partnership between the Crown and Māori. It is in this 
partnership frame that the Treaty’s essential message of hope is to be found 
– a message whose time, we believe, has well and truly arrived. It reminds 
us that this country began in consensus as two peoples, and that now, as 
many peoples, must continue on that path (2011a, pp.23-24). 
 
The principles of the Treaty, and the exchange of rights and obligations 
those principles enshrine, are woven together through the overarching 
principle of partnership. That, as we have said, is the framework for the 
Treaty relationship. In our consideration of the issues raised in this claim, 
we therefore must consider what partnership means for the relationship 
between Māori and the Crown, and for the place of New Zealand’s two 
founding cultures in this land (2011b, p.24). 205 
 
Partnership itself can mean many things . . . . The starting point should be 
shared decision-making (2011b, p.341). 
 
                                                 
203 The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi are inter-related to the Treaty document itself and have 
been developed from various Tribunal reports, legal interpretations, court decisions and government 
statements. Besides kāwanatanga and tino rangatiratanga, other principles include good faith; the 
need to compromise; and the duty to consult (see Department of Conservation, n.d; Hayward, 1997; 
Waitangi Tribunal, 2011b, pp.15-19). 
204 See Humpage (2002, pp.278, 284) for discussion of how government have treated Māori like a 
junior partner in the development of the Labour-Alliance 2000 Closing the Gaps’ policy. 
205 The use of the weaving metaphor is reminiscent of the master signifier in Žižek’s quilt which 
determines the pattern and shape of the whole (in this case kete). 
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As a result of the structuring provided by the concept of equal partnership, the 
Tribunal is able to propose a reconfiguration of the Māori language sector in a way 
that they believe better reflects the Treaty relationship and therefore will be more 
likely to achieve the revitalisation of the language. For example: 
 
Te Taura Whiri should function as a Crown–Māori partnership through the 
equal appointment of Crown and Māori appointees to its board. This reflects 
our concern that te reo revival will not work if responsibility for setting the 
direction is not shared with Māori (2011c, p.471). 
 
Thus, through their re-definition of partnership in a way that supersedes ideologies 
such as assimilation and Māori separation (expressed as tino rangatiratanga), the 
writers attempt to create a pathway to the objet petit à, that is, to a utopian existence 
for New Zealand society. Readers are promised that the ‘normalisation’ of this 
partnership will allow New Zealand to leave behind ‘grievance’ (2011a, p.xviii), 
the “burden of a troubled past” (2011a, p.xix), the “squandering [of] Māori 
potential” and “a seemingly endless stream of tax-payer [funding]” (2011b, p.xxiv) 
and move forward to a place where “conflict between the Crown and Māori is not 
a given” (2011a, p.xviii) and “mutual respect for each other’s mana . . . will last 
forever” (2011a, pp.xviii-xix). For example: 
  
Māori New Zealanders . . . . fear that the majority would prefer Māori were 
simply assimilated into an imagined utopian ‘mainstream’. Some Māori 
(though again, by no means all) argue for an entirely separate Māori future 
in which the non-Māori majority no longer has a veto over their aspirations 
(2011a, p.15). 
 
[The partnership framework] is changing from the familiar late-twentieth 
century partnership built on the notion that the perpetrator’s successor must 
pay the victim’s successor for the original colonial sin, into a twenty first 
century relationship of mutual advantage in which, through joint and agreed 
action, both sides end up better off than they were before they started. This 
is the Treaty of Waitangi beyond grievance (2011c, p.17). 
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[To] do-more-of-the-same choice is simply untenable. It still risks 
bequeathing to our collective future an uncomfortably large, poor, and 
underproductive cohort of working age Māori. In this dystopia the Treaty of 
Waitangi will remain, stubbornly, a locus for Māori anger and non-Māori 
resentment – a site of discontent for all. In this report, we say it needn’t be 
this way. We pose, perhaps for the first time, the possibility of a Treaty 
relationship after grievance. A normalised, fully functional relationship 
where conflict between the Crown and Māori is not a given (2011a, p.xxiv). 
 
In Ko Aotearoa Tēnei the Crown identity is overdetermined, subject to contestation 
by two opposing discourses. In the partnership discourse that structures the report, 
Government represents the non-Māori partner, while in the hegemonic ‘New 
Zealand as a state democracy’ discourse, which is seen in the call for the Crown to 
be Māori speaking, it represents all New Zealand citizens (including Māori). Hence: 
 
The core of the Crown’s position was that protecting what the claimants 
seek is impractical, and has consequences for New Zealand and New 
Zealanders that must be considered. (2011b, p.71) 
 
The report exposes the fact that the government has not truly represented Māori. It 
does not, however, successfully redefine the status quo key signifier - New Zealand 
government. Instead, it attempts to replace it with a Treaty-based partnership 
discourse that, because it implies a major shift in power and control, seems very 
unlikely to gain widespread acceptance: 
 
We have the opportunity now to take this a stage further through genuine 
commitment to the principles of the Treaty. This implies . . . a genuine 
infusion of the core motivating principles of mātauranga Māori . . . into all 
aspects of our national life (2011c, p.715). 
 
The Crown’s duties are partnership, wise policy, appropriate resources to 
achieve policy goals, and a Māori-speaking government (2011a, p.161). 
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Current widespread acceptance of New Zealand statehood means that this discourse 
would appear to represent a fundamental barrier to the full emergence of the future 
‘New Zealand as equal partnership’ identity. 
 
In this section, I have attempted to demonstrate that Ko Aotearoa Tēnei effectively 
contests the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and draws attention to 
significant dislocating events, exposing the inherent contingency and rhetorical 
manipulations in much of the Crown’s discourse. However, while the key signifiers 
are redefined in a way that is likely to resonate positively with those who already 
believe in the possibility of achieving an ideology of genuine partnership (which 
may include many Māori), it seems unlikely that their redefinition will resonate 
positively with many others. The concept of genuine partnership (the pathway to 
the objet petit à of national harmony), like that of an all-Aotearoa/ New Zealand 
identity, is likely, from the perspective of the repeated failures outlined in the report, 
to appear to many to be little more than a utopian fantasy, one which would, in 
addition, involve a considerable loss of control so far as key decision makers are 
concerned. 
4.4  Responses to Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
4.4.1 Responses to the early release of Chapter 5 
Media articles and reports following the release of the pre-publication version of 
the Te reo Māori chapter of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei (October 2010) picked up on themes 
relating to the poor state of health of the Māori language and the government’s role 
in the declining fortunes of the language. The Television New Zealand (hereafter 
TVNZ) Māori news programme Te Karere (TVNZ, 2010, October 20), for example, 
highlighted the report’s assertions regarding the lack of true partnership, repeated 
policy failures (particularly the Māori Language Strategy) and the inadequate level 
of resourcing for the language. Similarly, New Zealand Herald’s Yvonne Tahana 
(2010, October 21) emphasised the key message of language in crisis, clearly 
accepting the principle of equal partnership:  
 
The dry signs were all around us. . . . But somehow we were all at the oasis 
feeling good, bedazzled by important initiatives such as Māori Television 
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and the once-a-year feel good Māori Language Week . . . .  We are in a 
crisis. The language renaissance has faltered. However, for all its dire 
warnings the provisional report should be taken as intended: as a kick to get 
things moving again. It's a generational and timely reminder that this 
business of language retention is difficult, but it's a case where both Māori 
and the Crown have equal responsibilities.  
 
In an early response to the Te reo Māori chapter, Mamari Stephens (2010, p.64, 65 
& 81-82), a lecturer in the School of Law at Victoria University of Wellington, 
asserted that until an effective and coherent framework of protection and promotion 
for the use of the language in the public realm is put in place, “Māori is unlikely to 
be used as a language of civic importance, let alone as a normal language of the 
Crown”. In addition, Stephens noted with surprise the lack of a proposal to amend 
the outdated Māori Language Act 1987 (apart from a recommendation that the role 
of the Te Taura Whiri be enhanced). Opposition Māori politician, Shane Jones 
(TVNZ, 2010, October 20) challenged the Minister of Māori Affairs to act. 
However, given the draft nature of the chapter, the government was able to defer 
making any official response. Pita Sharples (2010, October 20), while noting that 
he preferred not “to pre-empt the findings of the independent review panel”, did 
observe that the Tribunal had identified “many of the same concerns that led [him] 
to establish the independent review”.206 He also noted the report’s references to the 
need for Māori ownership, community participation and government support if the 
Māori Language Strategy were to have any hope of success. The actual nature of 
the primary Government response is, however, perhaps best summed up in an email 
to the CEO of Te Taura Whiri from Te Puni Kōkiri official, Tipene (Steven) Chrisp 
(2010, October 19): 
 
[T]he whole-of-government communication strategy is: thank the tribunal, 
mihi to the claimants, and note that we cannot make any comment about this 
chapter of the WAI 262 report until we have had an opportunity to consider 
the whole report.207 
                                                 
206 Sharples was referring to the Review of the Maori Language Strategy and Māori Language Sector 
that was under way. 
207 A mihi is a formal Māori greeting: in this case a respectful acknowledgment of the claimants. 
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Notwithstanding the early release of the Te reo Māori chapter, the Tribunal 
expressed the belief that “the real value of the Wai 262 report [would] come [only] 
when it [could] be considered as a whole” (WT, 2010, p.ix). 
 
The press release and media theme for the launch of the full Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
report, released on the 2nd of July 2011, focused on partnership beyond grievance: 
Time to move beyond grievance in Treaty relationship . . . (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011, 
July 2). This emphasis is reflected in other media articles such as, for example, the 
article by Yvonne Tahana (2011, July 6) in the New Zealand Herald, entitled ‘Bold 
bid for common path for Crown, Māori’. 
4.4.2 Responses to the full report 
Most of the responses to the report as a whole related to the full range of issues 
covered rather than to the Te reo Māori chapter alone. An exception was a 
Dominion Post editorial (Editorial, 2011, July 7) in which it was claimed that while 
some of the report’s recommendations were “challenging and potentially divisive”, 
the recommendations “urging action to preserve the Māori language” were 
relatively uncontroversial”. 
 
Māori opinion on the report was mixed. Aroha Mead (2011, October 27) and Moana 
Jackson (1Matariki, 2011, July 1a), specialists in legal studies, expressed 
disappointment that the report had, in their view, avoided the important issues of 
rights and racism, asserting that Māori rights issues had lost ground, particularly in 
comparison with the advances made by other indigenous peoples overseas. Aroha 
Mead (2011, October 27) also expressed disappointment that the report created “no 
clear winners and no clear losers” and relied on the ability of the parties involved 
to swallow their pride and make changes. Also concerned by the conciliatory tone 
were bloggers Morgan Godfery and Anthony Marsh. Godfery referred to the report 
as “pedestrian” (2011, July 26), claiming that the Tribunal had worked 
“unimaginably within existing norms” and would “fizzle out” (2011, July 3). In 
connection with the statement that Māori interests would not be ‘inappropriately’ 
elevated above those of others but “fairly and transparently balanced alongside 
[them]”, Marsh (2011, July 3) made the following observation: 
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I just don’t understand this language – ‘inappropriately’ WTF are they 
writing this with Don Brash in mind or what. I’ll goddam ‘transparently 
balance’ some other interests all right cos at least I’ll be at the table. I 
thought the Waitangi Tribunal had more grunt than this pacifying stuff – 
just be quiet or you’ll upset people. 
 
There was also a high level of scepticism from Māori regarding the implementation 
of the recommendations. Green Party co-leader Metiria Turei (Radio New Zealand, 
2011, July 25) noted that she believed that there would be little if any “genuine 
Government engagement in response to the report”, such government response as 
there was being likely to be “fairly weak”. Lawyer and academic Moana Jackson 
(1Matariki, 2011, July 1b) stated that he believed that the report was unlikely to 
improve the Government’s rate of accepting Waitangi Tribunal recommendations 
for funding or reparation, which he assessed at less than 3% of the amount 
recommended. Similarly, Auckland University academic Peter Keegan (2011, 
April 27), although agreeing with the findings in relation to the declining Māori 
medium enrolments and the problematic relationship between Te Puni Kōkiri and 
Te Taura Whiri, noted that he did not believe that Te Taura Whiri would receive 
enhanced funding or be subjected to any major changes in role as a result of the 
report. In fact, he questioned whether any major changes in role were really needed. 
‘Simon Lambert’ (2011, July 3), in responding to a blog by Anthony Marsh (mars 
2 earth), noted that he believed that the size of the document would mean that its 
impact would be dissipated “to the disadvantage of Māori”, ending with “just a big 
long 'hmmmmmm' from me at this stage”. 
 
Not all Māori opinion was negative. Aroha Mead (2011, October 27), despite her 
criticism (above), did see some positives in the report, including the Tribunal’s 
assertion that the Crown “[has] to stop seeing [itself] as Pākehā and English 
speaking and Māori as the other”, adding “you represent Māori”. Haami Piripi 
(1Matariki, 2011, June 30), Te Rarawa iwi leader and former CEO of the Te Taura 
Whiri, supported the inclusive approach of the Tribunal: 
 
[There] is nothing in this report that the Crown ought to be able to shun, 
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everything in this report is about status quo . . .balance . . . moving on 
together . . . being New Zealanders together so it would be very difficult in 
my view for the Crown to say this report is no good for us, it’s not going to 
be good for the country, it’s not going to be good for anybody but actually 
I think what the report shows in revealing its recommendations is that it is 
good for everybody, it’s good for New Zealanders as well as good for us as 
Māori and as kaitiaki and that's got to be good so there's plenty there to work 
with.  
 
Carwyn Jones (2012, January 31), Victoria University of Wellington law lecturer 
and blogger, claimed that irrespective of the official response to the “political 
pressure currently being exerted”, the report would: 
 
[R]emain a hugely significant document because it articulates a 
conceptually coherent vision of a state founded in the worldviews of two 
distinct cultures. Importantly, it goes beyond simply articulating a vision, 
but suggests a range of practical law and policy mechanisms by which that 
vision might be realized. 
 
One non-Māori response to the report, that of right-wing former ACT Party leader 
Don Brash (who believes that the Treaty and the settlement process give Māori 
special treatment) interpreted co-governance between the government and iwi as “a 
recipe for disaster” (O’Brien, 2011, July 2).208 Similarly, former ACT party MP 
Muriel Newman (2011, July 3, p.1) described all of the Tribunal recommendations, 
including the requirement to provide Māori language plans, as “race-based lust for 
power and control.”209 She warns her readers: 
 
While the tribunal is careful to avoid suggesting that Māori should have 
ownership rights to native plants and animals, something that would evoke 
a strong public backlash they have proposed a series of wide-ranging and 
                                                 
208 Brash is also quoted as saying that “Most New Zealanders interpret the Treaty of Waitangi as 
saying all New Zealanders have equal rights under the law” (O’Brien, 2011, July 2) However, note 
that the reference in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi to the people of New Zealand (ngā tāngata katoa 
o Nu Tīreni) is to the original inhabitants, that is, Māori.  
209 Dr. Muriel Newman is also the founder and director of the New Zealand Centre for Political 
Research (NZCPR), a far right “web based public policy think tank”. 
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powerful rights that taken together effectively result in ownership by the 
back door (Newman, 2011, July 3, p.1). 
 
Kennedy Warne, co-founder and former editor of the New Zealand Geographic 
magazine and a regular commentator on Radio New Zealand, was supportive of the 
report. Warne (2011, July, 4) was particularly impressed with the covering letter to 
cabinet, referring to it as a “superb, superb document I think everyone should read”. 
His assessment of the document as a whole was just as positive: “[The report is] 
built on the desire for relationship and reconciliation”, providing “a new sense of 
strength and a new sense of optimism”. It is, he asserts, “a bit of a road map . . . 
identifying specifically Māori understandings, but we all can buy into these, and 
celebrate them I think, and incorporate them”.210 Public policy law expert Mai Chen 
(2011, July 7), while believing that there would be “no big bang as not all of the 
recommendations [would] be adopted and implemented”, nevertheless believed 
that, as a result of the report, “society [would] change”. 
 
Initially, the government simply acknowledged a number of aspects of the report, 
deferring any substantive policy response until the report had been read, understood 
and fully worked through. However, Treaty Claims minister, Chris Finlayson 
(2011, July 1), issued a press release that was clearly aimed at addressing the likely 
concerns of core National supporters: 
 
The Tribunal’s report does not identify any specific breaches of the Treaty 
. . . It also acknowledges the excellent work this Government has done in 
order to recognise the role of Māori as Treaty partners. . .  . The report covers 
a wide range of areas . . . [some] very novel and any response should not be 
rushed . . . in issues like intellectual property . . . rights are never absolute 
. . . There are public and private interests to consider, as well as other 
factors like the fiscal situation. That is always a balancing issue for 
Government, in order to find solutions that are right for New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
210 Warne (2011, July 4) also stated that "I am very impressed how the Tribunal has addressed that 
issue and is trying to transcend it and the words are really strong unless we allow Māori into the core 
of decision making . . . Māori will continue to be perceived and know they are perceived as an alien 
minority." 
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Meanwhile, the Cabinet’s Domestic Policy Committee (2010, June 30, p.2) had 
assembled a Ministerial Group to coordinate and manage a consistent whole-
government response, particularly as it related to issues that impact on a cross-
section of portfolios and agencies. The aim was to provide a substantive response 
between 2012 and 2014.211 The initial goal was: 
  
. . . to develop an overarching framework that considers the Treaty 
partnership generally, in the first instance, followed by the development of 
specific responses to particular issues that are informed by the overarching 
framework globally across the whole of government (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, 
July 26)  
 
In a briefing paper to this ministerial Group,212 Te Puni Kōkiri (2011, July 29, p.1) 
made the following statement: 
 
[O]n the whole, agencies find the Tribunal’s report to be reasonable, 
balanced and constructive. Current law, policy and practice meet or exceed 
the Tribunal’s recommendations, while other recommendations provide a 
sound basis for improvements. 
 
Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) had, potentially, the most to lose from the Te reo Māori 
chapter’s recommendation that Te Taura Whiri should be strengthened. Erima 
Henare (2010, October, 19), chair of Te Taura Whiri, noted to his Board that “as 
you can imagine, TPK are reluctant for us to talk to the media as the Tribunal’s 
report has not been kind to them.” Nevertheless, attached to an affidavit by Crown 
Law (2010, November 25, p.2), there was a lengthy negative response to the pre-
publication report which made reference to “factual matters that . . . stand out as 
points that the Tribunal should address”. The concerns of Te Puni Kōkiri centred 
on (a) the Tribunal’s reliance on the Office of the Auditor General report on the 
                                                 
211 Ministerial Group comprises the Attorney General (Chair); Ministers of Economic Development; 
Energy and Resources; Justice; Commerce; Environment; Agriculture; Biosecurity; Forestry; 
Foreign Affairs; Trade; Māori Affairs; the associate Ministers of Māori Affairs and Conservation as 
well as Tariana Turia (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July 26) 
212 The briefing paper (released under the Offical informations act 1982) outlines the nexts steps and 
high level principles which will underpin any whole of government responses. Unfortunately, the 
detail of what these steps were blanked out as they were still under consideration. 
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implementation of the Māori Language Strategy (2003) and (b) Bauer’s (2008) 
claims regarding the inaccuracies of the 2006 Health of the Māori language Survey. 
These concerns were expressed in spite of the fact that Te Puni Kōkiri had received 
an independent report from Statistics Research Associates Limited (Gray, 2010, 
November 18) that essentially agreed with Bauer’s thesis. It stated that the survey 
had “a poorly thought out design” and “should be seen as unreliable.” In the event, 
“[a]fter due consideration”, the Tribunal’s members “were not convinced by these 
submissions that the chapter needed to be amended” (WT, 2011c, p.387). 
 
The following year, Te Puni Kōkiri aired their concerns in the Ministerial group’s 
briefing paper: 
 
In general, we support the need to strengthen the role of Māori in Māori 
language revitalisation and to enhance the Māori Language Strategy. 
However, we have previously identified some concerns about the analysis 
undertaken by the Waitangi Tribunal (in particular, there are some gaps in 
the evidence that it has relied on which have impacted on its analysis) (Te 
Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July 26). 
 
Te Puni Kōkiri may also have played a role in persuading the Māori Affairs 
Committee to make the following statement: 
 
Te Reo Māori: The committee did not completely agree with the finding of 
the Waitangi Tribunal on the WAI 262 claim that “te reo Māori is 
approaching a crisis point”. It commended the work of TPK and others in 
revitalising te reo Māori.  It was eager to monitor the Government’s 
response to the Māori Language Strategy Review report, Te Reo Mauriora, 
released in April 2011 (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
2012, February 13, p.3). 
 
Other Crown entities, however, were more supportive of the report. The Crown 
Law Office was reported as seeing no immediate legal risks arising from the report, 
noting that although some of the claims were novel, the Tribunal’s analysis and 
response was in line with existing trends in jurisprudence (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, 
July, 29, p.5). They also advised that the Tribunal did not generally use the language 
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of ‘Treaty Breach’ in its report, but rather focused on opportunities to improve the 
Treaty partnership going forward. 
 
The response from Te Taura Whiri was also mildly positive, a stance which, given 
the Tribunal’s recommendation that its powers and position as lead agency in Māori 
language revitalisation should be increased, was not altogether unexpected. For 
example, in a private email to board members, Erima Henare (2010, October, 19) 
stated that: 
  
You can see, that although we have had no input into the Tribunals (sic) 
process their findings are almost identical to those that we have spoken 
about over the last three years . . . However, it would be prudent that we 
reflect what the Minister is thinking on the issue. 
 
Nevertheless, the following year Henare (2011, July 7) highlighted the fact that both 
Ko Aotearoa Tēnei and Te Reo Mauriora had claimed that the lack of prioritised 
support by the government had undermined the language's stability. Even so, he 
indicated that he believed that the present “far-ranging” powers and functions of Te 
Taura Whiri were sufficient and, therefore, that the major issue was adequate 
resourcing to enable it to fulfil its functions. 
 
The nearest thing to an all-government response to WAI 262’s recommendations 
was a number of proposals by Māori Party MP Te Ururoa Flavell (2011, October 
10) which included: 
 
· Te Puni Kōkiri and the Ministry of Culture and Heritage should take leadership 
in improving the co-ordination among agencies that look after Mātauranga 
Māori; 
 
· Te Taura Whiri should become a Crown-Māori partnership, with increased 
powers to approve the development of Māori language plans in central and local 
Government, state-funded schools and broadcasting as well as to provide input 
into educational curricula and teacher training; 
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· Local iwi should become reo Māori authorities in their rohe, with their planning 
and decision-making becoming part of central agency planning; 
 
· Crown-Māori partnership entities should be established in educational agencies. 
 
Although these proposals appeared to relate directly to the Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
report, Mai Chen (2011, October 11) responded by claiming that, in effect, “the 
Māori Party was helping the National-led Government’s policy of reducing the 
number of Crown entities”. She argued that if Te Taura Whiri became a Crown-
Māori Partnership instead of an Autonomous Crown Entity, it could lose its policy 
making role, have less say over funding and, overall, be reduced to a status similar 
to that of a regional office of the Ministry of Education. She also argued that the 
increased status of local iwi could result in their reporting directly to Te Puni Kōkiri 
“thereby by-passing TTWh.”213 
 
It is clear that a significant amount of on-going hegemonic contestation surrounds 
the recommendations of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei.214 The presiding officer of the WAI 
262 enquiry, Judge Joe Williams (2011, July 7), has acknowledged this:  
 
The tribunal's proposals are the beginning of a conversation . . . .There may 
be some who disagree with it for one reason, there may be some who 
disagree with it for other reasons, there may some who agree with it. 
Ultimately, what happens to it is going to be a matter for the parties, for the 
Crown, for the Claimants, and the private sector groups who might be 
involved in any discussions. This is our investigation and analysis of the 
problems and some solutions that are put up as recommendations. It will be 
                                                 
213 The initials TTWH (or TTWh) refer to Te Taura Whiri. 
214 For example, Leo Watson (1Matariki, 2011, July 1c), lawyer for the claimants, stated that “a lot 
of assistance has come through those [1200] pages . . . but over the next few months whānau and 
hapū have to have the opportunity to . . . make sure that a lot of that detail can be brought back to 
the table with the Crown, and not have the Crown run away with a set of solutions for themselves. . 
. . it’s for Māori to determine a pathway forward in engagement with the Crown, and to take some 
of the examples the Tribunal have provided, but not see that as the panacea for all the solutions in 
front of us.” Morgan Godfery (2011, July 26) noted that the Government’s response will depend on 
the level of influence on National by the ‘redneck right’, the ‘resurgent left’ and the Māori party. 
Political analyst Colin James conceived of the report as “one more big step in a long, winding 
journey” toward greater Māori influence (2011, July 5) noting that, “we’ve been gradually moving 
in this direction anyway. . . co-governance of the Waikato river for instance, no one would have 
thought of that five years ago” (James, 2011, July 2). 
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for others to decide what to do with it - our work is done. 
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Chapter 5  
A criterion-referenced analysis of Te Reo Mauriora 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the second report that relates to the Māori language in New 
Zealand - Te Reo Mauriora: Review of the Māori language sector and the Māori 
Language Strategy - once again providing background information (5.2), followed 
by the analysis itself (5.3) and discussion of the report’s reception (5.4). The chapter 
ends with some overall conclusions (5.5). 
 
An electronic copy of this report is available from the Te Puni Kōkiri website: 
www.tpk.govt.nz/documents/te-reo-mauriora.pdf 
5.2 Background to the report 
In 2007, the Office of the Auditor-General released a performance report that 
identified major areas of concern in relation to the implementation of the Māori 
Language Strategy (OAG, 2007).215 It concluded that the commitment to planning, 
resourcing and communication by all lead agencies had been far from adequate, a 
conclusion which quickly became the subject of political debate (OAG, 2007, pp.7-
10).216 A second development in 2007 was the Hui Taumata Mō Te Reo Māori 
which drew many Māori language leaders from across the nation. One of the key 
recommendations of this gathering was that the Māori Language Act 1987 be 
reviewed and updated (Te Taura Whiri, 2008, November, p.3; 2008, pp.6-7; 2010, 
                                                 
215 Reference was made to the Māori Language Strategy 2003 in Section 1.3.2.4 
216 For example, in question time in Parliament MP Te Ururoa Flavell (2008, July 22) drew on the 
Office of the Auditor-General findings to challenge the then Minister of Māori Affairs, Parekura 
Horomia, regarding commitment to the Treaty as well as to the implementation and evaluation of 
the Māori Language Strategy. His questions were: (a) “Does he [Horomia] agree that the Treaty 
obligation of the Crown to guarantee to Māori the undisturbed possession of their taonga includes 
their language; and what can he conclude about the status of the Treaty when no agency, including 
Te Puni Kōkiri, had completed and finalised a plan that fully met the requirements of the Māori 
Language Strategy by the 30 June 2004 deadline set by Cabinet?” (b) “What has the 2008 review 
concluded about the effectiveness of the implementation of the Māori Language Strategy to date, 
and what confidence can New Zealanders have in this review, knowing that the Auditor General 
identified, and I quote: “the activities carried out so far by TPK do not constitute systematic 
evaluations of the effectiveness of the Māori language activities carried out by the government 
agencies?” 
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July 29, p.4).217 Towards the end of 2007, the Te Taura Whiri and Te Puni Kōkiri 
(TPK) began a joint internal review of the Māori Language Strategy, the findings 
of which were not made public (Flavell, 2008, July 22; Te Taura Whiri, 2008, 
p.7).218 
 
Following the 2008 and 2011 elections, Peter Sharples and the Māori Party entered 
into a coalition agreement with the John Key led National Government.220 Within 
the context of this agreement, although the Minister of Māori Affairs (Sharples) 
“[would] continue to lead the revitalisation strategy for te reo rangatira” (New 
Zealand National Party and Māori Party, 2011, December 11), there was, crucially, 
no promise from National to support the Māori Language Strategy or Māori 
language sector reform recommendations.221 Any policy advances relating to the 
Māori language would therefore depend upon the Māori Party’s ability to use 
whatever leverage it had to persuade the National Government to act.222 
 
At the end of 2008, the year in which the National-led Government took office, the 
New Zealand economy was in trouble, with substantial overseas-funded private 
sector debt and a high current account deficit. This situation was exacerbated by a 
global financial crisis (2008), the collapse and bailout of South Canterbury Finance 
                                                 
217 In addition, Te Taura Whiri (2010, July 29, p.4) stated that it would be “short sighted from any 
review of the 1987 Act to merely consider an aspect of the Act when in fact “the role of TTWh 
within the Act itself is critical”. 
218 This report (Te Puni Kōkiri and Te Taura Whiri, 2009, p.28) proposed that the long-term vision 
of the 2003 strategy be retained but that its management be changed to make it “more effective.” 
Suggestions include adding outcome-oriented short-term goals for each health indicator, 
streamlining the organisation of functions and sectors, inviting more agencies to be involved and 
creating an overall action plan. 
220 It is important to note that National was not dependent on any one party to govern, thus placing 
all its minority coalition partners in a weak position from which to negotiate credible policy gains. 
This is why political commentator Gordon Campbell (Campbell, 2011, December 12) labelled the 
Māori Party’s confidence and supply agreement with National (the others were with United Future 
and ACT) “the sorriest” of three “shabby” agreements in that “it concedes a lot but gains very little.” 
221 The revitalisation and promotion of the Māori language is a major theme in the Māori Party 
principles (See Māori Party, n.d., p.4). 
222 The Māori Party have consistently justified their support of National by stating that to be “at the 
table” that is, in Government (see Cheng, 2012, January 25; Levy, 2012, July 19; Young, 2009, 
December 11) is “the greatest opportunity Māori have ever had to benefit from political influence” 
and certainly better than “disappearing into the crowded wasteland of the opposition” (Turia, 2012, 
July 23). 
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(2010-2011) 223  and the devastating Canterbury earthquakes (2010-2011). 224 
Consequently, in line with its neo-liberal orientation225 and public management 
model, 226 the Government adopted an austerity-based approach in order to attempt 
to bring debt down to what it considered to be prudent levels. This policy, 
commonly referred to as the ‘zero budget’, involved prohibiting new Government 
spending and looking for cost reductions (English, 2012, May 24; Hartevelt, 2012, 
May 23).227 This explains both the Terms of Reference instruction that the review 
“must be undertaken with the context of a tight fiscal environment” (Te Paepae 
Motuhake, 2011, p.71) as well as Finance Minister Bill English’s post-review 
assertions that he was “expecting them to make any changes within the current 
budget”, and that “there would be no new provisions in the budget for developing 
Māori language” (New Zealand Press Association, 2011, April 13). 
 
Consequently, the major justification of the review of the Māori Language Strategy 
(launched in July, 2010) was to ensure that Government investment in the Māori 
language was justified in terms of value for money. Thus, for example, Sharples 
(2010, July 29a, July 29b) observed that the aim of the review was to determine 
                                                 
223 South Canterbury Finance was New Zealand's largest locally owned finance company when it 
collapsed in August 2010. It had 35,000 investors and owned almost $NZ2 billion in assets. It was 
placed in receivership in 2010 triggering a $1.6 billion bailout of investors’ deposits by the New 
Zealand Government which was guaranteed under its Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme. 
224 The Canterbury earthquakes consisted of two major earthquake events as well as a long series of 
large aftershocks. The earthquakes, particularly the second in 2011 which killed 185 people, caused 
massive infrastructural and building damage, produced thousands of tonnes of silt, and disrupted the 
region’s economy, employment, and tourism. The total net cost to the Crown was estimated at $13.5 
billion, with the rebuild estimated to rise to $30 billion or 10 percent of GDP, which will have a 
huge long term effect of the economy (the Japan tsunami was only 3 to 4% of its annual GDP) 
(Parliamentary Library, 2011, December 20). 
225 Neoliberalism is an ideology that has influenced mainstream economics since the 1980s. It aims 
to use market competition to lift the performance of the state. Thus, in neo-liberalism, citizens 
become consumers or resource units, while it emphasises the personal freedom from state coercion 
and regulation and therefore advocates economic liberalisations, free trade, and deregulation of 
markets, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the promotion of the private sector's role 
in society. 
226 New Public Management has been a significant, albeit evolving, model of public administration 
since the 1980s. It combines neoliberal ideals with a distinctly proactive managerialist approach that 
aims to constantly improve performance, outcomes, efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Sayers, 2009, 
pp.226-228). It is now less stringently applied than the 80s radical market-led structural reforms, 
including wider concerns for collaboration and social outcomes (Duncan & Chapman, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the quest for cost-efficiency drives a reduction in back-office services through 
digitalisation, sharing and standardisation of systems as well as a focus on outcomes (rather than 
outputs) and evidence-based policy (James, 2011, September 30). 
227 Rotherham (2011, May 10) noted that the International Monetary Fund “recommended monetary 
policy would need to be tightened to contain inflationary pressure and a return to fiscal surpluses by 
2014/15”. The National Government ‘zero-budget’ policy appears to closely follow the IMF 
recommendation. 
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how government investment (estimated at approximately NZ$226 million per 
annum) could be ‘refocused’ on “encouraging active use of te reo in daily life” 
(Klein-Nixon, 2010, March 4). Securing ‘maximum’ or ‘enhanced’ value for 
Government investment in the sector was a major focus of the Terms of Reference 
(Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.71, 77 & 79).228 The other related major themes 
iterated by Government, in public discourse and internal reviews, were (a) the need 
for the cohesiveness of the sector, (b) Government accountability for, and 
commitment to implementing the strategy, and (c) greater iwi involvement and 
control (see, for example, Flavell, 2009, October 15; Māori Affairs Committee, 
2009, May 26, p.5; Sharples, 2010, July 29a; July 29b; September 1; Tahana, 2009, 
August 4; Māori Affairs Committee, 2009, May 26, p.5; Flavell, 2009, October 15; 
Sharples, 2010, July 29a; July 29b; September 1).229 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are widespread negative attitudes towards Māori 
language use among the approximately 85.4% of the New Zealand population who 
are non-Māori (de Bres, 2008a, pp.46-54).230 In connection with this, it is important 
to note that although there may be tacit agreement by many non-Māori with the 
principle of revitalising the Māori language, there is considerable resistance to 
specific initiatives (Nicholson and Garland, 1991, p.405).231 However, as indicated 
in the 2003 Māori Language Strategy (Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri, 2003, 
                                                 
228 The original Terms of Reference (Te Puni Kōkiri, n.d., pp.6-7) suggest that all the research 
(including the literature review, data collection, stocktake and analysis of programmes and services, 
assessment of expenditure) are intended to “provide the basis for the value for money assessment.” 
This sentence is missing in the version of the Terms of Reference that is provided in the Appendices 
of the Te Reo Mauriora report. 
229 The cohesiveness issues have existed for some years. In the 2000 Annual Report of Te Taura 
Whiri (2000, p.1) for example, Commissioner Patu Hohepa stated that “Burning issues continue to 
bedevil our work. Such an issue is the taking of some Māori language services and products from 
the Commission into your Ministry. They were better left to the Commission. Even though this 
Commission was created as the guardian and the activist for language promotion and maintenance, 
how could these be done if control over important aspects such as research and audit as well as 
possible funding have been moved to your Ministry? . . . That the Commission has continued to be 
at the mercy of non-Māori speaking analysts, linguists and decision-makers in your Ministry 
continue to cause repercussions in the Commission.” 
230 For example, 71% of non-Māori did not want their children to speak Māori (de Bres, 2008a, p.47). 
This includes the approximately 12% of ‘English only’ New Zealanders who tend to forcefully 
express their belief that English should be the only language used in New Zealand public life (pp.51-
53). 
231 For example, approximately 80% of non-Māori were not in favour of bilingual public services, 
bilingual public signs and Māori language television programmes; 60% were not in favour of Māori 
people speaking Māori in public places or at work; 79% of non-Māori did not agree to Māori as a 
compulsory school subject for Māori children; and 75% stated that they would not be willing to 
make a personal effort to ensure the survival of the Māori language (de Bres, 2008a, pp.46-50). 
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p.27), “to revitalise the language it is necessary for wider New Zealand society to 
value the language and support a positive linguistic environment.” 
 
The review of the Māori language sector and the Māori Language Strategy was 
officially launched on the 29th of July 2010, in Māori Language Week. The press 
release by Peter Sharples (2010, July 29a) which accompanied the launch provides 
a particularly clear window into the drive for a more co-ordinated approach that 
involves greater Iwi/Māori control based on the Treaty paradigm of partnership: 
 
‘The strategy and infrastructure of the Māori Language sector is to be 
completely reviewed, to ensure the programmes and expenditure across the 
whole of government are responsive to Iwi/Māori aspirations’, Māori 
Affairs Minister Dr Pita Sharples has announced. 
 
‘Government spends around $226 million every year to revitalise Māori 
language, in schools, through broadcasting, in programmes supported by Te 
Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori and so on,’ said the Minister. ‘Most of the 
funding is managed by Government departments to fulfil their policies and 
plans. Other funding is allocated to Iwi, hapu, whanau and communities to 
support their projects and priorities’. 
 
However, we need a more coordinated approach. We also need a strategy 
that will empower Iwi/Māori to take control of the Māori Language.232 I am 
asking the review group to consider whether responsibilities, programmes, 
services and expenditure are coordinated and whether or not they are located 
with the right agencies or Māori stakeholders. By restructuring and 
consolidating the sector we can only achieve better results. 
 
                                                 
232 Despite the benefits of speaking community control, there is also a danger that it doesn’t also 
involve neo-liberal governments disinvesting themselves from their legal and moral responsibilities 
for language revitalisation. Personal or individual responsibility can masquerade as empowerment 
or ‘freedom’ from state intervention when it results in less empowerment (Cabau, 2009). Writing 
about the deterioration of pluralism, Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) noted “that the whole idea 
of difference has been privatised. It’s been pushed back to the family and to the home”. This issue 
(as it relates to the report) is discussed again in Section 5.3.5. 
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‘A revised Māori Language Strategy will bring together all our efforts to 
promote and revitalise our language - a strategy that will be based on 
partnership between the Crown and Iwi/Māori’, said Dr Sharples. 
 
The review panel, which was called Te Paepae Motuhake (The Independent Panel) 
consisted of seven members, each representing a Māori dialectal region, and each 
chosen because of his/her expertise and experience in Māori language and Māori 
language revitalisation activities.233 
 
The terms of reference for this review begin with some background comments 
regarding the past and present status of the Māori language as well as the range of 
current government investment (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.69-72). The 
rationale for the review is that “there is still room for significant improvement”, 
particularly in terms of sector cohesion, value for money and strategic language 
outcomes (pp.69-72). The seven issues to be addressed within the review are 
summarised below, with the three priority issues first: 
 
Principles: Develop some guiding principles (including Treaty principles) 
that would underpin investment in Māori Language revitalisation. 
 
Outcomes: Develop a strategic framework and intervention logic for 
government that is informed by the current state of the Māori language and 
desired outcomes reflected in iwi language plans and the consultation 
process. 
 
Roles and responsibility of Government: Survey and prioritise the present 
roles and responsibilities within the Māori language sector. Consider the 
relationship between Māori / Iwi and Government and identify opportunities 
for partnerships as well as any other roles that should be undertaken by 
government.  
 
                                                 
233 Members of Te Paepae Motuhake included Emeritus Professor Sir Tāmati Reedy (chair), Rahera 
Shortland, Toni Waho, Pānia Papa, Hana O'Regan, Cathy Dewes, Pem Bird (July-November 2010) 
and Te Kahautū Maxwell (who replaced Pem Bird in Nov 2010). 
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Key initiatives: Gather evidence regarding Māori satisfaction and the 
impact of current initiatives delivered by government agencies and identify 
other programmes sought by Iwi/Māori 
 
Co-ordination and infrastructure of the Māori Language Sector: 
Review the infrastructure; identify whether responsibilities, programmes, 
expenditure and services are located with the right stakeholders; identify 
opportunities for enhanced co-ordination and inter-agency engagement; 
compare the functions and powers of Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori with 
similar bodies domestically and internationally. 
   
Expenditure: identify the expenditure, outputs and outcomes of all Māori 
language programmes and services. 
 
Value: assess the value for money of the expenditure in light of a tight fiscal 
environment (also exploring other dimensions of ‘value’, including the 
effectiveness and efficiency of delivery, the level of support for cultural 
identity, Māori wellbeing and community relationships, and finally, the 
status of the Māori language as a taonga in the context of the Treaty of 
Waitangi). 
 
The review period of eight months, with a further four months to develop a strategy, 
was timed to coincide with budget planning for the 2011/12 financial year (Te 
Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.76-77).234 It was expected that, subject to the Cabinet 
Strategy Committee confirming the framework for a whole-of-government 
response and a new strategy being developed, the Minister of Māori Affairs would 
be able to announce the new initiatives during Māori language week in early July 
2011 (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, March 22, p.2). Given the amount of work required to 
complete the review, this was a particularly tight timeframe. Nevertheless, 2011 
was an election year and may have been the last opportunity the Māori party would 
have to influence a process such as this as a part of Government. Thus, it was very 
                                                 
234 The official tabling of the Government budget was due on the 19th of May 2011 
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important that the review be delivered in a timely manner. The review phases are 
outlined below:  
 
1. Establishment of Panel TPK Provide background information  
Panel Confirm timeframe   Jul. 2010 
2. First Order Issues Panel Review state of Māori language 
Panel  Review Iwi/Māori aspirations Sept. 2010 
3. Second Order Issues Panel  Survey Māori language sector 
Panel  Review expenditure & impact  Dec. 2010 
4. Report   a. Panel  Assess information    
b. Panel  Complete report  Mar. 2011 
5. New Strategy  MMA Assess recommendations 
MMA Develop strategy; consult 
MMA  Prepare cabinet paper   Jun. 2011 
6. Strategy complete MMA Endorse and announce  Jul. 2011 
On completion of tasks 1-4a, panel members were expected to detail their findings 
and recommendations concerning a new Māori Language Strategy in a report to be 
presented to the Minister of Māori Affairs (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.71). That 
report was intended to form the basis of the strategy.235 The critical components of 
this new strategy are listed below in order to indicate how the information gathered 
in the seven areas of consideration was intended to be integrated into the strategy: 
 
a. Set out the guiding principles for the revitalisation of the Māori language; 
b. Focus on the desired outcomes for the revitalisation of the Māori 
language; 
c. Provide clarity about the most effective programmes and services to 
support the outcomes; 
d. Confirm the roles of government and those of Iwi and Māori and how 
they will be integrated to achieve the outcomes; 
e. Set out the priorities, location and quantum of funding given to the roles 
within agencies; 
                                                 
235 The steps required to gain cabinet approval for the new strategy were also outlined. 
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f. Provide options for enhancement of relevant legislation (for example, 
the Māori Language Act 1987); 
g. Provide an implementation plan to achieve the aims. 
 
An internal briefing paper produced at the beginning of the review shows that the 
Te Taura Whiri was concerned that the review would impact on their status, role 
and function (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). It was noted in that paper that 
they were the only agency to be reviewed on both their inputs and outputs and it 
was asserted that the functions, powers and outputs of all agencies should be 
reviewed (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). It was also noted in the paper that 
these concerns had been ignored by Te Puni Kōkiri in the drafting of the Terms of 
Reference and that, therefore, it was important that the Commission should “feed 
into the panel’s framework” in terms of “how this consideration happens” (Te Taura 
Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). 
 
The review ended on the 13th of April 2011 with the release of a bilingual report 
entitled Te Reo Mauriora. Higgins (n.d., p.9) notes that “the report reads in the way 
it was constructed through an amalgamation of separately written and researched 
components that is typical of many review reports.” This perspective is reinforced 
by evidence of different dialects in the Māori versions of the sections. 
 
The principal recommendation of Te Reo Mauriora was that the re-establishment 
of Māori language usage in homes be prioritised. It also recommended that the 
entire Māori language sector budget (which it estimated at approximately NZ$600 
million) be placed under the control of a Minister of Māori Language and a separate 
Board, Te Mātāwai, whose members would answer to him or her. Te Mātāwai 
would be made up of language experts representing nine regions. The panel also 
recommended the creation of nine Rūnanga ā-Reo which, through delegated 
authority from Te Mātāwai, would effectively control all of the Māori language 
sector programmes and services within their regions. 
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5.3 Criterion-referenced analysis of the report 
In line with the practice so far where italic print is used in extracts from the report, 
this is intended to draw attention to particular sections. 236 
5.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’ 
Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
 
Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as 
sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership 
of that group and to resonate positively with them? 
 
The key in-group identified in the report appears, at first sight, to be all Māori, as 
indicated by the use possessive pronouns in the extract below, 
 
It is naive to have a false sense of security about our recent gains in Māori 
language and cultural revitalisation initiatives. We have made significant 
progress in the last 25 years . . . . As a minority language, we are still very 
much in the critical stage. Ours will not simply become one of the surviving 
1000 languages . . . by chance. But left to chance, and by apathy, ours could 
certainly easily become one of the 5000 — and quickly so. 
 
The signifier for this group may also include the people or Iwi: 
 
Return control to the people (p.15). 
 
The iwi have to make sure the design of their respective houses are fit for 
purpose, and perhaps most importantly — they need to be committed to 
living in it (p.43). 
 
                                                 
236 In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the Te Reo Mauriora report will show only 
the page number. Thus, instead of ‘(Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.56)’ it will show ‘(p.56)’. 
Furthermore, given that the English version would be the only one read by the majority of hegemonic 
interests/ key decision makers, it will be the focus of the analysis. 
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In spite of initial appearances, this in-group does not include all Māori. It explicitly 
includes iwi organisations, Māori language activists (particularly those active in the 
1960s and 1970s), groups, such as Te Ataarangi, that have made a commitment to 
the Māori language and some of those who attended the consultation hui:237 
 
Māori Language Homes — priority funding to be given to programmes that 
work with families and communities that have made a commitment to te reo 
Māori, such as: Te Kōhanga Reo, Puna Reo, te Kura Kaupapa Māori, 
Wharekura, Kura a-iwi, Te Ataarangi, Wānanga Māori, marae, health 
services and businesses (p.44). 
 
The above summary captures the spirit and earnest voice of the people who 
attended the hui throughout. (p.24). 
 
[C]oncern was expressed by the people [who attended the consultation hui] 
(p.57). 
 
[government efforts have been made] largely as a response to political 
pressures that gained momentum in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 
recognise the rightful place of te reo Māori in New Zealand Society. These 
protests resulted in the establishment of the Māori Language Act 1987 
whereby Māori was declared to be an official language of New Zealand 
(p.32). 
 
Many Māori, by virtue of the negative nature of references made to them (negative 
references that are, however, often mitigated), appear to be excluded from this in-
group: 
 
The current reality is that 23% of the Māori population identify themselves 
as being able to speak te reo to some degree. Not all of that 23% are 
                                                 
237 That Te Ataarangi is a part of the ‘in-group’ is also indicated by the photographs (pp.44 & 45) of 
two well-known Te Ataarangi teachers speaking at the consultation meetings as well as the use of a 
quotation from the principle founder of Te Ataarangi, Katerina Te Heikōkō Mataira, to reiterate key 
principles in the Principles section (p.21). Review panel member Rāhera Shortland is also a member 
of the Te Ataarangi governing body. 
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committed to speaking te reo in the homes and use it as the language of 
communication with their children (p.27). 
 
Māori have also had a role to play in the loss of language as it may be argued 
that choices were still made around intergenerational transmission by those 
who had access to quality te reo, irrespective of the external pressures they 
were experiencing. Whatever the reason, there remains a number of Māori 
who have been able to or are currently able to nurture te reo Māori in their 
homes, whānau and community, who choose not to do so. Although one may 
empathise with the rationale or justifications for their respective choices, 
the responsibility nevertheless still lies with those people to impart the 
language to the next generation of their whānau if they have the ability to 
do so (p.37). 
 
Many iwi continue to prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its 
revitalization . . . (p.3). 
 
The perception was strong, that tribal governance tended to prioritise issues 
around Treaty Settlements, the Foreshore and Seabed Act, forestry and 
tribal economy over te reo . . . (p.39). 
 
Māori expressed grave concern that more needs to be done by both the 
Government and Māori . . .  (p.47). 
 
The fractured nature of language constructions being passed on is an 
insidious problem. Here, teachers of Māori language come under a huge 
barrage of criticism. Unfairly or not they are seen as providers of te reo and 
are ‘paid to do it’ while the home environment and parents often escape this 
carping criticism (p.47). 
 
There is also concern about the new language teachers are using in kōhanga 
reo and kura - a mixed up language with repeated errors (p.47). 
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The ‘in-group’ identified in this report appears to include only those Māori who are 
seen as being committed to revitalisation of the Māori language. This is 
fundamentally different from the inclusive national in-group representations 
articulated in Our Land Our Languages and Ko Aotearoa Tēnei. In fact, as indicated 
in the next section, the New Zealander signifier is used in Te Reo Mauriora with 
reference to an ‘out-group’. The answer to the two questions with which this section 
began must therefore be negative. 
5.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity 
 
Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
 
Question 4: Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be 
perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership 
of that group? 
 
It was noted in the previous section that the ‘in-group’ in Te Reo Mauriora is made 
up of a relatively narrow section of Māori who are committed to Māori language 
use and revitalisation. In spite of the acknowledgement that attitudes towards Māori 
and the Māori language are more positive than they were in the past (“but today a 
more positive change in attitudes and race relations is apparent” (p.63)), almost 
every other group is presented, directly or implicitly, in negative terms. This 
includes a number of existing or potential political allies, including government 
representatives, non-Māori New Zealanders (with the exception of the Governor 
General and those involved in the governance and management of King’s College) 
and those Māori who have not demonstrated their commitment to the revitalisation 
of the language. All of these groups are treated as the ‘Other’ in this report: 
 
Some New Zealanders may say that the loss of Māori language is 
unimportant (p.14).238 
 
                                                 
238 This is part of a quotation from the Waitangi Tribunal WAI 11 Report. 
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Raise critical awareness amongst Māori, other New Zealanders, and the 
global community to believe in the value of the Māori language. (p.23) 
 
[G]enerations of New Zealanders . . . saw little value in our Country’s 
indigenous language . . . actively degraded it and in many cases resented its 
presence (p.31). 
 
Many informants of the review expressed that the low status and lack of 
respect for the language is a relic of our colonial history . . . (p.63). 
 
The construction/ representation of an ‘other’ identity group in this report seems 
unlikely to be received in a positive way and appears, therefore, not to be consistent 
with the report’s overall purpose. Indeed, the largely antagonistic stance of the 
writers seems likely to impact in a negative way on the potential for support for the 
report’s recommendations. 
5.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation 
 
Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to 
increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support 
for its aims? 
 
Although the stance adopted in Te Reo Mauriora towards number of identities is 
frequently a negative one, it is government that is identified as a common adversary. 
Thus, for example, the government is represented as a being demolisher/ destroyer 
of te reo (pp.29 & 41); destroyer of Māori speaking communities (pp.31 & 37); 
unwilling to support te reo (pp.29, 33); devious (p.29); a liar (p.31); and 
unprofessional and disjointed (pp.31, 33, 41 & 43). Much of the report is dedicated 
to rehearsing past and present failures of the Crown in relation to the Māori 
language. A few examples are provided below: 
 
Although there are many factors that both directly and indirectly contributed 
to the decline of te reo in the 20th Century, there were perhaps no more 
damaging and long lasting than those forwarded by the Crown (p.29). 
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[T]he Crown and its agents led, resourced and supported the various 
campaigns that eroded the position of te reo in this country (p.31).  
 
Whether one focuses on the Crown’s failure to perform its duties in terms 
of protecting Te Reo as a taonga under the Treaty, and/or its failure to 
adequately promote and resource its development to ensure its continuation 
and survival — the end result was the same . . . (p.31). 
 
The State’s collective responses [to the Māori Language Strategy] have . . . 
remained largely isolated and disparate with significant questions being 
raised around accountabilities, confusion of roles, duplication of activities 
and waste (p.33). 
 
The word ‘responsibility’ in the Terms of Reference is used with direct reference 
to the provision of support for Māori language revitalisation. The report writers, 
however, use it extensively with reference to government culpability (see, for 
example, pp.29-30), a clear example of the antagonistic stance adopted. Indeed, 
where there are statements relating to the Crown that could be interpreted in a 
positive, or at least relatively positive way, they are immediately undermined (see 
sections in italics below): 
 
[T]he Government has continued to slowly grow the investment in te reo 
and its development across many spheres of public life. By and large, this 
investment however, has been made in an ad-hoc fashion and in the absence 
of a comprehensive strategic plan for te reo Māori (p.33). 
 
In the New Zealand situation, the Government has made efforts to give 
effect to those expectations around te reo Māori, largely as a response to 
political pressures . . . (p.33). 
 
Given that there has been an increase in the proficiency level of Māori from 
the early 1970s to 23% in 2006, it is reasonable to assume that government 
spending, especially from the Ministry of Education, has contributed to that 
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growth. However the Ministry acknowledges its own results as ‘patchy’, 
indicating the need for better and sharper evaluation methods (p.61). 
 
The identification of Government as a common adversary may be something to 
which many of the report’s in-group respond in a positive way.  It is, however, is 
an identification that is unlikely to increase the potential for the extension of an 
existing coalition of support for the report’s aims. The answer to the question with 
which this section began must therefore be - no. 
 
Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of 
support for its aims? 
 
The task with which review group members were entrusted was essentially to 
determine whether government Māori language expenditure was being directed in 
the best possible way to secure positive outcomes and, if not, to make 
recommendations in relation to the redirection of some of it. This being the case, 
whilst acknowledging that there are serious problems associated with government 
approaches to the Māori language (past and present) and with the Māori Language 
Strategy and its implementation, gaining support for recommendations made by the 
review group (establishing an ‘in-group’) appears, at first sight, to have been 
relatively unproblematic. There were many potential allies. In fact, the report’s 
Terms of Reference provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for the 
overall aims of the review:  
 
[T]he Government considers that there is still room for significant 
improvement in terms of the outcomes that are sought, the value for money 
and the infrastructure of this sector (p.69). 
 
Māori language experts have identified the need to continue to increase the 
population of highly proficient speakers, to strengthen Māori language use 
in a variety of settings . . . (p.69). 
 
Te Puni Kōkiri . . . . have . . . highlighted the importance of support for Iwi 
dialects. . . . Te Puni Kōkiri will convene and chair an inter-agency working 
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group, including the Ministry of Education and Te Taura Whiri, to support 
the Review (p.71). 
 
Other sectors: Ministry for Culture and Heritage; Department of Internal 
Affairs; Ministry of Economic Development; Ministry of Research, Science 
and Technology; National Library and related agencies; courts and 
Tribunals and, other agencies as required (p.73). 
 
The Minister of Māori Affairs will be responsible for this Review (p.73). 
 
Iwi/Māori communities: Iwi . . . Iwi radio stations; wānanga, Independent 
Tertiary Providers, Kura Kaupapa, Kōhanga Reo and Te Ataarangi. Hapū 
and Marae . . . . Whānau (p.73). 
 
In addition, there were a number of potential supporters who, while not included in 
the Terms of Reference, were known to the agencies involved. Thus, for example, 
a communication strategy sent by Peter Sharples (2011, April 12) lists key 
stakeholders, including interested Ministers and agencies as well as national Māori 
language organisations and advocates such as Te Kōhanga Reo National Trust; Te 
Rūnanganui o Ngā Kura Kaupapa Māori; Te Tauihu o Ngā Waka; Te Ataarangi; 
Te Whakaruruhau o Ngā Reo Irirangi and Ngā Aho Whakaari. 
 
In spite of an existing coalition of support for the aims of the review, the authors of 
the report appear to have fractured its potential support base. As indicated in earlier 
sections, the panel adopted what appears to be a largely antagonistic stance toward 
many of these groups. However, what appears to have alienated its most influential 
supporters is the fact that the reviewers chose not to perform some of the tasks 
outlined in the Terms of Reference. Indeed, one particularly unexpected aspect of 
this report, given its purpose and discourse context, is the fact that members of the 
review panel appear to have interpreted their role, in part at least, as being not 
merely to assert tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) by Māori over the process of 
Māori language revitalisation but also to assert their own authority by bypassing 
the Terms of Reference in relation to which they were appointed. This involved an 
attempted identity shift – from servant to master. This attempted shift in identity is 
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seen in the repeated use of modal auxiliaries (e.g. must; should; shall; need to) to 
indicate that, irrespective of the use, in places, of the word ‘recommendation’, what 
were being forwarded were requirements rather than recommendations. In the 
examples below, emphasis has been added: 
 
[T]he future implementation of the revitalisation strategy will be led by iwi 
(p.7). 
 
All initiatives will be geared to support the principal goal which is to create 
significant numbers of Māori language speaking homes (p.45). 
 
The programme called He Kāinga Kōrerorero carried out by Te 
Ataarangi . . . should be expanded . . . .  For example homes of a kōhanga 
reo or kura kaupapa Māori will be supported by Te Ataarangi so that the 
children and parents learn the reo . . . (p.47). 
 
The Minister will appoint an interim five person Board of Trustees. The 
term of this interim Board shall not exceed one year (p.49). 
 
The Minister will have over-riding authority for Māori language 
revitalisation and will control the Government’s budget for Māori language 
(p.49). 
 
Te Mātāwai will be elected by Māori (p.49). 
 
All agencies will be required to participate… (p.51). 
 
Te Mātāwai will be authorised to distribute te reo Māori funds… (p.51). 
 
The connection between the examples above and the assertion of tino 
rangatiratanga is an obvious one. They are all anchored in a situation in which the 
present Crown / Māori power relations are reversed. Thus Māori will have over-
riding authority (p.49), will control the budget (p.49), will elect Board members 
(p.49), will require Government participation (p.51) and will distribute funds (p.51). 
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Members of the review panel also call for a number of tasks to be completed by 
others that were, in fact, assigned to them as part of the Terms of Reference. 
Notwithstanding this, they express concern that these tasks have not been 
undertaken (see use of modal auxiliaries once again): 
 
[There have been] no evaluations on the state of the language in 
programmes funded by Government. This research must be carried out 
(p.25). 
 
[T]hese kinds of results [achievement of Māori medium schools] need to be 
further analysed . . . which should guide . . . funding prioritisation (p.61). 
 
The spend on Māori initiatives from now on needs to be tracked, monitored 
and evaluated for value for money (p.61). 
 
 [The] economic value of the language against the GDP should be measured 
(p.63). 
 
In connection with this, it is relevant to note that some of the tasks assigned to the 
proposed body, Te Mātāwai, are also tasks with which members of the review panel 
were themselves charged: 
 
Te Paepae Motuhake envisages that Te Mātāwai will carry out a detailed 
environment scan and develop a contract mapping analysis (p.51); 
 
Te Mātāwai will provide a forum to correct the current lack of co-
ordination, co-operation and inter-agency engagement (p.51). 
 
One of the tasks assigned to review panel members was to “identify current Māori 
language expenditure across Votes and agencies” (p.74). In the event, panel 
members noted that “[t]here was difficulty in extracting an exact figure on all 
government expenditure for Māori language”, with totals “rang[ing] between $225 
million and $600 million” (p.57). Notwithstanding the lack of clarity, panel 
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members not only recommended that a figure of $600 million be “the base funding 
for te reo Māori for the 2011-2012 financial year” (p.55) but also that “all current 
government funding allocated for te reo Māori be re-dedicated to Vote: Reo Māori 
under the authority of the [to be appointed] Minister for Te Reo Māori” (p.55).239 
In simply accepting the higher figure,240 panel members ran the risk of alienating 
some potential supporters (not to mention the government departments from whose 
budget the $600m would be derived) who may have been surprised at what might 
have appeared to them to be substantial expenditure. Furthermore, review panel 
members, in quoting from a Ministry of Education submission, note that the sum of 
$502.2 million allocated to Māori Language from Vote: Education equates to only 
approximately 4.3% of Vote: Education funding. In concluding that this signals a 
significant imbalance, they ignore the fact that the sum of $502.2 million is not the 
total sum spent on the education of Māori children and, in doing so, leave 
themselves open to a charge of financial misrepresentation or, at best, financial 
nativity. The risk here is loss of support from those Ministry of Education 
representatives who were initially on side with the aims of the review. 
 
Overall, the text not only fails to provide evidence of an existing coalition of support 
for its aims but appears, as a result of the ways in which many identities are treated, 
to fracture such potential support as is evidenced in the Terms of Reference and 
elsewhere. 
 
Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the 
creation of an opposition coalition? 
 
There is no evidence in Te Reo Mauriora of strategies whose aim is to avoid the 
creation of an opposition coalition. For example, the voices of those involved 
directly with the formulation and implementation of the Māori Language Strategy 
are largely absent from the report. No details of submissions or of meetings with 
government departments and agencies that took place during the review process are 
                                                 
239 It is difficult to see how such a proposal could operate in practice.  
240 Much of the supposed expenditure on reo Māori is not, in fact, genuinely expenditure on te reo 
Māori at all. Thus, for example, money spent on Kōhanga Reo would be spent on pre-school 
education even if there were no Kōhanga Reo. In fact, government expenditure on Kōhanga Reo is 
less per capita than is its expenditure on other forms of pre-school education. 
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provided (in contrast to Our Land Our Languages where there are Internet links to 
submissions and transcripts of consultation meetings). The views of those who 
attended meetings or made submissions are largely unrepresented. Although the 
report does provide (p.15) some key responses from regional consultation meetings, 
it is impossible to determine who provided these responses.  It is also impossible to 
determine whether these responses have been edited. Finally, it is noted that “there 
were many more solutions offered by attendees at both national and regional hui 
(p.15) but readers are left in ignorance of what these were. 
 
Representation of government as adversary seems likely to have the effect of 
creating rather than avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition.  So too do 
some of the report’s recommendations which would appear to have the potential to 
alienate some individuals and groups with authority in the area of Māori language, 
such as the Minister for Māori Affairs and members of Te Taura Whiri and Te Puni 
Kōkiri (The Ministry of Māori Development).241 These include recommending the 
appointment of a Minister with responsibility for Māori language (with over-riding 
authority for Māori revitalisation) along with an interim five person Board of 
Trustees, and, later, the establishment of Te Mātāwai (a body made up of nine Māori 
language revitalisation experts who would co-ordinate all revitalisation efforts). In 
connection with this, it is relevant to note that Te Mātāwai would also assume 
responsibility for budget management and research and evaluation, something that 
would inevitably impact on government at all levels. 
 
Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening 
differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential 
to create a coalition of different interests? 
 
It is clear from the establishment of a very narrow ‘in-group’ and the largely 
negative representation of a number of groups that this report does not move beyond 
Māori interests by articulating a broad inclusive agenda that non-Māori could 
                                                 
241 Te Taura Whiri expressed concern that they had "little-to-no involvement in what should have 
been our primary work” (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). Te Māngai Pāho were concerned 
enough to commission a report by independent academic Dr. Rāwinia Higgins (Higgins, n.d.) to 
consider the potential implications of the recommendations on them. 
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support. Instead, the Te Reo Mauriora report spends much of its time highlighting 
themes such as government culpability (as noted earlier) and Māori sovereignty 
(tino rangatiratanga), the latter being a major focus as is evidenced by its inclusion 
in the principles: 
  
Sovereignty: The sovereignty of the Māori language belongs to Māori. Te 
Paepae has heard a resounding call from Māori, for Māori to take charge of 
revitalisation initiatives (p.11). 
 
A further focus of the report is the assertion of Treaty, indigenous and linguistic 
human rights. ‘Rights’ is the first of the report’s seven stated principles: 
 
Rights: The recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi and supportive legislation 
such as the Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples (p.11). 
 
Key elements of this discourse include reiteration of the importance of a language 
to its speaking community and the legal obligations of governments to protect the 
language: 
 
[T]he Waitangi Tribunal states that: the now undisputed status of te reo 
Māori as a taonga... attracts the protections guaranteed in Article Two of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. (p.18). 
 
The obligation to protect the language is also encompassed in Article 13 of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
endorsed by the Crown in 2010 (p.18). 
 
There are two areas of rights one must consider when discussing the 
Crown’s responsibilities for te reo Māori (p.30). 
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007, 
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clearly articulates the rights of an indigenous people to their language. 
(p.30). 
 
It is important here to draw attention to the fact that there are aspects of this report 
which could, irrespective of the actual intentions of the reviewers, result in the 
perception that personal interests are in play. There appears, for example, to be a 
possible relationship between the review members themselves (Te Paepae 
Motuhake) and the membership of the proposed new Board (Te Mātāwai). The 
review panel had seven members, each a Māori language revitalisation expert 
representing a Māori dialect region. It was proposed that Te Mātāwai should also 
be made up of seven Māori language revitalisation experts representing different 
dialect regions (with the addition of two members representing the large urban 
centres of Auckland and Wellington). In the executive summary, panel members 
noted that their recommendations were “founded on . . . hearings and the expert 
knowledge of the Independent Panel members about language revitalisation” 
(emphasis added), a description that matches the criteria for the selection of 
Mātāwai board members (pg.49). The issue here is not whether review panel 
members intended to suggest an extended role for themselves, it is probable that 
they had no such intention, but the fact that this was a possible interpretation, one 
that could be seen as representing a significant threat to those who already had 
established roles in relation to Māori language revitalisation, roles that were, in 
some cases, challenged (sometimes implicitly) in the report. 
 
In relation to those questions that jointly constitute the third criterion, it is important 
to note that although the report was commissioned by government and although 
government representatives made up the largest potential coalition of support for 
the report’s findings and recommendations, past and present representatives of the 
Crown are represented throughout in a way that effectively identifies them as a 
common adversary. This, combined with the fact that panel members not only failed 
to complete the tasks outlined in the Terms of Reference, but also effectively 
subverted them, making recommendations that (a) did not accommodate a ‘tight 
fiscal environment’, (b) would have been extremely difficult to implement and (c) 
represented a potential threat to a number of individuals and organisations, almost 
certainly had the effect of reducing rather than extending the potential coalition of 
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support for the report’s recommendations. There is no evidence in the text of 
strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. Nor is there 
any evidence of a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a 
coalition of different interests. Furthermore, as indicated above, the parallel 
between membership of the review panel and the proposed membership of Te 
Mātāwai is such as to suggest the possibility that personal interests were involved. 
Nothing was done to dispel that possible interpretation. 
5.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-
makers 
The first question relating to this criterion (engagement with key decision makers) 
is: 
Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a 
way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic 
engagement with them? 
 
In an important sense, everything in the previous sections impacts on the way in 
which key decision makers have been positioned in this report. In adopting what 
appears to be an antagonistic stance, review panel members position key decision 
makers in a way that is unlikely to gain their approval. In addition to devoting much 
of the report to rehearsing Crown failures and obligations (with the few positive 
statements being immediately undermined), omitting key voices and suggesting the 
replacement of key players (whose funding is recommended for re-allocation) in 
their proposed revised structure, panel members redefine the focus of the entire 
review, reinterpreting their role (from fulfiller of tasks to delegator of some of those 
same tasks). The new identity that this entails is considerably more authoritative 
than the identity associated with the Terms of Reference, effectively positioning 
panel members as the central ‘in-group’ with whom only a few others (including 
language activists of the 1960s and 1970s and some of those Māori who attended 
consultation hui and made comments and/or recommendations consistent with 
those of the review group) can be readily associated. All others, including the 
majority of key decision makers, appear to be consigned to ‘out-group’ 
membership. 
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That panel members appear not to have completed the tasks assigned them is 
something that is unlikely to have been well received by key decision makers. 
Furthermore, although extensive consultation meetings were held with Māori/Iwi 
and Government, the fact that the minutes of none of these were included with the 
submission means that those involved were effectively out-positioned. This is 
something that signals a lack of agonistic engagement and, once again, is something 
that is unlikely to gain the approval of key decision makers. 
 
Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic 
interests/ key decision makers? 
 
The review report makes very few references to relevant literature, the total number 
of references in the reference list being seventeen. The main focus of the report is 
on the paramount importance of intergenerational transmission. However, although 
reference is made, in relation to this, to Fishman (1991, p.245), there is no indication 
in Te Reo Mauriora that Fishman himself actually stressed the importance of a co-
ordinated multiple focus (see, for example, 1991, pp.305-306), with opportunities 
for inter-generational transmission being reliant on the success of other activities.242 
In addition, although it is noted that “[m]other needs to know te reo Māori too” 
(p.25), there is no engagement with research-based literature that discusses what 
types of usage and levels of proficiency are required to successfully sustain 
transmission between generations.243 Nor is there any examination of the impact of 
current Māori in homes programmes, especially those run by Ngāi Te Rangi 
(Ormsby-Teki, et al, 2011), Ngāi Tahu (Skerrett, 2010) and Te Ataarangi (Te Puna 
Wānanga, 2010). Furthermore, while including the WAI 262 pre-publication draft 
(2010) in its reference list, panel members did not include in their report any 
                                                 
242 Successful revitalisation involves a range of factors and is located in both public and private 
domains (See Baldauf, 2005, p.959; de Bres, 2008a, p.28; Fernando, Goldstein and Valijärvi, 2010, 
pp.68-72; Shohamy, 2006, p.68; Strubell 2001, pp.279-280; Williams, 2000, p.14). Te Reo Mauriora 
(see p.17) draws on both the sections of Lewis and Simon (2010) and UNESCO (2003) to support 
its focus on Intergenerational transmission despite the fact that a key intention of both the EGIDS 
(Extended GIDS) framework in Lewis and Simon as well as the UNESCO framework was to utilise 
a wide range of endangerment/revitalisation factors. Although there is one specific reference to 
improving the status of te reo Māori in Te Reo Mauriora, it relates to a requirement that diplomatic 
staff should be fluent in the language (p.65) and therefore is incoherent with the overall emphasis 
on returning the language in Māori homes. 
243 Successfully re-starting intergenerational language transmission involves understanding wide 
range of theories (See Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, p.3). 
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reference to its discussion of the Māori Language sector and strategy although that 
discussion was the most up-to-date and in-depth review available at that time. This 
overall lack of a research-based rationale is reflected in the fact that (a) the report 
recommends, without indicating how this is to be achieved, that “by 2050, 80% of 
Māori will speak Māori on a daily basis”, and (b) the following observations are 
made in the report without any indication that the authors have any reservations 
about accepting their validity as a solid basis for planning: 
 
The most succinct answer was given at the Hui-ā-rohe in Wellington with 
the reply ‘Me kōrero!’ (We must speak it!) (p.13). 
 
Feedback from a workshop group at the Hui ā-motu indicated that the 
language would be deemed to be safe if 50% of Māori spoke Māori (p.19). 
All hui were adamant that speaking Māori at all times and everywhere is 
the solution to sustainability (p.23). 
 
The following extract is particularly revealing: 
 
Clearly, te reo Māori stakeholders and advocates representing their various 
communities who attended consultation hui have a grasp of what’s required 
in order for sustainability to be achieved (p.15). 
 
The overall purpose of the review was to supply information and recommendations 
that could inform a revised Māori Language Strategy. There is in the report no 
analysis of the existing strategy although paradoxically, it bemoans the absence of 
a “coherent strategy and direction” (p.41). Panel members were asked for a 
breakdown of the strategies, programmes and services provided by agencies and 
Māori / Iwi organisations, together with details and analysis of the associated 
cost.244 This was not supplied although the following observations were made: 
                                                 
244 This was to allow an assessment of their impact and efficiency in delivering the outcomes, as 
well as cross agency co-ordination. Also note that in its internal analysis of the report Te Taura 
Whiri asserted that the report “does not critique a single Government policy, practise or initiative – 
rather it summarises the role of Government as one that has “over the past 40 years been varied and 
disjointed” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, p.7). Furthermore, in its conclusion as to whether the 
report achieved what it promised Te Taura Whiri (2011, April 14, p.2) answered, “No – the report 
fails short of delivering sound advice, analysis and information about whether the outcomes sought 
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[T]here are no evaluations on the state of the language in the many 
programmes funded by the Government. This research must be carried out 
(p.25). 
 
[O]ver 86% [of Vote: Māori Affairs] is spent on the singular heavyweight 
expenditure item of Broadcasting, whose value for money in terms of te reo 
remains unknown (p.59). 
 
The economic value of the language against the GDP should be measured 
(p.62). 
 
The lives of all New Zealanders are enriched by the Māori language in many 
ways. We have yet to fully understand and articulate that enrichment (p.62). 
 
Panel members not only failed to determine the value for money of government 
expenditure in terms of outcomes and desired outcomes, but also complained that 
this is a task that had not been done (p.25), needed to be done (pp.33, 61 & 63), and 
was difficult (p.57).245 They admitted, furthermore, that they were unsure of current 
expenditure overall, but nevertheless selected the higher of two possible figures 
without analysis (p.57). In spite of all of this, there is no acknowledgment in the 
report that there has been a departure from the terms of reference and, consequently, 
no justification in terms, for example, of the short timeframe and high workload.246 
Nor is there any evidence of an attempt to work within the context of a “tight fiscal 
environment” (p.70). Rather, the report writers indicate that the overall cost of what 
is proposed will be higher than the existing budget (although there is no analysis of 
how much higher) (pp.35, 37, 47 & 55). 247  Furthermore, many of the 
                                                 
for the language are being achieved within a VFM framework – i.e. – is the language deriving any 
kind of real benefit from current policy, programmes and practice?” 
245 Given the fact that the lack of agreed outcomes is the major criticism of the 2003 Māori Language 
Strategy and the panel was specifically asked to develop outcomes, the Te Taura Whiri were justified 
in describing this aspect of the report as ‘hugely disappointing’ (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, 
p.2). 
246 This may explain why the Terms of Reference is placed in the back instead of the front of the 
document. 
247 A good example of allaying fears regarding budget blowouts is the ECE Taskforce report (Early 
Childhood Education Taskforce, 2011, p.4) which stated “we acknowledge the New Zealand 
Government is facing severe fiscal constraints. We also appreciate that – because of the size of the 
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recommendations are clearly neither practical nor viable. Quite apart from the 
extreme improbability of existing agencies agreeing to transfer NZ$600 million per 
annum to another (new) agency, recommendations relating to the creation of a new 
infrastructure would (a) be expensive to implement, and (b) necessarily involve the 
transfer of some funding from revitalisation activities to the support of a newly 
created level of bureaucracy (Rūnanga ā-reo) without any evidence that this would 
lead to any improvement in outcomes.248 There was no attempt to comparatively 
reference the figure of $600 million selected by panel members to the amount of 
$226.8 million identified in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei as “state resourcing of te reo Māori 
. . . [in] 2006” and no reference to the subsequent definition of what this resourcing 
entailed (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011c, p.407).249 There was also no recognition of the 
fact that some of the expenditure that the government attributed to Māori language 
revitalisation would have had to be spent on education irrespective of the language 
(and therefore is not really a Māori language expense). In addition, there is no 
discussion of the capacity of iwi to handle financial allocations relating to 
revitalisation effectively. Finally, there is no reference to recently completed 
reviews concerning the progress of Iwi language revitalisation strategies.250 Indeed, 
the issue of accountability in relation to the proposed new structure was not raised; 
something not helped by the lack of quantifiable outcomes.251  None of this is 
indicative of positive engagement with key decision-makers. 
 
                                                 
Government’s debt – fiscal pressures will continue for at least the next decade, no matter who 
occupies the Treasury benches in Parliament . . . . We contend that the subsidies from Government 
needed to advance the early childhood education sector could be funded from within current fiscal 
resources. We are confident that much can be done with what Government already spends. But, 
longer term, we invite you and your colleagues to reprioritise current allocations of government 
spending to this important area, and not only within the budget for education.” 
248 In contrast, Te Taura Whiri (2011, February, p.3) considered any major restructuring “too slow. 
. .too expensive” suggesting instead that Māori language impact statements for all new crown policy 
and legislation would be “simple, cost effective and highly effective change to cabinet regulations”. 
249 A definition of what Government resourcing for the Māori language entails is identified in Ko 
Aotearoa Tēnei as being “services and programmes that [contribute] more or less directly to 
supporting the health of the Māori language and for activities that are being undertaken by . . . 
government agencies to support the growth and development of the Māori language” (Waitangi 
Tribunal, 2011c, p.407). 
250 See for example, Ngāi Tahu (Skerrett, 2010); Taranaki (Edwards and Ratima, 2010); Te Arawa 
(Raureti and Hohepa-Watene, 2010) as well as Tūhoe communities (Matamua, 2010a; 2010b). 
251 Related to this is the way the type of ‘support’ required from Government is not clearly identified 
and defined. It is a term used specifically for the relationship envisaged between the Government 
(auxiliary-subordinate supporter) and Māori / iwi (supported / leader) (See p.35) however, can 
include clearing path - removing obstacles (p.35), extensive financial support (p.35), legislative 
support (p.35), all reasonable steps (p.37), broad-reaching support, agreement-acceptance (p.41). 
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A characteristic of effective policy is that it is accompanied by effectiveness 
indicators. However, there is little evidence of awareness of this in the report which 
asserts that: 
 
[B]y 2050, 80% of Māori will speak Māori on a daily basis (p.18). 
 
All initiatives will be geared to support the principal goal which is to create 
significant numbers of Māori language speaking homes, with the goal that 
by 2050, 80% of Māori will be speaking te reo (p.45). 
 
2050 — 80% of Māori homes are Māori language homes (p.23). 
 
There is no indication in the report of why these figures have been selected or how 
they are to be achieved.252 Nor is there any discussion of what constitutes a Māori 
home or a Māori language home.253 These are by no means the only statements in 
the report that lack any evidential basis. One of many possible examples is: [by] 
giving the role to Te Mātāwai to co-ordinate revitalisation efforts, the essential link 
between the current programmes and homes will be made (p.46).254 
 
In connection with this, the report uses extended metaphors which appear to 
function not as illustrations but as substitutes for evidence-based arguments. The 
first extended metaphor (p.35) states that: 
 
If the iwi fail to gain appropriate support from the Crown, then they are left 
having to cut back the scrub and foliage in order to move forward. 
                                                 
252 In contrast, the Te Māngai Pāho (2010, p.24) forecast of incremental increases of Māori speakers 
show an increase of only 2-4% every three years, an increase that would fall short of the 80% referred 
in Te Reo Mauriora. 
253 For example, does a Māori home have one or more non-Māori parent/guardian? Alternatively 
how many parents/guardians/children are required to speak with what fluency and how often for a 
home to be considered a Māori language home? It also ignores the key issues of motivation, as 
Keegan (2011, April 27) explains, “the majority of Māori aren't really that interested in investing 
the time required to learn the language to a high degree of proficiency needed to sustain household 
interactions in Māori.” 
254 Other examples include the “grave concern at the rate of language change occurring” (p.25) and 
also a desire to retain authentic tribal dialects (p.25) where there is no analysis of what is required 
to achieve a quality language production in educational settings nor is there a consideration of the 
impact and viability of a dialectal focus on education/ broadcasting. 
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Inquisitive readers might wonder what this ‘scrub and foliage’ actually constitutes, 
what cutting it back might involve, who will do it, how costly the exercise will be 
and how progress will be evaluated.255 
 
Within the context of a further metaphor – one that refers to ‘building the language 
house’ (pp.41-43) - the following points are made: 
 
Departments can be likened to the different trades-people . . . . working in 
isolation . . . . There was evidence provided when we interviewed the State 
and the agencies of the Crown. . . . they are not working to a shared idea of 
an end goal. 
 
The iwi have to determine the look of the house — they need to be the 
architects . . . . and have these key messages effectively communicated back 
to the trades team. 
 
In terms of fiscal implications for the Government, the greatest cost will be 
in the rebuild. Once established and furnished however, the costs will 
reduce to a level of maintenance. There will always be work to do, as with 
any house, but if well resourced and nurtured, these costs can be 
manageable over the long term. If the house is left however to decay and 
fall down, then the rebuild will again consume greater levels of investment. 
 
Within the context of this metaphor, Government co-ordination is identified as the 
problem and Government funding of iwi the solution. There are, however, several 
difficulties here. First, reference to Māori as architects and government as project 
managers is difficult to reconcile with the proposed structure which places Māori 
in both roles. Secondly, there is no clear indication of what blueprint the “trades-
people” referred to are failing to work to. If it is the existing Māori Language 
Strategy, then the implication is that the only problem is in its implementation – 
                                                 
255 For example, based on an earlier budget figure of $1.5 m for 140 whānau (Te Puna Wānanga, 
2010, p.3), the economic implications of expanding the Kāinga Kōrerorero programme to 80% of 
(the 180,000) Māori homes could be as much as $1 – 1.5 billion per annum. 
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something with which the remainder of the report appears to be out of line. There 
is no evidence provided for the assertion that interviews indicated that “the State 
and the agencies of the Crown  . . . are not working to a shared idea of an end goal” 
(p.41). Nor is there any evidence to support the implication that the financial cost 
of language maintenance is lower than that of language revitalisation. 
 
The review report is contradictory in places. Thus, for example, although it is 
asserted that revitalisation  strategies “will be led by iwi” (p.61), elsewhere it is 
noted that “a Minister for the Māori language [should] be established with powers 
to determine all matters pertaining to the Māori language” (p.7). 256 The following 
observations are also made in the report, the first two appearing to contradict the 
third: 
 
Many Iwi continue to prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its 
revitalisation (p.39). 
 
[N]ot all Iwi are at same level in terms of articulating their needs and 
aspirations for te reo and in committing to language revitalisation (p.39). 
 
[I]wi Māori expressed their readiness and willingness to assume leadership 
for revitalising Māori language (p.51). 
 
This dissonance between current practice and stated desire has the potential to 
undermine confidence in a key recommendation of the report, that is, that 
revitalisation strategy and its funding should be placed in the hands of Iwi (pp.7, 
23, & 49). 
 
There have been, in addition, contradictions between the content of the report and 
comments made about it. The recommendations and diagrammatic structure within 
the report (pp.52-53) indicate that the intention was that agencies such as Te Taura 
                                                 
256 Sir Tamati Reedy (as secretary of the Māori Affairs Department) agreed with WAI 11 claimants 
that similar powers, then held by the Minister of Māori Affairs under s77A (2) of the Māori Affairs 
Act 1953, were ineffective (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986: 8.1.2). Thus the recommendation to give the 
Crown direct responsibility for the language turns the clock back 58 years without providing any 
justification that it is an improvement on the ‘arms-length from Government’ Māori Language 
Commissioner or that it derives from comments from the consultation hui. 
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Whiri and Te Māngai Pāho should be replaced. 257  In post-launch interviews, 
however, Sir Tāmati Reedy (personal communication, WAI 262 symposium. 
Waikato University, Thursday 27 October 2011) insisted that the proposed new 
structure would not disestablish Te Taura Whiri.258 Indeed, he asserted that he saw 
the recommendations as merely expanding Te Taura Whiri’s functions - giving it a 
new image with a new name. 
 
In view of the discussion above, the answer to both of the questions with which this 
section is concerned must be in the negative.  
5.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction 
 
Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo 
hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire 
and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events 
and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its 
rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as 
implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the 
discrepancies between its promises and achievements? 
 
Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of 
signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and 
likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider 
readership? 
 
Central to the Terms of Reference is securing maximum value for money: 
 
 [S]till room for significant improvement in terms of  . . . the value for 
money . . . (p.69). 
 
                                                 
257 This is in spite of the fact that no research on the “functions and powers of the Māori Language 
Commission” was conducted (as requested in the Terms of Reference (p.75). 
258 With this, Rāhera Shortland agreed, asserting that Te Matāwai has been designed to “work with 
them so that the voices of the people will be heard . . . not to cut anyone off” (TVNZ, 2012, January 
1). 
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This work must be undertaken with the context of a tight fiscal environment, 
with the aim of securing maximum value from investments in this sector 
(p.71). 
 
[T]o identify and support opportunities for enhanced . . . value for money 
(p.71). 
 
The terms of reference identify the issues that will be considered within the 
Review, including a value for money focus (p.71). 
 
[T]his will include consideration of 'value' in terms of  . . . effectiveness and 
efficiency of delivery (including unit price analysis and an impact survey) 
(p.77). 
 
It is, however, also signalled in the Terms of Reference that ‘other dimensions of 
value’, including cultural identity, social well-being and positive Treaty 
relationships (p.77) should be considered. There was, therefore an opportunity to 
challenge the neo-liberal philosophy, the application of free market rationality to 
endangered languages, that underpins the status quo hegemony and to redefine cost-
effectiveness in ways that exposed its contingency. This opportunity was 
overlooked even though it could have been pointed out that actual expenditure by 
government on Māori language is considerably less than NZ$226 million identified 
in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, let alone the NZ$600 million sometimes claimed (and 
endorsed in this report). Thus, for example, it makes no sense to argue that all of 
the expenditure on Māori immersion education is expenditure on Māori language 
since, irrespective of the language of instruction, children must be educated. This 
had already been noted in a New Zealand Treasury policy paper in relation to 
language education planning of the Basque language (Euskera) (Grin and 
Vaillancourt, 1998, pp.134-135): 
 
It is important not to confuse the cost of education with the marginal cost of 
operating an Euskaldun education system. The reason for this is a simple 
one: children have to be schooled anyway, and what matters here is the 
additional expenditure resulting from teaching in Euskera and through 
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Euskera, instead of operating the system in Spanish only. If teacher-pupil 
ratios are identical in the various models, and if teachers of Euskera or 
through Euskera command the same wage rate, then expenditure per 
student is not part of the cost of the policy. 
 
Similarly, Dana Peterson of the Parliamentary Library (2000, p.8) observed that 
“children need to be educated and teachers trained and supported regardless of the 
subject matter, and only expenditure over and above what would be spent for any 
other special subject (e.g. science) or medium of instruction should be counted”. 
On this basis, she estimated that the Māori language component of the annual 
Education budget (1998/99) was a mere $22 million (rather than the $177.713 
million claimed) and the total annual Māori language funding by Government in all 
areas was NZ$53.846 million, that is, a mere 0.1% of the total appropriations for 
1999/2000.259 
 
The varying estimates of Māori language funding are referred to only briefly in the 
TRM report: 
 
The Minister of Māori Affairs established an Independent Panel on 15 July 
2010 to inquire into the state of the Māori Language, given the view that a 
sum of at least $225 million was currently being spent on the language (p.5). 
 
[F]urther clarification of the Government spend is needed. It ranges between 
$225 million (See Appendix One) and $600 million (MOE Submission and 
TPK Summary, Jan 2011) (?). 
 
Te Puni Kōkiri undertook an Inventory of Māori Language Services in 2006. 
At that time, it estimated that approximately $225m per annum was spent in 
the Māori Language Sector. This expenditure was concentrated in Vote: 
Education ($145m) and Vote: Māori Affairs ($75m) (p.55). 
 
                                                 
259 The Ko Aotearoa Tēnei report (2011c, p.558) also noted that “the cost of educating a child is 
relatively similar no matter which school they attend” and therefore “the cost of ‘kaupapa Māori’ 
education is not a burden on the budget.  
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The totals ranged between $225 million and $600 million (p.57). 
 
In spite of all of this, the figure of NZ$600 million was accepted without any further 
detailed financial analysis: 
 
The Panel recommends $600 million as base funding for te reo Māori for 
the financial year 2011-2012 (p.55). 
 
Review panel members could have contested the government’s figure of NZ$600 
million, thereby exposing and undermining one of its aims, that is, to appear to be 
spending much more on Māori language revitalisation than is actually the case (a 
discrepancy between a promise and an achievement). In doing so, they could have 
gone a long way towards convincing both Māori and non-Māori that they were fully 
justified in requiring that the report’s recommendations should not be fiscally 
neutral. In the event, many of the responses to the report (see Section 5.4 below) 
clearly indicate that the government succeeded in this aim. Furthermore, it was, in 
fact, the writers of the report rather than government who were often represented as 
being self-serving. 
 
Another focus of the Terms of Reference is the need for improved infrastructure 
and greater co-ordination. Although the review panel did recommend a new type of 
infrastructure which they maintained would lead to better co-ordination, they did 
not take the opportunity to point out that the government’s insistence on value for 
money actually did nothing more than highlight its own deficiencies in this area. 
After all, it could be argued that it was the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the 
government itself that had led to the failure to maximise outcomes and that, 
therefore, the government had failed in its duty to be fully accountable to Māori and 
other tax payers and must accept responsibility for this rather than attempting to 
suggest that Māori were somehow themselves responsible for it. 
 
A third opportunity to contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony concerns 
the responsibilities of government and Māori for Māori language revitalisation. 
Joseph Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) has pointed out the ways in which 
human capital economic theory places pluralism under pressure, noting in particular 
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the dangers involved in privatising “the whole idea of difference” in such a way 
that it has been “pushed back to the family and to the home”.260 Panel members did 
not contest the simplistic concept of responsibility as outlined in the Terms of 
Reference and, therefore, seek to expose and undermine one of the government’s 
aims – that is, to shift the main burden of responsibility for the revitalisation of 
Māori from the agency responsible for the decline of the language (the Crown) to 
the victims (Māori). Instead, they asserted that, although the Government has an 
obligation to support Māori (p.37), the major responsibility for revitalisation rested 
with Māori, thus placing Māori in a position where they could be held responsible 
in the future for any perceived failure in this area: 
 
It is this panel’s position that the responsibility of te reo rests with Māori 
and the government’s role is to act responsibly under its obligations under 
the Treaty. Māori revitalise the language. Government supports (p.35). 
 
Although the task itself of revitalising the language rests with iwi Māori 
themselves, there remains an obligation and responsibility on the Crown to 
support iwi Māori to achieve this (p.37). 
 
The objet petit à of Te Reo Mauriora appears to be control of financial resources - 
which involves assertion of sovereignty over Māori language. It is noted in the 
report that tax sourced funding will be extensive (p.35), that it will be at least, $600 
million for the first year (p.55) and will increase over time (p.45).  
 
It would have been perfectly possible to assert Māori sovereignty over Māori 
language without creating a situation in which Māori could be blamed for any 
perceived failure in the area of revitalisation in the future. This was not done. 
Instead, it was accepted by panel members that commitment by many Iwi/Māori 
had been and was currently lacking (pp.27 & 37) and that the “Government’s 
obligation to support the Māori language [was] neither absolute nor fiscally 
                                                 
260 Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.4) also recounts “how an Australian policy of allowing schools 
greater autonomy resulted in the powerful groups prevailing and “minority group’s voices being 
lost.” As noted earlier, individual responsibility masquerading as empowerment can, in fact, result 
in less empowerment (Cabau, 2009). Accordingly, a balanced approach of community control and 
state intervention is important in indigenous language revitalisation. 
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unlimited” (p.37). It was, furthermore, implied that in taking control of the 
(supposed) existing budget for Māori language revitalisation, Māori would also 
assume responsibility for any perceived failure in the area of revitalisation in the 
future notwithstanding the fact that (a) the responsibility for the precarious situation 
in which the language is placed rests with the Crown, and (b) the Crown continues 
not to commit fully to its future.261 Thus for example: 
 
The iwi have to make sure the design of their respective houses are fit for 
purpose, and perhaps most importantly — they need to be committed to 
living in it (p.43). 
 
The responsibility to upkeep the whare and live in it - belongs to Māori 
(p.43). 
 
Also missed were opportunities to draw attention to dislocating events, such as (a) 
the government’s repeated failure to ensure that the official status accorded to the 
Māori language was matched by support for its use in all official domains, and (b) 
the existence of documents that undermined government claims in relation to its 
contribution to Māori language revitalisation, and in particular, the (lack of) 
progress towards the twenty five year vision outlined in the Māori Language 
Strategy 2003, which states that: 
 
By 2028, the Māori language will be widely spoken by Māori. In particular, 
the Māori language will be in common use within Māori whānau, homes 
and communities. All New Zealanders will appreciate the value of the Māori 
language to New Zealand society (Te Taura Whiri & Te Puni Kōkiri, 2003, 
p.5). 
  
Opportunities for dislocation included, for example, potential references to (a) 
Bauer’s (2008) critique of the 2006 Māori language survey and its findings, (b) the 
                                                 
261 All of this in spite of the fact that in the report revitalisation efforts are described as “under 
resourced” (p.27), with government investment “made in an ad-hoc fashion”, “largely isolated and 
disparate with significant questions being raised around accountabilities, confusion of roles, 
duplication of activities and waste” (p.33) and something which has had “patchy” results (p.61). 
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performance audit on the implementation of the Māori Language Strategy 
conducted by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG, 2007), and (c) the Māori 
language chapter of the 2010 WAI 262 pre-publication draft report, which 
described government efforts as “a picture of lost opportunities due to poor 
communication and coordination, unrealistic expectations, and de-prioritising 
within agencies” (WT, 2010, p.63). Taking these opportunities, particularly if it had 
been done with an emphasis on logic rather than accusation, could have been 
effective in not only securing greater awareness of the realities of the current 
situation, but also in highlighting the fact that the desired cost-effectiveness would 
require a much greater level of government commitment and co-ordination than has 
hitherto been the case. In addition, if panel members had explicitly framed their 
recommendations within the existing policy parameters and legislative statements, 
they would have had a far greater chance of acceptance.262 
 
The overall structure of Te Reo Mauriora is unclear. A number of strands appear to 
compete with one another for the reader’s attention rather than complementing one 
another.   
 
A potential macro-structure for the report was provided in the Terms of Reference, 
that is: Principles; Outcomes; Roles and responsibilities of government and 
Māori 263 ; Key initiatives; Co-ordination and infrastructure; Māori language 
expenditure; and Value. The intention, one that is clearly indicated in the Terms of 
Reference, was that these should form a coherent chain of signification, with the 
final link in the chain (value) focusing on “securing maximum value from 
                                                 
262  For example, the Office of the Auditor-General (2007) states that “The Government 
acknowledges that it is responsible, under the Treaty of Waitangi, for helping to revitalise the Māori 
language”; (b) the New Zealand Education Curriculum “acknowledges the principles of the Treaty 
. . . the bicultural foundations of Aotearoa New Zealand. All students have the opportunity to acquire 
knowledge of te reo Māori me ōna tikanga.’ (Ministry of Education, 2007, p.9); (c) the vision 
statement of Te Taura Whiri is that “The human landscape of Aotearoa will resonate with its 
indigenous language”; (d) the vision statement of Te Māngai Pāho is “The Māori language – 
everyday, everyway, everywhere; (e) finally, an extract from The Māori Television Service Act 2003 
- “in its Te Reo Māori Report (WAI 11), the Waitangi Tribunal found that “. . . the Māori language 
is an essential part of Māori culture and must be regarded as a taonga, a valued possession [and] . . 
. questioned whether the principles and broad objectives of the Treaty of Waitangi could be achieved 
without a recognised place for the Māori language. The Tribunal found that the Crown is obliged by 
the Treaty to take active steps to protect the Māori language. The Crown accepted these findings:” 
263  The section dealing with roles and responsibilities focuses on injustices (often historical 
injustices) and rights but does not provide any insights into opportunities for Government-Iwi/Māori 
partnerships. 
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investments in this sector”. From this perspective, the principles would have had 
an over-arching role, determining both the approach adopted and the desired 
outcomes.264 These desired outcomes would then be achieved through clarification 
of the roles and responsibilities of government and Māori. This, in turn, would lead 
to the specification of key initiatives and an outline of improved co-ordination and 
infrastructure, the expenditure and the resulting value being then specified. Thus, 
the headings would have signalled the nodal points (the floating signifiers that 
represent ideals such as agreed principles, shared responsibilities and value for 
money) around each of which a number of floating elements (e.g. current 
revitalisation strategies; Māori aspirations) could have been clustered in such a way 
as to lead to a redefinition (contextually derived specification) of each of the nodal 
points in terms of the overall aims of the review, thus creating a shared vision for 
Māori language revitalisation. Each of the nodal points (made up of a cluster of 
elements) would, therefore, have represented a chain of signification and each of 
these chains would have combined into a single chain leading to the master signifier 
(value).  
 
In the event, although the authors of Te Reo Mauriora retained the overall 
macrostructure, with headings as specified in the Terms of Reference, these 
headings do not signal the nodal points of the report’s discourse: they do not act as 
focal points for the clustering of elements in such a way as to create new 
contextually derived specifications or combine into a single chain leading to a key 
signifier (value). 265  Instead, the report appears to have two main themes – 
government culpability and responsibility on the one hand and Māori sovereignty 
on the other. It is these themes rather than “securing maximum value from 
investments in this sector” that appear to underpin the report’s recommendations. 
However, neither of these themes emerges with any real clarity of (re)definition/ 
(re)specification and there are points at which they operate in a way that seems to 
run counter to the overall aim of the report’s authors (which appears to be to insist 
on the responsibility of government to provide funding and the responsibility of 
Māori to decide how that funding will be spent).  
                                                 
264 It is relevant to note here that there are no measurable outcomes in the report. 
265 There is no attempt to redefine ‘value’ in a way that could counter the government’s primary 
financial emphasis. 
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One of the reasons why these themes fail to operate effectively as nodal points is 
that they are undercut by the overall structuring of the report itself (which means 
that instead of operating as coherent wholes they are scattered throughout, 
appearing and reappearing in a range of different ways in almost every section of 
the report). Thus, for example, the theme of government culpability and 
responsibility appears under the heading of Principles (e.g. The Māori language is 
a treasure (taonga), guaranteed Crown protection under the Treaty of Waitangi 
and imposes certain obligations of the Crown to ensure its preservation (pp.10-11), 
Outcomes (e.g. Apart from the big picture surveys conducted by the Ministry of 
Māori Development, there are no evaluations on the state of the language in the 
many programmes funded by the Government (pp.22-25), Roles and 
responsibilities of government and Māori (e.g. Although there are many factors 
that both directly and indirectly contributed to the decline of te reo in the 20th 
Century, there were perhaps no more damaging and long lasting than those 
forwarded by the Crown (pp.27-33); Key initiatives (e.g. Māori expressed grave 
concern that more needs to be done by . . . the Government  . . . to revitalise the 
Māori language (p.47); Co-ordination and infrastructure (e.g. Te Mātāwai will 
provide a forum to correct the current lack of co-ordination, cooperation and inter-
agency engagement (pp.50-52); Expenditure (e.g. In terms of education, concern 
was expressed by the people with specific regard to the lack of evaluation of the 
quality and growth of te reo in the sector . . . (p.57); and Value (e.g. . . . the Ministry 
acknowledges its own results as ‘patchy’ (p.61).  
 
Some of the other reasons why the two overall themes of the report fail to operate 
effectively as nodal points are outlined below. 
 
The major theme of government culpability and responsibility is combined with 
repeated references to Māori culpability and responsibility which, though 
accompanied by concessions, nevertheless undercuts the major theme. A few 
examples are provided: 
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The fractured nature of language constructions being passed on is an 
insidious problem. Here, teachers of Māori language come under a huge 
barrage of criticism (p.25). 
 
The current reality is that 23% of the Māori population identify themselves 
as being able to speak te reo to some degree. Not all of that 23% are 
committed to speaking te reo in the homes and use it as the language of 
communication with their children (p.27). 
 
 . . . Māori have also had a role to play in the loss of language as it may be 
argued that choices were still made around intergenerational transmission 
by those who had access to quality te reo, irrespective of the external 
pressures they were experiencing (p.37). 
 
Many iwi continue to prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its 
revitalization . . . (p.39). 
 
The major theme of Māori sovereignty and, therefore, the right of Māori to 
determine how Māori language expenditure will be directed, is undercut by (a) the 
fact that the issue of how much is actually spent on Māori language revitalisation 
is not addressed, the strategy of accepting the highest figure (to be controlled in 
future by Māori) being open to a number of possible representations that seem 
unlikely to gain widespread support for the recommendations contained in the 
report, and (b) the failure of the authors to consider the likely impact on some 
existing programmes designed to support Māori language revitalisation of the 
proposal to redirect funding (e.g. from Vote: Education).  
 
A further barrier to the two major themes of the report functioning as nodal points 
is the fact that the major guiding principles outlined in the report (rights; identity; 
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sustainability;266 treasure; sovereignty; covenant; 267 and status) seem to compete 
with the two major themes (government culpability and responsibility and Māori 
sovereignty) and the section headings (Principles; Outcomes; Roles and 
responsibilities of government and Māori; Key initiatives; Co-ordination and 
infrastructure; Māori language expenditure; and Value) for the status of focal 
points.  
 
In summary, review panel members missed several opportunities to (a) draw 
attention to the discrepancy between claim and reality, and (b) contest the nodal 
points of the status quo hegemony (particularly in relation to value for money), 
exposing their inherent contingency and redefining them in a way that was likely to 
serve the intended aims of the report. Instead, they appear simply to have accepted 
and reinforced some existing stereotypes / perspectives in attempting to establish 
government culpability and Māori sovereignty as key signifiers. They also 
effectively treated many of those who were likely to have constituted the report’s 
primary readership (including its sponsors) as adversaries and made 
recommendations that are inconsistent with the Terms of Reference. There is, 
furthermore, little evidence of any attempt to provide support for the 
recommendations in the form of carefully constructed arguments that are intended 
to cohere around that weakening of internal differences and that establishment of a 
common identity that are “an important condition of possibility for . . . hegemonic 
success” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9). Consequently, little in the report is 
likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider 
readership. 
5.4  Responses to Te Reo Mauriora 
Following the release of Te Reo Mauriora, members of the review panel expressed 
the belief that there was considerable support for the findings (see, for example, 
                                                 
266 Sustainability is associated in the report largely with intergenerational transmission. However, 
successful and sustained intergenerational transmission results from a co-ordinated approach 
involving many different avenues and it could be argued that the narrow focus on private domains 
in the report acts counter to the notion of effective sustainability. Furthermore, the important link 
between sustainability and cost-effectiveness is not discussed. For example, cost-effectiveness can 
only be determined with a clear perspective of what it takes to reach an overall goal. 
267 Alongside ‘covenant’ is the following text: Added to the Government’s obligation to sustain te 
reo, is the responsibility to support the health and development of te reo in homes, and assist in 
raising its status publicly (p.11). 
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interviews involving Sir Tāmati Reedy (TVNZ, 2011, April 17) and Rahera 
Shortland (TVNZ, 2012, January 1). An initial Māori Party press release relating to 
Te Reo Mauriora (Māori Party, 2011, April 13) was upbeat, welcoming “the fresh 
ideas and bold new approach”. Even so, it was noted that “there [would] be 
questions regarding the practical effect the recommendations . . . might have on 
various bureaucracies”.  
 
Reservations about the report’s findings, however, increased rapidly. One day after 
its release, in an article in the New Zealand Herald (New Zealand Press Association, 
2011, April 13), Peter Sharples observed that there could be difficulties associated 
with the establishment of a Minister for Māori Language, adding that he was “not 
confident about the Government support the plan would receive”.268 In a speech in 
Parliament in May 2011, Peter Sharples (2011, May 19) noted that expenditure on 
community-driven revitalisation projects had been increased by NZ$2 million,269 a 
sum that had come from the Māori Affairs budget, adding, however, that “Te 
Paepae Motuhake . . . were quite clear that whānau themselves must take the 
primary responsibility for speaking Māori at home”, the role of the government 
being “to support”. In February 2012, he noted that recommendations were “at an 
interesting stage of development” (Sharples, 2012, February 8). In March 2012, it 
was reported that the Māori Affairs Select Committee had rejected the 
recommendation to create a Minister of Māori Language (Office of the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives, 2012, March 26, p.3). 270 
 
The initial internal response to the report of Te Taura Whiri (TTWh) appears to 
have been one of shock. In an email written to Board members on the afternoon of 
the release, Glenis Philip-Barbara, the CEO, wrote: 
 
As a result of this report I am now dealing with a group of staff who are 
wondering if this means that TTWh will be disestablished. The 
                                                 
268 The article also cited Finance minister Bill English as stating (as did Sharples) that any changes 
would need to be made within the current budget levels. 
269 This is the only impact Te Reo Mauriora had on the 2011/12 budget. 
270 In the view of this Committee, “iwi should retain mana for te reo Māori and that giving it to the 
Crown or Crown agency, as the review recommended, could be detrimental to the language” (Office 
of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 2012, March 26, p.3). 
-240- 
uncertainty . . . will have a dire impact on the productivity of this tari and 
on the well-being of the people employed here. . . . I am disappointed . . . 
that no thought entered the minds of the Paepae Motuhake for Te Taura 
Whiri, even at the very least to give us a warning about what the report 
contained (Philip-Barbara, 2011, April 13b). 
 
She added that “Te Mātāwai is whimsical at best” and observed that lawyer Mai 
Chen had advised that “it [would] be a mammoth and expensive task to disestablish 
TTWh and then to re-establish another entity”. It was also claimed in an internal 
analysis by Te Taura Whiri (2011, April 14, p.3) that it had had “little to no-
involvement in what should have been our primary work” and that the report had 
fallen ‘significantly short’ of delivering what it was supposed to deliver (p.2).271 
Draft media statements that were never released (procured under the Official 
Information Act) show that Te Taura Whiri were prepared to publicly reject the 
recommendations as being “largely ill considered” and “contradictory” and to state 
that the independent voice of Te Taura Whiri had been subjugated and “its roles 
usurped” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 13a; 2011, April 13b). 272 
 
Te Taura Whiri clearly found itself in an extremely difficult position. Philip-
Barbara (2011, April 13a) noted that if “we go hard out against the report we risk 
the future of TTWh and not having any say in what happens next”. Alternatively, 
“if we say nothing we risk our reputation and appear weak to all stakeholders and 
our community”. In a later email (Philip-Barbara, 2011, September 23), she noted 
that in the opinion of Erima Henare, Te Taura Whiri chairman, “Te Reo Mauriora 
was politically naïve” but asked “how do we say this in so many words”. 
 
                                                 
271 Te Taura Whiri (2011, p.2) concluded that not only had the report failed to fulfil significant 
aspects of its terms of reference but that it also had “create[d] a new agenda without informing the 
Māori language sector”. 
272 There are two versions of this unpublished media statement (2011, April, 13a & 13b). Both argue 
strongly against the report’s recommendations (in relation to practicality and effectiveness). One 
notes that the report was “a complete surprise”, the other that “a head’s up about the report and its 
contents would not have been inappropriate or problematic”. In an email to key staff, Philip-Barbara 
(2011, April 13a) stated that these press releases were focused on three points: "that a Minister for 
te reo is not cool, that the expense involved in the proposed new entity is foolhardy and that it is at 
odds with WAI 262." 
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Recognising the degree of disquiet in Te Taura Whiri concerning the report, Peter 
Sharples (2011, April 12), before the actual launch of the report, wrote to the Te 
Taura Whiri Chairman, Erima Henare, stating that he (Sharples) would be the sole 
Government spokesperson in relation to the release of the review report in order “to 
ensure consistent messages were provided to media and other stakeholders”. In an 
article published in the New Zealand Herald (Tahana, 2011, April 15), it was 
claimed that Peter Sharples had “effectively gagged the commission”. 
 
In private meetings with the Minister, representatives of Te Taura Whiri 
strenuously argued their case (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 18; 2011, September 
16). In public, they remained largely diplomatic (see Henare, 2011, July 7; Human 
Rights Commission, 2011, May 17; Tahana, 2011, April 15; Te Taura Whiri, 2011, 
December, p.6). However, the Chairman, Erima Henare, did observe in a TVNZ 
interview (TVNZ, 2011, May 3) that he had doubts about whether the key 
recommendations of Te Reo Mauriora would be accepted. Furthermore, in the 
annual report of Te Taura Whiri for the year ended 30 June 2011 (Te Taura Whiri, 
2011, p.4), Erima Henare noted that “[as] lead agency and a key advisor to 
Government on all matters pertaining to the Māori language, I have found it 
interesting in the extreme that others might assume this role for themselves thus 
creating  . . . confusion”. Nevertheless, Te Taura Whiri later made a point of 
acknowledging some of the report’s findings, including “the need for improved 
leadership and coordination of Māori language revitalisation work” and “language 
development in the home” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, September 16, p.6). Indeed, in 
December 2011, in Te Taura Whiri’s Briefing for the incoming Minister of Māori 
Affairs (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, December, p.2), it was stated that it had “deliberately 
aligned [its] priorities with the outcomes of the Māori Language Strategy and sector 
review”. 
 
Another organisation concerned about the recommendations included in Te Reo 
Mauriora was Te Māngai Pāho.273 Indeed, so concerned were representatives of Te 
Māngai Pāho that they commissioned an independent report (by academic Dr. 
                                                 
273 It was noted in Section 1.3.2.1 that Te Māngai Pāho (also called The Māori Broadcasting Funding 
Agency) was established with the primary goal of promoting Māori language and culture by making 
funds available for broadcasting and e-broadcasting (on-demand). 
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Rāwinia Higgins) to consider the potential implications for their organisation of the 
recommendations. That report (Higgins, n.d.), which was presented to Parliament 
on the 21st of March 2012, criticises the authors of Te Reo Mauriora on the grounds 
that their research was insufficient, the proposed iwi-led structure was potentially 
problematic,274 and the proposed creation of a Minister for Māori Language simply 
mirrored the current structure while nevertheless representing a threat to current 
agencies and, ultimately, the language itself. 275 Despite these criticisms, the author 
is cautious, observing that “if the proposed infrastructure was to take effect then Te 
Māngai Pāho would be a leading agency in demonstrating what would be good 
policies and best practice models for targeted language and cultural revitalisation” 
(Higgins, n.d., p.14).276 Reporting to the Auditor General (OAG, 2012, p.7), Te 
Māngai Pāho observed that although it was aware of the possibility of a significant 
change in the administrative landscape should the recommendations included in Te 
Reo Mauriora be fully implemented, nevertheless “in the short term it [was] 
continuing to operate and plan for ‘business as usual’”. 
 
The response from the wider public to media releases concerning Te Reo Mauriora 
appears to have been largely negative. Although this is not, perhaps, surprising, 
what is surprising is the fact that the focus is often on something that could have 
been contested in the report, that is, the reported annual spend on Māori language 
revitalisation - NZ$600 million. This focus was frequently combined with on-going 
                                                 
274 Issues identified in the Higgins’(n.d.) report include the fact that (a) both iwi and whānau do not 
currently prioritise language revitalisation when faced with other issues (p.13); (b) Not all “regions” 
(p.13) or “iwi organisations” (p.16) within the regional groupings are resourced or equipped to drive 
a co-ordinated iwi/community led approach to language revitalisation” (let alone a Māori Language 
broadcasting strategy) (c) “the devolution of resources targeted to the Māori Language Strategy out 
to regions and iwi will become problematic in “ensuring accountability for money”, it will “cost 
more money”; cause inequalities between regions; and may negatively affect current Iwi radio 
stations in some areas (p.17). 
275 Issues here include (a) The proposed Mātāwai structure only mirrors the current structure with a 
new name (Higgins, n.d., p.8), (b) In rendering current agencies redundant (p.10) (see diagram in 
Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.52-53) it ignores the fact that they are critical to Māori language 
revitalisation, and (c) there is no substantial research to support the proposed new structure or 
consider its effects should it be implemented (Higgins, n.d., p.15), meaning that by separating 
language from other domains may be counter-active, Te Reo Mauriora may well be “ghettoising” it 
from the wider aspects of the Māori world (Higgins, n.d., pp.8 & 18). 
276 It is important to note that it would be difficult to characterise the efforts of Te Māngai Pāho as 
being either isolated or disjointed. Its strategic framework links directly to the 2003 Māori Language 
Strategy and its five goals include strengthening Māori language skills, use, education opportunities, 
community leadership, and recognition. 
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resentment about Treaty claims. Thus, for example, typical of many responses was 
one by ‘rouppe’ (2011, April 14) and another by ‘Sofia’ (2011, April 14):  
 
It is up to Māori to save te reo, not me. I already resent being forced to pay 
the fine (aka Treaty Claim) for a crime I neither perpetrated nor perpetuated 
and to now have some self-aggrandising panel say another $600 million 
(and given it is from ministry spend I imagine they are talking that amount 
per annum) has to be diverted to save what they should be perfectly capable 
to saving themselves is just taking the * * *. . . . . . . That $600m per annum 
can be better spent on education, health and infrastructure – for the benefit 
of everyone, not the few (rouppe, 2011, April 14). 
 
Reports from yesterday said $225m to $600m a year is being spent to 
preserve the use of Te Reo. $616,438 to $1.64 million a day…. It is a * * * 
travesty that the figure ranges $225m to 266% times that amount with no 
real indication as to what it is spent on, but now it is of course the upper 
figure that is being talked of transferring to other attempts to save Māori 
language. Shouldn’t we know what has failed so far before flushing more 
taxes down te wharepaku (Sofia, 2011, April 14)?  
 
An email sent to Prime Minister John Key (More Maori handouts, 2011, April 29) 
described expenditure on the Māori language as an “obscene amount of money,” 
and asked “Why are all New Zealanders expected to give, give, give their hard 
earned money, when the people the money is supposedly benefitting seem unable 
to get out of their own way to help themselves. . . . As taxpayers, and National party 
voters we totally disagree with giving Māori anymore handouts”.  
 
Even those who were broadly supportive of the report frequently expressed concern 
about the figure of NZ$600 million. Representative of the online responses included 
in the Chelsey forum were those of ‘harksgal’(n.d), who called the sum ‘rediculas’ 
(sic) and, in light of the Christchurch earthquake, ‘just greed’, ‘Lols’(n.d.), who 
expressed bewilderment “at such a huge amount of money”, and ‘KH’ (n.d.), who 
wanted to know “how they arrived at this sum”. 
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An article by Matthews (n.d.) which appeared on the Kai Tahu tribal Māori 
language website, Kotahi Mano Kāika Kotahi Mano Wawata (www.kmk.maori.nz), 
while supportive of the report’s recommendations, notes that more than a year after 
the report’s release there is no evidence of action on it. Quinton Hita, a member of 
the council of Ngā Aho Whakaari (Māori in screen production) and former member 
of Te Taura Whiri noted that the omission of broadcast agencies from the report 
would be a “cause of great discussion” (TVNZ, 2011, April 13), adding that the 
report did not provide a solution to the problem of revitalisation (TVNZ, 2011, 
April 13). In relation to the recommendation relating to the use of Māori in homes, 
Peter Keegan (2011, April 27) made the following comment: 
 
[I am] not convinced that many iwi authorities are currently in a position to 
assist. Clearly some are and active in this area (e.g. Ngati Raukawa AND 
Ngāti Kahungungu), others lack the organisation or resources, others again, 
e.g., Waikato-Tainui certainly have the resources but currently don't seem 
to see supporting Māori language in homes as being very important. Too 
often it is forgotten that the majority of Māori no longer live in their 
traditional iwi regions, and too many urbanized Māori have very little 
meaningful contact with iwi organisations. 
 
The initial intention was to release a statement on the report’s recommendations 
during Māori Language Week (4-10 July, 2011) and then to devote the following 
week to developing a new Māori Language Strategy for confirmation early in 2012. 
It is noted in the Terms of Reference that the review “is timed to coincide with the 
planning cycle for the 2011/12 financial year, with key deliverables scheduled for 
November 2010, so that decisions can be implemented through planning and budget 
processes”. The only proposal relating to Māori language sector reform that 
emerged in 2011, from Māori Party M.P. Te Ururoa Flavell, (2011, October 10) 
was that Te Taura Whiri should function as a Crown-Māori partnership and should 
be the lead language sector agency, something that relates primarily to the WAI 262 
report but something that lawyer Mai Chen (2011, October 11) warned could have 
“serious detrimental implications for TTW”, including the loss of its policy making 
role and reduction of its say on funding. 
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The 2013 budget provided some new and increased funding for Te Taura Whiri (a 
WAI 262 report recommendation), funding which was intended to lay the 
foundation for a new Māori Language Strategy due later in the year (Sharples, 2013, 
May 16). This included $8 million for a new Māori Language Research and 
Development Fund “to strengthen the evidence base for effective Māori language 
policies and programmes”, $16.7 million to attract, train and retain Māori language 
teachers, and an increase to $2.5 million annually of community funding.277 It is 
noted in a budget statement that is linked explicitly to Te Reo Mauriora that “the 
Government is considering an additional $15.2 million in funding to Te Taura 
Whiri i Te Reo to fund Māori communities’ engagement in learning Te Reo Māori 
in homes and on marae”.278  While Ko Aotearoa Tēnei and Te Reo Mauriora both 
appear to have influenced these budget items, it is likely that they were more 
directly linked to pressure on government brought to bear by Peter Sharples who 
has observed: “What I did get was a whole lot of Te Reo Māori initiatives. Because 
we're trying to re-establish a permanent Te Reo Maori strategy amongst the 
community” (Newstalk ZB Staff, 2013, May 16). Notwithstanding, some relatively 
small 2013 budget concessions, it would seem that the negative impact of Te Reo 
Mauriora far outweighs any positive impact it may have had. 
5. 5 Some concluding remarks 
The analysis of Our Land Our Languages in terms of criteria derived from CDT 
revealed that its writers had, in almost all respects, succeeded in creating a text that 
was likely to be effective in developing hegemony and, therefore, in securing 
support for its recommendations. An important aspect of this is its successful 
representation of an inclusive all-Australian in-group identity in relation to which 
nodal points could be redefined in a way that was likely to have broad appeal. The 
largely positive response it received is consistent with this.  
 
In the case of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, the analysis revealed a rather different dynamic 
at work. Here, although the authors appear to have attempted to represent an 
                                                 
277 In addition, the Government stated that it was also considering transferring the Ministry of 
Education’s $2.3 million Community Based Language Initiatives fund to Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo. 
278 It is not known why this amount was included in the budget statement when it was still under 
consideration. One possible scenario is that it is actually intended to form part of the 2014 budget 
(an election year) subject to the Government getting its books in order. 
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inclusive all-New Zealand in-group identity based on genuine partnership, that 
identity, when set against repeated indicators of past failure, is never fully 
believable and could not therefore serve as an effective key signifier in relation to 
which the report’s nodal points could be effectively redefined. Overall, Ko 
Aotearoa Tēnei appears to have been more successful in highlighting problems 
associated with the status quo hegemony and the negative implications of 
opposition articulations as implemented policy than it was in presenting a 
believable counter hegemonic agenda. The nature of the mixed response it received 
appears to bear this out. While some commentators admired its breadth of vision, 
few indicated that they believed that it would have a major impact on policy and 
practice.  
 
The early release of Chapter 5 of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei presented the writers of Te 
Reo Mauriora with an opportunity. The Māori Language Strategy 2003 had already 
been analysed and found wanting, some of the strategies used by government to 
give the appearance of progress and of providing adequate funding had been laid 
bare. Even so, this opportunity was largely missed. Te Reo Mauriora, as witnessed 
by the almost wholly negative response it received, appears to have confused and 
alienated many, including some who could be expected to have represented a 
natural constituency of support, and to have strengthened rather than undermined 
the status quo hegemony. 
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Chapter 6 
Overview and conclusions  
6.1 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to summarise and comment on the research reported in 
this thesis (6.2) and to give some consideration to its contribution (6.3), its 
limitations (6.4) and possible directions for future research (6.5). The chapter ends 
with a final comment (6.6). 
6.2 Overview and discussion of the main research findings 
The research question underpinning this research project was: 
 
With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the 
revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory 
contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the 
production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony 
and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations? (Section 
1.4) 
 
This research question was addressed initially through a critical review of selected 
literature on language policy and planning (2.2) and critical discourse theory (2.3). 
That review indicated that CDT had not hitherto played a central role in language 
policy and planning, demonstrated its potential to do so, and led to the establishment 
of effectiveness criteria in the form of a series of questions that were then applied 
to the analysis of three recent documents concerned with language revitalisation.  
6.2.1 The literature review and the development of effectiveness criteria 
As indicated in the literature review, language policy and planning (LPP) is a branch 
of applied linguistics which is fundamentally concerned with changing linguistic 
behaviour. Its key considerations are context, participants, intentions, means and 
effect. The core areas of LPP activity include status planning, corpus planning, 
acquisition planning (or language-in-education planning), prestige planning and 
usage planning. It has been argued that it should also include discourse planning. 
-248- 
The following five closely related conclusions emerged from the review of 
literature on LPP:  
(1) The conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such 
a contentious and problematic area of social policy, providing little guidance 
for engaging with political decision-making processes. 
(2) Much LPP practice has remained a largely technocratic exercise. 
(3) LPP practitioners are often ignored in decision-making processes or located 
on the side of those élites that hold power. 
(4) There is an important role for language activists in influencing LPP 
processes. 
(5) Participation in public policy making processes involves, at its core, a 
discursive struggle. 
It was argued that notwithstanding the post-modern and critical turn within the 
discipline, the conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for 
such an inherently political, contentious and problematic area of social policy, 
providing little assistance for practitioners to engage successfully with political 
decision-making processes (conclusion 1). It was also noted that this inadequacy is 
symptomatic of the largely technocratic tendencies that underpin much 
conventional LPP practice, tendencies which lead to avoidance of, rather than 
engagement with, those critical social and political factors that directly impact on 
patterns of behaviour (conclusion 2). Thus, for example, so far as language 
revitalisation is concerned, there appears to be a separation between technicist 
sociolinguistic analysis of its causes, nature and outcomes, and critical analysis of 
the asymmetrical power relations that impact on social structures and ideologies. 
As a result, LPP practitioners are generally either ignored in decision-making 
processes or located at the periphery of power-holding élites (conclusion 3). That it 
is generally politicians rather than LPP experts who plan language represents a 
significant challenge for the discipline. Nevertheless, language policy and planning 
is not just a top-down exercise. As indicated in the literature, social actors at any 
level can influence LPP processes, particularly in relation to the implementation of 
decisions that come directly within their domain of influence. There is, therefore, 
an important role for language activists in LPP processes (conclusion 4). Given, 
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however, the fact that language activists lack the authority of élites, they depend 
heavily on persuading others, particularly those who are, or have the power to 
influence decision makers. Consequently, any participation in public policy making 
processes, whether it involves top-down action by élites or grass-roots activism, 
involves, at its core, a discursive struggle (conclusion 5).  
Drawing on a range of disciplines, such as Marxism, post-structuralism and 
psychoanalysis, Laclau and Mouffe, in formulating a critical theory of discourse 
(CDT), argue that meanings and identities are radically contingent, being 
continually constructed and re-constructed through a plurality of opposing forces 
which attempt to fix, disrupt and reconfigure them in order to achieve hegemony. 
Although the political arena is conceptualised in terms of a plurality of antagonisms, 
Laclau and Mouffe promote agonistic engagement in disputes, which involves 
acknowledging both the contingency of one’s own beliefs and the legitimacy of the 
opposing ‘Other’. Those involved in counter-hegemonic discourse should therefore 
attempt to unmask, contest and transform the existing hegemony in a way that 
provides evidence of an existing coalition of support, reinforcing and extending it, 
while avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition. This, it is argued in the 
review, has important implications for those involved in language revitalisation 
initiatives and, more generally, for the discipline of language policy and planning, 
having the potential to provide it with a secure theoretical base. 
 
Since society is constructed and transformed through discourse, the most effective 
way of changing society is to change social discourse. This is especially true of 
those issues with which LPP engages because they are never wholly subject to 
rational, scientific enquiry. This brings us to a central argument of this thesis and 
the sixth conclusion emerging from the literature review: 
 
(6) LPP as an academic discipline has little to say about the hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic discourse that lies at the very core of language 
revitalisation efforts and needs to take on a critical discourse perspective if 
it is to achieve its fundamental aims. 
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In view of the need to communicate in ways that are persuasive both to hegemonic 
interests/ key decision makers and the wider public, the use of appropriate discourse 
strategies is critical to the effectiveness of LPP. Lo Bianco has argued that discourse 
planning should become a core area of LPP. It is argued here that all LPP should be 
underpinned by CDT, with discourse planning becoming the very core of LPP. One 
of the problems identified in the literature on CDT is, however, that there is 
currently little guidance for those who are concerned with its application to real 
world problems. Thus, in order to determine the extent to which counter-hegemonic 
texts conform to the principles of CDT, a number of criteria (referred to as 
‘effectiveness criteria’) were developed on the basis of a review of the key concepts 
and principles of CDT. These criteria, formulated as questions were grouped under 
topic areas as follows. 
A Representation of an ‘in-group’ 
1. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent 
with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context? 
2. Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as 
sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target 
membership of that group and to resonate positively with them? 
B Representation of an ‘other’ identity 
3. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group 
consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse 
context? 
4. Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived 
as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of 
that group? 
C Group formation and fragmentation: The logics of equivalence and 
difference 
5. Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase 
the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its 
aims? 
 
-251- 
6. Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its 
aims? 
7. Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an 
opposition coalition? 
8. Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by 
articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create 
a coalition of different interests? 
D. Engagement with key decision-makers 
9. Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a way that 
is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic 
engagement with them? 
10. Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests/ key 
decision makers? 
E. Dislocation and deconstruction 
11. Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and 
expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and 
promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events 
and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its 
rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations 
as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or 
the discrepancies between its promises and achievements? 
12. Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a 
way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate 
positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership? 
6.2.2 Application of the effectiveness criteria to three reports concerned with 
indigenous language revitalisation 
The criteria listed in the previous section provided the basis for the analysis of three 
counter-hegemonic reports concerned with indigenous language revitalisation 
(Chapters 3, 4 & 5). These were: 
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 Our Land Our Languages: Language Learning in Indigenous Communities, 
a report produced in September 2012 by the Australian House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs; 
 
 Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law 
and Policy Affecting Māori Culture and Identity prepared by the Waitangi 
Tribunal with was released which in July 2011 (with a pre-publication draft 
chapter on the Māori language being released earlier – in October 2010). 
 
 Te Reo Mauriora, a report of a review of the Māori language sector and 
Māori Language Strategy that was released in April 2011. 
6.2.2.1 Our Land Our Languages 
In relation to questions 1 - 4, Our Land Our Languages was found to perform 
exceptionally well. It articulates a positive all-Australian identity (knowledgeable, 
authoritative, contemporary and enlightened) which is presented as being 
dependent on a uniqueness derived, in part, from its ‘Indigenous Australian’ 
heritage and the languages and cultures associated with that heritage, from whose 
protection and celebration a range of benefits for all are seen as flowing. The report 
writers avoid the potential danger inherent in repositioning the ‘Aboriginal Other’ 
as an integral part of the ‘Australian Us’ (‘Indigenous Australians’), that is, the 
danger of effectively suppressing the right of the indigenous people to assert their 
indigenous Otherness, by ensuring that their voices and perspectives permeate the 
report and are presented in a positive light. The only out-group detectable, with one 
exception, is that group which is made up of non-Australians. The exception is that 
group whose members dissent from the Committee’s aims (a common adversary / 
other identity). However, the existence of such a group is generally inferential and 
often historical and depersonalised (e.g. Government policies of the past) rather 
than the subject of direct comment and criticism. In relation to questions five and 
six, the report also fares well. Wherever possible, the report writers include praise 
for positive and effective government initiatives and align their recommendations 
as closely as possible with existing structural arrangements and existing 
government policies.  
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In relation to questions 7 - 10, Our Land Our Languages was also found to perform 
well. Avoiding direct reference to Australians who do not support positive 
intervention, the report writers identify as a common adversary a particular mindset, 
one that is located largely in the past and associated with institutional decision-
making rather than with particular individuals or administrations. They provide 
evidence of an existing coalition of support in the form of extensive quotations from 
public hearings and submissions and from a range of reports and surveys by 
influential bodies, creating the impression that their own findings and 
recommendations are merely a reiteration of those of others. In addition, they 
employ a wide range of strategies which would appear to be calculated to avoid the 
creation and/ or reinforcement of an opposing coalition. These include the provision 
of incentives for supporting their recommendations, including, in addition to 
references to language rights and social justice, a range of benefits relating, for 
example, to education, health and employment. Finally, almost everything in the 
report points to considerable efforts on the part of the writers to articulate a broad 
inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of interests, including, 
for example, health professionals, social workers, educationalists, politicians and, 
indeed, all of those Australians who wish to be associated with views that are 
presented as being contemporary, enlightened and endorsed by those who are both 
knowledgeable and authoritative. 
 
Carefully, agonistically and often largely implicitly, the writers of Our Land Our 
Languages expose the inherent contingency of the status quo hegemony, referring 
to some significant dislocating events and uncovering discrepancies between what 
policy has promised and what it has delivered. In doing so, they do not imbue the 
entire report with a sense of negativity. The overarching tone is a positive one, one 
that reflects the positive re-articulation of the key signifiers ‘Australian’ and 
‘Australia’. This re-articulation is central to the report, providing the nodal points 
around which the discourse clusters and creating chains of equivalence that are 
likely to resonate positively with indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian 
readers. Thus, in terms of questions 11 and 12, this report once again performs 
well. 
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In view of the fact that the analysis of Our Land Our Languages reveals that it 
performs well in relation to each of the effectiveness criteria, it is not surprising to 
find that has been extremely well received, with very positive media coverage and 
the unanimous support of insider organisations. Perhaps most significantly, it has 
been endorsed by the main ‘right’ and ‘left’ wings of Australian politics. 
6.2.2.2 Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
The ‘in-group’ identity represented in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei is potentially an inclusive 
one. However, membership of that group depends on commitment to a new national 
identity based on genuine partnership, as does acceptance of the report’s 
recommendations. Notwithstanding this, the evidence presented in the report itself, 
including evidence relating to a consistent lack of national commitment to genuine 
partnership, strongly suggests that only a minority of New Zealanders can claim 
current membership of this group. It also indicates that any extension of group 
membership would require a major repositioning. In this respect, Ko Aotearoa 
Tēnei differs fundamentally from Our Land Our Languages, where the 
presupposition is that Australians have already, in general, committed to 
membership of an all-Australia ‘in-group’. Overall, therefore, in relation to 
questions 1 and 2, Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does not perform well. Within the context of 
Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, those who are not committed to genuine partnership represent, 
by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Included in this group are government 
representatives, whose activities and lack of activity are both criticised (sometimes 
severely) and who are represented as having, on occasion, behaved in a way that is 
not only counter-productive but also intentionally misleading. Nevertheless, 
negative judgments are generally supported by evidence and careful argument, and 
negative criticism is generally couched in moderate language. Thus, although the 
report makes for uncomfortable reading for many, and although not all of the 
conclusions reached would appear to be beyond dispute, it is neither disrespectful 
nor offensive. In fact, there is considerable evidence of an attempt to engage 
agonistically in (a) the softening of some critical comments, (b) the praising of some 
individuals and groups, and (c) the acknowledgment of the interests, perspectives 
and even fears of different groups. Even so, its representation of an ‘other’ identity 
does not seem to be wholly consistent with the overall purpose of the text, that is, 
-255- 
to persuade key decision-makers (largely government representatives) to accept and 
act upon the report’s recommendations. In relation, therefore, to questions 3 and 4, 
Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does not fare particularly well.  
Some attempt appears to have been made in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei to establish as a 
common adversary a particular mindset. However, whereas the mindset that 
represents a common adversary is generally inferential and often historical and 
depersonalised in Our Land Our Languages, this is not the case in Ko Aotearoa 
Tēnei. Instead, that mindset is associated with all of those who do not currently 
share the writers’ belief in equal partnership, particularly government 
representatives. Thus, precisely because it is a mindset that they are likely to share, 
it is not one against which many readers who are not already committed to the 
report’s aims are likely to position themselves. The report does not therefore 
perform well in relation to question 5. However, in that much of the report is 
dedicated to highlighting the negative implications of opposition articulations as 
implemented policy, it does fare considerably better in relation to providing 
evidence of an existing coalition of support (question 6). The problem here, 
however, is that the effectiveness of this strategy depends on the existence and/or 
creation of a group of key decision-makers who are likely to support the report’s 
recommendations. Although the report cites a range of sources that appear to be 
broadly supportive of its general direction, it provides little evidence of an existing 
coalition of support for its more specific recommendations (and therefore does not 
fare well in relation to this question). 
 
In attempting to prevent the creation of an opposition coalition (question 7) as well 
as articulating an inclusive agenda (question 8), the report writers make repeated 
reference to an inclusive sense of national identity and emphasise the fact that there 
are, for all New Zealanders, potential advantages in adopting their 
recommendations. However, as indicated above, the first of these strategies fails to 
gain any significant traction because the inclusive sense of national identity 
presented is readily perceived to be largely mythical. Furthermore, although the 
second strategy seems to be more effective, references to the advantages for the 
country as a whole are not only less pervasive but also more tentative and 
speculative than is the case in Our Land our Languages.  
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There are clear attempts in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei to engage with key decision makers 
in an agonistic way.  Moreover, the Tribunal’s approach to the provision of 
evidence, its appeal to enlightened government and its placing of recommendations 
in the context of economic recession are likely to be appreciated by key decision-
makers. Nevertheless, this is counter-balanced by severe criticism of a number of 
government agencies and therefore, overall, this report appears to be only 
moderately successful when judged against questions 9 and 10. However, there can 
be no doubt that Ko Aotearoa Tēnei effectively exposes the contingency of the 
status quo hegemony, drawing attention to significant dislocating events, and 
revealing the rhetorical manipulations inherent in much of the Crown’s discourse. 
It is, therefore, clearly effective when judged in relation to question 11.  
 
The readily identifiable chains of signification in the Ko Aotearoa Tēnei redefine 
nodal points (genuine partnership, wise policy; adequate resourcing; and a Māori 
speaking government) and the key signifier (partnership) in a way that is counter to 
the purposes of adversaries and forms the basis of the report’s recommendations. 
However, although this redefinition is likely to resonate positively with those who 
believe that the vision of genuine partnership promoted throughout the report is one 
that is achievable within the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that this group 
will be a large one. Indeed, the concept of genuine partnership (the pathway to the 
objet petit à of national harmony), like that of an all-Aotearoa identity, is revealed 
as little more than a utopian fantasy when considered in light of the repeated failures 
outlined in the report and its emphasis on the fact that government has the final say 
on its recommendations (indicating the strength of hegemonic New Zealand-as-a-
state-democracy discourse). What this indicates is that the report is not successful 
when judged against question 12.  
 
Analysis of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei in terms of the twelve criteria produced a mixed 
result. Its success, or partial success, in relation to questions 6, 9 and 11 is 
undermined by weaknesses in relation to questions 1-5, 7, 8 and 12. It is not, 
perhaps, surprising therefore to find that the reception of Ko Aotearoa Tēnei was 
mixed. Although there were some who applauded its emphasis on genuine 
partnership, there were others who found it to be inappropriately idealistic. The 
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initial responses of government representatives have tended to confirm the view of 
Green Party leader Metiria Turei that it is unlikely to lead to any significant change 
in government policy and practice. Nonetheless, should future demographic, 
economic and geo-political changes in New Zealand favour Māori (as Tribunal 
members are convinced it will), the report’s New Zealand-as-an-equal-partnership 
discourse is likely to become much more widely accepted. Ko Aotearoa Tēnei may, 
therefore, in time, prove to be a report that represents an important landmark in the 
ideological landscape of Aotearoa. 
6.2.2.3 Te Reo Mauriora 
In the case of Te Reo Mauriora, review panel members departed substantially from 
the Terms of Reference that were intended to guide their deliberations, delegating 
some of the tasks with which they were charged to those involved in a proposed 
future organisational structure (one that would be very different from the existing 
one), often framing their conclusions as requirements rather than recommendations, 
and adopting a largely antagonistic stance towards key individuals and 
organisations. In doing so, they position/ represent themselves as the authoritative 
‘in-group’, appearing to consign most others (including non-Māori New 
Zealanders, Crown representatives and some Māori) to outsider status. Bearing in 
mind the fact that the overall aim of the report is to secure support for 
recommendations that are capable of implementation, these strategies appear to be 
inconsistent with a positive response to questions 1 – 4. 
 
The task with which the review group was entrusted was essentially to determine 
whether government spend on the Māori language was being directed in the best 
possible way to secure positive outcomes and, if not, to make recommendations in 
relation to the redirection of some of it. This being the case, whilst acknowledging 
that there are serious problems associated with government approaches to the Māori 
language (past and present) and with the Māori Language Strategy and its 
implementation, gaining support for recommendations made by the review group 
would appear to have been relatively unproblematic. There were many potential 
allies. However, in addition to consigning to outsider status many of those who 
might, under other circumstances, have provided a natural coalition of support, the 
writers actually include, by implication, those who commissioned the report in their 
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representation of a common adversary. There is no evidence of strategies whose 
aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. Nor is there any evidence of 
a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different 
interests. Furthermore, key decision-makers are clearly not positioned in a way that 
is likely to gain their approval. Thus, the report can be seen not to perform well in 
relation to questions 5 – 9.  
 
At first sight, the report appears to perform well in relation to questions 10 and 11. 
Certainly, there is a considerable volume of criticism of existing policy and 
practice. However, this criticism is largely antagonistic in tone and is seriously 
undermined by a lack of coherent evidence-based discussion. Thus, for example, 
there is no evidence of genuine engagement with relevant literature, no record of 
the content of consultation meetings, inconsistencies between some parts of the 
report and others, and inadequate and potentially misleading financial analysis. 
Furthermore, the writers missed several opportunities to contest the nodal points of 
the status quo hegemony. Thus, for example, they overlooked the opportunity 
(provided in the wide definition of value in the Terms of Reference) to undermine 
the neo-liberal philosophy that underpins the status quo hegemony and to redefine 
cost-effectiveness in ways that exposed its contingency. By accepting, without 
analysis, the government’s estimate of annual Māori language funding ($600 
million), they missed the opportunity of presenting a more realistic estimate and 
exposing the reasons for the government’s inflated figure. Also missed were 
opportunities to draw attention to dislocating events, including, in particular, those 
relating to the inadequacies of the existing Māori Language Strategy and the lack 
of progress in relation to its implementation. The final conclusion, therefore, is that 
this report did not perform well in relation to questions 10 and 11. 
 
In Te Reo Mauriora, there are no readily identifiable chains of signification and, 
therefore, no coherent and consistent redefinition of nodal points and key signifiers. 
Thus, for example, what appear to be two of the major themes of the report – 
government culpability/ responsibility and Māori sovereignty – never fully cohere 
into key signifiers that represent an effective challenge to the status quo. Certainly, 
they are unlikely to resonate positively with the primary target audience, an 
audience which includes those key decision-makers who will determine whether 
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the report has any impact on government policy and practice. In relation to question 
12, therefore, this report was judged to be unsuccessful. 
 
Almost immediately following the release of Te Reo Mauriora, government 
reservations about its findings and recommendations began to surface, as did a 
considerable amount of negative criticism in the public domain. While many of 
those who felt most threatened by the report, including those closely associated with 
Te Taura Whiri, maintained a largely diplomatic stance in public, their intra-
institutional responses were often considerably less temperate.  
 
6.2.2.4 Revisiting the research question 
The analysis of these three reports – Our Land Our Languages, Ko Aotearoa Tēnei 
and Te Reo Mauriora – in terms of criteria derived from critical discourse theory 
revealed some major similarities and differences among them and served to 
highlight some of those features of the reports that appear to have played a major 
role in the ways in which they have been received. There would appear, therefore, 
to be much that future writers of reports of this type, and, indeed, of other types of 
documentation relating to indigenous language revitalisation and language policy 
and planning more generally, could gain from this sort of analysis. From this 
perspective, the research reported here yields a positive response to the research 
question that underpinned it (see below): 
 
With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the 
revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory 
contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the 
production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony 
and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations?  
6.3 Research contribution 
So far as I have been able to determine, this is the first study to focus on potential 
links between CDT and language revitalisation. I believe that it contributes to 
language policy and planning discourse by demonstrating: 
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a) that CDT can provide the basis for the development of criteria that can be 
used to help to determine how successful texts designed to challenge the 
existing hegemony and secure maximum support for proposals and 
recommendations, (including reports relating to indigenous language 
revitalisation) are likely to be in achieving their aims;  
b) that CDT can provide the basis for the development of guidelines/ success 
indicators that can be used to assist those involved in LPP (including 
grassroots activists) to prepare texts (written or spoken) that are intended to 
represent a challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support 
for counter-hegemonic proposals and recommendations; and, by extension 
c) that CDT has the potential to provide LPP with a secure theoretical 
foundation. 
I believe that this research project also contributes to discourse about critical 
discourse theory by demonstrating that it is possible to develop, on the basis of 
CDT, a methodology that can usefully be applied to the analysis of counter-
hegemonic texts in order to determine how successful they are in conforming to the 
central principles of CDT. It should be borne in mind, however, that there are many 
factors that contribute to whether a counter-hegemonic text achieves its objectives, 
some of which may be available for scrutiny only by a select few (e.g. Cabinet 
members). It follows that a text that fares well in terms of the effectiveness criteria 
outlined here will not necessarily be successful in achieving the objectives of its 
author/s. 
6.4 Limitations of the research 
This research project reported here has several limitations of which I am aware. 
 
The three texts analysed here were selected because they had a number of 
characteristics in common. They were recent publications of a similar type (reports) 
which had a similar purpose (to contribute towards indigenous language 
revitalisation). Had it been possible in the time available, it would have been useful 
to have included further analysed texts – either those of a similar type (e. g. older 
reports or reports from other parts of the world dealing with indigenous language 
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revitalisation) or texts of a different type but still coming within the domain of LPP. 
This would have provided more substantial support for the overall conclusions 
reached, particularly in cases where discourse relating to the documents analysed 
was extensive. 
6.5 Recommendations for future research 
There is likely to be a need of further refinement of the criteria developed within 
the context of this research project and there is certainly a need for the development 
of a context-related criterion hierarchy. Each of these tasks would require a 
considerable amount of text-based analysis, including the analysis of a range of 
text-types that come within the general domain of LPP. 
6.6 A final comment 
Although the research project reported here has implications for language policy 
and planning in a general sense, my particular hope is that it will make some 
contribution to Māori language revitalisation. Furthermore, counter-hegemonic 
strategies, such as those discussed here, could usefully be included in the education 
curriculum, providing young Māori, who are, by definition, immersed in counter-
hegemonic struggle, with a useful, and potentially life-enhancing understanding of 
some of the ways in which they could contribute to a more just and equal society. 
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Appendix 1: Language policy and planning: Overarching frameworks 
 
Framework 1: An Evolving Framework for Language Planning Goals by Levels 
and Awareness (Baldauf, 2005) 
Table A1: An evolving framework of language planning goals 
     Levels Planning Processes and Goals 
 Macro Meso Micro 
 
Approaches 
to goals 
 
Policy Planning  
(on form) 
 
Cultivation 
Planning  
(on function) 
Awareness of goals 
Overt Covert Overt Covert Overt Covert 
Productive 
Goals 
 Status 
Planning     
(about 
society) 
Goals 
Status standardization 
 Officialization 
 Nationalization 
 Proscription 
Goals 
Status planning 
Revival 
 Restoration 
 Revitalization 
 Reversal 
Maintenance 
Interlingual 
communication 
 International 
 Intranational 
Spread 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Corpus 
Planning 
(about 
language) 
Standardization 
 Graphization 
 Grammitication 
 Lexication 
Auxiliary Code 
 Graphization 
 Grammitication 
 Lexication 
Corpus 
Elaboration 
Lexical 
modernization 
Stylistic 
modernization 
Renovation 
 Purification 
 Reform 
 Stylistic 
simplification 
 Terminological 
unification 
Internationalization 
 
  
Language-
in-
Education 
Planning 
(about 
learning) 
Policy Development 
Access policy 
Personnel policy 
Curriculum policy 
Methods and materials policy 
Resourcing policy 
Community policy 
Evaluation policy 
Acquisition 
Planning 
Reacquisition 
Maintenance 
Foreign / Second 
language 
Shift 
  
  
  
  
Receptive 
Goals 
Prestige 
Planning 
(about 
image) 
Language promotion 
 Official / Government 
 Institutional 
 Pressure group 
 Individual 
Intellectualization 
 Language 
of science 
 Language 
of 
professions 
 Language 
of high 
culture 
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Framework 2: Expanded language policy (Shohamy, 2006) 
Figure A1: Expanded language policy (Shohamy, 2006, pp.52 & 58) 
 
 
 
 
 
         M e c h a n i s m s                M e c h a n i s m s 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framework 3: Language management (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003, pp.187-
189) 
Language management aims to systematically address the wide range of 
communicative problems within a community by focusing on the following 
strategies. 
 
• participant strategies (strategies to determine participants and networks in 
communication processes). 
• variety strategies (govern what variety of languages are spoken and what 
problems affect these languages and their individual rules). 
• situational strategies (examines the problems in situations (recurring sets of 
the use of language) such as, for example, domains).  
• function strategies (examines problems relating to functions (communicative, 
symbolic, social etc.) 
• setting strategies (determine when and where a language or type of language 
can be used). 
• content strategies (the selection of the content of communication). 
 
Ideologies 
Rules and 
regulations 
Language 
education 
Language 
in public 
space 
Ideology, 
myths, 
propaganda, 
coercion 
Language 
tests 
De facto 
language 
Policy 
(practices)
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• Frame/message form strategies (determines the form of communication and 
form and order of its components). 
• channel strategies  (govern the various channels – electronic media for 
instance - through which communication forms are turned into surface 
structures).  
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Appendix 2: Language vitality and revitalisation frameworks  
Language vitality and language revitalisation are intrinsically linked, with the 
former foundational for the latter. 279  Nevertheless, the underlying motivation 
behind vitality is evaluative, while revitalisation is more interventionist (Grenoble 
& Whaley, 2006, p.3; Obiero, 2010, p.202).280 
 
Framework 1: Language ecology (Haugen, 1971, 2001) 
Einar Haugen (2001, p.57) sees the ecology of language relating to the “interaction 
between any given language and its environment.” Thus, this model emphasises the 
sociological, natural and psychological impact of a society where a language is used, 
learnt, transmitted on the language, and in particular how changes in some affect 
other areas (2001, p.63). Haugen asked 10 questions (2001, p. 65): 
 
1. What is its classification in relation to other languages? 
2. Who are its users (demographics)? 
3. What are its domains of use? 
4. What concurrent languages are employed by its users (level of bilingualism)? 
5. What internal varieties does the language show? 
6. What is the nature of its written traditions? 
7. To what degree has the written form been standardised? 
8. What kind of institutional support has it won (education, government, private, language 
planning) 
9. What are the attitudes of its users towards the languages? 
10. Sum up its status in a typology of ecological classification (where does it stand where is it 
going in comparison to other languages in the world). 
 
Framework 2: Ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977) 
This social psychological framework assesses the health of a language in light of 
its importance to its community as well as wider society (Giles et al. 1977, p.309). 
It initially included three variables but was expanded to include a fourth variable 
related to socio-psychological factors.  
                                                 
279 Grenoble and Whaley (2006, p.3) state that “the degree of language vitality is the basic indicator 
used in determining the appropriate type of language revitalization program.” 
280 Other frameworks/lists of factors that were considered but not included are Chrystal (2000) 
(Stages of language death; and Factors that may progress a language); Cooper (1989) (An accounting 
scheme for the study of language planning); Grenoble and Whaley (2006) (creating a language 
program); Hinton and Hale (2001) (Steps toward language revitalisation); Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) 
(Factors of language survival); Lewis (2007) (Language revitalisation, perception, choice and 
practices) and; Yamamoto (1998) (Key factors in Language Maintenance). 
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(a) Status: historical and socio-economic standing and prestige of a language, 
(b) Demographics: the number, growth, distribution and concentration of speakers within the total 
population, 
(c) Institutional support: formal and informal domains 
(d) Subjective perception: connection to language and perception of speaking community of its 
status in society 
 
The fourth factor acknowledges that the emotive connection to the language and 
the perception of themselves in relation to other groups are significant factors of 
language health. Myer-Scotton (2006, pp.74-75) notes that subjective perceptions 
are related to the composition and language of an individual’s social networks. 
Alternatively Sallabank (2011, p.500) sees a greater focus, in this framework, on 
economic and institutional opportunities provided by a language than social value 
and community support.  
 
Framework 3: Graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS) (Fishman, 
1991) 
The GIDS evaluative framework is a theoretical and empirical approach to address 
the functional disruption of threatened languages in social space (Fishman, 
1991).281 It both diagnoses vitality (where to start) and prioritises certain actions 
(what to aim at) in order to “focus the meager resources that are available in as 
judicious a way as possible" (Fishman, 1990, p.18).282 The 8 inter-linked stages 
constitute a step-by-step descriptive framework that aims to first achieve diglossia 
(stages 1-4) and second to increase power sharing with the intention of transcending 
diglossia (stages 5-8).283 The areas of focus in GIDS are language domains (stages 
1-3); literacy (stages 4-5) and intergenerational transmission (stages 6-8). It 
depends on the level of disruption as to where a speaking community begins. The 
fulcrum of the GIDS, and the most important factor of language survival is the 
recommencement of intergenerational transmission (stage 6). 284  In this regard, 
                                                 
281 It is based on large scale examples of language expansion, including, in particular, the revival of 
Hebrew (Hinton, 2001, p.6). 
282 Fishman (1991, p.113) observed that a number of RLS movements had failed because they had 
“engaged in struggles on the wrong front (or on all . . . fronts simultaneously), without real awareness 
of what they were doing or of the problems that faced them”. 
283 Similar to the Richter scale, stage 8 indicates immanent extinction and stage 1 relative safety. 
284  The RLS consists of two phases. The first phase, ideological clarification aims to create 
consensus among advocates that (a) much of RLS can be implemented without compulsion (b) 
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Fishman (1991, p.86) claimed that ‘‘success in intergenerationally unimportant 
functions is merely camouflaged failure.” 
 
Nevertheless, the GIDS stages are all linked, with the closest to stage 6 having the 
most direct and certain linkage or influence to intergenerational transmission.  
Fishman (2001c, p.467) asserts that stage 6 must be the primary priority and the 
linkages between it and the other 7 stages must be a constant focus. Thus, for 
example, early schooling or higher status function initiatives are helpful if they 
support informal intergenerational interactions. Likewise given that language must 
be used for the purposes of active communication, Fishman (2001c, p.471) asserted 
that, “Xish [requires] a society in which it can function, before school begins, 
outside of school during the years of schooling and afterwards, when formal 
schooling is over and done with.” 
 
Table A2: Graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS) 
STAGES OF REVERSING LANGUAGE SHIFT SEVERITY OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
DISLOCATION 
(read from the bottom up) 
 
1. Education, work sphere, mass media and governmental operations at higher and nationwide levels 
2. Local/regional mass media and governmental services 
3. The local/regional (i.e. non-neighbourhood) work sphere, both among Xmen and among Ymen 
4b. Public schools for Xish children, offering some instruction via Xish. but substantially under Yish 
curricular and staffing control 
4a. Schools in lieu of compulsory education and substantially tinder Xish curricular and staffing control 
IL. RLS to transcend diglossia, subsequent to its attainment 
 
5. Schools for literacy acquisition, for the old and for the young, and not in lieu of compulsory education 
6. The intergenerational and demographically concentrated home-family-neighbourhood: the basis of 
mother tongue transmission 
7. Cultural interaction in Xish primarily involving the community-based older generation 
8. Reconstructing Xish and adult acquisition of XSL. 
I. RLS to attain diglossia (assuming prior ideological clarification) 
 
Framework 4: The Catherine Wheel (Strubell, 2001) 
                                                 
minority rights need not interfere with majority rights (c) bilingualism is a benefit for all and (d) 
RLS measures are context dependant. The second phase, the research phase is the groundwork which 
creates the RLS plan. Both the programme working plan and the research interact with the GIDS. 
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In contrast to the more static GIDS, Strubell’s (2001, pp.279-280) Catherine Wheel 
(Table 2.7) places the individual at the centre of a dynamic and perpetual process 
of change which are wrought through the interrelationships between (a) language 
competence (b) the social use of language, (c) the demand for products and services 
in and through the language, and (d) the motivation to learn and use that language.  
  
The idea is that positive outcomes in any factor will turn the wheel in turn 
influencing the next factor on the wheel and so on. Strubell (2001, p.280) notes that 
as all six steps are subject to blockage “it is the task of the language planner to 
overcome the causes of blockage with specific measures when required”, although 
paradoxically admitting that many of the blockages are not directly linguistic in 
nature and cannot be adopted by language planners on their own. A further problem 
of the Catherine Wheel, acknowledged by Strubell, is that its idealised theoretical 
presentation inadequately conceptualises the inherent interdependencies between 
the factors.  
 
Thus, Darquennes (2007, p.73) suggests its use with ecological methods, such as 
the social profile method, that take into account the cognitive, social and affective 
dimensions of the situation.285 Nevertheless, despite this issue the Catherine Wheel 
is a “comprehensive, multidisciplinarily conceived and multi-dimensionally 
oriented total concept that is intertwined with social reality as a prerequisite for 
successful language revitalisation” (Darquennes, 2007, p.73). 
 
  
                                                 
285 The version of the Catherine Wheel in Darquennes (2007, p.70) differs slightly to the one 
represented in Figure A2 (which derives from Strubell, 2001, p.280). In Darquennes’ version the 
steps relating to the consumption and supply of good are combined, and a step relating to “more 
informal use of the language” is added. 
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Figure A2: The Catherine wheel (Strubell, 2001) 
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Framework 5: The UNESCO Language Vitality and Endangerment Framework 
(UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003) 
This framework identifies nine inherently inter-related factors. The UNESCO 
group asserts that although the factors are intended to be used together some factors 
are more important and should be assigned greater weighting. 
 
Factor 1. Intergenerational Language Transmission 
Factor 2. Absolute Number of Speakers 
Factor 3. Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population 
Factor 4. Trends in Existing Language Domains 
Factor 5. Response to New Domains and Media 
Factor 6. Materials for Language Education and Literacy 
Factor 7.Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies, Including 
Official Status and Use 
Factor 8. Community Members’ Attitudes toward Their Own Language  
Factor 9. Amount and Quality of Documentation 
 
 
Each factor is graded on a 0-5 scale. For example, the scale for factor 8 is seen in 
Table A3: 
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Table A3: UNESCO Factor 8: Community members’ attitudes toward language 
Grade Factor 8: Community Members’ Attitudes toward Language  
5 All members value their language and wish to see it promoted.  
4 Most members support language maintenance.  
3 Many members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even 
support language loss.  
2 Some members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even 
support language loss.  
1 Only a few members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even 
support language loss.  
0 No one cares if the language is lost; all prefer to use a dominant language.  
 
The UNESCO framework was modified slightly in Australia’s National Indigenous 
Language Survey (NILS) (FATSIL AND AIATSIS, 2005). They added ‘language 
programs’ as a tenth indicator and included an age group column in the 
intergeneration transmission indicator (FATSIL AND AIATSIS, 2005, p.31). Thus, 
indicator one for example, looked like this: 
 
Table A4: NILS Report recommended language endangerment Indicator One—
Intergenerational Language Transmission  
Degree of 
endangerment  
Grade Speaker population Age groups 
Strong or safe  
 
5 The language is used by all age groups, 
including children. 
All 
Unsafe  
 
4 The language is used by some children in 
all domains; it is used by all children in 
limited domains. 
Used by 
between 30% 
& 70% of <20 
age group 
Definitely endangered  3 The language is used mostly by the 
parental generation and upwards. 
Used only by > 
20 years old 
Severely endangered  2 The language is used mostly by the 
grandparental generation and upwards. 
>40 years old 
Critically endangered  
 
1 The language is known to very few 
speakers, of great-grandparental 
generation. 
>60 years old 
No longer fully spoken  0 There is no speaker left. None 
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Framework 6: Expanded GIDS (Lewis & Simons, 2010) 
Paul Lewis and Gary Simons from SIL have combined the GIDS, UNESCO as well 
the Ethnologue’s 5-level scale of language vitality to produce a 13-level scale called 
EGIDS. From the scale, a language can be evaluated by answering the following 5 
questions: 
 
1. What is the current identity function of the language? 286 
2. What is the level of official use?287 
3. Are all parents transmitting the language to their children?288  
4. What is the literacy status?289 
5. What is the youngest generation of proficient speakers? 290 
 
While EGIDS focus on assessing downward trending languages, Lewis and Simons 
(2010, p.117) also provide an alternative set of labels for levels 6a – 9 for languages 
that being revitalised (See Table A5). 
 
 
  
                                                 
286 Answers include (a) historical (no speakers or community), (b) heritage (no L1 speakers only L2 
speakers); (c) home (increasing/decreasing daily oral communication) and (d) vehicular (used by 
others as L2 in addition to L1 community). 
287 Levels of officials use relate to EGIDS levels (0) international, (1) national, (2) regional and (3) 
trade (important instrumentive functions beyond local group – although language is unofficial) 
288 The answer ‘no’ means that the language is being disrupted. 
289  Levels of literacy learning include (a) institutional, (b) incipient or (c) none. 
290 The term vehicular refers to the extent to which a language is used to facilitate communication 
among those who speak different first languages (Lewis & Simons, 2010, p.115). 
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Table A5: Expanded GIDS (Revitalisation specific) 
 
Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (adapted from Fishman 1991)* 
 
 
LEVEL 
 
LABEL 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
UNESCO 
 
0 
 
International 
 
The language is used internationally for a broad range 
of functions 
 
Safe 
 
1 
 
National 
 
The language is used in education, work, mass media, 
government at the nationwide level 
 
Safe 
 
2 
 
Regional 
 
The language is used for local and regional mass 
media and governmental services 
 
Safe 
 
3 
 
Trade 
 
The language is used for local and regional work by 
both insiders and outsiders 
 
Safe 
 
4 
 
Educational 
 
Literacy in the language is being transmitted through a 
system of public education 
 
Safe 
 
5 
 
Written 
 
The language is used orally by all generations and is 
effectively used in written form in parts of the 
community 
 
Safe 
 
6a 
 
Vigorous 
 
The language is used orally by all generations and is 
being learned by children as their first language 
 
Safe 
 
6b 
 
Re-established 
 
Some members of a third generation of children are acquiring 
the language in the home with the result that an unbroken chain 
of intergenerational transmission has been re-established 
among all living generations. 
 
Vulnerable 
 
7 
 
Revitalized 
 
A second generation of children are acquiring the language from 
their parents who also acquired the language in the home. 
Language transmission takes place in home and community. 
 
Definitely 
Endangered 
 
8a 
 
Reawakened 
 
Children are acquiring the language in community and some 
home settings and are increasingly able to use the language 
orally for some day-to-day communicative needs. 
 
Severely 
Endangered 
 
8b 
 
Reintroduced 
 
Adults of the parent generation are reconstructing and 
reintroducing their language for everyday social interaction. 
 
Critically 
Endangered 
 
9 
 
Rediscovered 
 
Adults are rediscovering their language for symbolic and 
identification purposes 
 
Extinct 
 
10 
 
Extinct 
 
No one retains a sense of ethnic identity associated 
with the language, even for symbolic purposes 
 
Extinct 
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Framework 7: Capacity, Opportunity and Desire (COD) (Grin, 2003b)Francois 
Grin (2003b, p.43) argues that the fundamental outcome of language policy for 
regional and minority languages is continuing vitality, that is, that people use them. 
He believes that the achievement of this fundamental outcome depends heavily on 
social behaviour and thus identifies three factors, in particular, which impact on 
behaviour and therefore should be accounted for in policy measures. The three 
measures are: capacity to use given languages at a competent level, opportunities 
to use them, and desire to use them.   
 
Lo Bianco (2013, p.i) describes capacity development as the development of 
personal language proficiency and language use, through both formal teaching and 
informal transmission; opportunity creation as the development of real and active 
circumstances and domains in which the use of the language is genuine, natural, 
welcome and expected, a condition which implies a crucial role for the state to play 
through its language policies; and desire enhancement as the creation of motivation 
to choose to learn and use the language, because proficiency in it brings certain 
rewards.  
 
The COD model is based on the idea that all three components must be 
simultaneously present for language revitalisation activity to be successful. Many 
language revitalisation efforts have focused on teaching and learning (capacity) 
alone and while capacity is an absolute necessity to foster language use in language 
revitalisation contexts, on its own it is insufficient, to do so (Lo Bianco, 2013, p.ii). 
Rather all three components taken together constitute a necessary and sufficient set 
of conditions for language use. 
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Appendix 3: Behaviour change and policy frameworks 
 
Framework 1: The Mindspace Framework (Dolan et al., 2010). 
 
Name  Explanation 
Messenger  We are more influenced by credible, likeable, peers with a convincing message 
Incentives  Predictable human responses to incentives include: losses loom larger than gains, 
reference points matter; small probabilities are overweighted, immediate rewards. 
Norms   We are strongly influenced by what others do and expect 
Defaults  It is easier to accept rather than change the pre-set option 
Salience  Our attention is drawn to what is novel, accessible, and simple and also what is 
relevant to us  
Priming  Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
Affect  Our emotional associations to words, images and events can powerfully shape our 
actions for even big decisions 
Commitments We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and feel the need to reciprocate 
acts. 
Ego  We act in ways that supports the impression of a positive and consistent self-image 
in order to feel better about ourselves 
 
Dolan et al (2010, p.9) also outline how MINDSPACE should be used in a policy 
process (see Figure A3). The process builds on existing methods of policy making 
and includes the four actions that should underpin government attempts to change 
behaviour, that is, enable, encourage, engage and exemplify. MINDSPACE also 
requires two supporting actions: Explore, which takes place before policies are 
implemented, and Evaluate. 
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Figure A3: MINDSPACE and policy-making (Dolan et al., 2010, p.9) 
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Framework 2: The behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011). 
This derives from an evaluation of nineteen existing behaviour change frameworks 
in relation to the criteria of (a) comprehensiveness (did it cover the full range of 
intervention functions or policies?), (b) coherence (were its categories consistent?) 
and (c) links to an overarching model of behaviour (were intervention mechanisms 
linked to potential behavioural targets?). Michie et al. (2011) found that none of the 
existing frameworks were adequate. Even MINDSPACE did not meet these criteria 
with Michie et al (2011, p .2) stating that it “does not appear to encompass all the 
important intervention types”, it “lacks coherence” as it involves a mixture of 
modes of delivery, and it focuses on automatic influences more than reflective ones 
and “does not attempt to link influences on behaviour with these two.”  
 
The behaviour change wheel (Figure A4) and the definitions of interventions and 
policies (Table A6) are provided below:  
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Figure A4: Behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011, n.p.) 
 
 
 
Table A6: Behaviour change wheel: Definition of interventions and policies 
(Michie et al., 2011, p.7). 
 
 
 
